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A bstract
Only relatively recently have the academic social sciences begun to give consumption serious 
attention as a phenom enon which merits investigation in its own right. Yet ideas about 
consumption perm eate social thought, largely on a taken-for-granted level. This thesis 
explores the developm ent of Western ideas about consumption in order to identify how and 
why ethical /  sustainable consumption is not given greater consideration or credence as an 
em ancipatory possibility. It tracks an extraordinary degree of antipathy which has been 
directed toward consumption from the early m odern period to the present day, various 
challenges to these views, as well as how disciplines as distinct as economics and sociology 
have developed to discourage any more careful and considered investigation into any 
underlying values or ethical issues connected to the use of goods. More recently in sociology 
and cultural studies, issues around identity have been the prim ary point of reference when 
consum ption is discussed. Here consumption is considered in relation to identity through 
the prism of two diametrically opposed positions: it is regarded either negatively, as shaped 
by the forces of the capitalist marketplace, or, more positively, as an interesting expression of 
the agency and specificity o f various cultural groups. M any accounts have attem pted to find 
a middle ground, but, as detailed in this thesis, both positions, as well as attempts to reconcile 
them rest on shaky epistemological foundations. Unanswered questions and internal 
inconsistencies undercut the rigour of their normative foundations. Yet these accounts and 
the concom itant focus on identity are nevertheless to a large extent sustained via a larger 
substrate of debate associated with the structure /  agency aporia. So while ethical /  
sustainable consum ption is the subject of increasing public concern and political interest, 
within the social sciences in Australia in particular, it has proven difficult to change the 
agenda to incorporate a ‘simpler’ study of the origins of goods, the impact of their use, or the 
consequences of their disposal. New perspectives are beginning to emerge, but questions of 
how and why people undertake ethical and sustainable consumption or how such action 
might be further supported are still largely displaced by more traditional concerns. M any of 
these accounts still tend to reiterate an older antipathy, even though on a strategic practical 
political level it is highly debateable whether they offer any means of achieving more 
widespread positive change in relation to people’s general consumption practices.
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Even in the poorest societies, hum an needs and desires 
are culturally constituted and socially defined.
(Schudson 1998, p .251)
Believing, with Max W eber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun, 1 take culture to be those webs, and the analysis 
of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an
interpretive one in search of meaning.
(Geertz 1973, p.5)
... I would not say that some interpretations are truer than others. 
I would say that some are m ore powerful than others. The 
hierarchy is between forces and not between true and false. 
There are interpretations which account for more meaning and this is the criterion.
(Derrida interviewed by Kearns and Newton, 
reproduced in Easthope 1991, p.238)
... the debate is over. We know the science. We see the threat. And we know the 
time for action is now.
(Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Calfornia, on 
the need for emission reduction targets, cited in Davies 2007)
Contem porary debates about which hum an actions and activities contribute to climate 
change position ethical /  sustainable consumption as a topical issue, one growing in 
importance as an everyday concern. Yet the idea that consumption can be treated as a 
definitive area of inquiry is a relatively recent, and still contested development in social 
theory. ‘M ainstream social science’, Buttel, Dickens, Dunlap and Gijswijt note in 
Sociological Theory and the Environment (2002), ‘has long tended to regard consumption as 
being relatively epiphenom enal com pared to the role played by the master social 
institutions of the economy and production, states and politics, family, education, and
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culture’1. Within sociology in Australia for example, there has been a significant body of 
work on consumption as a general adjunct to other concerns, but these accounts have 
predominantly treated consumption as not requiring any particular or special analysis. 
Consumption has simply been viewed as tangential, an ancillary by-product, or 
symptomatic ailment of larger problems. In Acknowledging Consumption: a review of new 
studies (1995) Daniel Miller wrote of a previous ‘extraordinary academic neglect’ of 
studies focusing specifically on consumption, yet as the title of his collection suggests, 
even in 1995 there were signs of a ‘considerable and relatively sudden expansion of 
interest in the topic of consumption throughout the social sciences’2.
In the introduction to the Consumption and the World of Goods (1993), editors John Brewer 
and Roy Porter also recognised this previous theoretical neglect, referring to the history 
of consumerism as ‘historiographically immature’3. They argued
We need to understand how this system originated and how it 
functioned. And to do this it is imperative that we investigate in the most 
comprehensive way the links connecting this material culture (one often highly 
and increasingly inegalitarian) to the political and social systems with which it 
has become symbiotic.4
In the last few years consumption as an acknowledged area of study has gown strongly in 
its own right, especially in the UK. The amount of new literature has grown 
exponentially. But I mention these older comments about academic neglect here simply 
because they remain relevant in Australia, as I shall discuss below. Brewer and Porter’s 
comments are also revealing because while they refer specifically to the discipline of 
history, by underlining and accentuating the utterly egregious basic inequality in access 
to material culture and resources they acknowledge the motivating concerns of many 
other disciplinary perspectives which dismiss consumption out of hand5. Nevertheless, 
when delineating the study of consumption as ‘historiographically immature’, they 
signalled their departure and divergence from accounts that dismiss consumption tout 
court. Their study insists these earlier perspectives are radically incomplete: consumption 
practices merit further examination.
1 Buttel, Dickens, Dunlap and Gijswijt 2002, p.20
2 Miller 1995, p. 1
3 Brewer and Porter 1993, p.3
4 Brewer and Porter 1993, p.3
5 Miller (2001) offers a similar assessment.
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As with Brewer and Porter I do not wish to diminish, disparage or undercut the driving 
concerns of the many critics of consumption. Consumption occurs amidst and 
contributes to problems of abject poverty, malnutrition, appalling income inequality, 
human rights abuses, cruelty to animals and escalating levels of environmental 
devastation. In the face of the gross injustices involved in these issues, stepping back 
from condemning what seems to contribute to them is not easy. And yet this is my 
starting point in this thesis - to rethink consumption, questioning what might happen if 
people could consciously come to consider, choose and adopt new patterns of 
consumption that might mitigate such problems.
Ethical and sustainable consumption as a form of political activity is never going to effect 
a revolutionary transformation, overturning capitalism as the dominant 
political/economic modus operandi. Yet as a diverse range of examples attest, ethical and 
sustainable consumption obviously has some effect. Most recently PET As (People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals) campaign against the mulesing of Australian sheep 
resulted in an agreement by the wool industry to phase out the practice by 2010. In The 
Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy (2003), Noreena Hertz cites a raft 
of very effective consumer-based activist campaigns, including the successful consumer 
boycott and protest at Monsanto’s attempt to introduce genetically modified food into 
Britain during 1999-20006. And in a discussion of the history of ethical consumerism, 
Irving, Harrison and Raynor (2002) write of a number of others which have achieved 
their aims. These include -
• campaigns against various British companies undertaking live animal exports.
• the North American boycott of Heinz because their fishing practices caught dolphins 
as well as tuna.
• the proscription of Icelandic and Faroese fishing industries due to those countries’ 
stance on whaling.
• consumer boycotts against companies including General Motors, Max Factor, 
Rimmel, Revlon, Yardley, Chanel, and Estee Lauder because they tested their 
products on animals.
• various fair trade companies addressing worker’s rights have also shown strong, 
rapid growth (vis. fair trade coffee, chocolate and clothing).
6 Hertz 2003, pp. 125-8
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• there has been increased publicity about the abuse of worker’s rights by businesses 
such as Nike, with corresponding consumer reaction. (Examples such as Jonah 
Peretti's now famous email exchange with Nike7 are regarded as generating publicity 
which influences corporate conduct - see appendix A)
• Irving, Harrison and Raynor also cite the boycott against South African apartheid as 
one of the most high profile boycotts, and mention action against the Burmese 
military regime by companies including ‘Heineken, Apple, Levi-Strauss, Reebok and 
Coca-Cola’.
More recent statistics indicate that the above examples are not partial or isolated. For 
according to the 2007 Ethical Consumerism Report, in recent years there has been a marked 
intensification in ethical consumption activity in the UK:
Household expenditure on ethical goods and services has almost doubled 
in the past five years: on average, every household in the UK spent £664 in line 
with their ethical values in 2006 compared with just £366 in 2002, an increase of 
81 per cent.8
The same report notes that ethical consumption is still carried out largely by a dedicated 
minority, however it also charts how the instance of ethical consumption behaviour is 
steadily increasing:
Whilst ethical spending has become more mainstream, a core of ethical 
shoppers (6% of the UK adult population or 2.8 million) still account for the 
majority of ethical purchases. Nonetheless between 1999-2007 there has been 
an increased predisposition towards ethical behaviours such as recycling and 
supporting local shops/suppliers, across all age groups of the population. 
Furthermore consumers are increasingly prepared to check out a business’s 
ethical credentials before spending their cash.9
This pattern is also evident within the corporate field. Irving, Harrison and Raynor
(2002) noted a significant increase in the number of ethical investment funds: in the
United Kingdom investment in these was estimated at ‘£4 billion in August 2001’. The
2007 Ethical Consumerism Report cites an increase in this figure to £7.2 billion. This same
report puts all forms of ethical consumption in the UK at around £32.2 billion a year,
up from £9.6 billion in 1999, an average increase of
7 Peretti 2001, and http://shey.net/niked.html, Accessed 10 February, 2009
8 Ethical Consumerism Report 2007, p.3. This report was published by The Co-operative Bank, in 
conjunction with the Ethical Consumer Research Association (ECRA).
9 Ethical Consumerism Report 2007, p.3
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15 per cent per annum since 2002 compared to a five per cent annual 
increase over the same period for overall household expenditure.10
Overall growth here shows no signs of slowing, and in their contribution to The Ethical
Consumer (2005), Clouder and Harrison relate how boycotts and ethical consumption can
also deliver more diffuse benefits, with flow on effects such as modification of their own
behaviour on the part of other companies in the sector1 With all of the above examples
then, it is clear ethical and sustainable consumption obviously has some effect12. The
question is if this can develop to become more effective, more significantly transformative, if
considered more consciously as a possibility within the general societal imagination - and,
then acted on accordingly. What hinders this occurring? What might facilitate it?
These questions are the focus of two recent qualitative research projects; an Australian 
report for the National Youth Affairs Research Scheme by Bentley, Fien and Neil, 
Sustainable Consumption: young Australians as agents of change (2004); and a British study led by 
Clive Barnett (2003-2005), Governing the Subjects and Spaces of Ethical Consumption'3. As its 
title suggests, Bentley, Fien and Neil’s report concentrates on young Australians and is 
positive about their capacity to practice sustainable consumption; the authors note how 
their subject’s expressed a desire ‘to minimise their impact on the Earth’14. They also 
emphasise how ‘sustainable consumption policy and practice carries considerable weight 
around the world’, especially insofar as ‘Many governments and international 
organisations have recognised the crucial value of policies that promote sustainable 
consumption’15.
The British report by Barnett is not centred on any specific demographic group16, but it 
too makes similar observations, with Barnett and his research team noting how ‘ethical 
considerations in shaping consumption behaviour has become increasingly significant’, 
even a ‘growth sector in the UK’17. With this, one of the main issues Barnett explores in 
the report is the ‘pragmatics of getting people to adopt “ethical” consumption behaviour’
10 Ethical Consumerism Report 2007, p.4
11 Clouder and Harrison 2005, p.90, p.99
12 Clouder and Harrison point out that ‘many writers agree that their is compelling and widespread 
evidence of boycott actions delivering on social ./  environmental goals’ (2005, p. 102).
13 This report was commissioned by the British Arts and Humanities Research Council and the 
Economic and Social Research Council
14 Bentley, Fien and Neil 2004, p.2
15 Bentley, Fien and Neil 2004, p.2
16 Barnett 2007a
17 Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, and Malpass 2006
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and in a subsequent article he and his co-researchers, Paul Cloke, Nick Clarke and Alice 
Malpass, point out a number of challenges in relation to this, most pertinently, people’s 
sense of their capacity and ability to act in any effective way:
In government initiatives on sustainability, in campaigning around the 
environment, and across the range of “ethical” trading initiatives, it is often 
supposed that the main challenge is to provide people with more information in 
order to raise awareness of the consequences of their everyday consumption 
choices: then they will magically change their behaviour.
However people don’t necessarily lack information about fair trade, organic 
food, or environmental sustainability, or third world sweatshops. They actually 
seem very aware of these types of things, but they often don’t feel that they have the 
opportunities or resources to be able to engage in these sorts of activities, 18
This apparent sense of helplessness correlates with Bentley, Fien and Neil’s findings:
young people’s ‘concern does not necessarily translate into personal action’19. Often
they feel their personal action cannot achieve any real impact20. Simultaneously
however, many
did not appear to understand how their own behaviour contributed to 
environmental problems’21.
So where Barnett draws into question the effectivity of a solely ‘informational strategy’ in 
buoying the growth of ethical and sustainable consumption, Bentley, Fien and Neil call 
for ‘enabling factors [to] be incorporated into sustainable consumption capacity building 
programs’22. Their report outlines the policies which could facilitate such programs, 
however principally they stress the need for government to become aware of the
critical role it plays in shaping individual consumer behaviours through 
institutional, social, cultural and ethical factors, and the responsibility it has to 
empower people to affect changes in their own lifestyles.23
Despite appearances, these reports are not at odds. Barnett simply focuses on how
important it is for ‘a variety of collective actors to practically re-articulate the ordinary moral
dispositions of everyday consumption’24, with policy makers ideally rethinking modes of
address in terms of ‘frames of reference that already shape people’s consumer
18 Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, and Malpass 2006. My italics.
19 Bentley, Fien and Neil 2004, p.3
20 See in particular the chapter ‘Young people’s views’, which details the results of this research 
(Bentley, Fien and Neil 2004, pp.31-50, esp. p.40).
21 Bentley, Fien and Neil 2004, p.33. In contrast to Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, and Malpass’s arguments, 
cited above, many of the respondents to Bentley, Fien and Neil’s survey called for the need for more 
information about ethical and sustainable products and services (2004, p.41).
22 Bentley, Fien and Neil 2004, p.3
23 Bentley, Fien and Neil 2004, p.3
24 Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, and Malpass 2005, p.47. My italics.
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behaviour’, in conjunction with ‘devices to actually enable people to adjust their 
consumption behaviour’25. Governm ent can play an im portant role here in facilitating 
and enabling action. Barnett just believes the construction of such strategies must take 
into account the ‘embeddedness’ of consumption in relation to people’s daily activities26.
For people to become more willing to undertake ethical and sustainable consumption on 
a larger scale certainly calls for some major shift in the Zeitgeist. Some kind of shift is 
indicated by even just the existence of these reports. Yet where the Bentley, Fien and 
Neil report was developed within the disciplines of International Relations and 
Environmental Science, Barnett comes from Geography. Barnett’s O pen University 
School has a strong social theory orientation, but Geography has not traditionally been 
considered a social theory discipline. Yet with its acknowledgment of material culture, 
cultural geography as a discipline is making significant contributions to consumption 
research27. And this brings me to a question that intrigued me at the inception of this 
thesis, one which became increasingly persistent as my research progressed, developing 
till eventually it became the prime focus of my project. W hy has ethical and sustainable 
consumption not been given greater credence as an em ancipatory possibility within 
those Australian social sciences traditionally concerned with analysing “the social 
frameworks and cultural experiences of hum an life”28, as one recently ‘restructured’ 
university sociology school website in Sydney phrased it. Yet the School had not a single 
subject on consumption.
I shall discuss this problem of the incomplete accounting of consumption among those in 
academia claiming the ability to articulate and analyse socio-cultural processes in a little 
more detail shortly, but I now want to introduce the arguments of two other texts. I 
have outlined how Sustainable Consumption: young Australians as agents o f change (2004) and 
Governing the Subjects and Spaces of Ethical Consumption (2003-2005) both intimate how
25 Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, and Malpass, forthcoming, ‘Citizenship between individualisation and 
participation: relocating agency in the growth of ethical consumerism in the United Kingdom’, p.10
26 Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, and Malpass 2006
27 Potter 2008. Miller and Slater 2007. Jackson and Thrift 1995.
28 ‘By studying Sociology you not only learn about life. You also develop valuable abilities for coping 
with it. This rich and deep understanding of the social world enables you to manage your life more 
thoughtfully, even more successfully. You acquire a number of specific skills that will enable you to 
make the most of life and its opportunities. Mastery of these skills is the bridge from a student’s hopes 
and aspirations to their achievement and realisation in adult life—in employment, citizenship activities, 
and personal pursuits, as well, of course, in the everyday life of effective, involved and fulfilled 
citizens’. Accessed 16 February 2007: http://sociology.arts.unsw.edu.au/
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im portant the role of government is in facilitating ethical and sustainable consumption. 
'The role of government is also raised in Naomi Klein’s No Logo (1999), and Noreena 
H ertz’s The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy (2003).
In chapter four I draw out the connection between neoliberal strategies of governance, 
the subprime mortgage crisis, and corporate power. Obviously the subprime mortgage 
crisis has m eant the relationship between governments and corporations is being further 
problematised. But writing in 2003, one of Noreena H ertz’s principal concerns in The 
Silent Takeover was the disparity between government and corporate fiscal power, and she 
cited a num ber of telling statistics:
T hree hundred multinational corporations now account for 25 per cent 
of the world’s assets. The annual value of sales of each of the six largest 
transnational corporations, varying between S i l l  and S I26 billion, are now 
exceeded by the GDPs of only twenty-one nation states.
Corporate sales account for two thirds of world trade and a third of world output 
(Coca-Cola, Toyota and Ford derive nearly half of their revenues outside their 
base in the United States), while as much as 40 per cent of world trade now 
occurs within multinational corporations.29
In The Silent Takeover (2003) Hertz expresses deep reservations about this new global 
‘m arketplace’, and is deeply perturbed about how governments are forced to ‘tout for 
business’ from corporations and are largely subject to corporate strictures30. 
Nevertheless, in the context of this capitulation Hertz is still hopeful about the potential 
of consumer activism to impact on and shape corporate behaviour. She believes, 
moreover, that even though politicians might ‘tacitly’ and ‘furtively’ support consumer 
concerns, they are really otherwise ‘im potent’31:
If the state is perceived as no longer to be relied upon to ensure the 
quality and safety of the food we eat, the air we breathe, or other environment 
issues, a growing num ber of people are beginning to bypass traditional political 
channels and express concerns and demands directly to the bodies that are 
believed to be able to address their concerns, the corporations.32
In contrast to government incapacity, Hertz characterises business as increasingly 
becoming aware of, and willing to respond to how consumer perceptions affect their 
‘bottom line’:
29 Hertz 2003, p.38
30 Hertz 2003, p.66. She notes also how ‘In 1999 state and local governments in the United States 
gave businesses over SI.7 billion in tax rebates and subsidies’, even though ‘Study after study reveals 
no statistical evidence that business incentives actually create jobs’ (Hertz 2003, p.67).
31 Hertz 2003, p. 148, p. 149
32 Hertz 2003, p. 129
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reputation is param ount. Corporations are increasingly realizing that 
there are new expectations of them. As their actions become more and more 
public, they are expected to justify their policies and actions, and address 
consumers’ and shareholders’ concerns, to a hitherto unprecedented degree. 
Does the company mistreat its employees? Is the company damaging the 
environment? Is the company backing a repressive regime? Can the company 
be trusted? These are increasingly asked questions, from key stakeholders rather 
than by politicians.33
For Hertz the decline of more traditional forms of political participation34 make these 
questions consumers ask about corporations more pressing, rather than less, and with 
this she argues strongly for the emerging potential of consumer activism:
there is an increasing realization that tarnishing the corporate image of 
unethical companies, or leaving their products on the shelves, are powerful 
weapons.35
She too highlights surveys which indicate the general public (at least in North America 
and Britain), seem willing to act /  consume in light of ethical concerns:
A U.S. survey in 1995 revealed that over 75 percent of Americans would 
boycott stores selling goods produced in sweatshops. Almost 85 percent said 
they would be willing to pay up to a dollar more on a twenty-dollar garm ent if it 
carried a label guaranteeing that it had been made under hum ane conditions. A 
Gallup poll in Britain the same year found that three out of five consumers are 
prepared to boycott stores or products because they are concerned about their 
ethical standards, or have already done so.36
In contrast to Hertz, in No Logo (1999) Naomi Klein focuses less on government and 
more on the enormous growth in the am ount of advertising and the development of new 
corporate branding strategies. Klein details how products are increasingly ‘presented 
not as “commodities” but as concepts: the brand as experience, as lifestyle’37. For Klein
33 Hertz 2003, p.144
34 In 2001, ‘Less people voted for any of the British political parties than voted in the final round of 
the United Kingdom's version of Big Brother’ (Hertz 2003 p. 123). In the UK between 1984-2000 
‘people’s participation in conventional political activities (such as voting, contacting a politician, and 
attending a political meeting) has declined, whereas participation in consumption and contact politics 
(boycotting goods and contacting the media) has grown significantly’ (Pattie, Seyd, P, and Whiteley 
cited in Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, and Malpass ‘Citizenship between individualisation and participation: 
relocating agency in the growth of ethical consumerism in the United Kingdom’ forthcoming, p.4)
35 Hertz 2003, p. 131. ‘In recent years it has been possible to witness the fashion trends of consumer 
protest: from Nestle boycotts in the late 1970s, through anti-apartheid protests in the early 1980s, 
global warming and rainforest depletion later in that decade, live animal exports in the early 1990s, 
then the rights of workers in developing countries, and most recently food safety. At each stage 
protesters secured small victories and corporations changed tack, but with the exception of apartheid 
in no case was the war won so conclusively that further protest was unnecessary, as we saw with the 
repeated denunciations of sweatshop labour. Consumer activism seems most effective when 
consumers remain active’ (Hertz 2003, pp. 159-60).
36 Hertz 2003, pp. 136-7
37 Klein 1999, p.21
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the huge levels of advertising38 strongly raise the question of who has the power and 
capacity to present meaning. She also argues however that people have become more 
concerned about the impact of the corporate ‘actor’ precisely because of the huge 
upsurge in advertising, and the increasing degree to which it now imposes and intrudes 
on our lives. The unexpected by-product of corporate ‘branding’ is that in attempting to 
associate positive qualities with brands, people now regard corporations as directly, 
personally responsible for their results of all their activities, not just that concerned with 
the product itself, that which the consumer directly experiences:
Anticorporate activism is on the rise because many of us feel the 
international brand-nam e connections that criss-cross the globe more keenly 
than we ever have before - and we feel them precisely because we have never 
been as “branded” as we are today.... For the past decade, multinationals like 
Nike, Microsoft and Starbucks have sought to become the chief communicators 
of all that is good and cherished in our culture: art, sports, community, 
connection, equality. But the more successful this project is, the more vulnerable 
these companies become: if brands are indeed intimately entangled with our 
culture and our identities, when they do wrong, their crimes are not dismissed as 
merely the misdemeanors of another corporation trying to make a buck. 
Instead, many of the people who inhabit their branded worlds feel complicit in 
their wrongs, both guilty and connected.39
In this Klein owns the power of ethical consumption as a ‘political strategy’40. And her 
observations do appear acute given a new willingness on the part of corporations to 
formulate ‘codes of ethics’ and investigate sustainable business practices41. Companies 
do attem pt to respond to bad press. ‘Greenwashing’ is an extremely serious concern 
with this, but some aspects of corporate behaviour have altered, to some degree. For 
instance, one the largest global fast food chains, Burger King, announced in M arch 2007 
that ‘it would begin buying eggs and pork from suppliers that did not confine their 
animals in cages and crates’42. (Bruce Friedrich, vice president of PETA immediately 
declared this action would ‘send a shock wave through the meat and egg industries’43,
38 The International Advertising Association estimates global advertising expenditure will rise to 
US$510 billion by 2009. Accessed 13June 2007:
http://www.iaaglobal.org/viewfullSmartChart.asp?smartchartID= 169&subsiteID=2
39 Klein 1999, p.335
40 Klein 1999, p.342
41 Business ethics and corporate ‘social responsibility’ make for good publicity. It is easy to be cynical 
about these company’s motivations and the extent of their genuine commitment. Yet Hertz also views 
the internet as having the capacity to act as a ‘corporate nightmare’, and she mentions a range of 
activist sites including Corporate Watch (www.corpwatch.org), Greenpeace (www.Greenpeace.org), 
Indymedia (indymedia.net) and Essential Action (www.essential.org) (2003, pp. 165-9).
42 Andrew Martin, ‘Burger King Shifts Policy on Animals’, New York Times, 28 March 2007
43 ‘Burger King changes policy on animals - rights groups’, Reuters, 28 March 2007
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‘signalling to agribusiness’, as Wayne Pacelle from the H um ane Society also stressed, 
‘that the most inhumane factory farming practices are on the way ou t’44. Both 
organisations will obviously m onitor Burger K ing’s practices closely.)
I outline Klein and H ertz’s arguments here for two reasons. First, it is vitally im portant 
to underscore at the outset that market power is not democratic. This is the main 
problem associated with the notion of consumption as a ‘purchase vote’. As Hertz 
observes,
consumer and shareholder activism empowers those with greater 
purchasing power and those with an ability to change their patterns of 
consumption with relative ease. It is a form of protest that favors the middle 
class . . .45
‘Trusting the market to regulate’, she writes, ‘may not ultimately be in our best 
interest’46. Even though Hertz believes governm ent so often only responds to business 
initiatives in light of how business may choose to address consumer concerns, 
government regulation, she states, is still absolutely essential:
just as consumer choice is premised on high-quality information, so also 
is it dependent on a framework of rights and regulations to protect the customer 
from unscrupulous vendors ... Because consumer power is market-based, it is 
effective only where consumers can convince a company that it is in its financial 
interests to comply ... W ithout the official weapons of sanctions, regulation, and 
restrictive laws, consumers are obliged to organize protests as best they can. 
Lacking the resources offered by the backing of democratic institutions, they can 
be ill-equipped to take on vested and powerful corporate interests.
Rather than providing an alternative to governmental action, the rise in 
consumer activism ironically makes it even more essential for governments to 
take an active role by providing the necessary information or by enforcing 
standards of transparency and accountability in business.47
Like Hertz, Klein too acknowledges the huge disjunction between governm ent and
corporate power, and she also stresses ethical consumption cannot stand as a
replacement for democratic government:
W hen we start looking to corporations to draft our collective labor and 
hum an rights codes for us, we have already lost the most basic principle of
citizenship: that people should govern themselves __  Political solutions -
accountable to people and enforceable by their elected representatives - deserve
44 ‘Burger King changes policy on animals - rights groups’, Reuters, 28 March 2007
45 Hertz 2003, p. 173
46 Hertz 2003, p. 173
47 Hertz 2003, p. 174
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another shot before we throw in the towel and settle for corporate codes, 
independent monitors and the privatization of our collective rights as citizens.48
n chapter four I discuss Klein and Hertz’s arguments further in the context of my 
exploration of the neo-classical and neo-liberal revisioning of economics as a value-free, 
v^ alue neutral ‘science’, whose most extreme practitioners seek, selectively, to undo, remove 
tnd deregulate the power of government and the judiciary. The second point I wish to 
highlight here however, is how both Klein and Hertz represent consumption as 
something involving meaning. This is in radical contrast to how neoliberal economic 
Tetoric has so often in the past, perpetuated a view of consumption as value neutral and 
value-free. Arguments about global warming are now also sharply challenging such 
views (here consumption obviously has consequences), but for all too long neoliberals 
have depicted consumption as involving singular private concerns beyond the ambit of 
others, beyond the interference of government. Consumers, it is argued, must be ‘free to 
choose’. I outline the development and internal contradictions of the neo-liberal 
doctrine in subsequent chapters. Here I just want to emphasise how despite its frequent 
reference to the ‘sovereign consumer’, economic theory largely treats actual consumer 
concerns and motivations as ‘irrational’. Unless these can be interpreted in technical 
and positivist terms, the worth of studying such motivations is dismissed. In this schema, 
marketing and financial analyses become the only legitimate /  worthwhile areas of social 
inquiry.
Consumption can been seen as involving ethical considerations in many ways. We 
might begin, for example, by asking what consumption actually means in terms of the 
objects that are being consumed. Where do the objects come from? What sort of labor 
practices were involved in the production of those goods? What was the effect on the 
environment of the production of those goods? Were they tested on animals? What will 
consuming those goods involve? Will consuming them have an adverse impact on the 
environment? What will happen after they have been consumed? What will be the 
effect of their disposal? Can they be recycled, or will they cause long-lasting 
environmental damage?
Until very recently most of these have been regarded as ‘externalities’, ethical questions, 
not economic. Economics as a discipline has, overall, been notably unconcerned with
*8 Klein 1999, pp.441-42
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such issues. As I shall discuss in more detail in chapter four, for the bulk of the last 
century the discipline as a whole has defined itself merely as a technical science 
concerned with technical rationality, a science which on an impersonal, amoral level is 
simply concerned, as Lionel Robbins put it in his classic Essay on the Nature and Significance 
of Economic Science (1948), with the study o f ‘hum an behaviour as a relationship between 
ends and scarce means which have alternative uses’49. Yet hum an behaviour considered 
in terms of consumption is not something that can be considered solely in terms of 
technical rationality, or something that has ramifications at only one particular point. 
Goods have origins, using them has effects and disposing of them has consequences. 
Nevertheless, the economic focus has overwhelmingly been set on the consumption 
moment itself - that is, consumption as it occurs at the point of sale and purchase, 
together with the factors contributing to this moment, the financial costs which comprise 
the price of goods. O ther considerations receive minimal study and are not regarded as 
part o f ‘real’ economics.
Hertz and Klein have positioned consumption as something involving values. Yet 
although Hertz is an Associate Director at Cam bridge’s Centre for International 
Business and M anagem ent, she can be seen as an unconventional economist. Klein, by 
way of contrast, writes from outside the academy. Both deliver valuable analysis, but not 
entirely within the style or scope of the traditional academic social sciences. Another 
issue that neither address is how any quantum  shift in relation to ethical and sustainable 
consumption might be developed, even though both are obviously aware of the potential 
of ethical consumption and tap into the mood which sustains it, while furthering its 
impetus through the media profile they’ve developed in conjunction with their 
intellectual practice. But once again, why hasn’t ethical and sustainable consumption 
been given greater credence as an emancipatory possibility within the disciplines such as 
sociology and cultural studies?
Economics has done its utmost to position itself as a science, and this is a large part of its 
reason for attempting to excise any understanding of consumption in relation to values. 
W ithin disciplines openly acknowledging their status as social sciences, consumption has 
traditionally been perceived through a radically different perspective. Here the 
importance of the social is accentuated, in contrast and response to the liberal, neo-
49 Robbins 1948, p. 16
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classical and neo-liberal stress on ‘the individual’. And traditionally consumption has 
been conceptualised predominantly through the prism of debates about needs and the 
shaping of identity. This is in turn often, although not always, referenced to a larger 
concern of how capitalism sustains itself in the face of the inequality market forces 
deliver. As I will detail in subsequent chapters, these debates have been central, but they 
have in part contributed to shaping discussion in a manner which has excluded other 
concerns, including issues around the origins and consequences of goods.
As I mentioned earlier, an academic neglect of ethical consumption is something very 
apparent in the social sciences in Australia. Probyn’s Carnal Appetites: FoodSexIdentities 
2000) focuses on the aspects of identity, everyday affective experiences of food, and how 
meaning develops in relation to it50. Yet while her account incorporates a consideration 
af the values associated with food, and the ethical ramifications of consumption 
aractices, she stands back from the imperative of ethical ‘moralisms’, these ‘fail to allow 
for a recognition of the ambiguities of living in an interconnected world’51. Hawkins’ The 
Ethics of Waste: How we Relate to Rubbish (2006) offers one more recent account which 
considers the validity of various perspectives, while at the same time acknowledging the 
importance of issues of pollution and sustainability. Yet in terms of furthering a stronger 
advocacy of and interest in ethical and sustainable consumption practices Bentley, Fien 
and Neil’s report appears to stand alone. In relation to consumption more generally, 
there are a number of relatively recent important and valuable Australian academic texts 
to be sure: Understanding Material Culture (2007) by Woodward; Accounting for Tastes: 
Australian Everyday Culture (1999) by Bennett, Emmison and Frow; The Sociolog)) of 
Consumption: an Introduction (1997), by Corrigan; and Slaves of Chic: an A - f  of Consumer 
Pleasures (1994) by Finkelstein, are all representative. In Shelf Life: Supermarkets and the 
changing cultures of consumption (1998) Humphrey also notes that within Australian cultural 
studies consumption has been dealt with through a consideration of popular culture, in a 
manner similar to the trajectory of British cultural studies52. Yet even with this literature 
consumption as a stand-alone category per se has generally existed on the disciplinary
",0 She writes that ‘while we still do not know the full capacities of bodies, in different contexts they 
give off clues about their knowledges’ (Probyn 2000, p. 147). Eating ‘can be a mundane exposition of 
the visceral nature of our connectedness and distance from each other, from ourselves, and from our 
social environment: it throws into relief the heartfelt, the painful, playful or pleasurable articulations of 
identity’ (2000, pp. 13-4).
51 Probyn 2000, p.35 
)2 Humphrey 1998, p. 171
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margins. In treating consumption as an important phenomenon meriting investigation 
in its own right the above accounts all make a significant contribution. What I wish to 
point to here however, is also that ethical consumption seems largely ancillary to such 
discussions. It is the role of sociology and cultural studies researchers to be concerned 
with identity, the ‘social’ and the ‘cultural’. But it is also this issue that transformed the 
primary thrust of my work: from an in-depth, theoretically informed examination of 
ethical and sustainable consumption, to an investigation into why accounts of 
consumption focus predominantly on identity, while ethical consumption - surely also a 
social /  cultural concern - has been given far less attention in the literature.
The Australian ‘state-of-play’ re consumption more generally is frustrating, especially 
when compared to the research which has been published over the last few years, 
predominantly in the UK. As I mentioned earlier, new perspectives seem to be 
emerging, and I will discuss some of these in my final chapter. But it has been the 
general lack of interest in Australia which has informed, shaped and also structured this 
thesis. Part of the challenge of any analysis of consumption is that it is necessarily cross- 
disciplinary, and cross-disciplinarity is not always well regarded. Nevertheless, 
disciplines theorising aspects of consumption include, but are not confined to marketing, 
psychology, business and management studies, economics, history, human /  cultural 
geography, environmental science and ecology, anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, 
and design. Developing a more comprehensive account of consumption necessitates 
examining a range of these disciplinary perspectives, and this cross disciplinarity brings 
both costs and benefits. Clarke, Doel and Housiaux point out in their edited Consumption 
Reader (2003) how any analysis can only ‘scratch the surface’ of a range of disparate 
debates53. Yet they also note how thinking about consumption across a range of 
disciplines is extraordinarily generative, as the
widespread interest in consumption today - conspicuous only by its 
absence a mere decade or two ago - has led to a vast amount of new research 
across a wide variety of disciplines, prompting a major re-evaluation of the 
contributions of earlier social theorists ... 54
In his edited collection, Acknowledging Consumption: a review of new studies (1995) Daniel 
Miller concurred with, and even extended this assessment of the worth of reassessing 
various disciplines through the prism of consumption:
53 Clarke, Doel and Housiaux 2003, p.20
54 Clarke, Doel and Housiaux 2003, p.22
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the topic of consumption seems to present a fundamental challenge to 
the basic premises that have sustained each discipline up to the present.55
In The World of Consumption (2002) Ben Fine similarly talks of an ‘appropriate recognition
that the subject of consumption knows no analytical boundaries’56. However he adds a
strong proviso concerning a growing realisation within the ‘study of consumption’ of the
‘inadequacy’ of intra-disciplinary approaches, as well as ‘naive interdisciplinary
research’57.
Generality can be extraordinarily naive. And generality is a feature of this thesis. Yet 
what I attempt to do here is to re-value consumption by developing an overview of it as a 
phenomenon in history while measuring it against many traditional accounts. At the 
same time I examine the merits of positions associated in some way with the structure /  
agency aporia. To most consumption theorists the ideas I review here are well known, 
and just the basic building blocks necessary for any extended analysis of consumption. 
Still, each chapter in this volume could moreover, and possibly should, be developed 
into a thesis in itself, from my initial chapter on early discourses of consumption from the 
late medieval period, to my chapter on Douglas and Isherwood, de Certeau, Bourdieu 
and Fiske. Focusing on ethical and sustainable consumption vis-ä-vis various accounts of 
consumption stretches the ambit of the project even further. However it is this that 
marks the peculiar contribution of my work.
I believe the route I have taken toward my argument was necessary. The adherence to 
the many dismissive and also often hostile perceptions of consumption, especially in the 
Australian social sciences, had to be addressed. When I began this work, little of the 
most recent, particularly productive research from the UK (which I discuss in my 
conclusion) had even begun. Neither had the most recent interest from a small number 
of other Australian academics. There was practically nothing on ethical /  sustainable 
consumption outside disciplines concerned with the environment, or human /  cultural 
geography. Those accounts in the social sciences which did acknowledge consumption 
as a stand alone category were positive, for the focus on everyday is a key aspect of 
consumption studies, and the constitution and expression of identity plays a central role 
in this. Yet at the same time the emphasis on interpretations /  accounts of ‘identity’
55 Miller 1995, p.l
56 Fine 2002, p.4 
37 Fine 2002, p.x
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seemed stifling. And once again, ‘critical’ social theory meanwhile largely treated 
consumption as trivial. Then again, while I have mentioned the extraordinary growth in 
academic consumption studies and suggested that Australia has rem ained largely 
untouched by these developments, I should note that despite those academic texts 
m entioned above, here Clive H am ilton’s Growth Fetish (2004) and Affluenza (2006) remain 
the acme of popular public comm entary on consumption58. Easy to read and appealing 
argued in the style of popular ‘self-help’ literature Ham ilton’s texts exhibit certain 
recurring themes. For Ham ilton consumption is opposed to sociality, it diminishes our 
intrinsically hum an capacity for hum an engagement and interaction. There is the clear 
implication consumption leaves us ‘spiritually’ bereft, being simply the result of false, 
irrational desires, driven by emulation and competition over status that is the engine 
motivar of modern economic rationalism59.
In his introduction to Acknowledging Consumption (1995) Miller outlines, and refutes a 
num ber of standard cliches which have afflicted serious analysis of consumption for a 
considerable period of time. He discusses how consumption is frequently depicted as 
invariably involving some loss o f ‘fundam ental personhood’ and ‘authenticity’60. Among 
a num ber of other crucial points he observes how
Sociologists, in particular, almost inevitably write about consumption as 
though contem porary society were a decline from some earlier state in which our 
main relationship to objects was constructed through some form of utility or 
need (as in vulgarized versions of the term ‘use-value’).61
I argue that approaches to consumption which stress consumerism and commodification
exhibit a strong tendency to tap into some notion of ‘real needs’ as opposed to imposed
desires (with their concomitant mental ‘impoverishment’)62. H am ilton’s argum ents are
derivative of a num ber of early sociological accounts which do just this. I will unpack
and critique a few of the more sophisticated versions of these accounts in chapter seven,
but I mention Hamilton here, not just because of his popular profile, but because as a
58 Bentley, Fien and Neil for instance, refer to Hamilton’s work on ‘downshifting’ as the ‘most 
authoritative of its sort to date’ (2004, p. 19).
59 These themes are reiterated in ‘discussion papers’ such as ‘Wasteful Consumption in Australia’ 
(2005). Here consumption becomes pathological, the only solution, therapy.
60 Miller 1995, p.23, p.24
61 Miller 1995, p.26
62 This is even evident in a key paper arising from an ethical consumption workshop from 2001 
published through the ‘Alliance for a Responsible, Plural and United World’, even though the paper 
advocates the potential power of ethical consumption to achieve positive social and environmental 
change, and the strategies through which this might be implemented (Soares and Diehl 2001).
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tactical political intervention his work supplies an interesting example of what I believe 
are the counter-productive effects of his style of argument.
As a media ‘talent’ Hamilton makes a reliable and authoritative subject. Semiotically, 
his suits cut a responsible line, as do the fine dining establishments in which he is 
commonly interviewed. This is not intended as a mean spirited ad hominem critique. 
Hamilton’s image is crucial, a key element in the appeal of his arguments. There is no 
smell or taint of the left-wing lunatic fringe here. For Hamilton speaks as one who has 
mastered and seemingly transcended the establishment mantra. His study on people 
consuming too much appears to be directed at people who can afford suits and 
restaurants, but might still be interested in his book, and may be in a privileged enough 
position to act on its recommendations for ‘downsizing’. He often utilises the media to 
highlight various examples of people who have done just that. This is in keeping with 
the current popular notions of the ‘sea’ and ‘tree change’, but Hamilton’s arguments are 
appealing on many levels.
First, according to the Living Planet Report, in 2003 Australia had one of the largest 
ecological footprints in the world (that is, ‘the amount of productive land and sea 
required to provide the resources we use and to absorb our waste’), currently at 6.6 
global hectares per person63. This same report estimates the supply of land per person 
available globally is 1.2 hectares64. Consumption in Australia is bloated and gluttonous 
compared to that available to most other occupants of our planet. Clive Hamilton’s 
points about unnecessary and excessive consumption seem all too accurate here.
Yet Hamilton’s ‘downshifters’ have not reduced their circumstances to altogether harsh 
conditions. They are working less perhaps, but still enjoying a comfortable lifestyle of 
their own choosing65. Ethical consumption is ancillary here. And this is one aspect of 
the problems with Hamilton’s ideas. One could downsize from Hamilton’s fine 
restaurants to a diet of McDonalds and still not tread lightly on the earth. It would be 
far more desirable for per capita global consumption and living standards to be raised to 
some more (optimal) parity, yet it is just as important to think about the effects, origins 
and consequences goods have on a general level. And in this respect Hamilton’s
63 Living Planet Report 2006, p. 16, p.30
64 Living Planet Report 2006, p. 16
65 In their conclusion to Downsizing Democracy political scientists Crenson and Ginsberg refer to the 
creed of postmaterialism as ‘the faith of citizens who have escaped want’ (2002, p.237).
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prescriptive pop-psychology about how to sustain /  maintain /  renew ‘our’ supposed 
‘socio-spiritual’ needs is ultimately counter-productive. For Hamilton simply reduces 
consumption to a psychological pathology. Across the bulk of the population, those not 
part of H am ilton’s ‘target m arket’, those unwilling or unable to adopt his creed, to what 
extent do views like his deter a fuller consideration of the possibilities ethical 
consumption offers? For as H um phrey has pointed out,
Pathologising consumption treads a fine line between resonating with 
people and turning them away from the very politics and futures you want them 
to consider ... the pathologising strategy does not have much of a history of 
intellectual prescience or political success.66
Another issue is that while I may find the disparity in access to resources offensive (even 
obscene), and feel that much consumer culture is reduced to the lowest common 
denominator, I am also aware that in many ways the right to consume has been a hard 
fought battle67. This fundamental point has been ignored by many critical accounts. 
Certainly these struggles are rendered almost invisible by modern day critics of 
consumption such as Hamilton, who often replicate the attacks of their conservative 
predecessors, whose class prejudices and religious doctrinal motivations they would 
abhor. So as compromised as any re-telling is, part of the story of this thesis is to bring 
out the uncanny resemblance between past and present day approaches to consumption, 
and to show that although surprisingly vivid, these similarities are often overlooked by 
purely contem porary analyses. This is my prim ary reason for including my initial 
chapters which chart changes to the ‘material culture’ as well as perceptions and 
discourses about consumption from the late medieval period to the 1850s. My intent 
here is to highlight how, as Joyce Appleby writes in her contribution to Consumption and 
the World of Goods (1993), the frequent pejorative treatm ent of consumption all too often 
simply castigates and so dismisses the hum an creativity and ‘variety of hum an 
satisfactions sought through the m arket’68. I know reinscribing a history seems to offer 
just another representation, but I still believe it is essential to situate the current 
approaches toward consumption in the history of their development if we are to 
understand the preconceptions they are informed by and often implicitly invoke. For our 
commonsense understanding of consumption is influenced not only by our everyday
66 (Humphrey 2005).
67 Miller has also pointed out that ‘What most of humanity desperately needs is more consumption, 
more pharmaceuticals, more housing, more transport, more books, more computers’ (2001, p.228).
68 Appleby 1993, p. 162
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practices, but also by a diffuse, but powerful and rich range of discourses that have been 
shaped over centuries. These initial chapters are vital to my later arguments insofar as 
they provide a historical context and connection to many m odern day accounts.
Instead of maintaining a constantly, continually, predom inantly anthropocentric focus 
on the effects of consumption on our identity, I believe we need to expand that focus to 
consider the importance of the role of goods in the world in terms of their impact, effect 
and consequences. This sounds simple, but given the current situation, particularly in 
relation to addressing the effects of climate change, it seems this must necessarily involve 
some kind of major shift in the quotidian. And when I say ‘we’ I am referring not just to 
society more generally, but to the academic social sciences in particular. Because as it 
stands, much of the current imperative thrust toward ethical consumption is coming 
from without. A1 Gore’s film on climate change, An Inconvenient Truth, being one recent 
example. Barnett, Clarke, Cloke and Malpass also observe how much of the current 
impetus toward ethical and sustainable consumption has developed through the work of 
activists69, as does Klein (1999) and Hertz (2003), Roberta Sassatelli in her contribution 
to Global Cultures, Consuming Perspectives (2006), and Michelle Micheletti in Political Virtue 
and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action (2003). Yet I argue ‘we’ in the 
academy more generally can, and should, also think on a practical and theoretical level 
about goods in terms of values, as opposed to being antithetical to values. As well as how 
those values may impact on something other than our ‘identity’. For through my 
research, throughout all this process, I have found my initial hypotheses sustained, even 
strengthened: the evolution of certain perspectives regarding consumption and the 
various preconceptions they obtain, have acted to prevent and undercut the possibility of 
a more engaged intellectual consideration of ethical and sustainable consumption per se. 
W hat this means in the case of ethical and sustainable consumption is that in certain 
disciplines theory has lagged behind everyday public perceptions, and even practices. 
Most importantly, rather than supporting the possibility of building a more engaged 
connection to others and the environment, such theoretical preconceptions and 
predilections have acted against this possibility, instead diminishing, discounting, and
69 Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, and Malpass 2005, p.46. See also discussion of the role of NGOs in 
increasing the role of media coverage about ethical consumption in the UK (Clarke, Barnett, Cloke 
and Malpass 2007a, p.240). Interestingly, with a few exceptions academics have tended to ignore 
these ‘social movements’, whose strategies appear directed as much at altering the behaviour of 
corporate actors as ‘educating’ individual consumers (Clarke, Barnett, Cloke and Malpass 2007a, 
p.237). See also (Micheletti and Stolle 2007).
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effectively dismissing the emancipatory potential ethical and sustainable consumption 
represents.
This brings me to the relatively straightforward but obligatory task of defining ethical 
and sustainable consumption. Ethical consumption is consumption that takes place in 
light of ethical considerations, that is, consumption which is not based solely on price or 
aesthetic considerations, but on other values. The character of those values is ancillary 
to the action itself, whether it’s a m atter of boycotting French foie gras because its 
production involves painfully force-feeding ducks and geese, or because of French 
criticisms of the American coalition’s invasion of Iraq70. Even the most cursory survey 
reveals how instances of ethical consumption have increased from the later half of the 
twentieth century, and is now practised by a variety of individuals, companies, grassroots 
organisations and other loosely affiliated groups71, as well as governments and supra- 
government organisations. Obviously some of these advocate and implement ethical 
consumption more rigorously than others, with daily practises involving ‘targets’, 
companies or countries to be actively boycotted or supported. O thers undertake ethical 
consumption in a way that is more sporadic and diffuse72. W hatever the degree to which 
it is practiced, ethical consumption encompasses a wide range of areas; addressing 
environmental issues, peace and hum an rights issues, cruelty to animals, development 
and fair trade, genetic engineering, gender, racism and hom ophobia. These actions 
moreover occur in a global context, often being concerned with international issues that 
go beyond the traditional academic focus on the processes of nation-states73. Supported 
by expansion of the internet74, these concerns often transgress national boundaries, in a 
m anner that often involves a kind o f ‘caring at a distance’75.
70 I stress here the subjective aspects of ethical consumption. For organisations such as the Ethical 
Consumer Research Association however: ‘Ethical consumption, put simply, involves buying things 
that are made ethically by companies that act ethically. Ethical can be a subjective term both for 
companies and consumers, but in its truest sense means without harm to or exploitation of humans, 
animals and the environment’ (cited in Clarke, Barnett, Cloke and Malpass 2007a, p.238)
7'These developments are evinced by the rapid growth of organisations such as Consumers 
International in 1960, one of the first of many groups concerned with ethical consumption and 
investment. Other include Investors for Corporate Responsibility, the Shareholder Action Network, 
Greenpeace, the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation, and the Ethical Consumer Research Association.
72 Evident in practices ranging from the purchase of free range eggs to products promoted through the 
Buy Australian campaign, to deliberate purchases from the Body Shop, to Oxfam. Micheletti (2003) 
has a useful review of many of these groups.
73 Benton and Redclift 1994, p.4
74 Berry and McEachern 2005, p.70, pp.84-5
75 Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, and Malpass, forthcoming, ‘Citizenship between individualisation and 
participation: relocating agency in the growth of ethical consumerism in the United Kingdom’
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In a sense all consumption is ethical in that it says something about the value system to 
which a consumer subscribes. As Slater writes in Consumer Culture and Modernity (1997):
in consuming we do not - ever - simply reproduce our physical existence 
but also reproduce (sustain, evolve, defend, contest, imagine, reject) culturally 
specific, meaningful ways of life.76
Even the decision to eschew consumption based upon ethical principals is itself a value­
laden decision, regardless of whether this decision is conscious or not. But while defining 
ethical consumption in terms of the conscious motivations of consumers is comparatively 
unproblematic, defining consumption more generally is much harder. As Miller and the 
contributors to Acknowledging Consumption (1995) all stress, it is not just a m atter of 
exchanging goods and services for money77. Slater (1997) similarly writes of 
consumption in terms of a housewife’s labour being consumed by her family.
In ‘Flights of Fancy: academics and consumer culture’ Fee argues consumption is not 
even restricted to shopping or the m oment of purchase:
consumption describes a process whose manifest aspect is that of the 
commodity as it passes through a variety of times and spaces: clothes are 
‘consumed’ every time they are worn, cars every time that we drive them and 
computer games every time they are played.78
Fee writes of consumption as both a cultural and economic phenom enon79, however his
regular use of the term “commodity” also relays certain negative connotations, implicitly
counter-posing the commodity to some purer, ‘genuine’ perhaps less fiscally tainted form
of good (or social exchange), somehow abstracted or removed from our existence under
capitalism. O f course his division of what is culture and what is economic (weighing
consumption in terms of both) forms an attem pt at a helpful working definition, but it
also suggests, even begs the partition between ‘culture’ and ‘the economic’ in the first
place. O n this point then, it is once again pertinent to note Barnett, Clarke, Cloke and
M alpass’ view that:
a great deal of the consumption people do is not undertaken by them as 
‘consumers’ at all. M uch of it is embedded in practices where they are being 
parents, caring partners, football fans, good friends. Some consumption is used 
to sustain these sorts of relationships: giving gifts, buying school lunches, getting 
hold of this season’s new strip.
76 Slater 1997, p.4
77 Miller 1995, p.31
78 Lee 1994, p.523. In their introduction to Consuming Cultures, Global Perspectives John Brewer and 
Frank Trentmann make a similar point (2006, p.3).
79 Lee 1994, p.526
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But quite a lot of consumption is done as the background to these activities, 
embedded in all sorts of infrastructures over which over people have little or no 
direct influence as ‘consumers’. What both of these points suggests is that the 
problematisation of consumption might require addressing people as more than 
just rational utility maximizers, because quite a lot of consumption is not 
sustained by consumers at all.80
In Material Culture and Mass Consumption (1994) Daniel Miller argues the twentieth century 
Western stress on production has shaped a perception which has sidelined, overlooked 
and undercut the extent to which consumption forms an inextricable part of our 
material culture. Recent studies also appear to now acknowledge the simple point that 
consumption does comprise our material culture, if sometimes reluctantly81. Miller’s 
argument is particularly interesting however, because he theorises the human 
consumption and use of goods by adapting and deliberately transmuting Hegel’s notion 
of ‘objectification’; externalisation (self-alienation) and sublation (reabsorption) from 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Miller argues that despite Marxism using this 
configuration to describe ‘the rupture in social relations through which people are 
reduced to objects, and objects in turn interpose themselves in relationships between 
people’82, from an anthropological perspective, the external world of things vis-a-vis 
consumption should be considered as a material culture which people shape and turn to 
their own ends. Or, as he writes in Acknowledging Consumption: a review of new studies (1995):
a use of goods and services in which the object or activity becomes 
simultaneously a practice in the world and a form in which we construct our 
understandings of ourselves in the world.83
And theorising consumption as material culture means, as Slater likewise observes, that
The world of things is really culture in its objective form, it is the form 
people have given the world through their mental and material practices84.
Such perspectives position consumption and material culture as something which just
reflects the human ‘state’85. Yet Miller also seems to have overlooked Marx’s point in
the Grundrisse that nothing is easier for a Hegelian to connect production and
80 Barnett, Clarke, Cloke and Malpass 2006. See also Clarke, Barnett, Cloke, and Malpass 2007b.
81 See for instance, Abercrombie, Hill and Turner’s Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism (1986)
82 Miller 1994, p. 13
83 Miller 1995, p.30
84 Slater 1997, p. 103
85 In relation to formulations such as this, in Consumerism in 20th-century Britain Matthew Hilton 
comments that ‘when consumption is loosely and lazily interpreted as material culture, there is no end 
to its applicability’ (2003, p. 12).
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consumption in an indivisible way86, disregarding the crucial significance of distribution 
and exchange. Miller’s overall point remains acute however. Yet it also leads into the 
rather fraught structure /  agency debates, and addressing these has taken up a far 
greater portion of this thesis than I would prefer.
My interest in consumption began in my first year as an undergraduate, prom pted in 
part by Clifford Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures (1993) and Goffman’s Presentation of 
Self in Everyday Life (1959). Both texts offered a seemingly straightforward means of 
thinking about the expression of identity through consumption: Geertz with his cock 
fighting in Bali, and Goffman’s Preedy with his ‘sign-vehicle’ book on the beach. It was 
only later I realised how these lucid accounts did, and did not fit in with the structure /  
agency controversy. They certainly did not mesh neatly with the work of M arx and the 
Frankfurt School, the latter of whom positioned people’s desires as completely 
manipulated - exemplified by Adorno’s famous dictum of the consumer as a ‘hopeless 
figure of curiosity ... wholly determined by the monopoly’87.
This depiction of the consumer as m anipulated recalls aspects of Naomi Klein’s 
arguments mentioned above concerning the pernicious power of advertising. Yet in 
Advertising and Popular Culture (1996) Jib  Fowles, a Professor of Media at Houston-Clear 
Lake, positions advertising as just another entertaining form of popular culture, drawn 
from culture itself:
Potential meanings actually flow in both directions: from the advertising 
/  popular culture mix to consumers and from consumers back into the symbol 
fields.88
Klein too notes this flow, but for her it is more indicative of a struggle over meaning, 
with marketing having a greater capacity to mine and exploit popular culture for 
corporate advantage89. Fowles however, also writes of how, in the US, ‘of the 22,000 
new consumer products introduced in 1994, an estimated 90% failed in spite of 
promotional efforts’90. And in the introduction to Popular Culture: Production and 
Consumption (2000), Harrington and Bielby refer to Cultural Studies as being
86 Marx 1974, p.93
87 Adorno 1991a, p.73
88 Fowles 1996, p.49
89 Klein 1999, p. 110
90 Fowles 1996, p. 19. See also Schudson 1993, p.37
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perhaps most noted for its now widely-accepted claim that consumers of 
cultural texts are not passive dupes but rather active participants in the creation 
of m eaning.91
Here then, crudely, are the structure /  agency debates vis-a-vis consumption. Does 
advertising per se promote an egregious ‘consumer culture’ as critics such as Christopher 
Lasch suggest?92 And do people express their own desires and their own identity through 
consumption, or are those desires imposed?
In Advertising the uneasy persuasion (1993) Michael Schudson notes how criticisms of 
advertising and consumption are evident across the political spectrum 93. Certainly by 
the early stages of my doctoral research I had come to realise the extent to which ideas 
about structure and agency dom inated so many accounts of consumption, even the most 
tangential. At first I had wanted to treat ethical and sustainable consumption as an issue 
that should overtake questions about structure, agency and the expression of identity 
through consumption, but I felt impelled to alter my thesis when I realised how in social 
theory these debates cannibalised most other accounts of consumption. There was very 
little room in this space for ethical consumption as an issue. Gabriel and Lang refer to 
the ‘relative dearth’ of academic literature about consumer activism as ‘surprising’94. 
But it is not surprising at all. O n  the one hand, all too m any accounts, influential 
accounts at that, depict the consumer as manipulated, but simultaneously, as tacitly 
responsible for all the socio-economic inequality and injustice in society. Zygmiint 
Bauman for instance, deprecates consumption as just a ‘disguise of a free exercise of 
will’95. He simultaneously positions consumption and ‘consumer society’ as accountable 
for inequality and all the horrors associated with global deregulation. For instance, 
referring to two classes of people, those who travel freely, and those who can’t, Bauman 
accuses ‘tourist’ consumers of needing their vagabond poverty stricken doppelgängers to 
feel good96. Reductionist approaches along these lines are usually associated with ideas 
about consumption instantiating a decline of culture and the pollution of proper social
91 Harrington and Bielby 2000, p.4
92 Schudson 1993, p.6, 1998, p.254, p.261; Gabriel and Lang 2006, p.91, p. 109; Fowles, 1996, p.62.
93 Schudson 1993, pp.6-8
94 Lang and Gabriel 2005, pp.39-40
95 Bauman 1998, p.84
96 Bauman writes: ‘the tourist’s life is all the more bearable, even enjoyable, for being haunted with a 
uniformly nightmarish alternative of the vagabond’s existence. In an equally paradoxical sense, the 
tourists have vested interest in rendering the alternative as dreadful and execrable as possible. The 
less appetizing is the vagabond’s fate, the more savoury are the tourist’s peregrinations. The worse 
the plight of the vagabonds, the better it feels to be a tourist (Bauman 1998, p.98).
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relations. As per type Bauman cites with approbation other theorists who similarly 
regret our ‘melancholic’ consumerist ‘malaise’97, and ‘the development of an artificially 
created and subjective sense of insufficiency’98.
The volume of hostile accounts of consumption is such that in many ways it is 
astonishing any more sympathetic views developed. But in stressing the role of societal 
structures in imposing ‘artificial’ meanings upon goods, questioning the possibility of any 
‘authentic’ identity being expressed by consumption, hostile accounts all fall prey to an 
implicit, counterfactual humanist conception of authenticity /  essentialism which also, 
curiously, provide scant account of agency. Questions raised about problems associated 
with this perspective led, in turn, alternate views more open to exploring the richness of 
cultural meanings evoked by goods and the hum an creativity involved in their use. In 
chapter seven I detail how such accounts initially developed via various anthropological 
arguments about the role of goods in m aintaining social connections, and later evolved 
via a search for agency as instantiated via ‘resistance’. But Slater also writes of 
postmodern ‘apologias’99, and the muddy battlefield’ associated with the development 
such accounts, how they dominated much of the work on consumption which took place 
in the 1990s, but also how they tended to proffer a rather limited theorisation of identity, 
while at the same time exhibiting an ‘obsession’ with it:
O ne of the less helpful turns taken by consumption studies was the 
obsession with identity which seemed to reduce all this to the banal question of 
how to perform a consistent persona, and reduced the object or good to a sign or 
marker; the object has a materiality only in a semiotic sense: as a signifier.10°
In subsequent chapters I place this new attention to identity /  agency in the context of
what Benton and Redclift describe in their introduction to Social Theory and the Global
Environment (1994), as the most ‘acrimonious dispute in social and political theory’:
The first and most pervasive of these contests is that between approaches 
which put hum an conscious agency at the centre of analysis, and those which
97 Carroll cited in Bauman 1998, p.82
98 Seabrook cited in Bauman 1998, p.94. Bauman (2007) only repeats the same themes, ad museum.
99 Miller and Slater 2007, p.7
100 Miller and Slater 2007, p.18-9. In contrast to Slater, Probyn positions postmodernism as 
responsible for generating more complex understandings of identity: ‘buffeted by the winds of 
postmodernism that have permeated public debates, it seems that there is a popular acceptance of the 
fact that identities are henceforth difficult, fragmented, temporary, unhinged by massive changes to 
modes of unemployment and the economy, re-formations of the family, and the changes in gender 
and sexual order’. (2000, p. 12).
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focus attention on the societal-structural conditions for, and constraints on, 
action.101
I mentioned earlier this thesis takes a longue duree view in examining the trajectory and 
lead up to these debates. Particularly prior to the new research that has recently 
emerged from the U K  my need to unpick the gaps, inconsistencies and flaws in the 
structure /  agency debates seemed to require a full accounting. But I was also taken 
aback and became absorbed by the sheer depth of hostility toward consumption 
throughout history. In Luxury: the Concept in Western Thought, Eden to Smollett (1977), Sekora 
details attacks on consumption evident even in the bible - Eve commits the original sin in 
consuming the apple102. As I will relate in more detail shortly, Fielding expressed alarm 
about consumption leading to a social decline in the seventeen hundreds, just as Leavis 
and T.S. Eliot did two hundred years later. The early hostile accounts of consumption 
have many m odern variations. I outline many of these earlier arguments in the next two 
chapters. To a certain degree these, and later chapters, merely review literature which 
has already been the focus of much early consumption research. But these chapters also 
provide an im portant corrective to more commonplace Australian sociological accounts 
of consumption which tend to begin by reiterating the views of Simmel, Veblen, M arx 
the Frankfurt School and Bourdieu, without situating the views of those theorists in any 
longer term framework of debates. In later chapters I do focus closely on M arx, the 
Frankfurt School, and in the first of the ‘identity debates’ chapters I discuss Veblen and 
Simmel, along with theorists such as Feavis, Eliot, Packard, Barthes, Ewen, Easch, 
Williamson and Debord. This chapter also outlines various inconsistencies and tensions 
associated with the more elaborately articulated structuralist positions, and the first 
attempts to reassess them on the part of theorists affiliated by the Birmingham Centre for 
Contem porary Cultural Studies. Chapter eight considers the accounts of Douglas and 
Isherwood, Bourdieu, de Certeau, and Fiske, all of which in varying ways fed into, 
attempted to address and overcome the structure /  agency debates, but in turn 
contributed to a new ‘theoretical hegemony of identity’. In the final chapter, the 
conclusion, I discuss new research, mainly from the UK, which is now offering alternate 
perspectives. Once again, I note that with a few exceptions, in Australia the course and 
param eters of the focus on consumption in social theory still appears largely subordinate
101 Benton and Redclift 1994, p.7
102 Sekora 1977, p.24
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to older accounts. Meanwhile, the value of any study of the origins and effects of goods, 
how and why people undertake ethical /  sustainable consumption, or the significance of 
their doing so remains diminished. Ultimately it is this issue that directs my thesis.
28
2Early discourses on consum ption:
H obbes, Locke, the P ro testan t ethic, and m ercantile philosophy
M aterial goods never simply exist; they are situated 
within structures of meaning . . .
(Xenos 1989, p.5)
I mentioned in the previous chapter that my prim ary concern in this thesis is to draw 
attention to the ‘theoretical hegemony of identity’ in the social sciences, as well as the 
limitations of the structure /  agency debate in relation to consumption generally, and 
ethical /  sustainable consumption specifically. These next few chapters focus on older 
arguments and concerns that later shaped the direction of the structure /  agency debate 
in relation to consumption. Accordingly, these chapters constitute an extended 
prolegomenon to much of my later discussion: complementing my later refutation of the 
ideas of the Frankfurt School (and their many epigones), in part by emphasising just how 
appalling living conditions were for the vast majority in Europe in the past - that strata in 
Western countries now enjoying the fruits of what Adorno and Horkheim er 
disparagingly referred to as the ‘culture industries’. But I also found it surprising how 
the Frankfurt School ignored the extraordinary class based restrictions on consumption 
(policed via sumptuary law) which I outline below.
The other aim of this chapter, and the next, then, is also to point to how the 
contemporary hostility toward consumption is rooted in and devolved from an earlier 
period of even greater hostility directed against consumption practices we would now 
consider banal. In this chapter I focus initially on the late medieval period and outline 
various perspectives on consumption up to the 1650s. I begin with notions of hierarchy 
associated with the idea of the ‘great chain of being’, and how that hierarchy took a 
tangible form in the material conditions of life through sumptuary law. I then consider
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the impact of the Reformation and the ‘Protestant ethic’, the increase in trade from the 
mid 1600s, and the views of Hobbes and Locke, particularly regarding the extent to 
which their arguments may have facilitated the development of a new ‘market society’, 
as theorists such as C.B. Macpherson claim. Many of the ideas I outline here are based 
on secondary rather than primär)-' sources. This is largely due to the broad based 
character of this thesis, and regrettable for the arguments of Hobbes and Locke in this 
chapter, and Smith and Hume in the next in particular deserve closer attention. Again, 
however, these next few chapters are mainly intended to set a context, preparing the 
ground for my later discussion.
Throughout these early chapters, then, I track an emerging practical and theoretical 
acceptance of consumption developing side by side with a continuing hostility. As with 
any account of a ‘trajectory’, I have found that in this, a teleological narrative and a 
linear order of exposition has been inevitable. Such narratives tend to be reductionist; 
yet this period was so extraordinary complex, with consumption evoking an incredible 
multiplicity of responses. Any attempt to capture the nuances and ambiguity of this can 
only be approximate. (I am also aware of the fallibilities, partialities and limitations 
involved in attempting to reinscribe any particular history by way of truth-status 
synecdoche1.) My conclusions have to be treated, accordingly, as partial. Still, obviously 
I believe what I trace below has had an impact worth investigating, especially to the 
extent it may have shaped and fostered the current climate vis-a-vis consumption in the 
academy. Here then is my primary aim; I believe it essential to situate current discursive 
manoeuvres in the history of their development if we are to understand the 
preconceptions they are informed by and often implicitly invoke. Contemporary critics 
would no doubt reject many of the motivations and prejudices of their predecessors; but 
there are so many, often unwitting parallels between them. This is unfortunate, 
especially as so many critics dismiss out of hand the ‘variety of human satisfactions 
sought through the market’2, while benefiting from so much of what that same 
consumption regime has delivered.
1 My response here however has to be pragmatic. What else could it be. Unless I was going to 
supplement my thesis with an extended and important discussion representing the problems of 
representation, perhaps drawing for support on a range o f ‘representative anecdotes’ (Chandler 1998).
2 Appleby 1993, p. 162
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Material culture in the feudal period
In Civilization and Capitalism 15th- 18th Century: The Wheels of Commerce (1981) Braudel 
outlines a range of different food eaten by the elite and the masses during the late 
medieval period3. There was a marked disparity. For ruling elites, Dunn records in The 
Age of Religious Wars 1559-1689 (1970) ‘luxuriated in unprecedented conspicuous 
consumption’4. (Lisa Jardine’s Worldly Goods: a New History of the Renaissance (1996) gives 
some indication of this with her delineation of the lush opulence of the architectural 
detailing and sumptuousness of the exotic Renaissance goods depicted in Carlo Crivelli’s 
The Annunciation with St.Emidius, I4865, pictured below.) In contrast, most of the rest of 
the medieval European population lived in conditions of appalling poverty: basic 
facilities we now consider commonplace were non-existent. For the vast majority during 
this period poverty was rife and starvation regular:
Famine recurred so insistently for centuries on end that it became 
incorporated into man’s biological regime and built into his daily life. Dearth 
and penury were continual, and familiar even in Europe, despite its privileged 
position.6
Both Dunn, and Joyce Appleby in Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth Century 
England (1980), observe how in England, one of the wealthier European societies of the 
Middle Ages, famine was commonplace until around the mid-sixteen hundreds7. 
Braudel details a similarly grim situation in France, which,
by any standards a privileged country, is reckoned to have experienced 
10 general famines during the tenth century: 26 in the eleventh; 2 in the twelfth; 4 
in the fourteenth; 7 in the fifteenth; 13 in the sixteenth; 11 in the seventeenth and 
16 in the eighteenth.8
Internecine wars only aggravated this longstanding, utter deprivation. Moreover, while 
famine may have abated by the 1700s, the lowest 20% of the population still suffered 
from chronic malnutrition9.
3 Braudel 1981, pp. 187-202
4 Dunn 1970, p.89
5 Jardine 1996, pp.6-10
6 Braudel 1981, p.73
7 Dunn 1970, p.l 16. Appleby 1993, p. 162, Appleby 1980, p.27, pp.54-63, p.101, De Vries 1993, p.95.
8 Braudel 1981, p.74
9 Appleby 1993, pp.162-3
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Carlo Crivelli's The Annunciation with St.Emidius, 1486. National Gallery, London
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The general hardship did not generate sympathy of the part of those in positions of 
power. In The Age of Plunder: the England of Hemy VIII 1500-1547 (1976), Hoskins relates 
how in the 1500s facial branding and enslavement for vagrancy was common in 
England10, with the living conditions of those fortunate enough to be housed being little 
better. The average peasant family lived in cottages with just one room and no 
ventilation. All household activities were carried out in this space: hygiene and amenities 
we now take for granted were non-existent. Even ‘good-class’ English homes enjoyed 
circumstances little better according to D unn’s recounting of a visiting Dutch envoy’s 
report:
Floors were covered with rushes which were occasionally removed, “but 
so imperfectly that the bottom layer is left undisturbed, sometimes for twenty 
years, harbouring expectorations, vomitings, the leakage of dogs and men, ale- 
droppings, scraps offish, and other abominations not fit to be m entioned” 11.
Unsurprisingly, a range of diseases, including frequent outbreaks of plague, contributed
significantly to mortality during the period.
European sumptuary law and the great chain of being
Despite these appalling living standards, from the late thirteenth until the eighteenth 
century ruling elites throughout Europe felt the need to enact laws to ensure that the 
material goods permitted to each social class were rigidly prescribed and graded 
according to rank12. John  Sekora in his classic Luxury: the Concept in Western Thought, Eden 
to Smollett (1977), discusses how this doctrine of “ ‘consumption by estates” ensured 
standards of conduct and comfort were fixed according to social rank; liberty and 
magnificence were reserved for the highest rank but prohibited to all others, and so on 
down the great chain of being’13. Enshrined on a juridical level, encoded in secular 
legislation and, at least until the Reformation, administered by ecclesiastical courts, 
sumptuary law created tangible, legal markers of societal status, and was represented as 
the legal embodiment of a Divine Order.
10 Hoskins 1976, p. 106. Also Hunt 1996, p. 130.
"Hoskins 1976, p.2. Also p. 119.
12 The earliest recorded European sumptuary laws were in France in 1294, the latest in Poland in 
1776 Jones 1982, p.97).
13 Sekora 1977, p.61. He also notes how these conceptions of hierarchy were sustained across 
scientific, philosophical and religious levels by ideas derived from Greek, Roman, Christian and 
Hebraic traditions.
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Dunn writes that this belief in a God-given Order was a striking feature of the Middle 
Ages14, and refers to Shakespeare’s (1564-1616) use of Ulysses’ soliloquy in Troilus and 
Cressida to illustrate how the hierarchy was even ‘considered a measure of civilisation’ 
insofar as it
perfectly expresses the prevailing contemporary belief that social 
hierarchy preserves political order and economic well-being.15
In The Waning of the Middle Ages (1990 [1924]) Johan Huizinga similarly describes
fourteenth and fifteenth century society in France and the Netherlands, claiming such
notions of hierarchy encompassed every aspect of people’s daily lives. The established
social order, he writes,
represents a divine institution, an element of the organism of Creation 
emanating from the will of God, constituting an actual entity, and being, at 
bottom, as venerable as the angelic hierarchy16.
One question here of course is the extent to which sumptuary law was accepted by the 
general populace. For despite Huizinga's idealised view of feudal society, there are a 
number of other accounts which suggest his views may gloss over the complexity of the 
period. One issue is that Huizanga’s idealised view of a religious hierarchy does not 
cohere easily with the warfare which occurred during this period with such frequent, 
brutal, and depressing regularity, largely a result of the ‘other-worldly’ behaviour of pre- 
Reformation clergy and self-interested actions of the feudal elite. In The World of Goods 
(1996) Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood relate, for instance, how ‘perjured oaths 
were as much a career as a necessity’; the pragmatics of feudal politics involved ‘a chain 
of blackmail, the kings openly handing out feudal rights as the price of conscience’17.
14 Dunn 1970, p.188.
15 Dunn 1970, p. 105
16 Huizinga 1990 [1924], p.55
17 Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p. 17, p.18. Huizinga acknowledges various forms of feudal 
corruption, but still argues the ‘violent and dissipated’ actions of individuals did not compromise their 
‘station’: ‘To the catholic soul the unworthiness of the persons never compromises the sacred 
character of the institution’ (Huizinga (1990 [1924], p.56). In a similar vein Schilling cites 
Kantorowitz’s The King’s Two Bodies: a study in Medieial Political Theology (1958): ‘the King possessed a 
political, sovereign and permanent body which received its authority from God, as well as an earthly 
body subject to death ... This conjoined the ideas of Christ’s mortal and eternal body with a 
“sociological distinction between an individual and collective body’” (2001, p.452).
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The Great Chain of Being, from Didacus Valades, Rhetorica Christiana, 1579
During the middle ages scholastic doctrine ascribed to the notion of a cosmological hierarchy. Earth was at 
the centre of the universe, surrounded by a number of unchanging, or immutable celestial spheres. Earth 
wasn’t immutable, it was subject to decay, and only Hell was considered lower. This ordered heavenly 
hierarchy was seen as being properly mirrored by a social hierarchy on earth, what became known as the 
‘great chain of being’. God was at the top of the rung, and so on down the chain. Even different classes of 
animals had their place. Established by God; inequality was thus represented as normal and natural.
35
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There is, nonetheless, no doubt religious doctrine promoted the notion of a social 
hierarchy and attacked consumption per se. Hirschman for instance, in 'The Passions and 
the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (1977), notes how at ‘the 
beginning of the Christian era St. Augustine had supplied basic guidelines to medieval 
thinking by denouncing lust for money and possessions as one of the three principal sins 
of fallen man’18. Augustine feared, Eric Roll also observes in A History of Economic Thought 
(1992), that trade would turn ‘men from the search for God’19. A similar cautionary tale 
is evident in Hieronymus Bosch’s Haywain triptych: in The Needs of Strangers (1994) 
Michael IgnatiefT elegantly and entrancingly positions Haywain as a terrifying ‘pictorial 
homily’, depicting kings and even the Pope recklessly and rapaciously pursuing and 
succumbing to the false satisfaction of various worldly temptations20. Then again, 
Abercrombie and Turner’s ‘Dominant ideology thesis’ interrogates the extent to which 
such intellectual formulations of the ‘great chain of being’ even filtered down to 
subordinate classes:
Although such a doctrine appeared to give religious and even natural 
sanction to the feudal social order, it was simply not generally available to the 
peasantry since it was so often couched in an intellectualized form.21
Abercrombie and Turner’s argument is convincing to a certain degree, for sermons were 
in Latin. But in relation to consumption specifically (as opposed to ‘ideology’ more 
generally), sumptuary law was a disciplinary strategy that was regulated and policed 
(even if sporadically, as Hunt suggests in Governance of the Consuming Passion: a History of 
Sumptuary Law (1996)). Moreover, the all too graphic images based on Aurelius 
Prudentius Clemens’ poem Psychomachia: The Battle for the Soul of Man (c.405AD), carved, 
and literally plastered on churches all over superstitious and largely pre-literate Europe, 
were all too visible didactic illustration that Luxury (always personified as a woman) was 
ungodly22. Huizinga’s writes of religious attitudes ‘saturating’ late medieval life and 
thought, and of there being ‘a marked tendency of thought to embody itself in images’23. 
One famous and horribly graphic carving at Moissac (Tarn-et-Garonne) in France
18 Hirschman 1977, p.9
19 Roll 1992, p.33
20 Ignatieff 1994, pp.65-79
21 Abercrombie and Turner 1978, p.155
22 Sekora discusses how Psychomachia was read widely during the Middle Ages, notes its importance in 
contributing to perceptions of ‘luxury’ (Sekora 1977, p.44), and cites various public examples of 
Psychomachia imagery.
23 Huizinga 1990 [1924], p. 147
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shows Luxury in anguish, snakes biting or suckling her breasts, toads poised repugnantly 
at her mouth and vulva. That, and other similar images can be seen on-line24, and are 
discussed in Weir and Jerman’s Images of Lust: Sexual Carvings on Medieval Churches (1999). 
The poem itself spells out appropriate behaviour and the dangers of luxury and 
overindulgence through the example of the battle between the personified Christian 
Virtues and Vices, with Luxury /  Indulgence, first beguiling and seducing the Virtues: 
‘Eal cet gaderunge mid gepende (“The whole throng, with changed banners went over to 
Luxury”25). Sobriety subsequently confronts Luxury, they battle, and Luxury is defeated 
in the most casually gruesome manner:
she [Sobriety] raises the cross of Christ high before the horses who draw 
the chariot of Indulgence. She pushes the holy wood against the bridles. The 
beasts are frightened and run away down a steep path; the chariot and its driver 
are dragged helplessly along. Dust blows in her face, she is thrown out and her 
body catches in the wheels so that she is the brake that stops the runaway. Then 
Sobriety strikes the death blow by hurling a great stone that she finds nearby. 
Chance found the stone and then Chance directs its short flight so that the nose 
and teeth of Luxury are smashed and her red lips are driven into the arch of her 
ruined mouth. The teeth are loose in their sockets, her throat is torn, and the 
chopped tongue spits out bits of its bloody flesh. This meal of her own body 
sickens her: she swallows the crushed bones and vomits the lamps she has eaten.
Sobriety speaks: “Drink up. You drained many cups before, surely you 
can stomach your own body. You have reveled in your excesses of sweetness; 
you should enjoy morsels like these. The taste of death must be bitter in your 
mouth; this last draught of wine must turn your previous pleasures to gall”. 
Then she dies.
In Governance of the Consuming Passion (1996), Alan Hunt details how sumptuary law
escalated between the waning of feudalism and the onset of early mercantile capitalism
(1300 - 1600)26. Yet he also positions the very existence of sumptuary law as a response
to challenges to the socio-political order, noting sumptuary law
is rarely, if ever, associated with stable relations of hieratic domination, 
but is a product of circumstances in which a hieratic order has come under 
internal pressure.27
24 Anne Marshall lists various allegorical friezes depicting the seven deadly sins and battles between 
the virtues and vices in England http://www.paintedchurch.org, Accessed 10/2/2009. One frieze 
from Shropshire is considered a reference to the battle between Luxury and Temperance in the 
Psychomachia: http://www.paintedchurch.org/jousclav.htm. Another site, http://www.beyond-the- 
pale.org.uk/zxLuxuria.htm, features carvings which are far more grotesque, Accessed 10/2/2009.
25 Tuve 1966, and Budny 1997, p.365
26 Hunt 1996, p. 146-7 & p. 173
27 Hunt 1996, p. 105
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This brings to bear questions about the extent to which sumptuary law was regarded as a 
legitimate imposition of the socio-political hierarchy. On one hand Hunt writes that 
there seemed a ‘broad consensus that favoured the existence of such laws’, insofar as 
‘most sections of the population shared general agreement that sumptuary laws were 
both desirable and necessary’28. On the other, he observes how ‘their existence rarely 
induced systematic enforcement practices from the rulers or compliance from the 
populace’29. He concludes if sumptuary law were rigorously imposed the ‘consensus’ 
supporting its existence would have been threatened.
Given the horrendous poverty, hardship and political tumult experienced by so much of 
European society during this period, we might begin to suspect that challenges to the 
hierarchy through consumption were uncharacteristic. The horrendous disparity in 
living conditions contributed to the Peasants’ War of 1525, for instance, during which 
time a priest, Thomas Müntzer, referred to elites as ‘ravening wolves’ ‘pitifully 
devastating’ Christendom30, while comparing other priests and clergy to vipers, temporal 
lords and rulers to eels. ‘You can see’, he says, ‘that handsome sight of eels and vipers all 
fornicating in a heap’31. But of course drawing generalisations about Europe during this 
period is fraught. One of the more curious indications of the success of religious attacks 
on consumption during this period was also the practice of publicly burning goods 
considered evidence of unnecessary ‘vanity’. Huizinga describes these bonfires of the 
‘vanities’ as a longstanding feature of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance, and 
writes of them being encouraged by ‘diatribes of preachers against dissoluteness and 
luxury’32. Of these bonfires, he writes of Savonarola’s (1452-98) being perhaps the most 
famous, boasting the destruction of at least one Botticelli. However Huizinga notes that 
the custom was ‘prevalent both in France and Italy’ well before Savonarola’s time. He 
also represents these public displays not as bizarre or unusual, but as just another 
example of the religious Zeitgeist33. Of course the degree of this religiosity would have
28 Hunt 1996, p.355
29 Hunt 1996, p.355. Hunt does not mention many instances of enforcement for blatant transgressions 
but it is very tempting to surmise that those wealthy enough to afford goods proscribed to their 
‘station’ were more likely exempt. Hoskins for instance notes that along with the great landowners, 
the wealthiest group in England during the 1500s were ‘merchants engaged in foreign trade’ (Hoskins 
1976, pp. 177-8). He notes also that this group enjoyed considerable political influence.
30 Müntzer 1966, [1524], p. 161
31 Müntzer 1966, [1524], p. 163
32 Huizinga 1990 [1924], p. 13. Savonarola took control of Florence from 1494.
33 MacIntyre 1980. Huizinga (1990) [1924], Dunn 1970.
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varied in strength and intensity between classes, regions, countries, and was likely 
mitigated by and pragmatically utilised according the m anoeuvring of various political, 
mercantile and even religious elites34. Still, these bonfires appear to strongly support the 
argum ent that religious discourse played a significant role in the struggle over the 
meanings attached to goods, and informed general perceptions, and the range of daily 
practices and activities across the spectrum of classes.
Then again, in 1497 Savonarola was charged with heresy, excommunicated, and burnt 
at the stake. An outcome more in line with H un t’s argum ent about the extent to which 
the populace tolerated the enforcement of sumptuary law. And there was also Luther’s 
shock during his visit to Rome in 1510-11 at the lax religious practices and irreligious 
views of its citizens. Yet Luther’s subsequent prescriptions were so stringent M ax W eber 
later argued they resulted in such a popular religious asceticism it fostered an ethic of 
accumulation which enabled capitalism to take shape. W hether or not this was actually 
the case, whether Protestant asceticism resulted in a materialist ethic that was a causal 
factor in the creation of capitalism, or just perhaps contributed to a more subtle and long 
term process of change, the impact of the Reformation in relation to more general 
perceptions of consumption is im portant to consider, for from the 1650s there appear 
the first initial attempts to reconcile the beginning of an increase in material wealth, for 
those outside elite classes, with religious doctrine.
‘Idle hands make the Devil’s work’
In A Short History of Ethics (1980) Alistair M acIntyre describes the unfolding of the 
Reform ation, noting how both Catholicism and early Lutheranism perceived everyone 
as guilty, and all desires sinful. W ith Catholicism however, the soul could be redeemed 
through the purchase of indulgences. For the early Lutheran, Calvinist and Methodist 
sects35 in contrast, redemption could not be purchased. For Luther M acIntyre writes, 
G od is ‘om nipotent’; the only power able to determine the fate of penitents. However in 
this the role of faith was param ount. For Calvinism the same precepts apply, but the 
soul was also predestined, attaining heaven depended solely on G od’s grace: ‘no amount
34 From the pragmatism of, for instance, the elites of the fifteenth century Florentine Renaissance 
mercantile principalities, to the irreligious military intercessions of the Papacy which were intended to 
further their political /  business interests, particularly prior to the Reformation.
33 These were only the first of many protestant sects, which later included Baptists, the many varieties 
of Anabaptists, English Protestants, Anglicans, and so on.
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of good works or sacraments’, David Ingram writes in Critical Theory and Philosophy (1990), 
‘would guarantee one’s “election”’36.
Luther’s doctrine disseminated fairly rapidly and became popular for a range of reasons, 
not just because of dissatisfaction with Catholicism. The internal politics of the Holy 
Roman Empire37 and hostilities with France are noteworthy because at first they 
provided a distraction (and later support), allowing Luther time to raise heated debate 
about the probity of Catholic practices. For by the time Luther was condemned by the 
Papacy and proscribed on a secular level in 1521, his use to German territorial elites 
seeking release from Papal interference and taxation had become clear. The ‘Protesting 
Estates’ who supported Luther in 15 2 938, just realised an opportunity to consolidate and 
improve their own political and economic standing. For as J.W. Allen details in A History 
of Political'Thought in the Sixteenth Century (1960 [1928]),
Despite the amount of strictly religious controversy in Germany, 
nowhere else did the struggle so completely turn on property and jurisdiction.39
MacIntyre argues Luther garnered the support of these elites by legitimating their
political resistance on a theological level, while simultaneously insisting the peasantry
adhere stringently to the existing political and socio-economic order40. This ‘bifurcated
morality’ MacIntyre writes, was just validated via a concern over the ‘psychological
transformation of the faithful individual’41. Subsequently Calvin too ‘sanctions the
autonomy of secular activity at every level where morals and religious practice do not
directly conflict with such activity’42.
Although elites appear to have found the political /  economic advantages of Luther’s 
ideas appealing, in his contribution to The Reformation (1972), Gerhard Ritter argues that
36 Ingram 1990, p.55. Ingram represents Luther, Calvin and Methodists as all advocating 
predestination. For Elton (1963, p. 170) and MacIntyre (1980) it is only Calvin.
37 The death of Emperor Maximilian in 1519, for instance.
38The Edict of Worms proscribing Luther was not enforced, and in 1529 the Emperor was forced to 
issue another decreeing its enforcement.
39 Allen 1960, p.xvi
40 Luther, writes MacIntyre, was unequaled in advocating obedience and ‘upholding the absolute 
rights of secular authority’ (Maclntrye 1980, p. 123).
41 Maclntrye 1980, p. 122-24. With Luther ‘the commandments of God became a series of arbitrary 
fiats for which to demand any natural justification is at once impious and meaningless’ (MacIntyre 
1980, p. 122). The individual must obey God’s injunctions which, as the ‘only true moral rules’, 
require no ‘further rationale or justification’. As all actions were condemned and simultaneously 
forgiven, it became ‘impossible to raise the question of merit of one action against another’ 
(MacIntyre 1980, p .123).
42 Here then ‘political and economic activity can proceed effectively unchecked by any sanctions 
whatsoever’ (Maclntrye 1980, p. 123).
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in Germany at the time, belief among artisans, burghers and peasants was 
overwhelmingly important43. Luther’s arguments about the vital importance of faith 
found a place here. Faith was the key element; work was represented as a way of not 
doubting God’s existence, the idea being that gainfully employed, one would not have 
time to think44. Work thus became an essential means of demonstrating obedience to 
God. At the same time prosperity and accumulation began to be regarded as a sure sign 
of God’s forgiveness and grace:
since unwavering faith was considered necessary for salvation, it was only 
natural for members of these sects to look for some confirmation of their election 
in this world. Interpreting literally the Old Testament stories, in which God 
rewards the faithful with material goods, they came to regard the pursuit of 
wealth in a totally different light than their Catholic brethren. Of course, this 
was an ascetic pursuit. These Protestant capitalists rationalized their unbrotherly, 
selfish competition by segregating themselves from the less fortunate (who were 
stigmatized as lazy and God-forsaken), and devoting their enterprises to the 
greater glory of God.45
In this, according to Weber a certain character of acquisitiveness became a virtue46:
they approved the rational and utilitarian uses of wealth which were 
willed by God for the needs of the individual and the community. They did not 
wish to impose mortification on the man of wealth, but use his means for 
necessary and practical things. The idea of comfort characteristically limits the 
extent of ethically permissible expenditures ... they set the clean and solid 
comfort of the middle-class home as an ideal.47
A number of strong criticisms have been drawn against Weber’s thesis. Hunt cites 
Werner Sombart’s refutation of Weber; Italian economic expansion prior to the 
Industrial revolution, he says, was fuelled ‘by a class of merchants ... enthusiastically 
engaged in consumption battles with the old nobility’. These merchants were not ‘frugal 
capitalist accumulators’48. Hunt also records that during Calvin’s rule in Geneva ‘there 
were around 800 arrests, that resulted in 76 banishments and 58 death sentences for 
sumptuary law and moral offences’49. The very existence of such transgressions suggests 
the partial scope of ‘Protestant aestheticism’, and McCraken relates how Chandra
43 Ritter 1972, p.140
44 I am indebted to Damian Grace for this insight.
45 Ingram 1990, pp.55-6
46 In The Worldly Philosophers (1972) Heilbroner argues that in a radical departure from earlier 
Christian and Hebraic religious traditions, the Protestant Ethic meant certain forms of consumption 
became permissible across a range of classes, so that ‘Acquisitiveness became a recognized virtue - not 
immediately for one’s private enjoyment, but for the greater glory of God’ (Heilbroner 1972, p.33).
47 Weber 1978,,p. 171
48 Hunt 1996, p.90. See also Sassatelli 2007, pp.9-10.
49 Hunt 1996, p. 169
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Mukeiji also notes patterns of ‘non-utilitarian consumption even among Protestants 
whom Weber supposed had forsworn it’50. Agnew however, in his contribution to 
Consumption and the World of Goods (1993) writes that Mukerji
did not so much discard Weber’s psychohistorical sequence of savings 
and spending, asceticism and hedonism, as telescope it in time. As a result she 
transformed a story of anguished cultural and temperamental change from one 
ethic to the another into a portrait of complementary and mutually energizing 
traits. Early modern capitalists saved and spent, and, in doing so, ushered in 
modernity.51
Another issue is raised by Hirschman in The Passions and the Interests (1977) when he 
argues that in Europe he Protestant ethic did not initiate any sudden dramatic social 
change:
the new rose out of the old to a greater extent than has generally been 
appreciated. To portray a lengthy ideological change or transition as an 
endogenous process is of course more complex than to depict it as the rise of an 
independently conceived, insurgent ideology concurrent with the decline of a 
hitherto dominant ethic.52
In Dutch Civilization in the 17th Century and other essays (1968) Huizinga similarly argues that
Prosperity flowed quite naturally from the medieval system and there 
was never a point where the old was deliberately shaken off and the new warmly 
embraced.53
It is obvious Weber’s ideas have generated heated responses in a manner which has 
directed debate along a particular channel. Let me clarify here however - I am not 
outlining Weber’s thesis in order to enter into a discussion about the precise 
periodisation of capitalism. I too doubt his ideas can be applied in an encompassing 
manner, across the board. His thesis is nevertheless fascinating insofar as to date, a 
supposed ‘Protestant’ guilt about consumption remains a commonplace trope (regardless 
of whether or not that ‘guilt’ is actually inconsequential in practice04). But the other 
factor I want to highlight here is that while notions of personal gain had been positioned
50 ‘Mukerji uses this discovery to argue that consumerism predates the rise of capitalism and that, 
furthermore, consumerism helped to create the capitalism it is conventionally supposed to have 
followed’ (McCracken 1990, p.9).
ol Agnew 1993, p.23. See also Sassatelli (2007, p.34), who writes that even ‘amongst Protestants there 
was no lack of materialist attitude or expenditure for consumption, rather there was a greater sobriety 
in the goods produced and consumed’.
32 Hirschman 1977, p.4. Hirschman argues the mercantilism of the Protestant Ethic was more a 
response to a general intellectual dialectic between the passions and reason, with the notion of 
“interest” providing the balancing theoretical /  moral synthesis.
53 Huizinga 1968, p.25. Huizinga argues the landscape of the Federated States, its social and ethical 
conditions, all permitted a system more conducive to trade and socio-economic equality.
54 Schudson 1998,p.250
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as blasphemous55, during the seventeenth century cultural conceptions of the profit 
motive gradually began to change. And in this respect, as Colin Campbell writes, Weber’s 
thesis provides one possible insight into how ‘a previously denigrated pattern of conduct 
became not simply accepted but also highly regarded’56.
Emanuel de Witte’s Interior with Woman at Virginals, c.1665, Museum Boymans-van Beuningen
Interpretation is tendentious, but the quietude of this painting suggests the subdued luxury of the rooms 
was somehow intended to be legitimated by steady activity as opposed to indolence. The simple lines pare 
back the impact of the opulence and luxury depicted, the somber but rich colouring evokes a religious 
tenor. The covered heads of the women can be read as matching this, suggesting modesty and Christian 
virtue. The pleasure of the music is similarly validated and moderated through the impression of 
dedication and quiet restraint. Restraint and balance are again emphasised by the harmonious ordering of 
the square and rectangular patterning of the furnishings, the perspectival lines of the rooms, door frames, 
mirror, chair, and floor patterns; all also suggestive of the pure, ordered mathematical unity of God’s world. 
Religious themes are further supplemented by the passages through the extended corridor, the ephemeral 
rays of the sun, even the glossy, almost seemingly transcendent sheen of the paint itself.
55 Heilbroner 1972, pp.20-3. Valenze 2006.
56 Campbell 2003, p.796
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Dutch trade, enterprise and mercantile philosophy
Dunn notes that sometime during this period, merchants, ‘traditionally disdained by the 
priests as moral parasites and by the knights as moral cowards, [came to feel] confident 
that they now formed the most dynamic social class’57. The seventeenth century 
Protestant Dutch Federated States who began thriving on trade and enterprise and 
became wealthy because of it represented perhaps the most notable example of this 
change. Certainly the ‘remarkable texture of the seventeenth century Dutch material 
culture’, as Jan de Vries puts it58, was also admired by the English. In The Embarrassment 
of Riches (1997) Simon Schama positions the Dutch as rather more ambiguously 
ambivalent (‘the anxieties of superabundance’59). Nevertheless Christopher Berry in The 
Idea of Luxury (1993) and Joyce Appleby also both note how (regardless of potential 
anxieties) English admiration of Dutch trade gave rise to a substantial body of early 
economic literature aimed at interpreting Dutch success and developing practical 
measures to emulate it60. Appleby remarks, moreover, that despite the initial mundane 
character of the goods traded by the Dutch,
The inevitable contrast with Spain, the possessor of legendary treasure 
teetering on the verge of bankruptcy for nearly a century, only underscored the 
novelty of the Dutch success.01
Notwithstanding the growing regard for and admiration of Dutch trade, mercantile 
economic philosophy was at the time more concerned with fostering the nation’s exports 
as opposed to imports. Here consumption, and consumption of imports in particular, 
was seen as diminishing a nation’s wealth, leaching the sum total of the value of the 
goods from the nation as a whole62. Exports, in contrast, were thought to increase the 
political power, strength and wealth of the nation, which was conceptualised in terms of 
bullion63. On a practical level, this admiration resulted in the Navigation Acts of 1651
57 Dunn 1970, p. 116
58 de Vries 1993, p.91
59 Schama 1997, xi
60 Appleby 1980, pp.73-98
61 Appleby 1980, p.74
62 Harth 1970, p. 22
63 As Clarke explains, in Marx, Marginalism and Modem Sociology (1983), the ‘task of economic theory, in 
the forms of mercantilism, cameralism and canonism was to advise the sovereign on how best to regulate 
the economy in order to enhance the wealth and power of the state. Such theories confined their 
economic attention essentially to exchange relations, seeing economic advantage to lie in securing an 
advantageous exchange and seeing political power the means to achieve such advantage, while the 
wealth so secured was considered to strengthen the State in pursuit of its domestic and foreign 
ambitions’ (Clarke 1983, pp.8-9).
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and 1673 that aimed to overturn Dutch dominance of international trade by attempting 
to ensure, de Vries details, that trade ran in ‘a closed circuit’ within the English market, 
instead of through the Federated States64.
The longstanding attitude of mercantile philosophy toward consumption is evinced by a 
preamble to an English parliamentary sumptuary law statute of 1463 Hunt cites, that 
acknowledges mercantile as well as religious concerns about consumption’s deleterious 
effects:
the commons of the said realm, as well as Men and Women, have worn 
and daily do wear excessive and inordinate array (and Apparel) to the great 
Displeasure of God, and impoverishing of this realm of England and to the 
enriching of other strange Realms and Countries to the final Destruction of 
Husbandry of this said Realm.65
Appleby notes the continuation of this theme in English economic literature some two 
hundred years later, where it was still ‘believed that English consuming habits 
represented a threat’. Critics ...
seized on the pervasive hostility to the French in the Restoration as a 
means to check the drive for economic individualism and free trade. What is 
significant in the development of social thought was the predisposition of those in industry to take 
a defensive stand toward economic growth and to argue instead for a retrenchment in 
consumption. Rejecting the definition of trade as a benign exchange of 
superfluities, the manufacturers’ tracts concentrated upon the husbanding of 
national resources rather than the cultivation of trading opportunities.66
It is important to note here that these mid-seventeenth century arguments in favour of 
leashing consumption took place in a time of rapid change. There was a huge growth in 
the European population67, trade with relatively unknown societies such as China, Java 
and India increased dramatically, there were innovations in banking, new technologies 
associated with agriculture and transportation, and a rising volume and variety of
64 These Navigation Acts only succeeded insofar as they raised both English imports and exports by 
50% between 1660-1700. deVries 1993, p. 87. Appleby 1980, p .103. Marx 1974a, pp.75-6.
65 cited in Hunt 1996, p. 134. Sekora also notes how mercantile philosophy was implemented on a 
practical level in terms of parliamentary acts in relation to trade (Sekora 1977, p.l 18).
66 Appleby 1980, p .l23. My italics. See also Hunt 1996, p.362 on cameralism, and Berry 1994, p. 103.
67 Appleby 1993, p .l63. Braudel comments that ‘Nobody knows the total population of the world 
between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries’ (1981, p.34; 1982, p.42), but he also states ‘that there 
was a prolonged population rise between 1100 and 1350, another between 1450 and 1650, and a 
third after 1750; the last alone was not followed by a regression’ (1981, p.33). And so as the earlier 
population growth rates were quickly reduced by subsequent mortality rates, it was not until after 
1750 that the world population experienced a sustained rise. Braudel subsequently estimates 
population growth in Europe 1500 - 1750 at 0.17% per year (Braudel 1982, p.245).
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imported commodities, especially textiles from outside Europe68. The surge in both 
national and international trade and commerce was extraordinary. At the same time a 
new tactic of lower prices with lower profit margins on individual sales led to even 
further increases in the volume of sales and overall profits obtained69. These changes are 
elaborately detailed in Appleby’s Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth Century England 
(1980), Consumption and the World of Goods (1993) edited by J. Brewer and Roy Porter, 
Porter’s English Society in the Eighteenth Century (1990), and also Ferdinand Braudel’s 
Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century: The Wheels of Commerce (1981). In contrast to 
the abject hardship of the earlier centuries, a wealth of new products became available, 
existing products became increasingly affordable, and an unprecedented level of material 
abundance became increasingly apparent. Appleby, Simon Schama, and de Vries all 
specify how it was domestic consumption which sustained and drove both English and 
Dutch economic growth in the earlier period, with trade centering on rudimentary 
goods such as basic materials and foodstuffs70. From around the mid-seventeenth 
century however, more complex and exotic imported goods began to feature. But the 
sum of these developments was that a whole range of consumption items became 
accessible to groups to whom such goods had previously been out of reach.
Banal luxuries
Ehe plethora of goods at that time considered luxurious ranged from coffee, sugar, tea, 
pepper and chocolate, through to tobacco, textiles and assorted household goods such as 
furniture, flat plates, glass panes and curtains71. We now consider these items
68 Dunn 1970, p.89
69 Appleby 1980, pp.l 14-5. Early writers ‘also publicized the idea that prosperity involved enlarging 
the incomes of those of middling fortune’ (1980, p.l 15).
70 Appleby 1980; Schama (1993); and de Vries (1993).
71 The first recorded coffee house in England was in 1652 (Wills 1993, p. 141), with coffee being 
consumed en-mass by 1750 (Shammas 1993, p .l99). Sugar, previously a luxury generally given as a 
gift, became plentiful sometime around 1700 with consumption increasing ‘twentyfold from 1663 to 
1775, while the population only increased from 4.5 to 7 million’ (Mintz 1993, p.265). Tea became 
available in 1660, was popularised from the 1690s, and consumed en-masse by 1750 (Wills 1993, 
p.141), (Shammas 1993, p. 183, p. 199). Spices such as cinnamon, cloves and nutmeg, pepper had 
been consumed from an early period (Wills 1993, p .l33) (see also Shammas 1993, p . l79), but only 
became available to a wider range of classes from the eighteenth-century. Demand for textiles 
increased after 1670 (Wills 1993, p .l36), and prices dropped (Shammas 1993, p.193). De Vries notes 
a number of analyses of probate inventories which reveal a steadily improving standard of household 
furniture and furnishings from the 1650s on (De Vries 1993, p p .l00-1). In Holland between 1550- 
1750 ‘tins and wooden bowls and dishes made way for pottery and delftware’ (De Vries 1993, p .l00). 
And Weatherill records that English ownership of curtains identified in probate inventories rose from 
7% in 1675 to 21% in 1775, with ownership of pewter plates from 9% in 1675 to 45% in 1725 
(Weatherill 1993, p.221). China had traded porcelain with Portugal from the late sixteenth-century
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commonplace. Then, they were remote, unusual and luxurious. Yet although these 
products had become increasingly available, there were still appalling disparities in 
wages, wage growth, wealth and living and working conditions. Many new products, as 
well as material prosperity, still remained beyond the reach of most. Dunn for instance, 
notes how in the 1600s ‘Dutch commercial prosperity was strictly limited to the upper 
and middle classes’72. In England during the 1700s, Porter writes,
A shockingly large mass of urban poor were still occupying lean-tos and 
cellars, with rural poor inhabiting shacks made of wattle, turf and road scrapings 
... At Bridgenorth things were worse, for they led troglodyte existences in homes 
gouged out of the cliff face. With timber shortage and enclosure, many could 
not even afford a fire.73
Given this horrendous inequality, its extraordinary that even when new products 
became more accessible to the lower classes, their consumption still fell into a dubious 
‘grey’ area vis-a-vis sumptuary law; if not technically illegal, they fell into categories 
bordering on the proscribed. Shammas for instance, details how prior to 1800 sugar, 
coffee and tobacco were consumed en-masse but only ‘over the objections of 
contemporary social critics who considered labouring class consumption of products 
formerly classed as luxuries a shameful waste of money’74. And these items still were 
luxuries. At least until last century tea, for example, an item we now consider ordinary, 
even mundane, was still so expensive it was kept under lock and key. In elite households 
the used leaves migrated down the social ladder to end up in the scullery, used many 
times over. Cafe-au-lait similarly originated from servants selling used grinds to street 
vendors who then mixed the grinds with watered down milk and sold the resultant drink 
on the street. Yet despite the restricted nature of lower class use of items such as these, 
their purchase and use generated enormous hostility with writers from Shakespeare to 
Defoe, Smollett and Fielding depicting the hierarchy and inequitable conditions as 
acceptable, even natural and necessary75.
(Morris and Bielenstein 1968, p.326), but from the mid-1700s this trade percolated through to the rest 
of Europe. See also Braudel’s comments on changes in furniture and everyday house hold goods, 
such as chairs, glasses, forks and food such as sugar, pepper and oranges (1981, pp. 183-6). Note also 
Styles’ comments that by the eighteenth century ‘[t]he middle and lower levels of the market were 
expanding ... as trends already established in the seventeenth century were reinforced’ (1993 p.539).
72 Dunn 1970, p.104
73 Porter 1990, p.215. See also Hobsbawm (1969).
74 Shammas 1993, p. 178
73 Dunn 1970, Sekora 1977, IgnatiefT 1994.
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The degree of elite hostility toward lower class use of products considered luxurious only 
grew as these items became increasingly available. Prior to the 1700s, however, while 
the outcry against luxury was vehement76, the tone of the hostility was simply that 
directed against a violation of the ‘natural’ order rather than that directed against a 
distinct threat to that order. For this period represented only the beginnings of a shift in 
the demographics of wealth and power, as in England a rapidly emerging bourgeois 
mercantile class responsible for facilitating the increased levels of trade and industry was 
now beginning to find access to political power and influence with their growing wealth. 
As Clarke observes,
Commodity producers, and, more particularly, merchants, came to form 
an economic interest that challenged customary authority, developing more 
democratic forms of political community and pressing their interests politically. 
In this way the development of commodity production, while not immediately 
challenging the foundations of the society within which it arose, presented a 
challenge to the established forms of social regulation ...77
As time went by this mercantile class came to display their new wealth in tangible, visible
ways that were previously only accessible to the elite. So although this new abundance
was still principally utilised by the gentry (inciting some political agitators calling for the
justification of privilege78), it slowly crossed the blurring class divisions.
Trade and prosperity
While the early religious notions of hierarchy manifest in sumptuary law co-existed 
strangely with the burgeoning levels of trade and consumption, it is in this context that 
Hunt’s reference to sumptuary law as ‘a case of the proverbial attempt to shut the stable 
gate after the horse has bolted’79, can be seen as most apt. As time went by however, 
reconciling sumptuary law restrictions with the growing abundance became increasingly 
difficult. Simultaneously it became apparent that the new types of goods had become 
indispensable, and that if the laws against consumption were adhered to, they would not 
only ‘bankrupt the nation’80, but also impoverish the lives of the increasingly broad
76 Hunt writes that the extent to which sumptuary law violations were punished is difficult to 
ascertain. As transgressions were generally summary violations details of enforcement is sketchy, 
varying also between as well as within countries (Hunt 1996, pp.325-56).
77 Clarke 1983, p.8
78 Such as the Diggers and Levellers during the 1600s (MacIntyre 1980, pp. 152-6) (Dunn 1970, 
p. 150) (see also Macpherson 1970).
79 Hunt 1996, p. 147. Hunt stresses sumptuary laws could not be reduced to any one consistent target 
or theme, yet he also observes the increasing power of the mercantile class meant a ‘sharpening’ of the 
sumptuary law in response (Hunt 1996, pp. 150-2).
80 Appleby 1993, p. 167
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spectrum of classes who enjoyed the new variety of goods that had become available. 
Berry, for instance, cites a tract by Mun, a director of the east India Company, published 
in 1664 (but written about thirty years earlier), where he asks, without trade, ‘what will 
become of our Ships, Mariners, Munitions, our poor Artificers and many others?’81 
Berry notes how in this same tract Mun was moralising against luxurious consumption, 
but concludes he simultaneously ‘adumbrates arguments that will subvert this 
understanding. It is significant that it is in the context of “trade” that this subversion 
occurs’82.
The debates these issues generated around consumption and trade were becoming 
increasingly intense, and by the end of the 1600s a number of different approaches had 
come to co-exist; mercantilism v’s the ‘protestant ethic’ v’s the perceived need for 
sumptuary law v’s the pragmatics and possibilities of everyday life. Into this mix 
humanism’s more positive view of human nature was also slowly filtering through via the 
dissemination of the ideas of thinkers such as Erasmus, Thomas More, and the 
Cambridge Platonists (the latter of whom displaced the previous focus on God’s 
omnipotence and predestination in relation to the problem of theodicy with a new 
emphasis on God’s benevolence and love.83) It was in this context that in the mid to late 
1600s Hobbes and Locke had developed arguments that legitimated the ‘sovereign’ 
desires of individuals, according to C.B. Macpherson’s The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism (1970). Many aspects of Macpherson’s account have been criticised, as I 
outline below, but I believe his analysis remains particularly useful because it focuses 
directly on how the ‘desire for “commodious living’” was thought of by the political 
philosophy of this pivotal period. Here, Macpherson’s account, taken together with the 
criticisms directed against it, offers an insight into how the primary political debates of 
the period accommodated, facilitated or protested the increased trade and associated 
changes to consumption practices.
81 Mun cited in Berry 1994, p.105
82 Berry 1994, p.104
83 Campbell 1990, pp. 111-113, pp.l 15-122. Dunn also notes how from the time of the Renaissance 
and the early scientific revolution humanism’s new ‘buoyant faith in rational human progress’ had 
slowly developed (Dunn 1970, p. 189).
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M acpherson on H obbes’s ‘m arket society’
In The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1970) Macpherson writes that Hobbes and 
Locke both built on a range of less sophisticated and systematised social contract and 
natural rights theories to develop their own more elaborate positions, with the work of 
both positioning ‘the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or 
capacities, owing nothing to society for them’84, what Macpherson refers to as ‘possessive 
individualism’. He begins his argument by adumbrating the standard interpretation of 
Hobbes’ theory of political power: in a hypothetical ‘state of nature’ men contract an 
agreement amongst themselves to give power to a strong sovereign who could ensure 
order amongst them, so avoiding the state of ‘warre of every man against every man’, 
driven what Hobbes saw as the key motivating force and essential feature of human 
nature; the need to avoid violent death, coupled with a ‘desire for “commodious 
living’”85. This desire for “commodious living” Hobbes saw as their primary aim, for 
desire, in Hobbes’ view, was a natural fact beyond the ambit of traditional 
condemnations: morality and law were purely societal creations86. To the extent ‘safely 
contained’87 desire delivered civilisation, it was even honourable. As Berry writes, citing 
Hobbes:
It is because “the pleasures of wealth and greatness ... strike the 
imagination as something grand and beautiful and noble” that men embark 
upon “toil” and the “continual motion of industry”. It is this industry which is
84 Macpherson 1970, p.3
85 ‘The Passions that encline [natural] men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are 
necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them’ (Hobbes cited in 
Macpherson 1970, p.29, also p.19). MacIntyre discusses how Hobbes, influenced by Eucilid (300BC) 
and Galileo’s (1564-1642) mathematical method of breaking things down into the simplest elements, 
believed that using this method he could theorise society in terms of its individual elements, arguing 
people could be explained at the simplest level in terms of their twin desires for domination and for 
the avoidance of death (MacIntyre 1980, pp. 130-4). Attempts to achieve these things in the state of 
nature involved brutal competition; ‘an incessant struggle of every man with every man, a struggle of 
each for power over others’ (Macpherson 1970, p. 19). Or, the ‘perpetual and restless desire of Power 
after power, that ceaseth onely in Death’ (Hobbes cited in Hindess 1996, p.36). The principal benefit 
and rationale for Hobbes’ absolutist sovereign is, then, as Berry notes, his ability to ‘enforce the 
conditions to enable its subjects to pursue their desires for “commodious living’” (Berry 1994, p.l 15). 
These hypothetical subjects would then transfer to the sovereign all their natural powers and natural 
rights, for as Hindess specifies, ‘there is no scope for anyone to question the legitimacy of the rule to 
which they are subjected’ (Hindess 1996, p.48). Macpherson states that Hobbes knew the ‘state of 
nature’ in which his ‘social contract’ took place never actually existed in reality. Hobbes was merely 
adopting a ‘logical hypothesis’ as a rhetorical device in order to enlighten his contemporaries about 
their ‘true’ state (Macpherson 1970, pp.60-2, pp. 104-5). Also Macpherson 1970, pp.20-5, p.72.
86 In the state of nature traditional condemnations had no place; ‘The notions of Right and Wrong, 
Justice and Injustice have there no place’.
87 Within the society contained by the sovereign, human desires and passions retained the brutal 
motivations they exhibited under the state of nature: ‘The natural condition of mankind is within men 
now, not set apart in some distant time or place’ (Macpherson 1970, p.25).
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responsible for all “the sciences and arts which ennoble and embellish human 
life” .88
Versions on this theme would be mooted Adam Smith and David Hume a hundred 
years later. The important point to note, however, is how in this Hobbes refutes 
traditional religious, Aristotelian, as well as Epicurean and Stoic arguments about the 
desirability of a desire-less state89. For Hobbes, ‘Felicity is a continual progress of the 
desire, from one object to another’90. The cessation of desire is a ‘living death’.
Thus far is a fairly straightforward reading of Hobbes. The more provocative and 
contentious aspects of Macpherson’s account relate to the extent to which Hobbes 
actually conceived of a competitive market society in the way we would understand it 
today. For Macpherson interprets Hobbes as regarding labour as a ‘commodity’91, with 
‘the value or worth of every man ... determined by the market’92:
where labour has become a market commodity, market relations so 
shape or permeate all social relations that it may properly be called a market 
society, not merely a market economy’93.
For Macpherson Hobbes’s model ‘did correspond in large measure to seventeenth- 
century English society’94, and he writes that as per Hobbes’ social contract theory in this 
‘market society’ the sovereign could impose whatever behaviour they believed necessary 
for the maintenance of society95, but otherwise,
there could be no question of imposing a system of values from outside or 
above. Hence there could be no question of finding a hierarchy of wants or of 
rights or obligations. Everyone’s must be assumed to be equal.96
According to Macpherson then, Hobbes frees human desires from tradition, and aside
from the sovereign enforcing the system, ‘social order was no longer dependent on the maintenance
of the hierarchy'191. The sovereign could ensure ‘Fuxurious consumption’ was
‘discouraged’, but his modus operandi was not so much focused on regulating desire (which,
88 Berry 1994, p. 165. Macpherson cites Hobbes on this point also: ‘Covetousness of great Riches, and 
ambition of great Honours, are Honourable; as signes of power to obtain them’ (1970, p. 154).
89 Berry 1994, p. 113
90 Hobbes cited in Slater 1997, p.77
91 Macpherson 1970, p.37
92 Macpherson 1970, p.80
93 Macpherson 1970, p.48
94 Macpherson 1970, p. 16
95 Macpherson 1970, p.96
96 Macpherson 1970, pp.77-8. Macpherson writes that state regulation existed in Hobbes’ model, but 
this was in order to maintain the system, it did ‘not affect the mainspring of the system’, and so ‘a 
mercantilist policy is perfectly consistent with the model’ (Macpherson 1970, pp.57-8).
97 Macpherson 1970, p.89. My italics.
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as Berry also argues, Hobbes represented as outside reason’s province and the 
determination of others98). The role of the sovereign was only to regulate the system in which 
desires could be orderly pursued99.
Hobbes’s view of human nature vis-ä-vis the pursuit of desires was ‘widely condemned’ 
Macpherson concedes, and certainly ‘not accepted by any significant group or 
movement in England in his own century’100. In The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern 
Consumerism (1990) Campbell writes of how the Cambridge Platonists ‘detested’ Hobbes, 
so much so that the intensity of their arguments against him impacted on the ‘more 
influential clergy’ to such an extent that from the mid-1680s it became de rigueur in 
charity sermons to emphasize that Man was created in God’s image and so inherently 
benevolent, sympathetic and empathic101. The Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Locke’s pupil, 
also saw Hobbes as having ‘threw all Order and Virtue out of the World’102, with Locke 
himself disagreeing with many of Hobbes’s arguments, not least his support of absolute 
sovereign power103. For Macpherson however, none of this lessened the impact of 
Hobbes’s views. In Reason and Nature in Eighteenth Century Thought (1968) Harris even goes 
so far as to claim ‘the challenge of his fundamental assumption remained’, insofar as 
Hobbes’ view of Man’s passion and desires and powers ‘demolished the moral order of 
the universe’, ‘shattering the Platonic assumptions of the great humanist tradition’104.
M acpherson on  Locke’s ratification of desire
Despite Hobbes and Locke’s more obvious disagreements in relation to the social order, 
Macpherson argues that the ideas of both exhibit a similar ‘possessive individualism’. 
Taking a similar tack, Sheamur, in his contribution to Economics and Ethics (1996), argues 
that Locke bypassed many criticisms directed at Hobbes by arguing that human 
capacities to shape and work the earth were given by God specifically so that man’s duties 
to God could be fulfilled. In this, Sheamur views Locke as ratifying desire as God-given,
98 Paraphrasing Hobbes in Leviathan Berry writes ‘the end [of desire] itself is not reason’s province; we 
do not do something because it is rational but because we want to do it’ (Berry 1994, p. 119).
99 Macpherson 1970, p.96. My italics.
100 Macpherson 1970, p.90, 91 & p.106. See also Berry 1994, p.l 18.
101 Campbell 1990, p.l 16, pp.l 19-22
102 Shaftesbury cited in Berry 1994, p.l 18
103 With Locke the sovereign no longer has the unquestioned right to absolute power. As Hindess 
states ‘the holder of that power is regarded as having very definite obligations towards its subjects’ 
(Hindess 1996, p.48), with sovereign power legitimate only insofar as it supplies a stable, overarching 
regulatory framework within which desires could be safely pursued.
104 Harris 1968, p.45, p.46
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hence natural and necessary. Achieving those desires means discharging duties to 
God105: having rights in order to do so is vital. Macpherson goes further than this 
however, seeing Locke as supplying a positive moral, worldly as well as religious basis to 
justify why desires should be pursued: first, as depicting acquisition as having positive 
flow-on effects acting in the interests of, and benefiting all; and so second, instead of 
being viewed as morally destructive, in fact having beneficent outcomes consistent with 
religious doctrine106.
Macpherson writes that Locke developed this argument through several stages. First,
according to the scriptural doctrines and natural law theory (with which Locke concurs),
‘the earth and its fruits were originally given to mankind in common’107. In the ‘state of
nature’ the consent of others was not needed to ratify what men obtained from nature
there was enough to supply everyone, and God had instructed men to work the earth
and help themselves to the results of their labour. For Locke,
As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the 
product of, so much is his property. 108
As Macpherson observes:
No consent of the others is needed for this appropriation. For God 
commanded man to labour the earth, and so entitled him to appropriate 
whatever land he mixed his labour with; and besides, the original appropriation 
was not “any prejudice to any other Man, since there was enough, and as good 
left” for others. 109
In this state of nature no-one was justified in taking what they could not use. This was 
both ‘foolish’ and ‘dishonest’110; it would go to waste, denying others. With the advent of 
money however, spoilage is prevented. The key point here is that money legitimates 
holding and accumulating possessions111. This in turn justifies the appropriation of land
105 Shearmur 1996, p.47
106 In his essay ‘The Nature and Logic of Capitalism’, Heilbroner restates this approach: ‘Locke sets 
out to demonstrate that unlimited private acquisition, for centuries the target of the most scathing 
religious and philosophic criticism, was in fact compatible with both the dictates of Scripture and the 
promptings of right reason’ (Heilbroner 2003, p.65). These themes are also evident in Hirschman’s 
the Passions and the Interests (1977) where the pursuit of money /  passions was comes to be seen as a 
steadying rather than disruptive character trait.
107 Macpherson 1970, p .199
108 Locke cited in Harris 1968, p.58
109 Macpherson 1970, p.202
110 Locke cited in Macpherson 1970, p.234
111 ‘The introduction of money by tacit consent has removed the previous natural limitations of 
rightful appropriation, and in doing so has invalidated the natural provision that everyone should 
have as much as he could make use of (Macpherson 1970, pp.203-4 & p.211).
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held in common, for even in the event of a shortage, appropriation and accumulation by 
some is depicted as bettering the condition of all:
he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but 
increase the common stock of mankind. For the provisions serving to the 
support of humane life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, 
are (to speak much within compasse) ten time more, than those, which are 
yeilded by an acre of Land, of an equal richnesse, lyeing wast in common. And 
therefor he, that incloses Land and has a greater plenty of the conveniencys of 
life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred left to Nature, may truly 
be said, to give ninety acres to Mankind. For his labour now supplys him with 
provisions out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in 
common. 112
In this Macpherson, MacIntyre and Heilbroner all charge Locke with too easily 
assuming these gains will be justly distributed (instituting further debate re the extent to 
which Locke’s arguments were designed to legitimate elite enclosures of land held in 
common for centuries, as well as the European invasion of the Americas113).
Aside from this latter point, however, thus far Macpherson’s interpretation of Locke is 
not particularly contentious. After presenting Locke as validating accumulation however, 
Macpherson then positions him (as with Hobbes) as viewing labour as a commodity, 
with the appropriation of that labour by others in return for wages as fully justified:
Locke took it for granted, throughout his justification of the natural right 
to property, that labour was naturally a commodity and that the wage 
relationship which gives me the right to appropriate the produce of another's 
labour was part of a natural order. 114
For Macpherson then, although Locke starts from a foundation of equality in a state of 
nature, where ‘rational behaviour’ equates with ‘industrious appropriation’, the 
character of this equality changes when as ‘unlimited accumulation becomes rational,full 
rationality is possible only for those who can so accumulate"1115. Elites are elite because they are 
rational and have the capacity to accumulate. This rationalises the class hierarchy: 
poverty is a ‘moral shortcoming'116 which just proves the rational incapacity of labouring 
classes and the depravity of the poor117. For Macpherson, Locke positions this
112 Macpherson 1970, pp.211-2
113 See Tully 1993
114 Macpherson 1970, p.220
115 Macpherson 1970, p.232. p.233. My italics. Locke cited in Macpherson: “God gave the World to 
Men ... for their benefit, and the greatest Conveniencies of Life they were capable to draw from it... 
He gave it to the use of the Industrious and Rational, (and Labour was to be his Title to it;) not to the 
Fancy or Covetousness of the Quarrelsom and Contentious”. See also Marx (1977, p.77) on this point.
116 Macpherson 1970, p.226
117 In his report on the poor law, ‘A Report of the Board of Trade to the Lords Justices Respecting the
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‘disproportionate and unequal’ system as being tacitly agreed to by all by their ‘use of 
money’118. And it is this reasoning MacIntyre refers to when he argues Locke captured 
and transmuted the debate about the existence of natural rights by connecting the notion 
of individual interests to tacit consent, thus legitimating coercion on the part of the state 
and justifying the inequality of existing property relations119. So where the ‘mediaeval 
idea of natural law envisaged man as living strictly within the confines of a moral system 
imposed by God’120, Macpherson concludes Locke overturns such views and provides a
moral foundation for bourgeois appropriation ... [and] also justifies, as 
natural, a class differential in rights and in rationality, and by doing so provides a 
positive moral basis for capitalist society’121.
Tully on Macpherson: ‘no one had a vision of a full-scale commercial or 
capitalist society’
One interesting aspect of Macpherson’s account of Locke’s justification of accumulation 
is its consonance with the ‘Protestant ethic’ and its religious-moral ratification of poverty. 
Yet in Locke in Contexts (1993) James Tully cites a wide range of criticisms that he believes 
displaces Macpherson’s ‘possessive individualism’ thesis, and calls into question 
Macpherson’s reading of Hobbes and Locke. Tully charges Macpherson as being so 
motivated by ‘the development and operation of capitalism’ that he elides the ‘diversity’ 
of views of the period, and ‘misidentifies the primary problems’, chiefly political, which 
seventeenth century theorists were addressing122. Seventeenth century theorists, Tully 
writes,
were not concerned with justifying unlimited accumulation in a market 
society but with more basic political problems of political order, preservation, 
state-building, obedience and liberty in a situation of insecurity brought on by a
Relief and Employment of the Poor’, Locke writes of the ‘growth of the poor’ being a result of 
‘nothing else but the relaxation of discipline and the corruption of manners’ (Locke cited in Bourne 
1969 [1876] Vol.One, p.378). Macpherson notes, ‘The idle poor he seems to have regarded as 
depraved by choice; the labouring poor as simply incapable of a fully rational life because of their 
unfortunate position. But whether by their own fault or not, members of the labouring class did not 
have, could not be expected to have, and were not entitled to have, full membership in political 
society; they did not and could not live a fully rational life. These were not only Locke's assumptions, 
they were also his readers’. When he makes these assumptions, as in the passages we have quoted 
from the Considerations and The Reasonableness of Christianity, he does not need to argue them’ 
(Macpherson 1970, p.226).
118 Macpherson 1970, p.234
119 MacIntyre 1980, pp. 157-6
120 Harris 1968, p.65
121 Macpherson 1970, p.221
122 Tully 1993, pp.72-8
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century of civil wars, religious wars, the Thirty Years’ War, and the European 
wars of the latter half of the seventeenth century.123
Tully also claims that Macpherson didn't understand how Locke utilised the concept of
‘property’, insofar as Locke thought of ‘property’ in terms of the proprietorship of
capacities in the political, not economic sphere. Locke was not working within the
dynamics of a capitalist mindset as ‘no one had a vision of a full-scale commercial or
capitalist society’124.
The accession of William and Mary definitively altered the English political landscape, 
however Tully’s criticisms have merit to the extent Locke, and certainly Hobbes, still 
existed in a restrictive quasi-feudal, religious and hierarchical state. Of course it was 
implausible they had any conception of a ‘market society’ as we understand it today, and 
of course questions of political governance were their primary concern. Despite this 
however, I do not think it altogether judicious to take Tully’s criticisms as given. As I 
discuss below, it may be more productive rather, to examine what else various tensions 
around the interstices of Macpherson and bully’s ideas might suggest about how Locke 
may have conceptually navigated the radical change in the consumption patterns of 
English society during this period.
The first important point is that in Virtue, Commerce and History (1985), J.G.A. Pocock 
takes issue with Macpherson’s interpretation of Hobbes and Locke, but he cites 
Matthew Wren, among others, as thinking in terms of a physical understanding of 
property owned125 (as compared to Tully viewing ‘property’ as only a political 
‘proprietorship of capacities’). Similarly, while Pocock notes republican thought 
during this period conceptualised ‘property’ primarily in terms of its delivering the 
right to political participation, thus civic virtue, political participation here is still 
predicated on physical ownership. More suggestive still is Deborah Valenze’s recent 
research in The Social Life of Money in the English Past (2006), where she positions the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century understanding of ‘property’ as intrinsically 
connected to the value of persons conceived of in monetary terms. Valenze cites 
numerous examples, from the slave trade, to the trade in vagrants, indentured labor,
123 Tully 1993, p.77. The European conflicts over political power were ‘the overriding issue of 
English political thought and action from 1640 to 1690’ (Tully 1993, p. 12).
124 Tully 1993, p.77
125 Pocock 1985, pp.61-8. See also Appleby’s discussion of the work of Barbon and North -  but this is 
more a discussion of the ratification of trade and human desires (1993, p. 165).
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to apprentices, to the trade in children hired to beggars, the trade in ‘involuntary 
migrants’, to marriage settlements, to female chattel status, to wife-selling, to 
marriage settlements and dowries; all indicative of how people were objectified as 
‘commodities for sale’126. For during this period, ‘monetary discourse’, ‘called 
attention to a literal transaction involving people, not just rhetorically, but as part of 
an economically motivated activity in which individuals were moved across distances 
or transferred from one proprietor or another’127. Given such examples, Tully’s 
positioning of Locke’s understanding of ‘property’ in rarefied political sans economic 
terms appears, if not idealised, then certainly partial.
With the extraordinary increase in consumption and trade around this period, clearly 
contemporary ways of understanding, grappling with, making sense of these changes, 
and sometimes validating them would have been diverse. Locke’s opinion of these 
changes certainly deserves a more detailed analysis than I can allow for here. (I have 
already given more space to various interpretations of his views than I intended.) 
However I note that while Tully corrects Macpherson for mistaking Locke’s primary 
area of concern as being economics, as opposed to politics, Tully also notes that for 
Locke the practical ‘art of government’ included
increasing the productive capacities, maintaining the welfare of subjects, 
and of co-ordinating these to bring about the “riches and power” of the 
community.128
Again, it is difficult to discern here how Tully excises the significance of Locke’s interest 
in economic, as opposed to political issues, given what seems to be Locke’s clear interest 
in the best means of generating, as Macpherson phrases it, ‘further capital by profitable 
investment’129. Pocock certainly notes Locke’s interest, and even participation in the 
‘financial revolution of the 1690s, and his being one of ‘a new class of investors ... who 
had lent government capital that vastly stabilized and enlarged it, and henceforth lived 
off their expectation of a return (sometimes a marketable one) on their investments’130, 
fully does acknowledge the central role Locke played in economic management and 
debates131, yet in his eagerness to depict Macpherson’s thesis as one-sided and
126 Valenze 2006, pp. 183-259
127 Valenze 2006, p.224
128 Tully 1993, pp.62-3
129 Macpherson 1970, p.207
130 Pocock 1985, p.68
131 Tully 1993, p.63
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anachronistic he glosses over Locke's interest in economic issues; mentioning, but eliding 
Locke’s membership of the Board on Trade, (which was connected to his political 
affiliation with the Whigs and their financial and mercantile concerns), his influential 
role in the debate over money supply and coinage132, and the new rules on public credit 
and debt133, as well as his thoughts on the best means of utilising the poor as an 
economic resource:
the individual labourer is considered as a resource who, on the one hand, 
needs to be cared for, and, on the other, can be reformed by repetition and 
practice to be a productive and utile part of a strategy to increase the strength of 
the nation vis-a-vis other states. 134
The second key issue raised by Tully’s criticisms of Macpherson concern the extent to 
which Locke’s ideas can be linked to a growing practical political acceptance of 
consumption across a range of classes. For Locke retained, as Berry notes, ‘much of the 
older censorious moralistic tone in his treatment of fashion’135. It is this, as well as 
Locke’s views about the importance of social restraints136, that Fully refers to when he 
argues that in no sense can either Hobbes or Locke be seen as supporting unlimited 
consumption:
From Hobbes to Locke unlimited consumption was not considered 
rational or morally permissible. 137
Fully argues that questions around the dynamics of commercial society were not taken 
up so explicitly until the eighteenth-century. Yet even from a cursory overview of the 
seventeenth century economic literature it is clear concerns about developing trade as 
means of strengthening the nation, as opposed to consumption as a source of corruption,
132 Appleby 1980
133 Tully 1993, p.91
134 Tully 1993, p.66
135 Berry 1994, p. 118
136 Locke had clear views of appropriate civic behaviour. In Discourses of Power (1996), Hindess refers 
to how Locke mooted a ‘Law of Opinion and Reputation’ which operated by ‘secret and tacite 
consent’ (Hindess 1996, p.60). Hindess writes Locke believed this ‘Law’ would moderate desires due 
to unspoken but tacit community standards, with this system being ‘more directly effective in the 
regulation of behaviour than the laws of God and the commonwealth’ (Hindess 1996, p.59). As 
Springborg observes in The Problem of Human Needs and the Critique of Civilisation (1981), in this Locke 
(perhaps writing against Hobbes), stresses the power of judgment in acting against the potentially 
corrupting powers of desire: ‘Will is the power to direct or suspend the operations of desire which 
allows the individual to lay aside the pursuit of ephemeral pleasures in favour of moral rectitude, by 
applying reason to ascertain moral laws and the sanctions of religion to follow them ... by the insertion 
of the faculty of judgement between desire and volition, he tried to rescue man from the subjectivity of 
appetite and sensuous need’ (Springborg 1981, p.31). He writes for example, that ‘The faculty which 
God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where it cannot be 
had, is judgment’ (1964, p.402).
137 Tully 1993, p.77. My italics.
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were subject to heated debate. Appleby and Berry detail (at length) how arguments for 
free trade were developing around this period (instanced in the earlier tract I mentioned 
by Mun). These were still debates at the time, not full possibilities, but Appleby argues 
in relation to the economic theorists of the 1690s, that
The positive construction they put upon the independent decision 
making of market participants represented nothing less than a major 
reevaluation of the role of self-interest in social relations.138
One other factor glossed over in the Tully’s discussion of Macpherson’s interpretation of 
Locke’s interest in economic issues was Locke’s mercantilism. Again, I am unable to 
give this issue the attention it deserves, but it clearly had a central impact on Locke’s 
view of consumption and free trade. Tully and Macpherson both recognize Locke’s 
mercantilism: a mercantilism, as Tully outlines, where ‘labour power, property relations, 
and trade are regulated by political power, or government, in order to preserve and 
“strengthen” the state’139. For Locke here ‘the wealth and strength of the nation is 
assessed relative to other European states in a zero sum situation of commercial and 
military rivalry’140. Macpherson, on the other hand, positions Locke as ‘a mercantilist to 
whom the accumulation of gold was a proper aim of mercantile policy not as an end in 
itself but because it quickened and increased trade’141. Here I note again that with 
mercantilism, the consumption of goods, especially imported goods, is seen as depleting, 
as opposed to contributing to a nation’s wealth. The acquisition of money in the form of 
bullion was thought to build on that wealth. I propose then, that Locke’s mercantile 
views accorded a difference between consumption, being the use of goods, and 
accumulation, which mercantilist philosophy understood in monetary terms. Yet 
Valenze also notes that Locke did not advocate the hoarding of money; out of circulation 
it ‘may lie dead, and thereby prejudice Trade’142. How can Locke’s views be summed 
from this? Locke supported trade, but certainly never advocated free trade in any ‘pure’ 
form143. I would argue then, despite Tully’s arguing Locke’s mercantilism precluded 
him from legitimating a capitalist market system, Locke’s mercantilism did not actually
138 Appleby 1980, p. 183. See also p.190 on the similarity of such perceptions to Hobbes’ views.
139 Tully 1993, p.85
140 Tully 1993, P.63&85
141 Macpherson 1970, p.205
142 Locke cited in Valenze 2006, p. 129, fn.37
143 As is evident in his report to the government regarding the promotion of the linen, and prevention 
of the wool trade in Ireland (Locke cited in Bourne pp.363-72). See Bourne for a discussion of 
Locke’s preeminent role in the Board ofTrade from 1696-1700 (1969 [1876] Vol.Two, pp.346-94).
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prevent him and other early modern commentators from prosecuting the factors which 
would enable a fuller market society to take shape. In short, Locke’s more superficial 
attacks on consumption do not automatically equate with an attack on trade /  
acquisition benefiting the nation, especially if the balance of that trade lay in England’s 
favour. For as Locke stated,
The chief end of trade is Riches & Power which beget each other.144
As a final point, I note that one especially curious feature of Tully’s argument is that he 
writes as though eighteenth century market society just ‘appeared’ (‘a new kind of 
moveable, non-landed property appeared’145), and eighteenth century theorists 
responded146. So while owning that eighteenth century theorists built on seventeenth 
century thought, Tully simultaneously represents that eighteenth century thought and 
practice as removed from any generation in, and alien to, the seventeenth century. I 
would argue strongly here that eighteenth century methods of dealing with market 
society did not spring from the ether. Neither did market society. It came about 
because people’s mental horizons and landscape of possible action permitted it. Given 
this, perhaps instead of viewing the Macpherson /  Tully debate solely in terms of an 
argument about the periodisation of capitalism (which as Tribe notes in Genealogies of 
Capitalism (1981) is a fraught enterprise anyway), perhaps it is more productive to 
examine what else their accounts of Locke might suggest. Even if Locke was primarily 
concerned with political issues, and didn't intend the implications Macpherson draws, 
there is, as Tully observes, a difference between what a theorist might intend and how 
their work is used147. (Locke certainly could not have predicted how Enlightenment 
philosophers, or Thomas Jefferson, would subsequently interpret him.) And the tensions 
in Locke’s work, as Tully acknowledges, do permit alternate explanations. Hirschman 
notes how ‘the possibility of mutual gain emerged from the expected workings of interest 
in politics, quite some time before it became a matter of doctrine in economics’148. In
144 Locke cited in Macpherson 1970, p.207
145 Tully 1993, p.91
146 Tully 1993, p.92
147 Tully keenly defends Locke from interpretations of his work that frame it in a conservative manner, 
noting ‘a similar concept can be used in various and indeed contradictory ways in different political 
contexts’, and that Locke’s theories have been utilised in a range of ways (Tully 1993, p.81).
148 Hirschman 1977, p. 50. Certainly Locke’s ideas initially only operated as weapons or alibis in 
political contests among the elites (Macpherson 1970). Sekora details for instance how eighteenth 
century government writers for Walpole’s Whigs utilised Locke to answer the opposition Tory attacks 
on luxury (Sekora 1977, p.l 18). Pocock is more cautious however, writing that ‘Locke’s Treatises are
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this, I propose that Locke’s mercantile philosophy, by validating an increase in trade, 
ensured his arguments, in conjunction with Hobbes’s, enabled the possibility for a 
greater acceptance of consumption than had previously been the case.
For around this period there certainly was some sort of shift taking place. Appleby has
identified an equivalent, increased level of support for consumption from a range of
Restoration theorists including John Houghton, Dalby Thomas, Francis Gardiner,
Nicolas Barbon, Dudley North, and Thomas Coke149. She even sees these views,
arguments and debates as clearly forming and shaping, along with a developing strand in
the economic literature of the time, a new perception ‘of man as a consuming animal
with boundless appetites, capable of driving the economy to new peaks of prosperity’150.
In a parallel, but less emphatic vein, Valenze too writes of changing conceptions of
money and the use of it between the mid-1600s and the early 1700s, where money came
to be seen as more ‘beneficial’, and ‘the dominant connection between money and moral
danger was in decline’151. She observes that
The detoxification of money was never complete, and fresh avowals of 
the divisive impact of riches would surface in the eighteenth century’, but no 
longer would money be almost unanimously regarded as having the wholesale 
potential for corruption’.152
Hirschman also notes a shift, and he cites a 1704 ‘technical book on commerce’ by
Samuel Ricard, which advocated the civilising propensities of trade:
Through commerce man learns to deliberate, to be honest, to acquire 
manners, to be prudent and reserved in both talk and action.153
Ricard’s book, Hirschman notes, was so popular it was ‘reprinted repeatedly over the
next eighty years’154. And it is these sorts of arguments Porter is also referring to when
he writes of the inception of a new phase in the consumption debates,
Resourceful apologists contended that desire, and its gratification via 
rising personal consumption, were not, after all, dangers to the soul, self or state; 
properly understood, they were universally beneficial155.
closely associated, and yet cannot be connected, with the establishment of the eighteenth century 
Whig commercial regime and the reaction against it in the name of virtue’ (Pocock 1985, p.48).
149 Appleby 1980, pp.168-176. See also Berry 1994, pp .115-25 on Dudley North’s opposition to 
sumptuary law as an impediment to trade in Discourses upon Trade (1691), and Davenant and Barbon’s 
advocacy of free trade.
150 Appleby cited in Porter 1993, p.65
151 Valenze 2006, p. 145 
1)2 Valenze 2006, pp.l 17-8
153 Ricard cited in Hirschman 1986b, p. 108 
1)1 Hirschman 1986b, p. 108
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These new arguments, I stress again, were not straightforward, one-sided, or 
uncontested. In the next chapter I shall examine how they were taken up and developed 
throughout the eighteenth century.
155 Porter 1993, p.65
62
3C orruption and  virtue: Mandeville, H um e, Sm ith, Rousseau
... the love of money is the root of all evil . . .
(St. Paul, I Tim., vi. 9, 10)
In his brilliant English Society in the Eighteenth Century (1990) Roy Porter writes in vivid 
detail of the ‘struggle, tension and conflict’ in English society during the 1700s1; he also 
notes the huge growth in trade bolstered by the new security of parliamentary credit 
underwritten by the Bank of England, established 1694 (in part due to Locke)2. Yet 
while many of the late seventeenth century economic theorists I mentioned in the 
previous chapter had supported this growth in trade, from the late 1600s and beginning 
of the 1700s, the degree and tone of the hostility towards consumption among 
commentators also grew dramatically. The increased availability of goods to people 
whom were still ostensibly proscribed impinged, all too visibly, on what had been the 
exclusive domain of elites. For lower class, as opposed to elite consumption, was in 
particular still interpreted as a threat to the hierarchy. Appleby refers, for instance, to a 
1683 pamphlet that argued aristocratic consumption should be exempt from any 
strictures, as they had been granted ‘dispensation’3; Hunt records that in 1698 Sir 
Richard Cocks called for further sumptuary laws in order ‘to hinder the expensive and 
vain way of living of our merchants and traders’4.
The effectiveness of the moralist’s attacks is drawn into question simply by the dramatic 
increase in the variety of goods and services consumed from the beginning of the 
eighteenth century alone. The attacks were emphatic however. Pocock describes how
1 Porter 1990, p.98
2 Porter 1990, p.188, p.202. See also Appleby 1980.
3 Appleby 1980, p. 134
4 Cocks cited in Hunt 1996, pp.360-1
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these debates were also crucially tangled up in issues of political governance relating to 
the move to a more mercantile economy, and how shifting political allegiances 
complicated many of the positions that were taken. In such debates, he writes, theorists 
such as Swift, Davenant and Defoe ‘were employing a highly ambivalent rhetoric, 
replete with alternatives, conflicts, and confusions, of which they were very well aware 
and in which they were to some extent entrapped’5. That aristocrats such as Sir Richard 
Cocks felt pressed enough to call for ‘dispensation’ is, nevertheless, telling. For the use of 
luxurious items was now being attacked not just in relation to the supposed moral 
degeneracy of merchants, traders and the poor: Appleby observes that Republican texts 
were now also being drawn on to argue elite consumption was getting out of hand:
classical republican texts [were used] to stigmatize novelty as the 
harbinger of social unrest. Using the essay form to inveigh against the new 
consuming tastes, these Augustan moralists read the goods they saw in 
haberdashery shops and food stalls as dangerous signs of corruption and social 
degeneration... The only antidote: frugality and simple living for the people, 
austere civic virtue in their leaders.6
Sekora writes of how Whig politicians often took this tack against the Tories, but as with 
Pocock he too notes that the debate did not fall strictly along party lines. It seems ideas 
of luxury were extraordinarily fluid, and the type o f ‘luxury’ being attacked often varied, 
depending of course on the preconceptions and motivations of who was doing the 
attacking. These differences of opinion did not, moreover, take place just at the level of 
discourse. In England in 1725 the self-styled ‘Society for the Reformation of Manners’ 
claimed responsibility for 91,899 arrests in relation to sumptuary law transgressions7. 
Half a century later, as Sekora records, the writer Smollett still bruited hanging as an 
appropriate punishment for such violations8.
Mandeville’s Fable o f  the Bees
From all the early literature supporting commerce and consumption Mandeville’s was 
the most (in)famous. His strong and open legitimisation of the national benefits of 
consumption, challenged religious arguments, conservative moralists, and mercantile 
philosophy, as well as Republican views that consumption would lead to a civic decline. 
Consumption, he argued, would not lead to the corruption of the res publica, but rather
5 (Pocock 2003, pp.446).
6 Appleby 1993, p. 165. My italics.
7 Sekora 1977, p.61
8 Sekora 1977, p. 110
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contribute to ‘civic energy’. His Fable of the Bees (first published as The Grumbling Hive in 
1703, edited and added to regularly in subsequent years), was an argument for full 
employment, busy national and international export and imports9, as well as for the 
validity of demand and fashion in maintaining trade:
The Root of evil Avarice,
That damn’d ill-natur’d baneful Vice,
Was Slave to Prodigality,
That Noble Sin; whilst Luxury 
Employ’d a Million of the Poor,
And odious Pride a Million more.
Envy it self, and Vanity 
Were Ministers of Industry;
Their Darling Folly, Fickleness 
In Diet, Furniture, and Dress,
That strange ridic’lous Vice, was made 
The very Wheel, that turn’d the Trade.
Their Laws and Cloaths were equally 
Objects of Mutability;
For, what was well done for a Time,
In half a Year became a Crime;
Yet whilst they alter’d thus their Laws,
Still finding and correcting Flaws,
They mended by Inconsistancy
Faults, which no Prudence could foresee 10
In the above stanza Mandeville refers to the arbitrary and frequently changeable nature 
of attributions of luxury and sumptuary law legislation. The vices he was promoting 
were those condemned by the religious and conservative moralists wishing to maintain 
the hierarchy. This is what is the subject of even his most infamous claim that
even the most vicious and decadent of tastes and desires will stimulate 
the economic enterprise needed to satisfy them, thus increasing wealth and civic 
energy.* 11
In writing that ‘societies cannot be raised to wealth and power, and the top of earthly 
glory without vices’12, and writing against, ‘frugality and the aesthetic virtues’13, 
Mandeville, Harth details, was mocking the short sightedness of those denigrating 
consumption, as well as derisively accentuating the hypocrisy of others who, indulging in
9 As long as ‘wise government’ ensured the balance of that trade remained equal (Berry 1994, p. 133).
10 Mandeville 1970, pp.68-9
11 Slater 1997, p. 177
12 Mandeville cited in Robinson 1962, p. 17 
19 Harth 1970, p.21
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the new and exotic types of goods which had become available, did not practice what
they preached. Mandeville’s ‘goal’, Appleby insists,
was to point up the hypocrisy in the outcry against luxury, not to endorse 
the abandonment of society to the consuming impulses of the least discerning 
members of society15.
In The Idea of Luxury (1994) Berry argues Mandeville said little that had not been said 
before, but that it was the explicit nature of his views and ‘deliberately provocative’ 
mode of expression that ensured his ‘succes de scandale' 16. For as Porter observes, while 
‘Mandeville’s formula scandalized many by its audacity, it was the golden rule by which 
many lived’17.
A changing world order: ‘The power of money as t he world is now 
constituted is real power’
Sekora discusses how anxiety about the connection between luxury and civic virtue was 
a trope shared by Plato, Aristotle, Cynic, Sophist, and early Stoic philosophy, Seneca, 
Cato, Cicero, Sallust, and Augustine. Moralists drew on these classics in an attempt to 
combat the many who, as Porter colourfully writes, ‘cocked a snook at killjoy 
denunciations of the pleasures of the flesh, finding them morbid, envious or splenetic’18. 
For in the wholesale condemnation of ‘luxury’ in the wake of the ‘furore stirred up by 
Mandeville’19 Sekora and Berry both refer to the huge volume of eighteenth century 
debates on luxury, ‘taken up and pursued throughout the world of letters from St 
Petersburg to Boston, from Naples to Aberdeen’20. Most commentators believed 
strongly that prosperity, luxury and avarice would only lead to the decline of 
civilisation21. Where Mandeville went to some lengths to refute perceptions that luxury 
led to effeminacy and military weakness (arguing against the perceived virtuosity of 
Sparta22, and noting that “‘wild Rakes” whose health has indeed been impaired by
14 ‘... the Fashionable Ways of Living, the Manners of the Age, that are often practis’d and preach’d 
against by the same people’ (Mandeville cited in Harth 1970, p.21).
15 Appleby 1993, p. 167. Also Berry 1994, p. 126. Robinson argues Mandeville intended ‘to show up 
the double standard of a people, purporting to be Christian, who value wealth and national glory 
above all’ (1962, p. 17). Smith also noted Mandeville was writing in response to ‘popular aesthetic 
doctrines’ (Smith cited in Robinson 1962, p. 18).
16 Berry 1994, p. 127
17 Porter 1990, p.258
18 Porter 1990, p.258
19 Berry 1994, p. 138
20 Berry 1994, p. 126
21 Sekora 1977. See also Muller 2002, p.40
22 Berry 1994, p. 127
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“Excesses of Wine and Women” have still fought bravely’23), historical studies were 
industriously drawn on to prove the opposite. In 1727 ‘pseudonymous editor’, Caleb 
d’Anver’s, for instance, argued Rome’s
Luxury and Profuseness led the Way to Indigence and Effeminacy; 
which prepared the Minds of the People for Corruption; and Corruption for 
Subjection; as they have constantly succeeded one another, and will do so again, 
in the same Circumstances, in all Countries, and in all Ages’24.
Sekora writes that later allegories of this ilk included Leland’s History of the Life and Reign of 
Philip King of Macedon (1758), and Montagu’s Refections on the Rise and Fall of Ancient 
Republics (17 5 9)25. But despite the customary didactic moralism, he too stresses that 
many such accounts were not clear-cut. He discusses, for instance, how Gibbon’s Decline 
and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776) conveys a similar trope, but also ‘distinguishes between 
harmless and harmful luxury’26. Pocock, in Virtue, Commerce, and History (1985), similarly 
characterises Gibbon as not antipathetic to luxury per se, but as with ‘Defoe, 
Montesquieu, Hume and others’, ambivalent about its effects, especially in so far as it 
involved trade27. Sekora also notes Defoe’s lack of consistency and how this was largely 
connected to the benefits of trade, the growth of that trade, and its impact on the class 
structure28.
Throughout the eighteenth century the “‘material drift” driven by a remorselessly 
creeping demand for more and better consumer goods of all kinds’29 associated with 
trade led to an inventiveness, richness, variety and ephemera of items which cannot be 
over emphasised. In English Society in the Eighteenth Century (1990) Porter outlines many of 
these in fascinating detail. The benefits of trade were not distributed evenly in this 
boisterous and violent society where children of seven could be hung for stealing a
23 Berry 1994, p. 133
24 Cited in Sekora 1977, p.64
25 Sekora 1977, p.96-7 & p.103. Hirschman notes the Republican virtues of ancient Rome were 
‘sobriety, civic pride and bravery. Luxury by contrast, ‘destroyed the republic and eventually the 
empire’ (Hirschman 1986b, p. 114).
26 Sekora 1977, p. 103
27 Pocock recounts Gibbon’s belief about the problem of senatorial disposition at the time of Alaric’s 
‘sack’ of Rome being associated with ‘an economy of conspicuous consumption, not of profitable 
exchange’ (Pocock 1985, p. 148).
28 Sekora 1977, pp. 116-18
29Jones cited in De Vries 1993, p.101. De Vries adds that from the Middle Ages ‘probate inventories 
seem to reveal an analogous “material drift” driven by a remorselessly creeping demand for more and 
better consumer goods of all kinds. “Consumer revolution” hardly seems to be the right term for such 
a protracted and broadly based process’ (de Vries 1993, jo. 101).
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petticoat, women could be burnt at the stake for murdering their husbands, public 
executions deemed a popular form of entertainment, and bodies of criminals lined streets 
mired in ordure (which passed for a sewerage system)30. Porter also points out numerous 
instances of lucrative political patronage and sinecure, the regular ‘smudging of hard and 
fast distinctions between the worlds of criminality and politics’31. He notes nonetheless, 
some overall improvement in living standards:
there was a growth of well-being which filtered down, however 
unequally, to improve the standards and quality of living of much of the 
population (though often heightening contrasts between the ‘haves’ and the 
‘have-nots’) ... much of this new wealth was being translated into personal goods, 
raising many households from subsistence levels to some comfort and style ... 
spare cash was widely laid out on entertainment and enjoyment.32
This overt consumption regime was an obvious, logical focus for anxieties about the 
growing ‘cash nexus’. Especially because despite the increasing prosperity, some toward 
the top of the hierarchy had come under threat. Most notable, Xenos documents in 
Scarcity and Modernity (1989) were the ‘ruined gentry selling their houses to rich 
merchants’33. Porter writes of how the peerage, by way of contrast, cunningly 
maintained, even increased their financial standing: it was the landed gentry whose 
financial status was dangerously tenuous and fluid34. Meanwhile, there was a new 
concern that the supposed niceties and verities of previous societal relations were being 
destroyed, for as the conservative English parliamentarian Bolingbroke protested in his 
Dissertation on Parties (1733/35): “THE POWER OF MONEY AS THE WORED IS 
NOW CONSTITUTED IS REAL POWER”35.
Despite any concerns about the new ‘cash nexus’, curiously enough the complaints 
against luxury which evoked the greatest furore throughout the seventeen hundreds were 
those which targeted the lower classes36. Yet Porter notes how ‘the mass of working 
people’ simply did not benefit from the new prosperity: ‘A proletariat, and a
30 Porter 1990, p.191-203
31 Porter 1990, p.99
32 Porter 1990, p.214
33 Xenos 1989, p. 17. See also Tribe, who discusses this process in the early sixteenth century, but also 
cites the reversal of this process ‘in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ (Tribe 1981, p. 17).
34 Porter 1990, pp.59-66
35 Bolingbroke cited in Sekora 1977, p.68. See also Hirschman, but note his brief and non-class 
specific argument that, for the most part, in the 1 700s, compared to the fears about the wildness of the 
passions, the docile ‘doux’ of making money was regarded as quite acceptable: ‘the dominant 
appraisal of the “love of gain” was positive, if somewhat disdainful’ (1977, p.57).
36 Sekora 1977, p. 107
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lumpenproletariat, were forming’37. However the all too evident poverty made no 
difference to the complaints. Sekora cites Fielding’s Enquiry into the Cause of the late Increase 
of Robbers (1751) as being representative of a general alarm about a ‘vast torrent of 
Luxury’. Fielding himself saw trade as responsible, having
given a new Face to the whole Nation ... and ... almost totally changed 
the Manners, Customs, and Habits of the People, more especially of the lower 
Sort. The Narrowness of their Fortune is changed into Wealth; the Simplicity of 
their Manners changed into Craft, their Frugality into Luxury, their Humility 
into Pride, and their Subjection into Equality.38
Even the many food riots of 1757, Sekora records, were taken as a sign of lower class
aspiration indicative ‘of the depravity of the times’39. Meanwhile, alongside elite
criticisms of the new middle class40, Sekora details instances of the middle class attacking
the working poor in turn41. Porter too writes of gradations of social distinction in
England and a ‘pecking order’ that fed on ‘status differentiation’42. To critics, no matter
what their station, perceptions of a righteous social hierarchy were paramount; most just
envisaged their own consumption as being on a level exempt from what they proscribed.
Nevertheless, it was lower class consumption of newly available goods, situated as it was
at the bottom of this scale, which resulted in the greatest chorus of malediction. At this
time in Britain when democracy was viewed as a terrible potential evil, lower class
consumption was positioned all too easily as representative of this dreadful potential
threat43. The vibrancy of imported East Indian cloth, for instance, whose popularity
swept across all classes, was one all too visible sign in this regard44. Cissie Fairchild
describes how in France there was also a market for ‘cheap copies of aristocratic luxury
items’45 giving lower classes access to what was previously only the province of elites.
Again, this novelty was seen to represent social unrest and for many moralists was an
unnatural upheaval in the order of things. In ‘T he meaning of things: interpreting the
consumer economy in the eighteenth century’, T.H. Breen details debates in America, as
37 Porter 1990, p.213
38 Fielding cited in Sekora 1977, p.91
39 Sekora 1977, p.65. He records ‘the normal economic attitude and practice of the century’ was that 
working class wages ‘should provide for only slightly more than mere subsistence’ (1977, p. 125).
40 Sekora notes how John Brown’s Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times (1757), with its 
diatribe against the luxury of ‘commercial classes’, became so popular it was reprinted seven times 
during its first year of publication (Sekora 1977, p.93).
41 Sekora 1977, p.75
42 Porter 1990, p.49
43 Pocock writes of Gibbon as being fearful o f ‘democratic fanaticism’ (Pocock 1985, p. 155)
44 Appleby (1980, pp. 166-9) also documents the resultant complaints of English wool manufacturers.
45 Fairchild’s study of the Parisian market between 1750 to 1850 notes the demand and plethora of 
‘populuxe’ goods (1993, p.228, p.242).
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late as 1768, about whether ‘equality’ in dress threatened the ‘divinely sanctioned social 
order’46. As the material expression of societal change consumption was a visible portent 
of an intangible but menacing threat.
Fairchild writes of how by the mid-eighteenth century the enforcement of the sumptuary 
laws had been largely abandoned in most countries47. Slater notes there were numerous 
attempts to revive them 48, but that on a practical level enforcing sumptuary law had 
simply become too difficult. Huge numbers of consumers had come to depend on the 
range of new consumption items, as well as the huge fiscal gains and employment the 
associated trade delivered. M uch of the increased taxation revenue throughout the 
eighteenth century, Porter details, also derived from ‘new levies’ such as ‘indirect taxes 
on consumption’49. And in his very clever, droll “Consumption: disease of the consumer 
society”, Porter records how sometime around the 1700s the shift in the traditional ways 
of thinking about consumption even translated into language. Prior to the seventeenth 
century the term consumption had been primarily associated with the wasting disease we 
now call tuberculosis, and as a m etaphor for national health was used to suggest a 
national ‘dissipation of accumulated resources, leading to economic entropy’50. With the 
new level of trade and material abundance however, it became apparent that
Buying and selling were vital for life-giving commerce.51 
Heibroner too notes the French Physiocrat Quesnay, who influenced Adam Smith,
insisted that wealth sprang from production and that it flowed through 
the nation, from hand to hand, replenishing the social body like the circulation of 
blood’52.
Slater similarly observes how from the 1700s the word also gradually took on more 
positive connotations related to the health of the nation, prefigured in terms of the 
stimulus of demand which could lead to wealth and material well-being53.
46 Breen 1993, p.255. Reverend Johnathon Mayhew made this particular complaint, although there 
were many others.
47 France, for instance, had no new sumptuary laws from the 1720s (Fairchilds 1993, p.231), and by 
the 1780s cheap copies of aristocratic luxury items became widely available (Fairchilds 1993, p.230).
48 Slater 1997, p.30, p.69
49 Porter 1990,p.l 17
50 Porter 1993, p.59
51 Porter 1993, pp.58-9.
52 Heilbroner 1972, p.47. Porter too notes this metaphor, and its probable derivation from William 
Harvey’s ‘discovery of the circulation of blood’ (Porter 1993, p.58).
53 Slater 1997, p. 177
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Hunt maintains ‘sumptuary law came in as an expression of a pre-modern critique of 
luxury and goes out as a soon-to-be discarded vehicle of economic protectionism’54. 
Clearly societal perceptions of consumption and luxury were changing. However 
Fairchilds argues that the impact of sumptuary law on subsequent thought and social 
practices still remained significant, with the disciplinary force of those laws being 
internalised55. Hunt too writes of the influence of sumptuary law after its demise:
The sumptuary ethic lived long past its participation in an active 
hegemony; it survived as a component of a cultural nostalgia for a time when 
people knew their place and that place was recognizable from their dress and 
deportment.56
Slater also argues that for some time after, the right to consume various ‘luxury’ items 
was still regarded as belonging to the elite and upper middle classes alone57.
In chapter eight I discuss Bourdieu’s Distinction (1984) and his notion of habitus, which 
charts how certain behaviours, habits and tastes remain the prerogative of certain 
classes, insofar as class position’s generate ways of viewing the world and provide skills 
and guidelines for appropriate behaviour. Habitus provides one possible way of viewing 
how conceptions of hierarchy remained entrenched. Once again, however, no matter 
the force of the discourse its power must be qualified by each instance of lower class 
consumption of items outside their ‘station’. Nevertheless attempts to demarcate the 
hierarchy appeared to remain unambiguous: Slater, for instance, relates a astonishing, 
perhaps unlikely account of churches still detailing obsolete sumptuary laws on an 
annual basis:
Until the nineteenth century it was customary for sumptuary laws to be 
read from the pulpit in every church at least once a year - a daunting task, since 
ordinances regarding dress alone often ran more than one hundred duodecimo 
pages.58
54 Hunt 1996, p.99. Although he also qualifies this: ‘The similarity and dissimilarity of protectionist 
and sumptuary laws is not to be resolved by definitional fiat. Rather I propose to treat them as being 
located within distinct discursive traditions and thus able to address the same objects of regulation and 
frequently ... as forming coexisting traditions’ (Hunt 1996, p.302).
55 Fairchilds also notes that ‘before the late eighteenth century the lower classes had been inhibited 
from buying luxury goods not only by their cost but also by sumptuary laws and their own acceptance 
of a heirarchical social order’ (1993, p.230).
56 Hunt 1996, p.329
57 ‘... eighteenth-century conservatives regarded luxury as a vice of the poor and middle classes, who 
strive above their station; the aristocracy have a culturally legitimate right, through their breeding and 
status superiority, to refined and excessive consumption’ (Slater 1997, p.79). See also Braudel 1981, 
p.311, Appleby 1993, pp.165-7, Hunt 1996, pp.332-4.
58 Sekora 1977, p.61
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Porter likewise details how the force of religious strictures were given further impetus by 
many conservative and historical scholars:
Churches preached against the love of lucre and the sin of unbridled 
appetite, while civic humanism prophesied that private enrichment sapped 
public liberty and virtue59.
By 1750 London had, Porter notes, ‘perhaps 150,000 retail outlets’60 for a ‘population of 
about 675,000’61. Pleasure gardens such as Vauxhall and Ranelagh thrived, as did 
theatres and all kinds of sport from bearbaiting to cock-throwing and horse-racing62. All 
were patronised by rich and poor alike. There were ‘masquerades, waxworks, magic- 
lantern shows, cock-fights, panoramas, hippodromes, puppet-theatres’63. In the 
meantime, engaging resort towns such as Bath attracted the ire of moralists such as 
Smollett, and Porter writes of explanations for visits there being whitewashed:
‘Taking the waters’ for medicinal reasons was the excuse, but in reality it 
was a holiday haven. Visitors flocked in to idle away time, ogle the exquisite, 
haggle matches for their daughters, and, above all, gamble.64
In this, as well as so many other activities,
forms of enjoyment which had previously been private, exclusive and 
monopolised by the very rich were becoming open to the paying public at 
large.65
H um e and Sm ith: ‘The increase and consu m p tio n  o f all the  com m odities 
w hich serve to the  o rnam en t and  p leasu re  o f life are advantageous to 
society ...’
Aside from Mandeville’s (in)famous provocation the two writers most obviously (and 
more respectably) responsible for displacing and undermining the attacks on 
consumption during the 1700s were Adam Smith and David Hume. Both connected 
their ideas with reason, freedom and social progress, and both strongly positioned the 
continued complaints against consumption and free trade as ‘pernicious to society’66. 
Consumption, as opposed to merely trade, they argued, was responsible for generating 
conditions that benefited the nation as a whole. In this both represented consumption
59 Porter 1993, p.58
60 Porter 1990, p.25
61 Anderson 1996, p.5
62 Porter 1990, pp.229-30, pp.294-95
63 Porter 1990, p.232
64 Porter 1990, p.227
65 Porter 1990, p.
66 Smith cited in Robinson 1962, p. 19
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and consumer sovereignty, associated with ‘the economic pursuit of self-interest by 
economic m an’67, as quite acceptable, even necessary. They believed it would also 
improve the material conditions of all, and in a novel m anner also actually attempted to 
consider those at the bottom of the socio-economic strata.
Following Mandeville, Berry comments, there were two standard views of the way 
luxury impacted on the strength of nations:
Those in favour of luxury emphasise employment or industry as a source 
of national strength, while those opposed emphasise military valour and 
associated traits as the chief prop of states68.
Berry points out that in his 1 74269 essay ‘On Luxury’, Hum e reversed both accounts, 
arguing ‘Refinement on the pleasures and conveniences of life has no natural tendency 
to beget venality and corruption’70. At the same time he declared consumption vital to a 
functioning military, insofar as desire for goods develops the capacity of labour which 
can then be channelled and used when necessary in order to maintain military strength:
The increase and consumption of all the commodities which serve to the 
ornam ent and pleasure of life are advantageous to society, because at the same 
time that they multiply those innocent gratifications to individuals they are a 
kind of storehouse of labor, which, in the exigencies of state, may be turned to the 
public service. In a nation where there is no dem and for such superfluities men 
sink into indolence, lose all enjoyment of life, and are useless to the public, which 
cannot maintain or support its fleets and armies from the industry of slothful 
members.71
Here commerce, for Hume
rouses men from their indolence; and presenting the gayer and more 
opulent part of the nation with objects of luxury, which they never before 
dream ed of, raises in them a desire for a more splendid way of life than what 
their ancestors enjoyed’72.
As Berry points out, Hume saw the results of commerce delivering a progressive 
development of refinement and civilisation73: however this was still prefigured in terms of
67 Slater 1997, p.41
68 Berry 1994, p.137
69 There appears to have been a number of editions of “On Luxury”. Muller dates it at 1742, Sekora, 
1752 (Sekora 1977, p.l 10, Muller 2002, p.41).
70 Hume 1995, pp.494-5
71 Hume 1995, p.492
72 Hume cited in Xenos 1989, pp.l 1-2
73 Berry 1994, p .l45
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the value of ‘industry’ with the ‘love of gain’ intended to ‘prevail over the love of 
pleasure’74.
David Hume and Adam Smith were friends and interlocutors. Like Hume, Smith also 
refuted arguments that trade was corrupting and would weaken the nation75. And with 
the Wealth of Nations, published in 1776 (the same year as the American Declaration of 
Independence and its pronouncement of ‘certain unalienable human rights’), his stance 
became a most effective, famous counter to the arguments of the moralists76. Smith’s 
argument for the necessity for trade and commerce was based on a complex ethical and 
philosophical foundation. This was delineated in the Theory of Moral Sentiment (published 
in 1759), and was concerned with the improvement, Heilbroner avers, of human society 
in general77, in a manner that attempted to rebut conservative moralists head on. For 
Smith was not, Joan Robinson stresses in Economic Philosophy (1962), simply advocating 
the unbridled pursuit of wealth or the validity of unlimited desires78: when he declared 
consumption the sole purpose of production he was attempting to validate consumption 
in terms of the work involved in producing goods to be consumed79. Properly 
channelled, the pursuit of self-interest he believed would result in public benefits, and the 
motivations generated by consumer interactions would develop human ‘sympathies and 
sociability’. Slater too notes Smith’s belief that emulation and desire would generate 
morality and empathy, leading a progressive improvement in material conditions, society 
and culture:
‘consideration on the part of others’ is not a form of moral corruption 
but the very basis of morality and social solidarity, and the basis of emulation is 
to a very large extent an innate human desire for aesthetic pleasure, a drive to 
culture. Their arguments are based on the notion of ‘sympathies’: it is through 
the human imaginative capacity to place ourselves in the position of the other, 
and to view self and other ‘from the standpoint of a “spectator”, a hypothetical 
Other embodying the values and customs of a given society’ that we can see, and 
desire and aspire to, the satisfactions which various goods (forms of wealth) can
74 Hume cited in Hirschman 1977, p.66. Berry also notes Hume’s payment ‘of dues to the moralist 
tradition’, although ‘the whole tenor of Hume’s argument runs counter to that tradition’ (1994, p.144).
75 Berry 1994, p. 170
76 Smith 1990, p.28
77 Heilbroner 2003
78 This is the case on an individual rather than societal level: on a societal level Smith still believed 
unlimited desires necessary to drive the new prosperity. However these were not necessarily negative. 
Smith disagreed with Mandeville’s representation of every passion as wholly vicious’ (Smith cited in 
Robinson 1962, p. 18). On an individual level Smith disparaged aspirational and ‘frivolous types of 
consumption’, advocating instead the importance of prudent investment.
79 See also Gabriel and Lang 2006, p.33, and Appleby 1993, p.168.
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offer. Yet this capacity for sympathy is also the basis of all moral behaviour and 
social solidarity80.
Smith’s principal target in the Wealth of Nations was mercantile philosophy. As I 
mentioned earlier, this had enjoyed considerable political sway since the late 1600s; it 
had become even more influential in the eighteenth century. And in comparison to 
conservative moralists and the mercantile economists81, Smith’s views were quite 
progressive. As Appleby details, Smith was progressive insofar as he hoped that free 
from the constraints of oppressive, nepotistic feudal systems of government equilibrium 
in the market would result in an abundance for all:
Smith saw that in the esteemed primitive societies where men and 
women retained the whole of their produce, there was material equality, but lives 
of misery and want. In commercial societies with their flagrantly unequal 
distribution of wealth, the labouring poor prospered as well.82
Although ‘liberal’ in the sense of being concerned with the betterment of society, Smith
remained opposed to universal suffrage: women and ‘inferior’ men were ‘naturally’
excluded from his schema. Smith also still held a Deist view of Nature as God’s creation;
this creation was ordered as precisely as a mechanical system. As a working
epiphenomenon of God’s natural system, Smith believed the market would act with
perfect, pure rationality to refine orderly social equilibrium from the multitude of
80 Slater 1997, p.81. Appleby further notes that Smith believed that at some point people would come 
to place more value on attempting to improve their condition by investing prudently, encouraged by 
the mechanism of consumption itself as people’s ‘sociability’ and moral feeling ‘developed’ through 
their engagement with others (Appleby 1993, p.169). This in turn mitigates their self-interest, but still 
ensures ‘social benefits’ as Clarke puts it, ‘ensue’ (Clarke 1983, p.21). Hirschman also notes Ricard’s 
less famous 1704 defence of commerce’s civilizing powers, ‘reprinted repeatedly through the next 
eighty years’ (1986b, p. 108).
81 As an tactic for developing prosperity and growth mercantile policy was not, as Dunn records, 
intended to benefit ‘subordinate’ classes (Dunn 1970, p. 165). And mercantile policy was still going 
strong well into in the early 1800s. The English Corn Laws for instance, ratified and validated by 
mercantile ideas saw the imposition of huge taxes on grain imports which artificially increased the 
price of English grain, benefiting the landed aristocracy. As Heilbroner documents, this led to a 
situation in 1813 when, ‘despite the extraordinary hardship experienced by the poorer classes of the 
time, a bushel of wheat sold for a price equal to nearly twice a workman’s whole weekly wage’ 
(Heilbroner 1972, p.79). Clarke too writes that where conservatives called ‘for a restoration, in one 
form or another, of the medieval order, enforced by Church and State and governed by an hereditary 
ruling class’ (Clarke 1983, p. 115), writers in the liberal tradition were ‘reactive’, being against any 
‘return to medieval forms of social regulations’ (Clarke 1983, p.l 1)
82 Appleby 1993, p .l68. See also Berry 1994, p. 161. He also argued sumptuary law was the ‘highest 
impertinence and presumption on the part of kings and ministers in their effort to watch over the 
economy of private people’ (Smith cited in Berry 1994, p.l 15).
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different and competing desires83. As Slater and Tonkiss relate in Market Society: Markets 
and Modem Social Theory (2001),
In advancing a claim for the mutual gains from trade, Smith drew on the 
eighteenth-century physiocratic belief that a “harmony of interests” ordered 
human affairs. While seemingly guided only by self-interest, market behaviour is 
in fact co-ordinated as if by an “invisible hand” to bring general benefit to all. 
Smith in this way twinned the physiocratic concept of natural order with a 
contemporary philosophical emphasis on “interest” as shaping individual action 
(Hirschman 1977) ... The art of association in a commercial society, then, is 
based on the beneficial effects of self-interest.84
Appleby relates that Smith believed classical republican thought was incapable of 
explaining to the ‘economic changes transforming society’, and she maintains that 
providing such an explanation was a motivating force that informed the work of the 
Scottish philosophers85. She notes that Smith’s account was deemed a more credible 
analysis, with his ideas achieving widespread publicity and support. Coupled with an 
increasingly optimistic and economically confident nationalism which Porter depicts 
England developing in the eighteenth century, such views appear in turn to have had an 
impact on certain strains of Republican thought:
down at least to the 1780s, it was the world of ancient politics which 
could be made to seem rigid and austere, impoverished because 
underspecialized; and the new world of the social and sentimental, the 
commercial and the cultural, was made to proliferate with alternatives to ancient 
virtus and libertas ...86
Sekora notes in 1757 Walpole even went so far as to label the classics outmoded:
Throw away your Greek and Roman books, histories of little peoples87 
So this is the context in which consumption and trade increasingly came to be positioned 
as transcending their connection with dangerous and morally degenerate passions, 
becoming instead vehicles for beneficent interests, as Hirschman’s The Passions and the 
Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (1977) records, with the pursuit of 
acquisitions viewed as a steadying, even convivial, rather than disruptive, character trait.
83 Slater 1997, p.41. This conception was explicitly expressed by Burke when he argued ‘the laws of 
commerce are the laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God’ (Burke cited Clarke 1983, p.48).
84 Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p.42, pp.39-53.
85 ‘classical republican thought utterly failed ... in explaining the economic changes transforming 
society’ (Appleby 1993, pp. 167-8).
86 Pocock 1985, p.50
87 Sekora 1977, p. 106
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With this shift in perception its curious that, towards the end of the century, first the 
French and then the American revolutions were represented as tangible manifestations 
of what many moralists feared the new consumption regime to signify. These 
revolutions were political struggles, but to the extent they were also struggles over taxes 
and disproportionate access to resources, they were conflicts about consumption. On 
the role of consumption in relation to the American revolution, Michael Schudson 
contends ‘Political activism in the years leading up to the American Revolution was 
organised around consumer identity and the nonimportation of British consumer 
goods’88. Citing Breen, Schudson holds that
While traditional political action was available only to propertied white 
males, consumer-based protest could be much more widely shared. Basing 
protest on consumer identity was a radically egalitarian move and a novel one: 
“No previous popular rebellion had organized itself so centrally around the 
consumer” .89
On this point of the equity as being expressed through the market, however, despite the 
increasing ratification of Smith’s solution, and the positioning of consumption and trade 
as delivering civility, another group were beginning to become increasingly vocal during 
this period: socialist critics, denouncing the market system as based on intrinsic 
exploitation90. But whatever the source of the arguments against free trade, Smith’s 
enduring account positioned consumption as a vehicle driving prosperity; all complaints 
were regressive. Here embedded in Smith’s conception of economic life, Clarke writes, 
was the notion that all class relations should and ‘could be harmoniously regulated on 
the basis of competitive pursuit of individual self-interest’91. Yet even towards the end of
88 Schudson 1998, p.260
89 Schudson 1998, p.260. Also Breen’s ‘Narrative of Commercial Life: Consumption, Ideology, and 
Community on the Eve of the American Revolution’ in William and Mary Quarterly, 50 (1993): 486
90 Clarke notes the theoretical opponents of the political economists included conservative as well as 
socialist critics, and more moderate liberals: ‘First, political economy had to face conservative critics 
who believed that the development of capitalism was undermining the established order and creating 
a society marked by conflict and moral degeneration. Second, it had to face socialist critics who 
believed that exploitation was inherent in the capitalist system and who proposed reform on the basis 
of co-operation. Third, it had to face criticism from those who accepted the fundamental social 
relations of capitalist society, but who could not accept that such social relations could be regulated 
solely by the free play of the market’ (Clarke 1983, p.l 15).
91 Clarke 1983, p.l 19. Also Berry 1994, p.162-5. In relation to this approach, keep in mind also, that 
even prior to the economic devastation and wide unemployment wrought by the Speenhamland Law 
of 1792 (Polanyi 2001), well into the 1800s a commonly held view was that the poor were so idle they 
should remain poor or they would not be prepared to work (Heilbroner 1972, p.37). It was in this 
context that the least manifestation of comfort on their part generated cries of complaint. Yet see 
Appleby also for a detailed analysis of seventeenth century writer’s views, acknowledging their 
awareness of the unremitting levels of unemployment (1980, pp. 129-157).
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the eighteenth century Clarke observes how Smith’s ideas were subject to criticisms 
related to political power, class and the distribution of wealth in society, from across the 
political spectrum. Here consumption was still targeted by conservatives and religious 
moralists as transgressive and degenerate, by mercantile economists as economically 
detrimental, and by socialists as illustrative of the unequal distribution of material well 
being and symptomatic of the incapacity of the free market policies to achieve the 
reform necessary to address that inequality.
Shifts in Republican attitudes during the 1700s only added to the layered complexity 
and diversity of views. In discussing elite attempts to formulate /  reconcile idealised 
conceptions of active political citizenship and civic virtue in the face of the new 
challenges and threats offered by the growth in commerce and credit, Pocock writes of 
republican notions of virtue being redefined ‘with the aid of a concept of “manners’” 
connected to a new ‘relationship’ with ‘things’92:
if he could no longer engage directly in the activity and equality of ruling 
and being ruled, but had to depute his government and defence to specialized 
and professional representatives, he was more than compensated for his loss of 
antique virtue by an indefinite and perhaps infinite enrichment of his 
personality, the product of multiplying relationships, with both things and 
persons, in which he became progressively involved.93
Of course such a position once again only relates to elite acceptance of their own
consumption, but Pocock discusses how this ideal changed yet again after 1789, when
those strands encompassing an acceptance of consumption as a practice of virtue,
morphed into new
denunciations of commerce as founded upon soullessly rational 
calculation and the cold mechanical philosophy of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and 
Newton.94
This shift, as well as the other positions mentioned in the preceding paragraph can be 
further transposed against Colin Campbell’s arguments in The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit 
of Modem Consumerism (1990). For Campbell identifies yet another thematic approach 
toward consumption which he sees as first developing as a result of the Cambridge
92 Pocock 1985, p.48
93 Pocock 1985, p.49. He continues, ‘Since these new relationships were social not political in 
character, the capacities which they led the individual to develop were not called “virtues” but 
“manners”, a term in which the ethical mores and the juristic consuetudines were combined, with the 
former predominating. The social psychology of the age declared that encounters with things and 
persons evoked passions and refined them into manners; it was preeminently the function of 
commerce to refine the passions and polish the manners ... (Pocock 1985, p.49)
94 Pocock 1985, p.50
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Platonist’s ‘optimistic theodicy of benevolence’93, which in turn facilitated the movement 
of Sentimentalism early in the eighteenth century, and later Romanticism proper.
Campbell on Sentimentalism, the ‘Romantic ethic’ and ‘taste’
Campbell’s richly drawn study makes conscious reference to Weber’s The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism (1978), and attempts to draw connections between a number of 
different strands of thought from the Protestant ‘Ethic’ on with the aim of providing an 
explanation of the emergence of a new ‘ethic’ associated with Romanticism. Campbell 
acknowledges Romantic social and economic criticisms of society, yet in an acrobatic 
twist argues that Romanticism inadvertently fed into and enabled the tremendous 
growth in middle class consumption that developed during the 1700 and 1800s. He 
stresses that in no sense could Romantics be regarded as intending to bring about this 
‘state of affairs’96, especially given their general repudiation of bourgeois conventions. 
He nevertheless cites a number of studies which note how the ‘expansion of demand in 
the early part of the Industrial Revolution was essentially middle class in origin’97, driven 
by a new propensity to spend rather than save98, notes a rise in leisure activities around 
the time, the growth of fashion, and an enormous increase in romantic fiction (along 
with the development of notions of romantic love). All this seems indicative, Campbell 
writes, o f‘fundamental changes in beliefs, values and attitudes’99.
Campbell contends that the more general economic arguments of the time ratifying 
consumption and trade were not ‘compelling enough’ to account for this change, or ‘to 
counteract’ what he regards as a previously ‘powerful Puritanical suspicion of luxury 
consumption’100. Neither does he believe arguments stressing emulation and imitation 
are convincing enough to explain the decline of Protestant aestheticism. He argues 
instead, that the key to understanding the character of these changes was the 
development of a new self-directed imaginative capacity for day-dreaming101, supplying 
a detailed analysis of the changes he believes enabled this capacity for daydreaming to
95 Campbell 1990, p.l 18
96 Campbell 1990, p.208
97 Campbell 1990, p.25
98 Campbell 1990, p .l8
99 Campbell 1990, p.28
100 Campbell 1990, pp.28-31, p.100, pp.202-3, p.31
101 Campbell 1990, p.76-8
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develop; initially because of how shifts in various currents in religious thought impacted 
on societal notions of ideal behaviour102.
Campbell believes the Protestant search for evidential signs of each individual’s ‘state of 
grace’103, postulated by Weber, played a central in this process. Going beyond Weber, 
Campbell contends that even after the weakening of predestination as a doctrine, this 
concern about ‘signs’ led to a more generalised belief that various pointers, including 
‘displays of feeling’, could be representative of ‘the fundamental spiritual state of an 
individual’104. The influence of the Cambridge Platonists’ rejection of Hobbes was 
critical here, and Campbell charts, at length, the development of their ideas and 
progression of their influence105, claiming their views shaped a new ‘optimistic theodicy 
of benevolence’ in England106. As this spread via sermons, he believes it linked ‘a 
pietistic strand of Puritan thought to a neo-Platonic philosophy, [in a manner that] served 
to create an “emotionalist” ethic of Christian sensibility’^ 1. With increasing secularisation 
subsequently belief and emotion came to be ‘identified in such a way that an expression 
of feelings was thought to serve in place of an expression of faith’108.
Campbell positions the doctrine of Sentimentalism as being the initial domain in which 
this new tendency played out. He writes of how it became ‘especially fashionable’ in 
England ‘in the 1740s and 1750s’, with ideas about ‘sensibility’ as a character attribute 
being its main feature: sensibility as a personal quality involved the capacity to feel and 
express an emotional response, and as a character ideal was regarded as representative 
of moral virtue109. Sentimentalism supported a view ‘that only feelings can be truly relied 
upon to indicate that which is good’110, and was concerned with personal conceptions of 
appropriate feeling, usually exhibited in ‘indulgent’ excess of normal societal
102 Campbell 1990, p. 116-17
103 Campbell 1990, pp. 123-31
104 Campbell 1990, p. 131
105 Campbell 1990, pp.107-23. ‘In the years following the Restoration this theology of benevolence 
spread outside the small circle of scholars who constituted the Cambridge Platonists to meet with 
increasing acceptance among the more influential clergy ...’ (Campbell 1990, p.l 19)
106 Campbell 1990, p.l 18
107 Campbell 1990, p.l 18. My italics.
108 Campbell 1990, p .l33
109 Campbell 1990, pp. 138-41. Campbell refers, for instance to Raymond Williams, who cites Lady 
Bradshaugh in turn ‘as commenting in 1749 that the word “sentimental” is “so much in vogue among 
the polite’” (Campbell 1990, p .l38)
110 Campbell 1990, p. 151
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expectations111. Sentimentalism was thus less focused on societal conventions112, but also 
tacitly and implicitly proffered new norms in turn:
Responsiveness to beauty thus became a crucial moral quality, such that 
any deficiency in this respect became a moral lapse, whilst correspondingly 
virtue became an aesthetic quality, such that, in turn, any moral lapse was ‘bad 
taste’. 113
Campbell argues that one key aspect of Sentimentalism relates to how manners and taste 
were perceived differently by the upper and middle classes. This is one reason why he 
believes that the growth in middle class consumption cannot just be explained away as 
emulative. He positions the aristocracy as still being ‘drawn to the classical ideal’ (of 
restraint), rejecting middle-class claims to distinction, and regarding the middle-class 
conception of taste as pretentious and vulgar (but here too ‘appearance was taken as a 
major indication of the degree of one’s mastery of good form as a whole and hence as a 
prime index of character’114. It is easy to surmise how Republican thought, as outlined 
in relation to Pocock and Appleby’s arguments above, may have played a role here). 
Campbell claims then, that while elites partook in luxurious consumption, they did so 
with stoic ‘restraint’, and advocated an adherence ‘to carefully defined standards of 
propriety’115. He does note the difference between aristocratic rhetoric and reality (gout 
was an ‘occupational’ hazard), but believes this does not discount the importance of 
‘approved forms of conduct’116. He contends the eighteenth century middle class, in 
contrast, did not find the neo-classical tradition appealing117, although they still felt the 
force of its ‘claim to moral and cultural superiority’118. Yet he also points out the
111 Campbell 1990, pp. 140-5
112 This idea, that only feelings could be relied upon to determine good, again was only possible, 
Campbell argues, following the arguments of thinkers such as the Cambridge Platonists and the Third 
Earl of Shaftesbury, who associated goodness with beauty (Campbell 1990, p. 151), ‘making both 
morality and aesthetics a matter of emotional intuition’ (Campbell 1990, p. 152).
113 Campbell 1990, p. 152. In his contribution to Consumption and the World of Goods (1993), Campbell 
adds that ‘Consequently ‘taste’ itself became the most important of an individual’s qualities of 
character’ (Campbell 1993, p.49). Here then, it was felt that an individual’s sensibility could be 
determined ‘through their aesthetic taste or sense of beauty’ (Campbell 1990, p. 152).
114 Campbell 1990, p. 160
115 Campbell 1990, pp.203-5
116 Campbell 1990, p. 166. Dissolute types of aristocratic conduct ‘often represent attempts to 
demonstrate heroic or manly qualities; consequently they are typically communal, taking the form of 
character contests in which there is a predominant concern to demonstrate strength, stamina, will­
power and self-control’ (1990, pp. 166-7). Note that this conduct Campbell refers to is gendered, 
female members of the elite may, he believes, have been more receptive to Sentimental character 
ideals (1990, p. 172).
117 As a doctrine it ‘was too far removed from their interests’ (Campbell 1990, p.149).
118 Campbell 1990, p. 149
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inconclusive debates over the determination of beauty at the time: reason was being
called on in vain to provide a guide to universal standards, but increasingly, there was a
growing feeling that this discerning faculty, based on individual 
sensibility, expressed itself in such a complex and manifold way that no such 
measure could exist. 119
Campbell mentions middle class irritation with these debates, and with the ‘aesthetic 
paternalism of neo-classical writers’120. He also discusses how an alternative middle class 
claim (or discourse), developed in response:
aesthetics itself became a battleground in the class struggle for cultural 
hegemony waged in the second half of the century. For as the middle classes 
sought to contest the elite’s taken-for-granted claim to moral and cultural 
superiority, they increasingly found that their own lack of any claim to aesthetic 
distinction counted against them.
Just as the eighteenth-century English aristocracy were most vulnerable to the 
criticisms of immorality and extravagance, so were the rising middle classes most 
vulnerable to the charge of being vulgar, that is, of lacking ‘taste’ in both the 
behavioural and aesthetic senses of the word. In order to counter this 
accusation, there was a move to develop an essentially ‘bourgeois’ aesthetic and 
norm of conduct, and to argue that it, and not upper-class neo-classicism, 
represented ‘good taste’. 121
Here then, from the mid-eighteenth century, a number of theoretical positions had 
increasingly begun to collide: the increasing failure of elite appeals to tradition as a 
means of determining beauty, disagreements as to what the essential universal standard 
of what beauty might actually consist of, and ‘a growing individualism’122. All combined 
he writes, to ensure a new emphasis came to be ‘placed upon self-determination in 
matters of taste’123. Debates about standards of judgment remained an issue, but 
Campbell believes it is at this point that ‘fashion’ came into its own124.
119 Campbell 1990, p. 155
120 Campbell 1990, p. 156.
121 Campbell 1990, pp.149-50
122 Campbell 1990, pp.155-6
123 Campbell writes that where Shaftesbury and Hutchinson had not drawn a distinction between 
individual’s ‘innate’ ability to discern beauty and universal standards, with Hume ‘sensibility could be 
seen as totally subjectivist’ (Campbell 1990, p. 156).
124 One key point to note here however is that Campbell positions fashion as meeting the need of an 
‘underlying predisposition’ (1990, p. 159), rather than being a commercial strategy imposed from 
above in any simply conceived way. Again, arguments that emulation drove the consumer demand of 
the time are, he believes, inadequate: ‘This combination of circumstances, where a strong desire to 
manifest a highly valuable personal quality existed, and yet no commonly agreed aesthetic standard 
could be found to replace the classical ideal, led to the development of modern fashion, the other 
crucial factor being the very real demand for novelty which the search for emotional pleasure 
naturally stimulated’ (Campbell 1990, p. 158).
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The 1800s most commonly spring to mind as the hegemonic domain of the bourgeois 
aesthetic, but Campbell seems to sketch here clear traces of its inception. The 
aristocracy, their ideals unsupported by reason, fell back on customary ‘norms and 
conventions’, while the middle classes instead drew on a mix of Sentimentalism, 
Protestantism and ‘certain classical ideals’ to position their interpretation of taste in 
terms of ‘a quasi-charismatic quality of near-spiritual dimensions’125. Sentimentalism, 
then, ratified the view that felt emotions were pleasurable and should be indulged126, and 
with an ‘enthusiasm’ repugnant to the aristocratic neo-Stoic ideal, expressing taste, and 
thus virtue via consumption accordingly became legitimate in terms of the bourgeois 
horizon of permissible social strategies127.
Sentimentalism as a doctrine did fall out of vogue toward the latter part of the 1700s 
Campbell records, coming to be viewed as excessive, suspect, and even insincere128. But 
he contends the attitudes it permitted in relation to consumption were only fostered by 
the concomitant shift to ‘a full-blown romanticism’ which developed through a new 
stress on ‘natural’, as opposed to ‘artificial’ feelings129. It is tempting to suggest that 
Rousseau’s response to artificiality may have played a role in this shift130. Yet while
125 Campbell 1990, p.150, p.159. The middle class, ‘true to their religious heritage, regarded ‘taste’ as 
a sign of moral and spiritual wealth, with an ability to take pleasure in the beautiful and to respond 
with tears to the pitiable equally indicative of a man (or woman) of virtue’ (Campbell 1990, p.205).
126 Whether such emotions derived ‘from pity, benevolence, love, grief or horror’ (Campbell 1990, 
p.141). This, Campbell argues later, ‘was an ethic which inevitably provided powerful legitimation for 
the pursuit of emotional pleasure’ (Campbell 1990, p.205).
127 Campbell 1990, p.153-67
128 Campbell 1990, pp.173-4
129 Campbell 1990, p. 17 7
130 In Consumer Culture and Modernity (1997) Slater for instance, writes of how Rousseau was part of a 
general reaction against materialism and industrialisation, focusing instead a new attention on the 
‘artistic’, personal development of a ‘true’ inner self (Slater 1997, pp.15-6). Slater points out that 
Rousseau, unlike Smith and Hume, did not believe that culture developed ‘civilisation’ or 
‘sympathies’, only unnatural vices. Where Hume and Smith saw desire and emulation operating as 
civilising forces (Slater 1997, p.78), Rousseau, Slater writes, argued that society ‘actually delivers 
heteronomy - man’s needs are determined by the fashions, opinions and scrutiny of society ... he 
becomes ‘other-determined’ (Slater 1997, p.78). Here, as Slater further outlines, ‘Emulation replaces 
that authenticity with mere appearances’ (Slater 1997, p.81). Xenos too notes how for Rousseau it 
was society which caused people to emulate one another simply in order to be recognised as a ‘socially 
acceptable self (Xenos 1989, p.23), and that he saw this as an altogether negative process, not only 
because it prevented the authentic formation of self, but because it also ensured the immediacy of 
natural desires become transformed into a malformed and unhealthy dependency upon vice. Here 
Rousseau, Xenos adds, saw ‘signs of slavery in the conventions of civilized life and its symbols of 
success’ (Xenos 1989, p.23). In an unpolluted state of nature humans desired nothing more than the 
satisfaction of their immediate needs. In their ‘natural state’ human desires were not insatiable, as 
Hobbes and others had proposed, they only became so as society developed and emulation occurred.
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Campbell does not discuss Rousseau, he does mention a num ber of other factors131, 
including Romanticism’s relation to certain Sentimentalist ‘ideals and attitudes’, and its 
growing out of and constituting a reaction against Enlightenment rationalism 132.
The Romantic movement was inconsistent, diverse, and was represented by a gamut of 
writers and artists from across the political spectrum 133. Campbell acknowledges that 
defining Romanticism is ‘notoriously difficult’, as is making any definitive claims about 
the movement as a whole134. Yet, as with Sentimentalism, Campbell positions 
Romanticism as providing a new arena for competing understandings of ‘taste’. One 
crucial point he mentions is how even at the very beginning of the Romantic movement 
the previous middle class antipathy toward the aristocracy had diminished. Divisions 
within the middle class which had developed at the end of the eighteenth and beginning 
of the nineteenth century in the context of the atmosphere wrought by the French and 
Industrial Revolutions, now become the new arena of opposing concerns as anxieties 
were directed toward the establishment regime supporting ‘cold, impersonal economic 
forces’135:
Ehe waning of the old aristocracy, and the rise to prominence of the 
trading and business classes, m eant that the sentimentalist critique of the nobility 
- indicted for their emotional stoicism, frivolous extravagance, and an arrogance 
that his a lack of spiritual depth - was increasingly irrelevant, and it came to be 
recognized that the real enemy of sensibility lay in the cold-hearted utilitarian 
philistinism of the nouveaux riches'1 began to be seen as representative of repressive 
conventionality to be rebelled against. 136
It is in this context that Campbell describes the key appeal of Romanticism in relation to 
middle class consumption as being its ability to connect ‘taste’ vis-a-vis imagination and 
creativity to a spiritual quest:
With the ... reaction against an overly narrow rationalism ... and the 
incorporation of an evangelical spirit into sensibility, the key attribute of ‘taste’ 
became transformed into a capacity for seeing into the nature of sacred truth,
131 Campbell positions Gothic and romantic novels, especially popular with women, as crucial in 
generating a ‘sense of dissatisfaction with the world’ and the development of a ‘generalized longing’ 
that resulted in ‘the critical break with traditionalism which occurred in the second half of the 
eighteen century’ (Campbell 1990, p. 176, pp. 174-8).
132 Campbell 1990, p. 179, p. 181
133 Winch 2004. Chandler 1998.
134 Campbell 1990, p. 179. As does Chandler 1998.
135 Campbell 1990, p. 179
136 Campbell 1990, p. 178. With Romanticism ‘an individual’s true sensibility became validated as 
much by their defiance of convention as by the direct manifestation of emotional susceptibility’ 
(Campbell 1990, p .177).
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relabelled ‘im agination’, and used to link the aesthetic with the spiritual rather 
than the ethical. 137
Signalled here is the tendency, which some more conservative strains of Romanticism 
exhibited, for societal improvement to be prefigured in a less material vein. But 
Campbell also discusses how Romantics more generally regarded art (their art) as having 
the capacity to awaken the feelings necessary for correct conduct138. In this, pleasure, as 
opposed to a didactic moralism also played a key role:
moral insight and improvement is achieved through the medium of 
pleasure itself, such that this becomes the moral agent. 139
As I m entioned earlier, Campbell stresses that with their rejection of bourgeois 
conventionality in no sense could the Romantics be seen as intending to ratify 
consumption. Overall however, he contends that, with its emphasis on pleasure 
Romanticism unintentionally legitimated an imaginative hedonism, a kind of ‘day­
dream ing, longing and the rejection of reality, together with the pursuit of originality’ 140 
that he sees as supporting certain aspects of modern consumer behaviour. In this he 
positions consumption ‘as a voluntaristic, self-directed and creative process in which 
cultural ideals are necessarily implicated’141, and argues that Rom anticism ’s unintended 
legitimation of consumption provided a powerful justification ‘counteracting both 
traditionalistic and utilitarian restraints on desire’142. Challenges to tradition, the
137 Campbell 1990, p. 182. Here he also ratifies Romanticism as a mode of feeling; ‘it tends towards 
the new, towards individualism, revolt, escape, melancholy, and fantasy’ (Gauderfroy-Demombynes 
cited in Campbell 1990, p. 181). Campbell also notes that while skeptical about religion, the 
Romantics ‘still took for granted the association between nature and religious truth which had 
characterized Deism’ (Campbell 1990, p. 183). He adds that ‘the romantic was as fascinated by the 
distinctive nature of his own self as by his powers of the imagination ... it was the forces of nature 
within man, the passions and promptings of the id, which came to be regarded as the ultimate source 
of all thought, feeling and action, the very seat of the imagination’ (Campbell 1990, p. 183-4) .
138 Campbell 1990, p. 187. See also Chandler 1998.
139 Campbell 1990, p. 191. Rejecting societal conventions, the Romantic, Campbell writes, ‘becomes 
not merely a virtuoso in feeling but also in pleasure, something he must prove by creating cultural 
products which yield pleasure to others. Pleasure indeed becomes the crucial means of recognizing 
that ideal truth and beauty which imagination reveals - it is the ‘grand elementary principle of life’ - 
and thus becomes the means by which enlightenment and moral renewal can be achieved through 
art. These are urgently needed in a society now thoroughly imbued with the life-denying philosophy 
and institutions of a materialistic utilitarianism’ (Campbell 1990, p.205).
140 Campbell 1990, pp.201
141 Campbell 1990, p.203
142 ‘The romantic ideal of character, together with its associated theory of moral renewal through art, 
functioned to stimulate and legitimate that form of autonomous, self-illusory hedonism which 
underlies modern consumer behaviour ... The romantic world-view provided the highest possible 
motives with which to justify day-dreaming, longing and the rejection of reality, together with the 
pursuit of originality in life and art; and by so doing, enabled pleasure to be ranked above comfort, 
counteracting both traditionalistic and utilitarian restraints on desire’ (Campbell 1990, pp.200-1).
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bourgeois and the utilitarian take a moral form and force, while consumption, and 
pleasure through consumption is ratified143.
Campbell’s overall account is elaborate and seems well supported. Yet the same 
criticisms that were directed at Weber can be applied to Campbell (as he himself 
acknowledges). As with Weber, the increase in consumption from 1650 suggests there 
was a longer-term process of change that Campbell simply does not account for. One 
reason for this may be his reliance on McKendrick, Brewer and Plumb’s Birth of a 
Consumer Society (1982), which claimed there was a new, unique type of ‘consumer 
revolution’ in the mid-1700s that supposedly ‘drove’ the Industrial revolution. Phis was 
one of the first new studies focusing specifically on consumption; its arguments have 
since been reassessed, as evident in Consumption and the World of Goods (1993), for instance. 
But yet another issue is raised in this same book: Porter notes the ‘fashionable 
fastidiousness’ of Sentimentalism, yet his extremely funny discussion of the eating habits 
of the more comfortably situated classes in the eighteenth century details practices of 
consumption that can only be thought of as cheerfully gluttonous materiality (moderated 
only by occasional anxiety). Campbell’s ‘stoic’ aristocracy and idealised middle class 
daydreamers appear effete in contrast. (Despite the ‘occupational’ hazard of gout.)
To what extent then can Campbell’s Romantic ‘ethic’ be applied in broad-brush strokes? 
The radical increase in middle class consumption in the 1700s does appear to have 
represented some kind of change. Campbell is perspicacious in regarding emulation as a
143 Campbell ties this transformation of consumption in England around the 1800s to a more general 
transformation of Western modernity: ‘The cultural logic of modernity is not merely that of rationality 
as expressed in the activities of calculation and experiment; it is also that of passion, and the creative 
dreaming born of longing’ (Campbell 1990, p.227). Yet one point Campbell does not raise which 
deserves consideration is how Romanticism as a doctrine was directed toward the lower classes. 
Briefly, I note here that Romanticism is usually interpreted as stressing rebellion. One different 
perspective is offered, by Xenos, however, who in Scarcity and Modernity (1989), positions Carlyle, 
Morris and Ruskin as arguing that societal change should be configured in terms of ‘the subsumption 
of desire within an ordered whole’ (1989, p.58). He sets this encouragement to accept the status quo 
in the aftermath of an awareness of the brutality and horror of the French revolution, and notes that 
this stance was directed towards the ‘lower’ orders in particular, with a doctrine advocating individual 
responsibility and ‘wise management of one’s labour and consumption, within an overall order of 
nature and society’ (1989, p.56). Here a pragmatic acceptance of one’s material circumstances (for 
signs of wealth were ‘sham externalities’ (1989, p.56)) was also represented as offering the consolation 
of a heightened aesthetic sense of life. This aestheticism was, moreover, positioned as feasibly 
supplying all lack, even with the increasingly evident horror and poverty of industrialisation. 
Consolation for material wants was realised through denying the importance of those wants and 
accepting, instead, a ‘higher’ plane of values.
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wholly inadequate explanation for this144. Yet his response, depicting the change as a 
result of individual (if albeit contextual) daydreaming, somehow also seems to underplay 
the grounded lived reality of eighteenth century ‘selves’ situated in the context of uneasy, 
fluctuating class /  status based social relations. Any diffuse Romantic justification of 
consumption that Campbell associates with an aesthetic ‘project of self, also needs to be 
transposed against the practical, and simultaneously aesthetic social role consumption 
practices played. This should not be conceived as emulation, but more as part of 
longstanding practical, pragmatic and individual aesthetic expressions of social lived 
reality, which applies just as much to the idealisations of Pocock’s Republican elites.
Bourgeois consum ption  and  ‘taste ’
Regardless of the extent to which Cam pbell’s thesis can be considered representative, 
with the increase in consumption, by the 1800s the fears of earlier conservative theorists 
were clearly realised: the new prosperity and the financial changes that had developed 
from around the seventeenth century m eant the traditional hierarchy, established by 
birth and expressed through land holdings, could now, at least potentially, be overturned 
by wealth gleaned through traditionally despised occupations. In England this was all 
too evident with asset rich merchants and cash poor gentry. And whereas in the past a 
lower class person’s increase in wealth was less likely to result in any increase in status, 
now, in conjunction with ‘appropriate’ forms of consumption, status itself developed into 
a consumer item 145, which could, at least potentially, be acquired, in a range of complex 
hues, across the spectrum of the fine gradations in social class. Phis was particularly 
galling to the aristocracy; who believed, Sekora points out, that they ‘possessed the right 
to rule, not the moneyed men who were natural subjects, who had no virtue themselves 
and who led a herd of blind m ercenaries’146.
Here then, at the time of the Peterloo massacre (where arm ed militia charged a group of 
60,000 peaceful protesters, resulting in hundreds of casualties and ‘perhaps a dozen 
fatalities’147) we have Jane  Austen’s novels, focused on upper-middle social niceties and 
anxieties about status distinctions (where subordinate class struggles do not rate a
144 Campbell specifically refers to McKendrick, Brewer and Plumb’s Birth o f a Consumer Society (1982), 
but his arguments can also be directed towards texts such as McCracken’s Culture and Consumption: New  
Approaches to the Symbolic Character o f Consumer Goods and Activities (1990).
145 Slater 1997, p.70
146 Sekora 1977, p.69
147 Chandler 1998, p. 15-7
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mention). For as Slater notes in Consumer Culture and Modernity (1997), the overall irony of 
the Romantic disparagement of bourgeois norms is that by the nineteenth century, 
certain types of consumption had come to be viewed as signifiers of sensibility, 
refinement and taste; as signifiers of the ‘authentic’ self148. Even Romantics were not 
exempt: Campbell notes that bohemians, for instance, did not disparage all material 
wants:
whilst the bohemians (who espoused an especially rigorous form of 
romantic faith) despised the bourgeoisie for the importance they attached to such 
material possessions as houses and furniture, they themselves valued books, 
works of art, music and clothes. O f course, they did not share the same pattern 
of valuations as the bourgeoisie but the fact remains that their philosophy of life 
did not involve a simple rejection of goods so much as a distinctive attitude 
towards their meaning and use.149
From the end of the eighteenth century the traditional signifiers of elite class and status 
became increasingly tendentious; as dress and accoutrements could no longer be ‘read’ 
and interpreted as an accurate representation of social position150, the meanings of these 
previously uncomplicated signifiers began to change:
Whereas previously people were adjudged according to ‘stations’ in life 
revealed by their appearance, now appearance could be viewed as a misleading 
‘act’ which mystified the true nature of personhood which lay deep within ...151
In sum, it seems this new kind of moral imagination, generated and perpetuated by the
celebration of the aesthetic aspects of certain consumption goods and services, was so
pervasive that even the disease consumption itself, Roy Porter relates, came to convey
the idea of ‘an intriguing, enticing languor ... associated with superior imagination,
talents and discrimination’152. It seemed sensibility through consumption could be
acquired, in whatever sense of the term.
148 'The individual’s style of goods, activities and experiences was no longer a matter of pure social 
performance (as Sennett (1977) argues it was for the eighteenth century) but a matter of personal truth 
and authenticity’ (Slater 1997, p. 16). See also Campbell 1993, p.54.
149 Campbell 1993, p.54
150 Sennett 1994, p.65
151 Miller 1995, p.25
152 Porter 1993, p.67
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Flowers of the Southern Hemisphere, Fanny Macleay, circa 1830 
This Australian colonial painting references A Flower Piece by the Dutch master van Huyssen. It exhibits 
classic Dutch still life motifs; heavy flowers at the fullest moment of bloom, with the almost imperceptible 
insects supplying other references to the ephemeral. The urn containing the flowers, and the statues and 
buildings in the background also evoke classical civilizations Europeans hoped to emulate (but note the 
tastefully covered cherubs). Elizabeth Windshuttle situates Floweis of the Southern Hemisphere in the genre of 
fashionable, non-scientific feminine flower painting (Windshuttle 1985). Science was a gentleman’s pursuit, 
and the sexual character of Linnaeus’s classification system also meant that botany was considered too 
risque for women (Fara 2003). Macleay’s depiction of these plants would, nevertheless, have been valued 
within the scientific community - an earlier companion piece, Flowers of the Northern Hemisphere, was hung in 
the Royal Academy in 1824, and 5 of the 16 Australian natives depictured above were not illustrated in 
English botanical magazines until after 1836 (Windshuttle 1988 p.61, p.94, fn.53). In keeping with the 
classical aesthetic tradition (Campbell 1990, p.148) this is botanical art intended for the edification of the 
viewer. Here, despite Macleay’s father’s precarious financial standing, she demonstrates her character, 
sensibility and taste, situating herself as refined and accomplished. Her depiction of the butterflies also 
recalls her father’s famous collection, further establishing her position as a legitimate member of the elite.
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As sumptuary laws were abandoned, and eventually even forgotten, other signifiers of 
status such as education, ‘taste’ and the awareness and use of certain cultural codes were 
used more frequently to establish connections to elite status153. Slater positions the 
Kantian aesthetic, contrasting educated contemplation against sensate bodily absorption 
and activity, as one philosophical elaboration of these concerns:
Bourgeoise cultural consumption is defined in terms of a Kantian 
aesthetic in which the audience calmly and knowledgeably contemplates the art­
work; popular consumption is characterized by emotional and bodily immersion 
in an event.154
In Distinction (1984) Bourdieu had advanced a similar view, arguing that this aesthetic, 
while universalising its judgements of elite taste as good taste, actually conceals the class 
origins and class based capacity of those able to acquire and display the various signifiers 
of elite taste, ensuring the fine distinctions involved always seem inherent. Interestingly 
enough, transgressing class boundaries via attempts to accjuire signifiers of higher status 
retains negative connotations today: ‘aping one’s betters’ is represented as unnatural, 
vulgar and grotesque. The BBC comedy Keeping Up Appearances, for instance, is based 
solely around the torments a middle aged housewife inflicts on her family and 
acquaintances in her desperate, cumbersome, excruciating and doomed attempts to ‘rise 
above her station’.
Given the range of views outlined above it is unsurprising anxiety about consumption 
continued throughout the nineteenth century amidst the general turmoil, radical change 
and political upheaval of the period. Trade nevertheless continued to grow even more 
dramatically, particularly in England, with ever more novel and exotic products 
becoming increasingly available - except for the many at the bottom of the industrial and 
agrarian ladder who continued to experience horrific working conditions, penury, and in 
Ireland, particularly, famine and starvation. (Ireland’s landlords ensured the country 
‘remained a net exporter of food’, in the years 1845-48 while ‘over one million Irish 
men, women and children slowly starved to death’155.) Meanwhile, from the Georgian 
through the Victorian era new innovations impacting on everyday existence ranged from
133 These included gardens, knowledge of art etc. Mukerji for instance, writes that ‘taste became more 
important as capitalism made social rank more unstable’ (1993, p.442).
134 Slater 1997, p.57 
l33Easthope 1991, p.9
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ready-to-wear clothing, folding umbrellas156, flushing toilets157, full length mirrors158, 
cast-iron stoves159, elevators, and gas, then electric lighting160. Hot air balloons hovered 
over London from the late 1700s; 1785 ‘was the year of the first cross-channel flight’161. 
Less visible, but equally important technological advances included ‘scientific livestock 
breeding, soil chemistry, steam power and manufacturing by machine’162. These 
developments furthering industrialisation, along with speedier transportation via the 
canals, then better roads and railways, all resulted in yet further growth in trade, 
bringing in turn further unprecedented socio-economic alteration and change.
Despite so many new products becoming available, the social dislocation and economic 
inequality brought about by industrialisation was extreme. Workers in traditional trades 
found themselves replaced by large scale industrial machines, and with the decline in 
rural employment, migration to cities increased, further contributing to the decline of 
older forms of rural life. The extreme hardship wrought by the resultant dislocation was 
only suggested in the black industrial novels of Hugo, Dickens and Hardy163. The 
evidence Marx cites in Capital (1976) is far more horrific. Meanwhile alongside such 
conditions, the growing middle class prospered164, and from the late 1700s the outcry 
against luxury began to change direction. It was increasingly argued that ‘doux commerce’ 
had the capacity to ‘cordialise mankind’165, and this transformation was regarded as 
reaching its epitome, Hirschman notes, in the new so-called ‘civility’ of the bourgeoisie, 
with their supposed characteristics of ‘industriousness and assiduity (the opposite of 
indolence), frugality, punctuality, and, most important perhaps for the functioning of
156 The folding umbrella had only been invented in 1705, but by 1785 featured in about 31% of 
lower-class probate inventories. Prior to that time an umbrella was a cumbersome luxury which had 
to be carried around by servants (Fairchilds 1993, p.230 & p.235).
137 Perrot & Martin-Fugier 1990, p.372
138 Corbin 1990, p.460
139 Perrot & Martin-Fugier 1990, p.391
160 Elevators were first used in 1846 and electric lighting in 1882 (Sennett 1994, p.348).
161 Porter 1990, pp.270-71
162 Dunn 1970, p.93
163 Williams 1977
l64”There is no dispute about the fact that relatively, the poor grew poorer, simply because the country, 
and its rich and middle class, so obviously grew wealthier. The very moment when the poor were at 
the end of their tether - in the early and middle forties - was the moment when the middle class 
dripped with excess capital ...’ (Hobsbawn cited in Xenos 1989, p.37)
163 Paine [1792] cited in Hirschman 1986b, p.108. Marx’s later bitterly sarcastic use of the 
appellation was intended with the greatest scorn.
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market society, probity’166. At some point during this period then, the outcry against 
luxury previously targeted so vehemently against subordinate classes began to be 
directed more against modes of living outside the acceptable bourgeoisie norm. With 
this, as Slater describes, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, elite, as well as the 
lower class consumption and behaviour, came to be frequently represented as 
undisciplined, perfidious and seditious. For as suggested by Hogarth’s popular 
irreverent, mass produced etchings with their didactic moral tales,
By the nineteenth century, luxury was redefined: it was now the vice of 
an aristocracy with too much money and idleness. Working-class consumption 
then came to be seen as akin to aristocratic luxury, and often allied with it 
(drinking, gambling, horses, boxing and so on are debauched entertainments of 
both upper and lower classes.167
Phe new department stores and new-found bourgeois pride 
Along with the increasing levels of trade and industrialisation, another significant change 
occurred around the end of the eighteenth century with the decline of the guild 
system168. This had exercised enormous control over both social and economic life, not 
only in relation to what kind of goods could be produced and thus consumed, but also in 
terms of how those goods could be distributed. Fairchilds discusses how in France for 
example, with the guild system in place, with a very few exceptions it had only been 
possible to purchase single items legally through a guild manufacturer169, or from 
relatively small scale markets or illegal vendors170. In The Bon Marche: Bourgeoise Culture 
and the Department Store (1981), Miller details how the cessation of the guilds from the early 
1800s enabled shops to begin selling multiple items in one place. The further 
development of large department stores in the 1850s became a particular concern for
166 Hirschman 1986b, p.109. In Robinson Crusoe for instance, Crusoe’s father comments ‘that the 
“middle state” is “the most suited to human happiness, not exposed to the miseries and hardships, the 
labour and sufferings of the mechanic part of mankind, and not embarrassed with the pride, luxury, 
ambition and envy of the upper part of mankind’” (cited in Hirschman 1986a, p.43). See also Curren 
1982, p.224.
167 Slater 1997, p.79
168 Guilds last longer in France than in England but were phased out in Paris in 1791 (Fairchilds 1993, 
p.228, p.231, p.242) (Heilbroner 1972, p.34), and throughout Europe were under challenge from the 
end of the 1700s. However the guild edicts were not rigidly enforced even prior to their being phased 
out completely (Jones 1982, p.102). This finally occured in England in 1813, as late as 1846 Sweden, 
Denmark 1849, Austria 1859, and across Germany in 1869 (Hobsbawm 1979, p.35) (Heilbroner 
1972, p.34).
169 Heilbroner 1972, pp. 19-20 & pp.28-9. Fairchilds notes this was particularly the case in Paris (1993, 
p.232), and Miller also states that in France ‘guilds regulated and limited entry into the various trades. 
They insisted that each seller be confined to a single specialty and to a single shop’ (1981, p.22).
170 Fairchilds 1993, p.242
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critics. These departm ent stores were a radical departure. They encouraged, yet 
simultaneously reflected the expanding bourgeois disposition; this was expressed through 
their unasham ed ratification and celebration of bourgeois consumption, and their avid 
and sure acceptance of the new found bourgeois pride and self-satisfaction. The British 
Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851, proudly showcasing the fruits of modern trade and 
industry171 represented a similar illustration of the political acceptance and manipulation 
of this shift. Built with glass, iron and wood, it departed for the first time, despite some 
hostile opposition, from the previously rigid adherence to classical architectural forms, 
materials and motifs.
M any of the new departm ent stores were also built using these new materials, and as 
with the British Exhibition they offered a fantastic spectacle172. Both were advertised as 
such, and both featured an enormous range and diversity of goods from around the 
world. The departm ent stores catered in particular to the prosperous new bourgeois 
class who, subsidised by European colonial aggression and lower class industrial penury, 
could now afford to pay for practically whatever kinds of exotic goods they desired. The 
stores relied on low margins, relatively low prices and high turnover173. Consumers were 
allowed free entry, and were under no obligation to buy174. Instead of haggling, from 
1800 on goods began to be marketed with fixed prices175. Symptomatic of the increasing 
rationalisation of the labour force and oppressive labour practices, Miller argues that 
these stores also ensured consumption became a far more pleasurable activity176, 
becoming places where women could meet and spend time without fear of harassment. 
The lives of the new generation of bourgeoisie women who patronised these stores, 
previously circumscribed narrowly within their local districts, opened up as new 
territories became accessible due to the developing transport systems177. With this, as
171 Steegman 1987, p. 15. Also Xenos 1989, p.37 & p.86. Xenos notes Benjamin’s comment on this 
and the subsequent Wodd Expositions as “places of pilgrimage to the fetish commodity” (1989, p.86).
172 Parker 2003
173 See Schudson (1993, pp. 150-1) for a discussion of a similar, slightly later trend in America.
174 The advertising catalogue of one Parisian store, the Petit Saint-Thomas, promised ‘the freedom to 
view merchandise without being harassed to buy it’ (cited Miller 1981, p.26). However Walsh’s (1999) 
study of eighteenth century stores questions whether customers during the 1700s were actually 
pressured to buy - but this study also seems to focus on stores catering to the upper class.
175 Miller discusses how ‘advertisements from the late 1830s called attention to fixed and marked 
prices’ (1981, p.25). He also notes the time consuming nature of haggling (1981, p.24).
176 Miller 1981, p.24
177 Miller also cites the creation of the broad Parisian boulevards, the railroad and the rationalization 
of Omnibus companies (1981, pp.35-7).
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Crossick and Jaumain write in Cathedrals of Consumption: the European Department Store 1850- 
1939 {1999), the
department store now appears as not merely a huge sales hall, but as a 
meeting place, a site for female sociability and arguably also emancipation.178
The dangerous frenzy of consumption and bourgeois feminine morality 
English trade continued to expand even more dramatically during the nineteenth 
century. As Hobsbawm notes in The Age of Capital 1848-1875 (1979), it almost doubled 
from 1800 to 1840, then ‘Between 1850 and 1870 it increased by 260 per cent’179. The 
new department stores were the principal repositories of the huge growth in trade and, 
as obvious signifiers of a radically changing world order, became obvious targets for the 
usual fears about consumption, this time with an outpouring of elite anxiety about the 
decline of family life around the mid-1800s. Within the strict morality of the time the 
gravest concerns centered around women, who were portrayed as seduced, or at the very 
least as vulnerable to seduction when placed in the midst of these ‘supercharged’, 
hedonistic and supposedly morally questionable environments, away from the 
moderating influence of husband and family180 (shades of Campbell’s hedonistic 
daydreaming). Transposed against the idealised image of the wife/mother as regulating 
the conduct (and the consumption) of the household181, this concern about appropriate 
feminine consumption fed into the popular morality tales of the age. There were fears 
that the department stores would result in women abandoning their ‘proper’ duties 
towards husband, children and family182, or even abandoning their families altogether183. 
It was also believed that the new frenzy of consumption led formerly respectable 
bourgeois women to spend beyond their means. For Miller discusses how around this 
period it was perceived that a desire for excessive purchases equated with immorality, as
178 Crossick and Jaumain 1999, p.2
179 Hobsbawm 1979, p.33
180 Miller 1981, pp. 192-6, p.211. Crossick and Jaumain also write of how ‘the absence of conventional 
boundaries’ in these new department stores ‘engendered contemporary anxieties’ (1999, p.2).
181 Obverse to the fear of women as being subject to ‘darker influences’ is the representation of women 
as the exemplar of the moral ideal. As Ruth Smith notes in her ‘Order and Disorder: the 
Naturalization of Poverty’, ‘In the nineteenth century, middle- and upper-class women were 
considered the embodiment of moral goodness. As such they became the primary agents in the 
process of socialization through which women taught children the bourgeois ideology of public 
autonomy and private morality. Through this mission, women themselves upheld the order that 
defined and controlled nature; they were complied in the inner construction of “good nature’” (Smith 
1990, pp.222-3). See also Donzelot 1979, and Hunt & Hall 1990, p.81.
182 Crossick and Jaumain 1999, p.31, Tiersten 1999, pp. 116-7
183 Miller 1981
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was the case with Flaubert’s Madame Bovary. Tiersten, in her study of gender and the 
politics of consumption in Paris, similarly outlines that another French novelist, Henri 
Boulet, argued the emotions engendered by shopping ‘mimicked the emotional cycles of 
an adulterous wife’184. Stories of problems deemed sexual in origin, such as hysteria, 
irrationality, and kleptomania, were frequently reported as being connected to some 
kind of primitive impulse, seemingly resistant to the Evangelical Victorian belief in the 
power of education and their insistent striving for and concern with a ‘higher’ kind of 
morality. Miller notes how Saulle, an early French psychotherapist writing on 
kleptomania, believed that:
Women of all sorts, drawn to these elegant surroundings by instincts 
native to their sex, fascinated by so many rash provocations, dazzled by the 
abundance of trinkets and lace, find themselves overtaken by a sudden, 
unpremeditated, almost savage impulse185.
Perhaps the principal fascination with this phenomenon was the exciting belief that this 
the newly respectable bourgeois class of women’s refinement could be overcome by an 
onslaught of wild and raw instinctual desire, tinged with a sexual overtone186. 'This must 
have threatened the relatively recently acquired status of this class and their emphasis on 
the newly ‘comfortable’ public morality. Certainly the vehemence directed towards the 
upper and lower class consumption suggested a displacement of bourgeois anxiety onto a 
disreputable Other, perhaps suggesting the fear of the return of the ‘repressed’. Around 
this time there was also, Clarke records, an
ideological resurgence of models of a hierarchical gradation of rank and 
status that corresponded not only to economic conditions, but also to personal 
moral qualities and educational achievements. 187
Phis renewed emphasis on bourgeois morality drew on an updated version of Protestant 
asceticism, with lesser tones of Campbell’s similarly moralistic, quasi-spiritual, Romantic 
‘ethic’. Smith’s eighteenth century' ratification of ‘comforts’, understood as ‘the happy 
mean between biting necessity and indulgent luxury’, was also now promoted, changed, 
and ‘narrowed’ here, as Appleby details, to
to a family-based respectability in the nineteenth-century. Increasingly 
the desire to better oneself became associated with the motive of providing for 
one’s family. Novelists gave respectability a distinctly material embodiment in
184 Tiersten 1999, fn. p. 132
185 Saulle cited in Miller 1981, p.202
186 Miller 1981, pp.200-6, Crossick andjaumain 1999, pp.31-2, Tiersten 1999, pp. 120-23.
187 Clarke 1983, p.129
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the cleanliness and cut of clothes, the privacy afforded in the home and the 
accoutrements required to support the round of domestic rituals. 188
This resurrected alibi supporting the bourgeois Victorian desire for possessions 
supported, in turn, still further criticisms of wom en’s consumption. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given the morality of the time and the moral panics about women in 
departm ent stores, new, increasingly vocal attacks on luxurious consumption were 
overwhelmingly directed towards women, and overlooking masculine forms of luxurious 
consumption, instead targeted at female ‘fripperies’. Despite respectability in the home 
being based around, and validated by the consumption which was carried out by 
women, as Vickery contends in her study of Lancashire woman Elizabeth Shackleton, 
women were ‘relentlessly derided for their petty materialism and love of ostentation’189, 
with wom en’s purchases being frequently denounced as unnecessary luxuries. As Breen 
further notes, the term “luxury” itself ‘was usually described as a “she”, as effeminate, 
soft and weak’190. Berry too comments on the longstanding and extensive gender bias 
against wom en’s consumption (even evident in the description of Luxury as a woman in 
Prudentius’ Psychomachia). Building on the concerns about the degenerative power of 
consumption mentioned earlier, it was now women who were positioned as primarily 
responsible for softening the moral fibre of the nation, and diminishing national 
Virility191.
Ehe other factor here is that with the renewed Victorian stress on education, particularly 
a classical education focusing predom inantly on Greek and Roman texts, now many 
Victorian m en’s understanding of ideal masculine behaviour would have been 
influenced by classical thought. The Aristotelian conception of virtue saw the ideal 
masculine life ‘ruled by reason rather than desire’192. Here women are represented as 
properly ‘m an’s inferior in reason and public virtue’193. Elite men, as opposed to women 
and ‘inferior’ classes of men, were simply associated with a ‘higher’ realm of activity and 
thought. Elite consumption was again justified as an expression of elite rationality: for 
despite his supposed concern with a ‘higher’ realm of thought, a principal feature of
188 Appleby 1993, p. 169
189 Vickery 1993, p.274
190 Breen 1993, p.256
191 Appleby 1993, p. 167. Slater 1997, p.82. Hunt 1996, pp.80-2.
192 Slater 1997, p.82
193 Vickery 1993, p.274
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Aristotle’s ‘great-souled m an’, and thus for many his Victorian counterparts, was the 
enjoyment of ‘conspicuous consumption’; for as Aristotle put it: “he likes to own 
beautiful and useless things, since they are better marks of his independence” 194. 
Clearly, here the attacks on wom en’s consumption exhibited extreme bias, because as 
Vickery uncovers in her own extensive study and finds confirmed in other research on 
consumption patterns of the period,
female consumption was repetitive and relatively m undane, male 
consumption was by contrast occasional and impulsive, or expensive and 
dynastic . 195
Dandies and flaneurs in particular were renowned for and even identified by their 
consumption practices, yet they simultaneously m aintained an extremely misogynistic 
view of women and wom en’s consumption. Such disparagement was a common feature 
of magazines such as Punch196, and comm enting on a similar tone adopted by the 
American press, a female correspondent to the Pennsylvania Gazette wrote; ‘I have several 
times in your Paper seen severe Reflections upon us W omen, for Idleness and 
Extravagance, but I do not rem ember to have once seen any such Animadversions upon 
the M en’197. These criticisms are still common in modern vernacular -  in the film 
American Beauty for instance, masculine consumption of items such as red sports cars are 
portrayed as autonomous and liberating; feminine consumption of household items as 
oppressed and oppressive.
In demonising wom en’s consumption it is easy to forget that far from being overcome 
by, or solely focused upon luxurious bourgeois fripperies, as an oppressed and ‘utilised’ 
class, women have more often, as Irigaray notes, been treated as commodities 
themselves, as objects for patriarchal exchange. From at least the time of ancient 
Greece, women have also sustained m en’s idealised, supposedly ‘reasoned’ collaboration 
with the spiritual world at their own expense in the m aterial198. As Appleby similarly 
notes:
194 Aristotle cited in MacIntyre 1980, p.79. Sekora notes that Aristotle saw subordinate consumption 
as potentially subversive (Sekora 1977, p.33).
195 Vickery 1993, p.281
196 Campbell 1993, pp.51-2
197 Breen 1993, p.256
198 Utilising Marx, Irigaray argues women have been treated as commodities, that have been used as 
‘a mirror of value of and for man’ (1997, p. 178). Further, ‘Women are the symptom of the 
exploitation of individuals by a society that remunerates them only partially, or even not at all, for 
their work’ (1997, p. 188).
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Classic republicanism had taught that men - and it was just men and 
only men of independent means - realized their full human potential when they 
participated in civic affairs. Supported by a substructure of labouring men and 
all women, this idealized citizen realized moral autonomy because of his 
independence from the necessities imposed by nature and through the 
interaction of a community of peers199.
As this thesis progresses, the staying power of these formulations, particularly evident in 
the work of many critical theorists, will become clear. But in general, in privileging 
production, so often ‘characterized as collective, male, creative and useful’, and 
implicitly and explicitly denigrating consumption, so often characterized as 
‘individualistic, female, parasitic and pointless’200, these approaches exhibit a tacit, subtle 
gender bias operating to the detriment of women201. Even in terms of depictions of the 
difference between popular and high culture, Andreas Huyssen observes a further 
prejudice:
... the political, psychological and aesthetic discourse around the turn of 
the century consistently and obsessively genders mass culture and the masses as 
feminine, while high culture, whether traditional or modern, clearly remains the 
privileged realm of male activities.202
This bias had a long pre-history, but as a discursive construction it was adopted last 
century in such an enthusiastic and persuasive manner it metamorphosed into a rigid 
orthodoxy of its own.
‘"Appleby 1993, p. 167 
2° °  Vickery 1993, p.274
201 See also Pringle 2001
202 Huyssen cited in Fowles 1996, p.71
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4Plus ca change, plus e ’est la meme chose: classical political 
econom y, utilitarianism , m arginalism , 
and m odern econom ics
The relations of production are not simply ‘economic’ relations, 
spontaneously created by individuals on the basis of the pursuit of their 
rational self-interest.
(Clarke 1983, p.6)
the main purpose of the previous two chapters was to drive home the depth of hostility 
exhibited toward consumption throughout history. Despite attempts by Smith and 
Hume to position consumption more positively, even today commentators frequently 
take the hostility toward consumption as legitimate, and the reasons for it as given. I 
shall examine some of these more recent positions in subsecjuent chapters. This chapter 
considers an alternative discourse; it provides an overview of how economics as a 
discipline largely celebrates consumption, yet at the same insists consumption requires 
no in-depth analysis. For as Slater shows in Consumer Culture and Modernity (1997), 
economists largely represent consumer motivations as the province of other disciplines, 
viewing such motivations as ‘irrational’, and the value of studying them questionable. 
Hirschman similarly observes how
The complex psychological and cultural processes that lie behind the 
actually observed market choices have generally been considered the business of 
psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists.1
In the orthodox economic schema, technical, positivist marketing analyses become the
only worthwhile areas of inquiry relating to consumption. As with Slater however, I
believe that the focus on this kind of technical, formal rationality results in a foreshortened
analysis, for while economists position
1 Hirschman 1986c, p. 143
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individual choice at the centre of their moral and social world, it is 
something they can say very little about: we do not get to see individuals coming 
to formulate their desires and interests, only the way in which they calculatedly 
pursue them .2
A further concern is that the manner in which orthodox economists excise the full range 
of diffuse social beliefs and meanings associated with consumption from their disciplinary 
sphere of interest means they also dismiss the ethical aspects of consumption practices. I 
mentioned at the beginning of this thesis how thinking about consumption as something 
involving values requires that we should be prepared to consider, inter alia, where goods 
come from, the labour practices involved in their production, if they were tested on 
animals, and their impact on the environment, before, during and after consumption 
takes place. Orthodox economics has largely treated such questions as outside the ambit 
of its interest. Mises, a well known neoclassical economist, for instance, even boasted of 
economics being a ‘science of praxeology’, concerned only with
the means and ends chosen for the attainment of such ultimate ends. Its 
object is means not ends. In this sense we speak of the subjectivism of the 
general science of human action. It takes the ultimate ends chosen by acting 
man as data, it is entirely neutral with regard to them, and it refrains from 
passing any value judgement. The only standard which it applies is whether or 
not the means chosen are fit for the attainment of the ends aimed at.3
In this doctrinal statement the ‘proper’ role of the discipline is positioned as focusing only
on the technical aspects leading to the consumption moment itself - consumption as it
occurs at the point of sale and purchase, together with analysis of the financial costs and
technical processes contributing to the price of goods. More ‘diffuse’ factors, such as the
human rights record of the country that good has been produced in, or the effect of the
production of that good on the environment have until recently received minimal
attention, not being regarded as properly the concern o f ‘real’ economics.
Goods, nevertheless, have origins, using them has effects, and disposing of them has 
consequences. Consumption involves frameworks of belief about the world, and having 
beliefs inescapably means making reference (explicitly or implicitly), to some kind of 
ethical standards. The recent scientific consensus about the need to address global
2 Slater 1997, p.43. See also Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p.33. In Slater’s view, a fuller account of 
consumption requires the analysis o f ‘culture’ and ‘the economy’ as a coherent whole. The confected 
analytic division between them, he says, has resulted in the effective ‘disappearance of consumer 
culture itself (Slater 1997, p.51).
3 Mises cited in O ’Neill 1998, p.44
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warming has begun to challenge the orthodoxy, and initiate a shift in policy 
prescriptions, but this shift is only recent, and still strongly contested. So why was Mises 
so proud of his program? Why has economic theory largely attempted to disregard any 
larger range of concerns?
I began researching this chapter with the aim of outlining the ramifications this 
disciplinary perspective has had in relation to consumption specifically: I found reasons 
for it that spoke of a particular political program tied to the development of the 
discipline. From the neoclassical to the neoliberal economists a theoretical strategy was 
used to promote a political, socio-economic agenda: marketed through new technical 
‘refinements’ in the ‘science’ of economics this agenda deprioritises attempts to address 
the more oppressive and inequitable aspects of the current day global economic 
environment. Accordingly, this chapter, while primarily concerned with how economic 
thought came to proffer a discourse positioning consumption as value-free, also offers an 
account of a political agenda.
In the first part of the chapter I chart the evolution and attractions of neoclassical, or 
marginalist theory - dominant up until the Great Depression, when Keynes’s ideas came 
to constitute the most complete and successful challenge to the neoclassical orthodoxy. 
However since the 1970s it has been neoliberalism’s re-worked marginalism that has 
enjoyed a hegemonic status in the political arena. Despite numerous, longstanding 
criticisms, it has only been in the last year with the ‘subprime’ mortgage crisis that the 
hegemony has been threatened. For free market fundamentalism aka neoliberalism is 
being judged and deemed bankrupt: as Stiglitz has recently observed, ‘Even the right in 
the United States has joined the Keynesian camp with unbridled enthusiasm and on a 
scale that at one time would have been truly unimaginable’4.
I do not attempt to engage fully with these events here, only to chart the broad shifts in 
economic thought that led to neoliberalism’s dominance over the last thirty years, how 
neoliberalism ‘speaks to’ and has taken up the neoclassical themes which are the focus of 
the initial section of this chapter. A fuller examination of in-depth criticisms of 
neoliberalism along with alternatives theories that could have been taken up, would, in 
any case, have necessitated at least another chapter, more likely another thesis. And this
4 Stiglitz 2008
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has recently been undertaken; Mark Blyth’s Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and 
Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (2002) offers one particularly good analysis of the 
North American political strategies and economic policies informing that period. 
Machine Dreams (2002) by Phillip Mirowski features an in-depth account of refutations to 
its basic mathematical premises glossed over by the orthodoxy during the twentieth 
century. A forthcoming collection, The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal 
'Thought Collective, edited by Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe also promises a detailed 
examination of the funding, and concerted organisational effort expended on promoting 
neoliberalism as an economic doctrine and rationality of government5. And James 
Galbraith’s The Predator State (2008) offers an insightful account of the neoliberal 
contribution to the subprime mortgage crisis.
The obvious question in any study of the development of neoclassical and neoliberal 
doctrine is what sort of government, and what sort of freedom is being promoted. 
Hindess notes that as a practical philosophy of government liberalism has traditionally 
contained a ‘fundamental ambiguity’6; advocating ideals of freedom while 
simultaneously viewing ‘subordinate’ classes and cultures as not yet capable of autonomy.
The liberal ideal may be for the state to rule over, and to rule through, 
the free activities of autonomous individuals but liberals have traditionally taken 
the view that substantial parts of humanity do not, as a matter of fact, possess the 
minimal capacities for autonomous action that would enable them to be 
governed in this way.7
This is a key aspect of liberalism, the shadow side of its doctrine of ‘freedom’. For 
liberalism has traditionally treated ‘subordinate’ classes and cultures as objects to be 
worked upon and ‘improved’ so as to derive maximum ‘benefits’ according to liberal 
ideals of what constitutes ‘progress’. It is in this sense that liberals such as Smith and 
Hume found the market a useful mechanism for inculcating the requisite, ideal liberal 
qualities, or capacities, of self-government and self-regulation, self-restraint and industry, 
they deemed desirable. Here the poor (as Locke also reckoned), become a utile 
resource8. The beauty of the market then, was that as a naturally regulating system, it was
5 van Horn and Mirowski 2005.
6 See Hindess 1998, p.211. Also Hindess 1993b.
' Hindess 2002, p. 133. See also Hindess 1998, p.211, Hindess 1993b.
8 See for instance Locke’s 1697 report on the poor law, ‘A Report of the Board of Trade to the Lords 
Justices Respecting the Relief and Employment of the Poor’, where he discusses ‘proPer methods for 
setting on work and employing the poor ... making them useful to the public, and thereby easing 
others of that burden’ (Locke cited in Fox-Bourne 1969 [1876] Vol.One, pp.377-91).
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thought capable of automatically controlling populations, ‘regulated’ Hindess writes, 
‘and coordinated without direction from a single controlling centre9.
But just as the sugar market was built on the back of the slave trade, and the growth in 
the tea trade depended on the trade in opium Britain imposed by force on China, 
neither the origins and consequences of the ‘free’ trade in such goods cohered too easily 
with the overtly stated liberal values of freedom and autonomy. Depicting the market as 
a natural force, then, and now, is still a notion that goes quite some way towards 
alleviating liberal responsibility for the hum an action which directs its deleterious effects. 
In the meantime, the dom inant impulses of economic thought have also inhibited 
awareness about the possibilities of ethical consumption, restricting also the incidence of 
legislative programs that could generate and support its development. As I shall detail 
below, neoliberalism has m aintained this strategy, while finessing and transforming the 
liberal myth of ‘freedom’ to a doctrine of government, turning the implementation of 
market relations into a bureaucratic art form.
The initial section of this chapter then, constitutes a close analysis of the steps through 
which economic theory developed in this respect. My account is non-sequential — I first 
consider Bentham ’s concept of utility, how that was taken up by marginalist, or 
neoclassical economists, how they promoted their ideas as supplying answers to the 
‘problem ’ of price not satisfactorily addressed by Smith and Ricardo. I then return to 
Hum e, outlining how the marginalists drew selectively on key aspects of H um e’s 
argum ents about reason in order to position economics as a technical, as opposed to 
social science. Here I point to how marginalism selectively cherry-picked H um e’s ideas 
to suit a conservative political program . In the latter part of the chapter I focus on how 
neoclassical economics dealt with growing arguments for democratic reform, was 
challenged by Keynes following the Great Depression, and how its program  was
9 Hindess 2002, p. 134. Or, as Hayek put it: ‘It was men’s submission to the impersonal forces of the 
market that in the past has made possible the growth of a civilization which without this could not 
have developed’ (Hayek 1997 [1944], pp.151-2). Hindess also points out that: ‘Rather than describe 
liberalism as committed to governing through freedom, then, it would be more appropriate to present 
it as claiming only that there are important contexts in which free interaction can serve as an 
instrument of regulation: that is, that certain populations, or significant individuals, groups and 
activities within them, can and should be governed through the promotion of particular kinds of free 
activity and the cultivation of suitable habits of self-regulation, and that the rest must therefore be 
governed in other ways’ (2003, pp.6-7). In a similar manner, Rose likewise comments that ‘The 
autonomy of the self is thus not the timeless antithesis of political power, but one of its objectives and 
instruments of modern mentalities of government ... Governing in a liberal-democratic way means 
governing through the freedom and aspirations of subjects rather than in spite of them’ (1992, p. 147).
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subsequently reconstituted (and transformed) via neoliberals such as Friedman and 
Hayek.
Bentham’s utilitarianism
Bentham’s Introduction to the Principals of Morals and Legislation (1996 [1780]), is arguably 
one of the most important precursors to modern economics, and he begins with the 
simple proposal that people benefit by maximising what brings them happiness, while 
avoiding what causes them pain. Bentham then proposes the sum of individual pleasure 
and pain can be calculated, and he uses the term utility as a descriptor for the resultant 
sum, which he then argues can be used to compare any one person’s utility to another. 
Incorporating the doctrine of the greatest good for the greatest number enabled 
Bentham to conclude utility could be used to institute programs of reform aimed at 
delivering the benefits to the population as a whole10.
Bentham’s formulations form a strange contrast to the eighteenth century moralist’s
concerns about excessive and luxurious consumption. Heilbroner regards ‘the greatest
good for the greatest number’ as validating any kind of consumption, effectively
rationalising any dictat of the market:
the utilitarian framework provided the final resolution of the moral 
dilemmas of the economic process by its assertion that whatever served the 
individual served society. By logical analogy, whatever created a profit (and 
thereby served the individual capitalist) also served society, so that a blanket 
moral exemption was, so to speak, extended over the entire range of activity that 
passed the profit and loss test of the marketplace.* 11
Rosen argues that valorising the market was not Bentham’s intent. Conditions of
terrible scarcity were becoming increasing apparent during the early industrial
revolution, and Rosen views Bentham as being particularly concerned about disparities
in wealth: with diminishing utility intended to take into account, at the level of policy,
the varying relative degrees of satisfaction which individuals in different financial
circumstances would feel according to improvements in their circumstances. For Rosen,
Bentham’s main aim was to develop a modern theoretical foundation on which to base
10 As Slater writes, ‘individual actions and social policies should be analysed and judged rational and 
proper, in terms of their consequences for producing a total sum of pleasure and pain, utility and 
‘disutility’ (Slater 1997, p.45).
11 Heilbroner 1985, p.l 15. Galbraith also notes how utility suited ideas about increased productivity, 
being effectively reliant on and equated with increased levels of consumption (Galbraith 1984).
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efficient and practical reforms, where the ‘diminishing utility’ of the wealthy justifies the 
potential redistribution of their wealth12:
An addition of wealth to a rich man would bring far less increased 
happiness than the same additional amount would bring to a poor man. 
Similarly, a decrease in the wealth of a rich man would cause less pain than for a 
poor man. Bentham’s emphasis on equality as an end of legislation and as part 
of his very conception of happiness thus made equality an important aim of 
public policy.13
Bentham may have been writing with beneficent public outcomes in mind, yet as with 
Heilbroner, Slater too notes how Bentham’s philosophy dismisses socially embedded 
moral sentiments, and effectively discounts the richly complex range of human emotions 
and motivations, while positioning society as a collection of rational utility maximising 
egoists14:
Bentham ... replaces the variety of social motives with the single, and 
individual, self-interested motive of “maximising utility” ... replaces “society” 
and “culture” (the substantive character of human wants in particular ways of 
life) with “reason”, with abstract calculation and with quantification.15
Hopkins makes similar observations in his contribution to Polanyi’s Trade and Market in the
Early Empires (1957), noting that for Bentham, ‘all objects, persons as well as things, [are
regarded as] as means and never ends in themselves’16. And Slater also writes that while
Smith and Hume sought to validate individual desires, the difference between them and
Bentham was that they still based ‘morality and self-interest itself in an innately social
sentiment, a desire to be approved of by others’17.
12 Writing in the context of Enlightenment rationalism and empiricism, Bentham was trying to avoid 
transcendental or metaphysical ideals. Haddad notes how the influence of Hume’s arguments 
ridiculing any universal standard of morals informed his approach (1996, p.69), but Bentham was also 
responding to a longstanding theoretical trend. Hirschman records how Bacon was one among many 
others engaged in a ‘systematic attempt at shaking off the metaphysical and theological yokes that kept 
men from thinking inductively and experimentally’ (1977, p.21). Greek Epicurean philosophy also 
played a role, for as Springborg notes, ‘the Epicureans in general enjoyed a considerable revival in the 
European Enlightenment precisely because they had developed a rudimentary theory of human 
motivation that was in some sense “scientific” or secular rather than theological’ (1981, p.22).
13 Rosen 1996, p.xxvii. Roll cites J.S. Mill as referring to Bentham as ‘the great subversive’ in this 
respect (Roll 1992, p.324). For Macpherson however, ‘as soon as Bentham had thus demonstrated 
the case for equality ... it had to yield to the case for productivity’ (1975, pp.20-1).
14 Here ‘solidarity and economic growth arise automatically from the isolated hedonic calculus of 
monadic individuals’ (Slater 1997, p.81).
15 Slater 1997, p.45 
16Hopkins 1957, p.283 
17 Slater 1997, p.81
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It is ironic Adam Smith is so often presented as a ‘founding father’ - for while modern 
economics gestures regularly to him, it is characterised by a focus on technical means /  
ends rationality. Slater states this not a result of Bentham’s influence alone, but 
concludes that neither can his influence be underestimated. Utility effectively posits a 
singular, universal conception of human nature; Slater also believes it tends to close off 
the need for any further enquiry into consumption, becoming
a tautology which says nothing about particular needs but simply infers 
their presence or absence from the act of buying. To say that someone bought 
something because it represented a utility to them adds nothing to our 
knowledge of why they bought it, what their motives or needs were.18
In this, as Joan Robinson elaborates in Economic Philosophy (1962), utility supplies ‘a
metaphysical construct of impregnable circularity’, which many economists have used
since as an expedient smokescreen19. Yet while utility proved so useful for economic
theory, the manner which the redistribution of wealth connected to ‘diminishing utility’
also offered particular tensions which subsequent neoclassical economists felt the need to
bypass. I will revisit this point below.
From Bentham to Marginalism, in the context of the problems of price and 
distribution raised by Smith and Ricardo
It was in the late 1800s utility was first formally used to dismiss any motivations or values
connected to consumption. The concept was given a ‘scientific’ imprimatur when three
theorists, Jevons, Menger, and Walras, separately, but almost simultaneously, all began
combining Bentham’s notion of utility with differential calculus to represent the
incremental amounts o f‘diminishing utility’ resulting from the increased consumption of
a good20. Here incremental amounts of ‘diminishing utility’ were measured in order to
determine the unit price of a good by following ‘laws’ that stated supply and demand
could be regulated to a point of equilibrium. Theoretically at that point, Clarke
explains, it was argued under ‘ideal’ market conditions price should equate with the cost
of the factors of production, if those factors are fixed21. This new theory, now known as
18 Slater 1997, p.44 
19Robinson 1962, p.47
20 Roll notes how marginalism was anticipated by Gossen in 1854 (Roll 1992, pp.341-3), and with a 
range of variations was subsequently taken up by Edgeworth (1845-1926), Marshall (1842-1924) and 
Pigou (1877-1959) in England; Böhm-Bawerk (1851-1914), von Wieser (1851-1926), von Mises (1881- 
1973) and Hayek (1899-1992) from Menger’s Austrian school; Pareto (1848-1923) from Walras’ 
Laussanne School at Switzerland; andjohn Bates Clarke (1847-1938) in America.
21 ‘It can be shown that under appropriate assumptions (including the absence of ignorance, 
inconsistency and uncertainty) the interaction of demand and supply will give rise to a unique set of
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marginalism or neoclassical economics, was represented as sophisticated, scientific, and 
universally applicable, and the marginalists made full use of the concept, extending it to 
a whole range of items and activities22. (Appleby deprecatingly observes how this 
‘permitted all the passions of motivation from frivolity, vanity and boredom to ambition, 
avarice and need to be weighed on the same scale’23.) Yet it was this representation of 
scientific universality which assisted the marginalists in supplanting the ideas of Smith 
and Ricardo, whose focus on the cost of the factors of production in contributing to the 
price of goods had not been successful in reconciling the consumption and production 
sides of the price and value ‘equation’: the discrepancy between the exchange price value 
of a good, and its value in use.
Robinson documents how Smith tried to explain how value could be measured, focusing 
primarily on the ‘appropriate’ value of a good, as determined by the cost of labour and 
other factors of production. She also points out that Smith maintained that price must 
be just, as ‘Value rules because it is fair and right’, even though he never explained 
inconsistencies in prices, even to his own satisfaction24. She writes that it was this which 
prevented Sm ith’s ideas achieving long-term dominance as an encompassing general 
theory, even though his vision of the market as a neutral, self-regulating system retained 
an enduring force. Robinson notes that following Smith, Ricardo did not deal 
successfully with the price /  value conundrum  either, but that his work also gave rise to a 
new concern. Like Smith, Ricardo focused on determining how productivity could be 
increased, trying to take into account all the factors involved in production25. However 
in this he inadvertently brought into question the appropriate recompense which should 
be apportioned, accruing from the price of a good, to the capital and labour involved in 
the production of that good26. This highlighted a conflict of interest between classes, 
drawing into question the moral justification of capitalist profits27. With the social and 
political unrest throughout the early to m id-nineteenth century identifying and
stable equilibrium prices that clear all markets by equalising supply and demand. These prices are 
those that correspond to the free and rational choices of all the individual members of society seeking 
to achieve their own optimal solutions to the conditions of scarcity’ (Clarke 1983, pp. 152-3).
22Xenos 1989, pp.71-2. Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p.50.
23 Appleby 1993, p. 171
24 Robinson 1962, p.28. She notes Smith’s motivation for theorising value was to support his 
arguments about methods of increasing production and the desirability of free trade (1962, p.30).
23 One of Ricardo’s most well known contributions involved integrating international trade into 
Smith’s theories about the comparative advantage.
26 Robinson 1962, p.31
27 Robinson 1962, p.34. Also Roll 1992, p.340. Ricardo also called for the Corn Laws to be repealed.
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elaborating on this issue only promised to exacerbate conflict. What is just as significant 
however, is that in conjunction with Malthus’ mordant Essay on the Principle oj Population 
(1798), Ricardo’s ideas cast doubts over the belief in the autonomous, beneficent 
progression of the market that had been popularised by Smith. As Heilbroner notes,
natural forces which once seemed teleologically designed to bring 
harmony and peace into the world now seemed malevolent and menacing.28
In The Market: Ethics, Knowledge and Politics (1998), O ’Neill explains that the marginalists 
successfully supplanted Smith and ‘resolved’ the price /  value problem by presenting 
price as ‘an indirect measure of subjective states’29 (what Jevons referred to as ‘subjective 
utility’30), as opposed to just an amalgam of the sum of the costs of production. Here the 
issues Ricardo raised were bypassed - marginalism was presented as technically and 
mathematically ‘rigorous’ - and able to explain small changes in the price of goods at a 
temporal moment, significantly ‘abstracted’, as Clarke puts it, ‘from the particular social 
and historical context within which economic activity takes place’31. The varying 
capacity of different individuals to pay was just subsumed under a new emphasis on the 
‘accurate’ movement of price refined by the influence of ‘the whole’, supposedly 
balanced by the regulation of supply and demand to a point of natural ‘equilibrium’32.
The core aims o f m arginalism  in the  context o f V ictorian  desire for reform  
The Victorian desire for reform was robust (if also partial, in terms of its objectives and 
social basis for support for them), and it formed a curious juxtaposition to how utility 
theory was used to excise any consideration of the moral justification of capitalist profits. 
At the same time however, in addition to the doubts about the market raised by Ricardo 
and Malthus, Heilbroner also outlines how impetus for more positive change in Britain 
developed wider legitimacy through the popularity of J.S. Mill’s Principals of Political 
Economy, published in 1848, the same year as Marx and Engel’s The Communist Manifesto.
28 Heilbroner 1972, p .100
29 O ’Neill 1998, p.36
30 See Skidelsky 1992, p.41. As Slater writes; ‘each individual has his or her own utility function which 
cannot be judged from the perspective of anyone else’s’ (Slater 1997, p.56).
31 Clarke 1983, p. 16
32 As Xenos states: ‘whereas classical political economy had taken wealth as it subject, neoclassical 
economics focuses on economizing actions, beginning with individual ones and then aggregating 
them’ (Xenos 1989, p .71). Here, as Clarke writes, ‘In its theory of price, marginalism explains the 
formation of prices as an expression of the individual rationality of economic agents, competitive 
exchange serving optimally to reconcile the conflicting interests of these individuals so as to reconcile 
individual and social rationality’ (1983, p. 157).
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Heilbroner writes that in contrast to popularised renderings of Smith, Mill positioned the 
market not as an impervious natural force, the expression of a ‘harmony of interests’, but 
something which could, and should, be improved through intervention33. Written in the 
context of conditions of highly visible abundance set against terrible scarcity, Clarke 
argues these accounts ensured many came to question the capacity of the autonomous 
free market to achieve reform, to solve societal inequities, and to address the 
dissimilitude between the ‘freedom’ of individuals and the maintenance of social order34. 
As the increasingly visible horrors and general dislocation of Industrialisation worsened 
throughout the mid-1800s, the idea of a self-moderating and self-adjusting market also 
fell completely out of sync with the nineteenth century ‘religious-conversion narrative’ of 
Evangelism35. Robert Skidelsky further outlines how romantics such as Carlyle and 
Ruskin wrote against what they saw as the egoism of the classical economists who 
‘would, by destroying existing social relations, prepare the way for anarchy and 
revolution’36.
The marginalists and political economists were responding to very different 
circumstances, yet both had similar aims. The political economists were celebrating and 
defending nascent free market capitalism against political nepotism. The marginalists, in 
responding to the many critics of the free market, focused on defending capitalism 
against detractors who questioned whether the free market really was a panacea. The 
political influence of the working class movement was growing around this time, and 
Roll discusses how their concerns were given particular force through socialist 
arguments37. Skidelsky positions socialists as the most vocal critics of the free market, 
and as such, the marginal economists’ principal targets38. Yet Clarke and Xenos both 
argue the marginalists just responded by shaping the ambit of theoretical economics so 
as to avoid even the need to justify inequalities in access to goods and services; in this 
simply sidestepping concerns about inequality, and changing the terms of the debate39.
33 Heilbroner 1972, pp.126-9. Also Xenos 1989, pp.40-3.
34 Clarke 1983, p. 14 & 16
35 Xenos 1989, p.44. Clarke 1983, pp. 148-9. Skidelsky also writes that ‘classical political economy 
founded by Adam Smith and his followers was out of tune with Victorian evangelism because it 
offered no scope for the benevolent motives’ (Skidelsky 1993, pp.41-2)
36 Skidelsky 1992, p.42
37 Roll 1992, p.329
38 Skidelsky 1992, p.49
39Clarke 1983, p. 146, also p. 154. Xenos 1989, pp.70-9.
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Marginalism and the shift from God and Nature, to Scienee and Nature 
I mentioned earlier that Adam Smith’s ‘hidden hand’ conception of the market has 
enjoyed longstanding theoretical success. Smith understood the market as maintaining a 
‘harmony of interests’40, and based this on the idea of there being underlying laws 
regulating distribution, part of a pattern ordered and determined by God. Attempts to 
replace metaphysical with scientific foundations did form part of a longstanding trend, 
challenging such conceptions such as Smith’s, but Darwin’s 1859 publication of the 
Origin of the Species undermined traditional foundations of justification even further. 
Marginalism’s contribution to this issue was significant, for the doctrine seemed to 
address the crisis in the religious faith of the intelligentsia that was exacerbated around 
the 1860s41, offering a ‘modern’ shift in focus from God and Nature, to Science and 
Nature. In this marginalism also represented itself as a hard science, focusing on the 
mathematically quantifiable. For as Xenos observes,
marginalists sought to expunge metaphysical substances and contingent 
historical episodes from their theory.42
By explaining the individual acts of economic agents as something that could be 
understood in a purely technical way, and only needed to be understood on this level, the 
marginalists avoided any problems associated with philosophical, ethical or religious 
foundations of justification, ‘overcoming’ what was represented as a ‘fruitless’ 
consideration of ethical and moral issues resulting in questions deemed just too hard to 
resolve. As the British marginalist Marshall (writing largely in response to the moral 
philosopher and economist Sidgwick), declared,
We are not at liberty ... to ... exercise ourselves on subtleties which lead 
nowhere.43
Despite its dismissive tone, this statement is also indicative of the degree to which the 
marginalists exhibited an abiding concern over the need for action, along with a need to 
justify their program. In his Pleasure Wars: The Bourgeois Experience: Victoria to Freud (1988) 
Peter Gay argues that the Victorian ‘age of confidence was also an age of anxiety’44. 
Writing prior to the Depression in conditions of increasingly evident bourgeois
40 Clarke 1983, p. 13
41 Skidelsky 1992, p.26
42 Xenos 1989, pp.70-1
43 Marshall cited in Skidelsky 1992, p.40
44 Gay 1998, p.3
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prosperity, existing alongside still appalling poverty, Marshall self-assuredly, yet still 
nervously opined that
the social and economic forces already at work are changing the 
distribution of wealth for the better: that they are persistent and increasing in 
strength; and that their influence is for the greater part cumulative; that the 
socio-economic organism is more delicate and complex than at first sight 
appears; and that large ill-considered changes might result in grave disaster.45
Hume vis-ä-vis marginalism: further justification for economies as a 
technical science, and for t he separation of economics from ethics
The marginalists called on Smith to support their arguments of the market being an 
ideal self-regulating system, but Slater records that they also made use of Hume’s 
arguments. As with other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers Hume had questioned 
established norms, mysticism and superstition46. He went beyond any simple 
Enlightenment criticism of ecclesiastical authority however, averring there were no 
universal truths, ‘eternal rational measures of right and wrong’47. Religion could not be 
relied on as a foundation for ethical justification, but neither could reason: for reason 
could not, Slater relates, ‘prescribe the ultimate ends or meaning of life’48:
For Hume ... reason arises solely from sensation and is therefore limited 
to observation of that which exists; it is therefore incapable of moving from ‘is’ to 
‘ought’, of moving from what it knows to be the case to stating what should be, of 
deriving values from factual knowledge (crudely, unlike the physical properties 
and movements of an object, its ‘value’ or ‘rightness’ cannot be observed). 
Reason therefore cannot prescribe the ultimate ends or meaning of life ... 
Reason, mirroring the general course of modernity, can dethrone the absolutism 
of traditional values but by the same token cannot provide socially authoritative 
values to replace them .49
Hume’s criticisms of ethical rationalism caused a great controversy50, yet he also believed 
people had a moral sense, and that moral judgements guide action51. Like Smith, Hume
45 Marshall cited in Barber 1988, p. 193
46 See for instance Hamilton 1992, p.43.
4/ Hume 1968, p.44, also Hume 1969c, p.20.
48 Slater 1997, p.48. See MacIntyre 1998 and also Varoufakis 1996.
49 Slater 1997, pp.47-8 . See also MacIntyre 1998.
50 Particularly with statements such as it is ‘not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the 
whole world to the scratching of my finger’ (Hume 1969a, p.6).
ol MacIntyre 1998, p.169. Where Locke still acknowledges religion as the foundation of morals, 
Hume bases this in social experience and interaction. This is particularly evident in terms of how 
religious faith imbues Locke’s work, with God viewed as providing the basis for existence. See for 
instance Chapter x, Book iv, of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ‘Of Our Knowledge of 
the Existence of God’ (Locke 1964, p.379), and also the first paragraph of ‘Essays of the Law of 
Nature: Is there a Rule of Morals, or Law of Nature given to us? Yes.’ (Locke 1998, pp.81-88).
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viewed moral sense as developing through social interaction, with ‘sympathy’ arousing a 
positive response within us, allowing us to empathise with others, and this empathy is a 
characteristic to be welcomed52. Yet as Copleston stresses in A History of Philosophy (1964), 
for Hume reason plays no foundational role in this process; ‘moral distinctions are not 
derived from reason’53. Moral feeling alone determines values, as morality, Hume 
writes, ‘is more properly felt than judged o f 54. For Hum e then, our desires and passions 
are not determined by reason. The only role reason plays is in assisting us to calculate 
how to obtain what we desire:
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never 
pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them .55
Reason determines how desires might be obtained, but cannot determine desire itself:
Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself 
is utterly impotent in this particular.56
Slater delineates that this latter aspect of H um e’s thought was drawn on to promulgate 
the liberal m otif that reason could not have any legitimate role in determining the 
validity or acceptability of what individuals should or should not consume57. He notes 
H um e’s ideas about the separation of facts and values informed Bentham ’s work, and 
were likewise taken up by the marginalists to support a focus on technical, empirical 
aspects of hum an behaviour. Yet while certain of H um e’s arguments and phrasing do
52 Aiken describes Hume’s view as follows: ‘The importance of conventions lie precisely in the fact that 
as nature provides no natural remedy for the irregularities and anti-social tendencies in human 
behaviour, it is necessary that conventional rules of conduct be established which will be generally 
observed. The social utility of such conventions lies first of all in their universal observance. In this 
every man has an enduring interest ... it is Hume’s belief that as man came to be aware of the social 
utility of rules of justice they will be led by such moral sentiments as they possess to “concur with 
interest” (Aiken 1968, p.xxxix-xl).
53 Copleston 1964, p. 133
54 Hume 1968, p.43. He believed however that ‘reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral 
determinations and conclusions. The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and 
actions amiable or odious, praiseworthy or blameable; that which stamps on them the mark of honour 
or infamy, approbation or censure; that which renders morality an active principle and constitutes 
virtue our happiness and vice our misery: it is probable, I say, that this final sentence depends on some 
internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species. For what else can 
have an influence of this nature? But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper 
discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice 
distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distinct comparisons formed, complicated relations 
examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained’ (Hume cited in Copleston 1964, p. 133).
55 Hume 1969a, p.5
56 Hume 1968, p.33. Also Hume 1969b, p.9.
57 Slater 1997, p.46-8
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lend themselves such an approach58, whether or not this is consistent with H um e’s 
overall thought given the im portant role he granted the social is moot. Nevertheless, in 
the standard liberal utilitarian tradition needs are always represented as originating 
endogenously (Slater writes, ‘from the separate and private interior world of the 
individual ego’59), with each individual’s preferences being a private matter, and the 
motivations supplying ‘utility’ solely the right of each individual to determine according 
to their own criteria60.
Marginalist free trade and the naturalisation of unequal class relations 
In this tradition any consideration of values associated with or underlying consumption 
become wholly subjective, and thus ancillary. Yet although Hume was conscripted to 
extinguish the importance of ethics and transform the domain of the economic to the 
purely technical61, we should be very wary of any attem pt to position technical decision­
making as value-free. Clarke observes that while the marginalists may have presented 
themselves as scientists solely concerned with the means by which humans provision 
themselves, they were actually providing ‘a naturalist justification for capitalist social 
relations’62, in a m anner not unlike Smith. But where Sm ith’s hidden hand had 
represented the m arket as m aintaining a ‘harm ony of interests’63 in equilibrium due to 
underlying laws which regulated distribution in an ordered pattern determined by God, 
the marginalists just transposed God with ‘science’, while m aintaining a natural ‘harm ony 
of interests’ ensured individuals attained functionally-given economic ends64. 
M acpherson too notes how the marginalists posited ‘just rewards’, that is, accurate 
compensation for work, insofar as ‘the capitalist market ... gave everyone - labourer, 
entrepreneur, capitalist, and land-owner - exactly what his contribution was w orth’65. 
Clarke charts how in this the state was positioned as ‘benevolent’ and ‘neutral’66 (or 
generally ineffectual), and largely ‘uninfected’ by the financial and political power of
58 For instance: ‘If we take in hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us 
ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any 
experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence? No. Commit it then to flames: for it 
can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion’ (Hume cited in Copleston 1964, p. 120).
59 Slater 1997, p.56
60 Slater 1997, p.46
61 Slater 1997, p.47. Heilbroner 1985, p.l 15.
62Clarke 1983, p .l48
63 Clarke 1983, p .l3
64 Clarke 1983, p .l64
65 Macpherson 1975, p.23 
66Clarke 1983, p .l92
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business or established elites. He argues that this was a total reversal from the position of 
the political economists, and that in this reversal the marginalists also naturalised 
unequal class relations and positioned complaints by subordinate groups about 
inequality as threats to the organic operation of the market.
Disutility
Utility had proven a powerful concept for the marginalists, however it also retained 
traces of Bentham’s original equitable aims, recognising, Macpherson writes, ‘an order 
of urgency of wants in every man, ranging from the most basic necessities to pure 
frivolities’67. This meant that at some level utility always recalled claims for a 
redistribution of wealth:
To recognize an order of urgency of wants would be to cast serious 
doubts on the ability of the market systems, with all its inequalities of income, to 
maximize the aggregate utility of all members of society, which ability is offered 
as the system’s great justification.68
The marginalists were well aware of this problem, but utility was intrinsic to their 
doctrine and Marshall in particular, Roll details, still found it necessary to use it69. Other 
marginalists tried to get round the issue by using Hume to argue that subjective 
considerations of value could not be measured or compared being private and 
unobservable, even metaphysical. Jevons for instance, in discussing ‘subjective’ utility, 
wrote that ‘every mind is inscrutable to every other mind and no common denominator 
of feeling is possible’70.
Pareto and pure ‘science’
A solution was finally derived courtesy of a second generation marginalist, Vilfredo 
Pareto, whose work enabled the conclusion that by focusing solely on price, utility could 
be bypassed71. Where interpersonal comparisons of utility were both undesirable and 
pointless, price on the other hand, was simply an observable, technical fact, representing 
what came to be known as ‘ordinal utility’. As Roll relates,
67 Macpherson 1975, p.25
68 Macpherson 1975, p.25
69 Roll 1992, p.351, p.427. Also O ’Neill 1998, p.36.
70 Skidelsky 1992, p.41. Roll, 1992, p.351. Attempting to address criticisms against his use o f ‘utility’, 
Marshall wrote, ‘It is essential to note that the economist does not claim to measure any affectation of 
the mind in itself, or directly; but only indirectly, through its effect’ (cited in O ’Neill 1998, fn.7 p. 182).
71 Menger had bruited the notion o f‘ordinal’ utility, but Pareto formalised it (Roll 1992, p.374).
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a purely “ordinal” conception of utility sufficed for the formulation of a 
theory of choice ... The scale of preference as exhibited in conduct is the only 
determinate phenomenon; any number of utility functions could fit it.72
Price was accordingly deemed the most accurate indication of those subjective states
according to the ‘revealed preferences’ of consumers. This represented a seemingly
elegant empirical solution to the problem of utility /  demand as the underlying value
elements of previous marginal utility analysis could be eradicated73, and the egalitarian
motivations behind Bentham’s original conception discarded. Twentieth century
neoclassical economists were subsequently able to overcome ‘deficiencies’ they perceived
in the work of earlier marginalists such as Marshall74, and able to view any incorporation
of utility, as Paul Samuelson determined, as something ‘which deserves the impatience of
modern economists’73. Samuelson was instrumental in resuscitating and reworking
Pareto’s ideas76, and this is especially significant because Samuelson’s textbook Economics,
according to Roll, was one of the mostly widely used during the second half of the
twentieth century, to the extent it actually reshaped the preoccupations of the
discipline77. What is important to note here however, is that notions of ‘ordinal utility’
and ‘revealed preferences’ are predicated on stifling investigation into any and all
motivations associated with consumption /  demand.
For with this shift later marginalists, and subsequently neoliberals were able to position 
the discipline as dealing with tangible, established ‘facts’, as opposed to merely being 
reliant upon a certain hypothesis about human nature and society. Both slighted 
questions about human nature and metaphysics and, representing them as unnecessary 
distractions impeding the grounded, ‘real life’ issues of formal economic concerns, then 
placed themselves above and beyond any need to consider such questions, which were 
dismissed as the province of other disciplines. On a theoretical level at least, orthodox
72 Roll 1992, p.377
73 Roll notes that in one of his earlier works, Corns d’Economie Politique (1896-7), Pareto takes the 
position ‘that the constancy of inequality in the distribution of income reflects inequality of human 
activity, which is a universal and natural category’ (Roll 1992, p.376)
74 Roll 1992, p.427. Also Mirowski and Hands 2006.
75 Samuelson cited in O ’Neill 1998, fn.19 p. 182
76 The notion o f ‘revealed preferences’ was Samuelson’s (1938) contribution, although Mirowski has 
also written of the ‘complexity of the debate’ around this period (2006, p.4), and of the various 
inconsistencies of Samuelson’s account, criticisms of which he just largely ignored (Mirowski, 2002).
77 Roll 1992, pp.488-92. And Mirowski writes that Samuelson was ‘most strident in his insistence 
upon the “scientific” character of neoclassicism’ (2002a, p.226).
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economics finally began to regard itself as being perfectly value-free. As Mises proudly 
claimed:
Because it is subjectivistic and takes the value judgem ents of acting man 
as ultimate data not open to any further critical examination, it is itself above all 
strife of parties and factions, it is indifferent to the conflicts of all schools of 
dogmatism and ethical doctrine .78
The marginalists did not have to dwell on subtleties that led nowhere. A sjoan  Robinson 
has pointed out however, they still based their approach on a particular philosophical 
conception of people as self-seeking egoists79.
This Hobbesian egoism also supported the marginalists in their quest to avoid 
formulating any theory of tastes or preferences. I'astes could be treated as ‘exogenous’, 
isolated and atomistic. Here need, Xenos notes
is constructed solely out of the individual’s preferences, without any trace 
of social determination. Marginal utility theory' is deliberately unconcerned with 
the sources of the individual’s desires (it stipulates only that such desires exist as 
empirical fact) or with the process by which people order them (it stipulates only 
that they do order them) ... For the marginalists, the only issue of any relevance 
is the fact that a good has entered the realm of the economic because an 
individual wants it, and expresses that w ant .80
With their supposedly ‘natural’ laws in place, which were then elevated to the highest
expression of ‘individual rationality ’81 the marginal economists with their ‘ideology to
end ideologies’82 as Robinson terms it, were not concerned that the real world did not
equate with the pure mathematical rationality they envisaged. Discrepancies merely
illustrated the need for reforms in order to ensure a ‘cleaner’ operation of the market. As
Clarke writes:
The pure theory offered an abstraction that represented an ideal world 
against which reality could be measured and proposed reforms could be 
evaluated. It is therefore no criticism of the marginalist analysis to note that 
reality does not accord to its abstractions: insofar as the real world does not accord with
78 Mises cited in O ’Neill 1998, p.46
79 Robinson 1962, p.21 & p.53. Xenos similarly refers to how the marginalists used diminishing 
marginal utility to proffer ‘value free’ calculations along with a tacit value-laden conception of human 
nature: ‘needs in the aggregate are infinitely expandable, but economizing individuals are 
continuously engaged in allocative acts that involve limitations on particular needs, rendering them 
calculable’. He continues, ‘It is the movement from need to need that simultaneously provides for 
conditions of relative satiety and absolute scarcity - needs are satisfied only as long as there are other, 
unsatisfied ones to which the individual can turn. Individuals decide that they have had enough of 
one thing only at the same moment they decide that they want something else even more. Desire - 
restless, perpetually unfulfilled - underlies the marginalist notion of need’ (Xenos 1989, p.70).
80 Xenos 1989, p.70
81 Clarke 1983, p. 157
82 Robinson 1962, p.53
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the abstractions of marginalism it is not economic theory that is in error, but the real world that 
is in need of reform .83
The marginalist ‘solution’
Despite their desire for a ‘cleaner operation of the market, early marginalists were more 
open to government intervention than the earlier political economists, although they 
stressed this intervention should be minimal and designed to cause the least disturbance 
to the ‘natural’ equilibrium. Regulation which might prevent the formation of 
monopolies was permissible84, for instance, but if other solutions to problems of price or 
distribution were followed those prescriptions would overrule the need for the market to 
‘set value’. And it in this sense the marginalists presented the role of the economist as 
merely being a ‘solicitous statesman’85 providing useful analysis and occasional corrective 
advice to ensure the smooth working of the economic ‘mechanism’. So while economics 
was represented as a technical, scientific discipline removed from any concerns about 
social inequality, it was usually intimated that inequality would (eventually) just be 
ameliorated by marginalist prescriptions. Economic benefits would ‘trickle down’. In 
the meantime groups who did not ascribe to the marginalist agenda, and sought to 
trespass on the economic domain only promised, in their view, to act to the detriment of 
society as a whole. And for the marginalist economists the correct government response 
to complaints was not an acceptance of the rights of individuals to lobby government in accordance with 
any democratic process; instead, the marginalist doctrine implicitly advocated, Clarke argues, 
the repression of such complaints:
class conflict is no longer fundamental to capitalist economic relations, 
but rather is a superficial disturbance that arises as special interests seek to 
subvert the competitive process to their own ends. For the economic liberal the 
formation of classes, and the consequent class conflict, is entirely illegitimate, and 
the State is required to legislate to prevent the formation of agreements in 
restraint of trade by means of which classes seek to pursue their ends.86
83 Clarke 1983, p. 165. My italics.
84 Barber 1988, p.203 & p.206
85 Using Hirschman’s analogy, this also once again recalls the popular liberal view of the world as 
God’s ‘clock’, which although self-operating and repairing still needed judicious tinkering.
86 Clarke 1983, p.190
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Capitalism, democracy, freedom
M acpherson relates in Human Needs and Politics (1977) how the 1832 Reform Act (which
extended the franchise to seven percent of English adults87) was achieved in a climate of
elite fear about loss of property and power88. Such fears about political unrest were not
without grounds (the French revolution still being relatively recent), however Graeme
Duncan in Marx and Mill: Two views of social conflict and harmony (1973), insists there was
never any serious threat. He records that ‘reformers’ played on such fears ‘to push
reluctant governments into action’89, with some English middle class radicals arguing for
democracy ‘primarily as a means of drawing the working class into society and thus
reducing the extent and the dangers of class conflict’90. In this it appears the beneficent
aims of the Victorians rested on a doctrine of educative control; the idea that if the
working class were educated they would come to adopt appropriate behaviour: frugality,
restraint, sobriety, industry and deference. Duncan for instance, cites an 1858 editorial
in the M anchester Guardian, where education was regarded as having
made the lower classes more intelligent, more self-reliant, more 
energetic, has taught them to think more justly of their fellow countrymen, to feel 
ashamed of their former prejudices, and to acknowledge that it rests with them 
and not with any Government to ameliorate their social condition.91
These docile, disciplined workers9“2 were m eant to accept the status quo.
It was in this context M arx criticised his liberal contem porary John  Stuart Mill for failing 
to recognise the endemic inequality of capitalism, despite Mill’s concern about social 
issues. As Duncan details, Mill and his followers were ‘struggling for the extension of the 
franchise and other political reforms’93, but M arx argued that this would not determine
87 Parliament of New South Wales, Accessed 8/11/8:
http:// www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/common. nsf/key/HistoryResponsibleGovernment
88 Macpherson for instance, writes that ‘classical liberal theory was committed to the individual right 
to unlimited acquisition of property, to the capitalist market economy, and hence to inequality, and it 
was feared that these might be endangered by giving votes to the poor’ (1977, p. 19). Lewis similarly 
observes how ‘With the growth of an industrial working class and recurrent signs of its discontent, 
there was a natural fear that mass democracy would lead to seizure of the wealth and property of the 
privileged classes as well as the end of their political dominance’ (Lewis 1992, p.22).
89 Duncan 1973, p.33. Although the Russian revolution of 1917 could have been seen by some, 
however, as a justification for that fear.
90 Duncan 1973, p.36. Skidelsky discusses how desire for reform was also connected to evangelism and 
rejection of egoism (1983, p.42), and Elizabeth Windschuttle positions the 1832 Reform Act as a new 
alliance between the elite and upper middle classes (Windschuttle 1985, p.2).
91 Duncan 1973, p.36
92 Rose 1990, 1992, Gascoigne 2006
93 Duncan 1973, p.3
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political power94. U nder capitalism real political power was only obtained through the 
ownership of property, along with an effective validating ideology. M arx saw capitalism, 
with or without democracy, as simply offering new forms of institutionalised domination 
and systemic inequality. And for Duncan, to the extent that the vote ‘was conceived as 
both an incentive to good behaviour and as a reward for good conduct - an appropriate 
gift to men who had demonstrated their virtue, especially their conservatism’95, M arx’s 
analysis could be considered correct. Certainly by the 1867 Reform Act a new elite 
confidence could be contrasted against the earlier fears of 183296. (And the system of 
representative government then instituted still excluded 84% of the adult population97.)
Clarke points out that liberals consistently dismiss M arx’s identification of the structural 
limitations of democracy vis-a-vis capitalism. From Smith on, he writes, the ‘moral 
justification for capitalism was based fundamentally on the progressive character of the 
capitalist system’98. This ‘progressive character’ is represented as the freedom to 
produce and consume free from traditional constraints99, enabling both political freedom 
and optimal material outcomes. At the same time, the role of government in this is, 
ideally, minimal: in Morality and the Market: Consumer Pressure for Corporate Accountability 
(1990) Craig Smith cites Mises, for instance:
Government means always coercion and compulsion and is by necessity 
the opposite of liberty. Government is a guarantor of liberty and is compatible 
with liberty only if its range is adequately restricted to the preservation of 
economic freedom .100
With this denegation of government, liberals prom ote the benefits of market freedom by 
selling consumer sovereignty as the optimal ‘steering’ m echanism 101. Yet neoliberals 
such as Milton Friedman have gone even further, claiming an actual symbiosis between 
capitalism and democratic freedom 102. In Myth America: Democracy vs. Capitalism (2003)
94 Marx perversely also criticised Hegel for not recognising the need for universal suffrage, while, of 
course, still maintaining it was, as Ingram puts it, ‘but a pretext for the wealthy to extend their class 
domination under the rational guise of advancing the common interest’ (Ingram 1990, p. 17).
95 Duncan 1973, p.36
96 In 1867 the franchise was extended to artisans, and in 1885 to workers and agricultural labourers.
9/ Parliament of New South Wales, Accessed 8/11/8:
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/common.nsf/key/HistoryResponsibleGovernment 
98 Clarke 1983, p.42. O ’Neill observes that Smith believed ‘commercial society increases welfare not 
because of the manner in which it satisfies consumer preferences but despite the way it does so’. 
Human desires may not necessarily be ‘good’ but they foster characteristics which are (1998, pp.60-1). 
"Such as hierarchical laws, guild restrictions and nepotistic government. See O ’Neill 1998, p.77.
100 Mises cited in Smith 1990, p. 16
101 Smith 1990, p.3
102 Stilwell 2003, p.28
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William Boyer details how the myth of this supposed synthesis has become a 
commonplace feature of the popular imagination, but he strongly disputes such a 
simplistic association.
The increasing levels of trade from the mid-seventeenth century on did result in a shift in 
the balance of power from the traditional aristocracy to a wealthy mercantile class. But 
the horrendous conditions that many of the working class were subject to deteriorated 
even more dramatically during Industrialisation. The improvement of these conditions 
in Western countries and the development of Western democratic freedom, only began 
with the political agitation of the mid-1800s, developed during the late 1800s103, and 
seemed to consolidate itself, as Lewis observes, after elite recognition of the working class 
sacrifices during WW1104. In conjunction with an enormous level of popular political 
activism, it was these factors that contributed to the extension of the franchise, and led to 
regulations protecting workers, along with supportive welfare system. (Which still had to 
be strenuously fought for, as Mark Blyth details in Great Transformations (2002), in relation 
to American policies during the 1930s and 40s105.)
So while, as Slater puts it, ‘capitalist development has generally been characterized by 
the slow extension of formal rights against a background of real disadvantage’106, these 
‘formal rights’ have occurred separately to the operation of capitalism. There are also 
indications these early gains are being reversed, not to mention large parts of the world 
where capitalism has simply not delivered positive outcomes. I have already cited 
Klein’s observations about the need for governments to control free market 
depredations. She further emphasises how this is particularly vital in relation to global 
trade, and refers to how the hopes of the development community about the positive 
benefits of trade and foreign investment have given way to despair:
Until the mid-eighties foreign corporate investment in the Third World 
was seen in the mainstream development community as a key to alleviating 
poverty and misery. By 1996 ... that concept was being openly questioned, and 
it was recognized that many governments in the developing world were 
protecting lucrative investments - mines, dams, oil fields, power plants and 
export processing zones - by deliberately turning a blind eye to egregious rights 
violations by foreign corporations against their people ... in case after case, 
foreign corporations were found to be soliciting, even directly contracting, the
103 Curren 1982, p.224
104 Lewis 1992
105 Blyth 2006, pp.49-95
106 Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p.68
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local police and military to perform such unsavory tasks as evicting peasants and 
tribespeople from their land; cracking down on striking factory workers; and 
arresting and killing peaceful protestors - all in the name of safeguarding the 
smooth flow of trade. Corporations, in other words, were stunting human development, 
rather than contributing to it.107
Friedman, Hayek, Keynes: managing ‘The Market’
The Great Depression was a sharp rejoinder to marginalist views. And it was in the 
context of the Great Depression with its unrelieved hardship that Keynes began to doubt 
the efficacy of the ‘self-regulating’ market, even though, as Eric Roll documents, Keynes’ 
ideas were initially ‘rooted in the Marshallian version of neo-classical economic 
doctrine’108. With his General Theoiy of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), Keynes 
questioned the capacity of the free market to achieve equilibrium in the long run (in the 
long run ‘we are all dead’109). He also disputed here a number of philosophical precepts 
of neoclassical thought, including its adherence to Hume’s fact /  value distinction110, as 
well as its rendition of economics as universally applicable* 111. But Keynes’ primary aim 
was to set in place a new program: he believed unemployment could and should be 
alleviated by using government spending to ‘kickstart’ the economy in times of 
depression.
In A History of Economic Thought (1992) Roll describes Keynes’ effect on policies on a 
practical political level as unprecedented. There was no ‘direct family relationship 
between Keynes and Roosevelt’s New Deal’112, but the parallels between them were 
obvious, so despite Keynes’s subsequent criticisms of the New Deal, his General Theory was 
also regularly used as a rationalisation for it113. The success of both ensured that 
government fiscal policy using Keynesian demand management strategies (in
107 Klein 1999, p.338. My italics.
108 Roll 2002, p.442. Karl Polanyi also positioned marginalism as responsible for the Depression, 
disparagingly referring to it as ‘the corrosive of a crude utilitarianism combined with an uncritical 
reliance on the alleged self-healing virtues of unconscious growth’ (Polanyi 2001 [ 1944], pp.35).
109 Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p. 122
110 Sheehan discusses Keynes’s disagreement with Hume in Keynes’s Treatise on Probability (1921) and 
his view about how ‘there could in many situations be rational judgments of probability, and these 
ought to be utilised in determining moral basis for action. These judgments should be used, not in 
calculations of the social good, but in guiding action in complex and difficult situations in the light of 
fundamental moral values’ (1996, p.53, pp.45-66).
111 Sheehan 1996, pp.54-5
112 Roll notes that Roosevelt’s New Deal ‘evolved in a purely ad hoc manner and primarily by men 
little versed in economic theory of the Keynesian or any other variety’ (1992, p.475). Blyth similarly 
refers to its influence as ‘marginal at best’ (2002, p.76, fn.92).
113 Roll 1992, p.475
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conjunction with pastoral social welfare programs), eventually came to be regarded as a 
beneficent and temperate way of promoting equality while improving the living 
standards of all114. With WW2 there was an extraordinary new impetus and capacity to 
collect statistical data, and as quantitative analysis developed, Western governments 
began to use data with openly interventionist policies buoyed by the mathematical 
validity of a new ‘science’ of ‘hard fact’, and the ‘m arket’ was directly, openly 
m anipulated as never before115. Economists increasingly came to utilise mathematical 
formulae and attem pt to apply these to everyday life116.
Keynes’s ideas are often held up as the obverse to marginalism insofar as Keynes 
acknowledged the inherent failings of the market. Yet Peter Kriesler has observed how 
‘much that has been labelled as “Keynesian” economics are attempts to derive 
Keynesian results in neoclassical theory’117. Stilwell and Jones also argue that in the 
academy Keynesian ideas were often only used to support neoclassical prescriptions:
Keynesianism was introduced into the conventional syllabus, but only at 
substantial cost to its conceptual autonomy. Its role has been reduced to a 
subsidiary one of generating recommendations for appropriate government 
economic policy while the supposed theoretical integrity of the neoclassical 
system has remained intact.118
In Market Society: Markets and Modem. Social Theory (2001) Slater and Tonkiss too note that 
‘by the 1950s Keynesian macro-economics had been integrated into a “neoclassical- 
Keynesian consensus’” which used national accounting figures to calculate, through the 
marginal increments on a ‘Phillips curve’, an ‘optim al’ trade-off between unemployment 
and inflation119. Yet even with this ‘neoclassical-Keynesian consensus’ (what some have 
even referred to as a ‘statistical theology’120), with the lower unemployment rates during 
the 1950s and 60s, a new neoliberal economic doctrine began to gain prominence. 
Arguments that inflation rather than unemployment was the prim ary obstacle or
114 Hindess 1987. Also Slater and Tonkiss 2001, pp.122-3. And ‘Within a welfarist politics’, Slater 
and Tonkiss observe, ‘the right of citizens to meet their basic needs is seen as the substantive corollary 
to the formal rights of citizenship’ (Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p. 133).
115 Roll 1992, pp.461-71
116 Mirowski 2002a
117 Kriesler 1996, p.217. See also Axel Leijonhufvud ‘s On Kynesian Economics and the Economics of 
Keynes: a Study in Monetary Theory (1968).
118 Jones and Stilwell 1986
119 Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p. 123
120 See Nelson’s (1997) cynical, opportunistic and strategic apologia for free market doctrine through 
his presentation of Samuelson’s ‘Keynesianism’ as a ‘progressivist’ theology.
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deterrent to growth, the Phillips curve ‘spurious’121, and the type of government 
intervention recom mended by Keynes simply damaging to long term economic well 
being, all gained increasing currency.
In a preliminary chapter from their forthcoming The Road from Mont Pelerin, Van Horn 
and Mirowski detail how this new brand of neoliberalism as a doctrinal movement was 
instituted in the 1940s via a network of like-minded theorists, with Hayek one of its 
principal organisational architects122. Hayek’s Road to Serfdom essay was published in 
1944123: in the book he at once hints at, dismisses, and elides the importance of 
government:
we cannot, within the scope of this book, enter into a discussion of the very 
necessary planning which is required to make competition as effective and beneficial as 
possible. 124
Subsequent offers of corporate financial support did help foster an ‘appropriate’ stance 
toward government, enabling Hayek to foster networks that became key centres of 
neoliberal thought — the Chicago School, and the M ont Pelerin Society125. O ther 
‘quasi-independent’ strains of neoclassical economics that played an influential role in 
the transition from neoclassical to neoliberal economic doctrine included ‘German 
Ordoliberalism, Austrian political economy, Christian Neoliberalism, and so forth’126. 
Slater and Tonkiss discuss the Austrian and Swiss Lausanne ‘Schools’127. And Mirowski
121 Friedman 1988
122 Van Horn and Mirowski 2005, p.34
123 This became extremely popular in North America in 1945 when it was published by Reader’s Digest 
in a rudimentary abridged version (and later as a cartoon). The Readers Digest version is still available 
through the British right-wing think tank, the Institute of Public Affairs:
http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=book&ID=43 Accessed 16 December, 2008
The cartoon version is available on-line from the Ludwig von Mises Institute website:
http://m ises.org/books/TRTS/ Accessed 16 December, 2008
124 Hayek 1997 ,p.31. My italics.
123 The Volker Foundation was the primary initial source of funding, and Van Horn and Mirowski 
(2005) details how this funding led to the early concerns about corporate monopolies held by some of 
the Chicago School’s early liberal supporters (Henry Simons) simply being set aside. The focus 
instead turned to ‘guaranteeing the freedom of corporations to conduct their affairs as they wished’ 
(2005, p.33). Later Mirowski notes that the Volker Foundation was motivated by a desire to 
countermand the ‘socialist tendencies they thought had infected economics’ (2005 p.86).
126 Mirowski 2006a, p.463
127 In Market Society (2001) Slater and Tonkiss mention two main schools of neoliberal doctrine, the 
Austrian and Swiss Lausanne, and the principal difference between them, the notion of ‘market 
clearing’, or equilibrium. The Swiss school which developed from Walras and Pareto, sees free market 
supply and demand able to approach and reach equilibrium, signifying the market’s capacity to 
respond efficiently to a range of competing demands. (Discussing views about equilibrium in North 
America Mirowski and Hands have observed that ‘the third quarter of the twentieth century was not 
the best of times for Walrasian general equilibrium theory’ (Mirowski and Hands 2006, pp.4-5).) The 
alternative Austrian school (Hayek, Menger and Mises), views equilibrium as deferred insofar as it is
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and van Horn note the role of the Cowles Commission and the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT), where Samuelson taught from 1940: military funding played a 
crucial role in the development of both128. A wealth of support - Cold War funding from 
the military and well-heeled corporate donors - ensured the spreading, concentric 
spheres of influence of all these different groups; their associated activist think tanks129, 
growing number of Centres and Foundations, coupled with the McCarthy era attacks on 
communism, all combined to nourish, sustain and promote neoclassical /  marginalist 
economic theory. There were a whole range of disputes between the various neoclassical 
schools130, but Mirowski also writes that toward the last quarter of the twentieth century 
these disputes were subsumed under a transnational neoliberal movement with an 
agenda aimed at instituting a new form of political governance in order to ‘foster the 
spread of “free market” relations’131. So while neoliberal thought is often conflated with 
its neoclassical, liberal antecedents, Van Horn and Mirowski stress the difference is that 
neoliberalism tacitly regards government as necessary to implement market conditions132, 
despite the contrary message its rhetoric conveys.
In terms of the more public challenge to Keynesian ideas it was the Chicago School 
economist Milton Friedman who was the public face and a key player in the political 
uptake of neoliberal policy prescriptions. His Capitalism and Freedom (1962) supplied new
subordinate to the dynamism and constancy of change necessary for ‘optimal’ market operations: the 
‘dynamic effects of competition and innovation in markets’ (Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p.52). Here the 
focus is more on price as a method of communication enabling effective responses to competing 
demands: as ‘an information signal or system of shared meaning between market actors, rather than 
as a neutral mechanism that brought supply and demand into alignment. With this move, markets 
may be seen as rich information networks - even as a kind of “conversation” between buyers and 
sellers’ (Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p.53). Enforcing market ‘flexibility’ and minimising government 
intervention is presented as the key to success here. (The Mont Pelerin Society website elaborates on 
this theme: http://www.montpelerin.org/home.cfm).
128 In a interview Mirowski recently stated that ‘military money was largely the initial common 
denominator: the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the Office of Strategic Services, the 
Office of Naval Research, the Atomic Energy Commission, the MIT Radiation Lab, the Applied 
Mathematics Panel, and so forth’ (Mirowski 2005, p.85). Mirowski’s Machine Dreams (2006) supplies 
an extended account of the strategies and dealings of the neoclassical economists associated with the 
Cowles Commission, and Samuelson’s role in fostering the neoclassical orthodoxy.
129 With discussion papers supporting ‘timely interventions in local political controversies’ (Mirowski 
2006a, p.463).
13° Mirowski stresses that ‘It is of paramount importance to observe that no single discrete doctrine 
served as an all-purpose “litmus test” for neoclassical orthodoxy in the immediate postwar era.’ 
(Mirowski 2007, p.1.2). However he notes that differences were mitigated by 1980 as graduates 
migrated between schools as faculty members (Mirowski 2005, p.91). He notes also how these 
differences (in relation to consumption /  demand theory in particular) formed a conceptual edifice 
which made the neoclassical doctrine as a whole less vulnerable to criticism (2002).
131 Mirowski 2005, p.89, p.91-3
132 Van Horn and Mirowski 2005, p.37
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doctrinal precepts, but just as importantly, proved tremendously popular133. But what 
particularly enabled Friedman to gain credence was that by the early 1970s the quasi- 
Keynesian policies then practiced did not appear able to address the new phenomenon 
of stagflation, the unprecedented increase in both unemployment and inflation134. At the 
time, Friedman’s reputation had been buoyed by an opportune empirical prediction of 
stagflation through a ‘Natural-Rate Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve’ (which 
positioned Keynesian theory as responsible for stagflation)135. When he claimed he had 
a new ‘scientific’ understanding of the way the money supply impacted on demand and 
how the money supply could be manipulated to generate ‘real’ economic growth, as 
opposed to that ‘manufactured’ by Keynesian policies, his claims were taken seriously. 
Friedman was also a determined and proficient media performer; as he marketed his 
‘monetarist’ neoliberalism he even argued his policies could have prevented the Great 
Depression, and for a time his arguments vis-a-vis the money supply even become the 
new ‘it’ theory136. Here Friedman also provided high profile support for other schools of 
neoliberalism calling for reduced fiscal intervention on the part of the state137, private 
ownership and deregulation, as opposed to public ownership and legislative regulatory 
controls138. And from the 1970s, particularly in the UK under Thatcher and US under 
Reagan, these policies were represented as being the only solution to rising 
unemployment and inflation139. At the same time it was argued that even if government 
could gain the necessary understanding and knowledge required to run the economy,
133 Van Horn and Mirowski note that the book was also regarded as intellectually simplistic, and made 
no attempt to engage with alternate positions (2005, pp.50-1).
134 Inflation in Britain for instance, reached 25% in 1975, yet the monetarist’s policies were already in 
place by this point when, as the British Treasury cut government capital works program. As 
unemployment rose to over 10% in 1981, this was taken as the final confirmation that the Keynesian 
policies had failed (Barratt Brown 1984, p. 71).
135Leeson 1996b, p.250 
136Leeson 1996b, p.252
137 Slater and Tonkiss write that Friedman’s rhetoric about reducing the influence of government 
found crucial ‘political’ support from the two other main schools of neoliberal doctrine, the Austrian 
and Swiss Lausanne schools. Both positioned the market as ‘the most efficient means of economic 
allocation and co-ordination’ (Slater and Tonkiss 2001, pp.51-2), and both united in their antipathy 
towards welfare provisioning in particular. Although frequently referring to the lack of choice in the 
USSR (Gabriel and Lang 1995, p. 15), in this they too were writing against perceived deficiencies in 
Keynesian demand management strategies. See also Hindess 1987, p. 123.
138 Pusey refers to this as economic rationalism, ‘the dogma which says that markets and money can 
always do better than governments, bureaucracies and the law. There’s no point in political debate 
because all this just generates insoluble conflicts’ (Pusey 1991). Slater and Tonkiss describe how both 
Friedman and Hayek argued governments were failing to cope with a range of contending demands 
(Slater and Tonkiss 2001, pp. 123-5, p. 139).
139 In Economic Rationalism in Canberra (1992) Pusey outlines a requisite policy capture in Australia. 
Democracies in general, were positioned just as not fully able to cope with an increasing range of 
demands (Crozier 1975).
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people’s ‘rational expectations’ account for, and thus counteract and nullify the 
beneficial intent of government intervention (while also impacting negatively on the 
freedom of individuals and creating a “culture of dependency”140). Subsequently these 
ideas were widely promulgated via Friedman’s 1980 television series, Free to Choose, and 
his popularist best seller of the same name.
In his 2008 Milton Friedman Distinguished Lecture James Galbraith details the 
disastrous impact of Friedman’s policies, and how the American Federal Reserve 
discarded monetarism as a practical policy tool by the early 1980s141. In The Predator State 
(2008) Galbraith also relates how monetarists actually positioned the failure of their 
policies as a success (due to the subsequent decline in unemployment)142. However the 
principal tactical achievement of the monetarists and other neoliberals has arguably 
been their very public representation of Keynesian policies as responsible for stagflation. 
Yet this representation is highly questionable. Mark Blyth’s Great Transformations (2002) 
offers a fascinating analysis of the strategies on the part of business along with various 
political decisions, especially under Nixon, which created the conditions contributing to 
stagflation, even prior to the turmoil that followed the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
agreement and the gold standard. Galbraith also details the role the collapse of the gold 
standard played143.
140 Slater and Tonkiss 2001, pp. 139-40
141 Galbraith writes: ‘From 1979, the Federal Reserve formally went over to short-term monetary 
targets. The results were a cascading disaster: twenty-percent interest rates, a sixty percent 
revaluation of the dollar, eleven percent unemployment, recession, deindustrialization through the 
Midwest including here in Ohio, and in Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin, and ultimately the debt crisis 
of the Third World. In August 1982, faced with the Mexican default and also a revolt in Congress - 
which I engineered from my perch at the Joint Economic Committee - the Federal Reserve dumped 
monetary targeting and never returned to it’ (2008a, p.5) ... ‘the monetarists’ recession of 1981-82 
was by far the deepest on the postwar record. It was far worse than any inflicted under Keynesian 
policy regimes’ (Galbraith 2008a, p.7). While more recently Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke ‘tightened’ the money supply (2008a, p.9), he and others offering ‘vague and imprecise’ 
variations on Friedman’s ideas (2008a, p.5) have proven utterly incapable of accounting for events 
such as the financial meltdown associated with the subprime mortgage crisis (2008a, p.10). See also 
Coleman (2007) for a discussion of how monetarism was abandoned in Australia by 1985.
142 Galbraith 2008, p.40
143 Galbraith outlines how 'The Bretton Woods rules provided that if the United States ran a trade 
deficit, other central banks could demand gold in payment, drawing on the formidable gold hoard the 
United States had accumulated during the two world wars.' However the growing trade deficit meant 
this system 'could not be sustained'. In 1971, 'Nixon closed the gold window and devalued the dollar'. 
(2008, p.41) With this, exports became cheaper, and imports more expensive, and 'immediately 
raised the price, measured in dollars, of commodities traded around the world'. Nixon then instituted 
price controls, and 'imposed export curbs to prevent U.S. producers from diverting supplies to the 
more profitable export markets'. Worldwide inflation grew, with oil initially being exempt; 'But that 
meant oil producers were suffering from inflation in the price of everything they consumed ... in
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The curious aspect of all this is the extent to which these issues were sidelined at the 
time, while Friedm an’s ideas filtered through to the public at large, and came to 
dominate public debate, despite being firmly discredited as policy tools by the mid- 
1980s. Yet Galbraith observes a difference between how neoliberal prescriptions are 
expounded in the academy, how they are used in political rhetoric, and how they taken 
up in the policy arena. I will return to this point below. Here I note that in the 
academy, despite monetarism being discarded as a policy tool, Friedm an’s influence 
remained, and served to support neoliberalism more generally144. Following Friedm an’s 
ascendency Keynesian ideas were relegated to quaint historical footnotes: economics 
curricula increasingly began to disseminate neoliberal doctrine as economic T ru th 145. 
(The impact of this trend was only exacerbated in the larger public arena as the doctrine 
infiltrated high school economics (the take up of which grew rapidly from 1970s)146.)
Econom ics as a ‘species o f social th o u g h t’ 147
W ith neoliberal theory then, individual freedom is predicated on the freedom of the 
market, which, subject to the steering mechanism of consumer sovereignty, uses price to 
deliver the most legitimate hum an desires148. H um an action and behaviour is viewed as 
quantifiable and all desires morally equivalent. The proto-Hobbesian vision of existence 
as the war ‘of every man, against every m an’149 the promotion of people as asocial, 
amoral, rationally calculating agents, acting autonomously and against others was only 
ratified further by the neoliberal adoption of N ash’s game theory in the 1970s. Here, 
Mirowski writes, was a new ‘vision’, ratified as science, depicting
everyone as driven to falling back on their own wits, cynically 
manipulating others, lacking even a trace of communal intelligence or 
transpersonal com m itm ent150
1973, following the Yom Kippur War, the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
struck back, abruptly quadrupling the oil price. And by then, domestic price controls had been largely 
lifted, so the shock could not be kept away from American consumers' (Galbraith 2008, p.42).
144 Galbraith (2000), in his witty account of the denial of various key economic problems associated 
with monetarism at the 2000 The American Economic Association conference writes that Friedman 
and his disciples’ primary achievements have been to eradicate ‘all alternative theories of inflation’.
145 Mirowski 2005. See also Stilwell (2006) and Jones and Stilwell (1986) for a discussion of the 
struggle in the Economics Faculty at the University of Sydney.
146 See for instance Maier 2002, and Cahill 2005
147 Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p.36
148 O ’Neill writes that Hayek, for example, sees ‘well-being as preference satisfaction and justifies the 
market as an institution that best ensures that the preferences of individuals are satisfied’ (1998, p.53).
149 Hobbes cited in Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p.30.
130 Mirowski 2005, p.93. Also 2002a, pp.331-49.
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In this ‘rational’ new neoliberal marketplace those who can pay take precedence over 
those who cannot, all under the auspices of rhetoric claiming long term ends justifies the 
means151. Economic costs such as the environment and human rights cannot be part of 
the government or business agenda, because this would gainsay the doctrine of 
individual consumer sovereignty. Yet at the same time the doctrine of consumer 
sovereignty, Crocker and Linden write, ‘blocks moral deliberation and judgement about 
consumption choices’152, effectively permitting business to abdicate moral responsibility 
and engage in any form of ruthless practice that might improve their ‘competitive’ edge. 
In Morality and the Market: Consumer Pressure for Corporate Accountability (1990) Craig Smith 
also comments that this framework permits almost any injustice. Any corporate guilt 
that might arise can be assuaged because it is ‘the market’ which is responsible:
Ehe corporate executives believe in the power of the consumer because 
this is how ideologies work. Any guilt they may have, about dubious practices 
that are a consequence of corporate power or merely the recognition of that 
power, is allayed in the process.153
A good example: in 1992 Lawrence Summers, then chief economist of the World Bank, 
argued that ‘the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage 
country is impeccable and we should face up to that’154. The reason? Ehe ‘demand for 
a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is likely to have a very high 
income-elasticity’155. The memo from which this was leaked was couched in logically 
rational, amoral, scientific and mathematical language. Delivered in an environment in 
which such an approach could not only be offered but also reasonably defended, it was 
divorced from any consideration of the meaning or consequences of the economic action 
in question. Yet while executives may fall back on the cover of a comforting, if 
hackneyed ideology, Joel Bakan’s The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power 
(2004), delineates how corporations, legally considered as entities in themselves, with 
profits their only legislatively slated aim, are in effect required to disregard moral 
considerations altogether:
the corporation can neither recognize nor act upon moral reasons to 
refrain from harming others. Nothing in its legal makeup limits what it can do to
151 In her contribution to Economics and Ethics (1996), Gill refers to neoliberalism as a ‘philosophical 
position that justifies means in terms of the ends which they are believed to serve’ (Gill 1996, p. 147).
152 Crocker and Linden 1998, p.4
153 Smith 1990, p.39
154 Summers cited in The Economist February 8, 1992 p.62
155 Summers cited in The Economist February 8, 1992 p.62
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others in pursuit of its selfish ends, and it is compelled to cause harm when the 
benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.156
Bakan also notes the corporate imperative to attempt to sidestep or bypass democratic 
regulatory ‘restrictions’ as well:
Because regulations reduce profitability, strategies to remove them make 
good business sense. The executive who, out of principled concern for the 
integrity of the democratic process, refuses to be involved in political influence, 
fails his or her shareholders, as well as the corporation’s legal mandate to protect 
its best interests. The job of a corporate executive is not to promote democracy 
but to manage its uncertainties and avoid the obstacles it presents.157
Idle Art of Exercising Power
Neoliberal doctrine clearly ‘speaks’ to the corporate arena, and the legal status of 
corporations as ‘persons’ compliments and furthers that doctrine, particularly insofar as 
corporations become the perfect Hobbesian actors. I have also noted Mirowski’s 
arguments about how neoliberalism seeks to use government to rigorously promote a 
free market agenda, even as it attacks government intervention per se. I have further 
noted the neoliberal capture of the economics discipline in the academy. However I 
mentioned earlier the distinction Galbraith has drawn between the views promoted in 
the academy, generalised political rhetoric, and actual policy. Galbraith argues that in 
the North American political arena, although Democrat and Republican party rhetoric 
celebrates the benefits of the ‘free’ market and deregulation, in actuality both have 
practiced what he terms a distorted quasi-Keynesian intervention, coupled with strategic 
deregulation158: ‘free’ market doctrine is now only used as a ‘legitimating myth’159. 
Furthermore, due to the disastrous effects of the Reagan-era policies Galbraith believes 
that in the practical policy arena economic conservatives are no longer regarded as 
having credibility:
The economic conservative still reigns supreme in the academy and on 
talk shows, but in the public realm, he is today practically null and void. He 
does not exist. And if he were to resurface today in the policy world, offering up 
the self-confident doctrines of 1980, he would be taken seriously by no one. 
Today in the great policy house of conservatives, there are only lobbyists and the
156 Bakan 2004, p.60.
157 Bakan 2004, pp. 101-2
158 For instance, in 1999 Congress under the Democrats repealed the Glass-Steagall Act (1934). This 
allowed commercial, as well as investment banks to engage in investment transactions. The type of 
unregulated lending associated with the ‘subprime’ mortgage crisis subsequently exploded, and the 
safety net protecting savings vanished.
159 ‘... something to be repeated to schoolchildren but hardly taken seriously by those on the inside’ 
(Galbraith 2008, p.xi).
129
Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose ....
politicians who do their bidding. There are slogans and sloganeers. There are 
cronies and careerists.160
G albraith’s concern is to identify who benefits from the government policies and 
intervention that actually does take place. His comments provide a clue, and in this the 
differentiation between his view, and Mirowski’s, is not as great as first appears.
I have outlined how as a philosophy and a practical doctrine of government marginalist 
and neoliberal ‘free’ market ideas operate under false pretences. Over a century ago 
Marshall acknowledged, even if he buried that acknowledgement in footnotes, that 
marginalism aimed at improving already energetic British national interests at the 
expense of others161. Hertz notes similar strategics in America:
W oodrow Wilson's proclamation that “the world must be made safe for 
democracy” has been presented as the driving ideology behind U.S. foreign 
policy for most of the last century. This is clearly misleading ... Throughout the 
last century, the United States has cloaked a foreign policy based on trade 
considerations, and centred on safeguarding private economic interests in a veil 
of a concern for dem ocracy.162
The difference between marginalism and neoliberalism is that neoliberals have sought to 
turn their practices of government into a bureaucratic art form catering to transnational 
corporations who have in effect largely abandoned national affiliations altogether.
Bourgeois prosperity of the 1800s was built on the back of slavery and a range of other 
colonising practices (evident in terms of the trade in tea /  opium, sugar and Indian cloth 
for instance). Today’s privileged Western consumers, and the multinational companies 
who supply them, likewise benefit from the oppressive labour practices and labour 
relations experienced by workers in poorer non-W estern countries, and even within 
those W estern countries themselves:
According to UN Development Programme data, between the 1960s and 
1990s, the income of the richest 20 per cent in the world grew from 70 per cent 
to 85 per cent of the world total, while the share of the poorest one fifth fell from 
2.3 per cent to 1.4 per cent.163
160 Galbraith 2008, p.5: ‘principled conservatives are guilty of taking the myths they helped create too 
seriously, and to sophisticated people, that makes them look a bit foolish’ (2008, p.7).
161 Robinson 1962, pp.65-6 & pp. 124-9
162 Hertz 2003, pp.90-1. Hertz also lists a range of instances of US government industrial espionage 
on behalf of US based corporations, along with numerous other examples of corporate /  government 
malfeasance (2003, pp.72-90).
163 Gabriel and Lang 1995, p.25
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In 2006 World Bank researcher, Branko Milanovic, argued that these glaring 
inequalities which exist on a global level are getting worse, not better164. Even more 
recently, he has claimed that earlier statistics may have actually underestimated the 
extent of the problem 165. This ‘free’ market is not free, but tied to systems of constraints 
and exploitation that are all too illustrative of the degree of inequality inherent in the 
capitalist system. The neoliberal doctrine of an ideal ‘free’ market controlled by price 
delivering optimal solutions exists in an era when multinationals have the power to 
dom inate nations, and, in fact, often gross far more than many nations. Meanwhile, 
Klein has noted how multinational corporate power has been brought to bear in order to 
elude regulation on an international scale:
Centuries of democratic reforms that had won greater transparency in 
government suddenly appeared ineffective in the new climate of multinational 
power ... Disillusionment with the political process has been even more 
pronounced on the international stage, where attempts to regulate multinationals 
through the United Nations and trade regulatory bodies have been blocked at 
every tu rn .166
John  Kenneth Galbraith, Baran and Sweezy, and M andel, have all likewise drawn 
attention to how markets can be subverted and controlled, prices set, and political 
patronage obtained ‘so as to evade market competition altogether'167. In the context of 
the new global marketplace Hertz too records a range of instances of US government 
industrial espionage on behalf of US based corporations168, along with numerous other 
examples of corporate /  government malfeasance169 (and this was even prior to the 
subprime mortgage fiasco). Governments, she wrote in 2003, are now also being forced 
to ‘tout for business’ via ‘corporate welfare’:
In 1999 state and local governments in the United States gave businesses 
over $1.7 billion in tax rebates and subsidies ... 170
164 Milanovic 2006
165 Milanovic’s most recent research shows that global inequality is worse than even he previously 
realised: ‘new numbers show global inequality to be significantly greater than even the most 
pessimistic authors had thought. Until the last month, global inequality, or difference in real incomes 
between all individuals of the world, was estimated at around 65 Gini points — with 100 denoting 
complete inequality and 0 denoting total equality, with everybody’s income the same -  a level of 
inequality somewhat higher than that of South Africa. But the new numbers show global inequality to 
be 70 Gini points -  a level of inequality never recorded anywhere’ (2008).
166 Klein 1999, p.341
167 Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p.22 
168Hertz 2003, pp.72-6
169 Hertz 2003, pp.76-90. Then there are the more ‘straightforward’ cases of corporate malfeasance: 
Enron 2001, WorldCom 2002, One-Tel 2001, HIH 2001, National Textiles 2000, and so on ...
170 ‘Study after study reveals no statistical evidence that business incentives actually create jobs’ (Hertz 
2003, p.67). Despite this, ‘Corporations effectively auction off promises of new jobs, infrastructure
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The $700 billion North American government subsidisation of the financial sector now 
renders this $1.7 billion insignificant. Yet with hindsight it appears such a predictable 
outcome of the neoliberal agenda. For James Galbraith has recently stressed, despite the 
way free market rhetoric has been (ab)used, corporations were never in favour of the 
‘free’ market at all:
In the real world, the autonomous individual is not the active agent who 
matters most. The business enterprise, the company, the corporation is. And 
companies do everything they can to take advantage of human changeability. 
They seek to control markets, even to replace them altogether. And often they 
succeed ... the ‘free’ market is actually a threat, a source of uncertainty and risk. 
To the greatest extent possible, therefore, it is made to disappear. Only the 
fiction that the company operates in a market is maintained, for the obvious 
benefit of shielding the corporation of close scrutiny of its actual business 
methods.171
For Galbraith, the ‘political deliberations’ operative in North America over the last few 
years, the neoliberal rhetoric, coupled with what he calls a quasi-Keynesian government 
intervention, have not been about encouraging any ‘level playing field’, let alone a more 
favourable distribution of wealth, or even an attempt to maintain the national interest. 
What has occurred, he writes, has simply been a vigorous, brazen, and sophisticated 
predatory, crony corporate capitalism:
The administration, following the installation of George W. Bush, 
became little more than an alliance of representatives from the regulated sectors 
- mining, oil, media, pharmaceuticals, corporate agriculture - seeking to bring 
the regulatory system entirely to heel. And to this group was added another, overlapping 
to some degree, of equal importance: those who saw the economic activities of the government not 
in ideological terms but merely as opportunities for private profit on a continental scaled72
In such circumstances neoliberal rhetoric about ‘freedom’ only serves, as Burchill terms
it, as ‘an “art of government” which uses economic thought as an organising force’173 in
a manner that serves to maintain a docile, self-regulating, compliant and ‘flexible’
working population. So here we can consider Rose and Miller’s point that
The language that constitutes political discourse is more than rhetoric. It 
should be seen, rather, as a kind of intellectual machinery or apparatus for
investment, and economic growth to the highest international bidder, declining to move to or 
threatening to pull out of countries whose employment costs and taxes are too high, or where 
standards are too stringent or subsidies and loans not forthcoming. Globally, dominant companies 
increasingly call the shots, able to move money freely, deciding for themselves where to invest and 
produce, where to pay taxes, and playing these potential sites off against one another ... National 
governments appear increasingly impotent in the face of the giant corporations’ (2003, pp.60-1).
171 Galbraith 2008, pp.22-3
172 Galbraith 2008b. My italics.
173Burchill 1991, p.29
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rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political 
deliberations.174
One notable feature of the subprime crisis is that so few economists saw it coming175. 
Yet the scale of it is just so extraordinary. Ben Bernanke, current Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, even as recently as 2007 made complacent pronouncements about the 
North American economy176. His theoretical affiliations are evident however. Speaking 
at Friedman’s 90th birthday in 2002, Bernanke, touted as an expert on the Great 
Depression, celebrated Friedman’s analysis of, and solution to it:
As everyone here knows, in their Monetary History Friedman and 
Schwartz made the case that the economic collapse of 1929-33 was the product 
of the nation’s monetary mechanism gone wrong. Contradicting the received 
wisdom at the time ... Friedman and Schwartz argued that ‘the contraction is in 
fact a tragic testimonial to the importance of monetary forces ... Let me end my 
talk by slightly abusing my status as an official representative of the Federal 
Reserve. I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great 
Depression. You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we 
won’t do it again.177
It is harsh to say Bernanke has been proven clueless. But as Skidelsky recently put it, 
‘mainstream theory has no explanation of why things have gone so horribly wrong’178. 
Nevertheless even prior to the crisis the consensus supported intervention that favoured 
the wealthy, and accounts that celebrated the ‘free’ market overlooked or disregarded 
the extent of the power of elite networks, liaisons and alliances to facilitate and enable 
elite transgressions and subtle forms of resistance to the political, legal and economic 
constraints that impede their aims179. This occurred, and still occurs at a level far 
removed from any conspiracy180, and is still evident betwixt ethical and honest practices 
and concerns. The more ethical and redistributive Keynesian theorists could still be 
warned here: to hope that governments are ‘uninfected’ by the power of business and 
established elites, and can achieve positive social outcomes in the face of that power ...
174 Rose and Miller 1992, p . 179. See also Rose 1992.
175 Galbraith 2008c
176 Galbraith 2008a
177 cited in Galbraith 2008a
178 Skidelsky 2008
179 Hindess (1993, p.374) observes how the separation of economy /  state /  society sets in place a far 
too rigid distinction. The state is not a structural entity separate to the economy; they are entwined 
through interpersonal networks, connections and alliances. See also Hindess’s incisive report for the 
Democratic Audit of Australia, Corruption and Democracy in Australia 2004.
180 Considered even in terms of a ‘internally competing, peacefully disunited ruling class’ (Therbon 
1992, p.53).
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well, it is possible, but unfortunately, there are too many instances where government 
actions have supported and reflected predatory interests.
In relation to consumption specifically, the beauty of liberal economic theory was that it 
validated consumption, enabling an acceptance of improved material conditions across a 
range of classes, thus facilitating new forms of human creativity, untrammelled by 
hierarchical feudal constraints. It gave credence and validity, though selectively, to the 
rich multiplicity and variety of human desires. And when I say selectively here, I am 
again referring to the gender bias against women’s consumption that I mentioned in the 
previous chapter. Lauding capitalism, liberal economists celebrate consumption as the 
means by which ‘sovereign individuals’ can rationally pursue their individual needs. At 
the same time, orthodox theory, Slater notes, generally regards those needs as
completely distorted and misshapen by irrational factors external to the economic 
equation, such as advertising and fashion181. This inconsistent stance is implicitly 
gendered, and yet again features the rational, amoral man versus the irrational,
manipulated woman182. It is this kind of disordered and illogical unpredictability
academic economists have viewed as a problem they would prefer to scythe from their 
antiseptic model of choice.
The tragedy of the theoretical predilections of liberal political economists from Hobbes 
through to Bentham and the marginalists was, Appleby concludes, that their theory 
trammelled conceptions of the human and human creativity into a narrow 
individualism, dominated by the rigid structure of the market, and devoid of any of the 
care and connectedness to human culture and the environment which was the font of 
that creativity in the first place:
Variety and abundance became a permanent feature of western society, 
revealing the fecundity of human inventiveness, the insatiability of human
curiosity, the splendour of human talents and the inaccuracy of aristocratic
assumptions about ordinary people’s abilities. Yet the reigning social theories 
assumed that human beings invariably sought gain through the equally invariant 
invisible hand of the market. Scholarly light narrowed to a laser beam directed 
at the workings of rational choice, utility maximization and competition for
181 Slater 1997, pp.49-50
182 In Social Communication in Advertising (1986), Leiss, Kline & Jhally note this dualism, and how while 
many economists argue that advertising is a ‘valuable contributor to the efficiency and freedom of the 
market economy’ (Leiss, Kline & Jhally 1986, p.4), others believe it simply disables the unimpeded 
freedom of individuals (Leiss et al 1986, p . 16).
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scarce resources while the rich diversity of human personality found no place in 
social theory. 183
It is in this context that thinking about consumption and material culture as something 
having and reflecting values becomes so important. There are evident, structural flaws 
connected to capitalism. Are we are now seeing the demise of neoliberal doctrine? 
Perhaps not ... its historical roots run deep, its organisational structure is well established, 
and its various incarnations have proven enormously resilient in the past. Meanwhile 
the critical issue of addressing climate change not only remains unresolved, its 
importance also appears to have been displaced. And ethical consumption? The idea of 
using ethical consumption as an emancipatory tool also buys right back in to the basic 
premise of the supposed free market system — it is obviously not an option for those 
subject to the power imbalance of ‘the market’, where the ability to pay is the sole 
mechanism determining whether desires should be satisfied and ‘asymmetries of 
power’184 are consistently disregarded185. However while neoliberals have fostered the 
fallacy of a ‘level-playing field’ that effectively just promotes a ‘new’ kind of naturalised 
feudalism where monetary might equals right, to ignore the values given expression by 
consumption is to buy right back into the neoliberal paradigm, in a more damaging way, that ascribes to 
and validates the workings of the whole philosophy. Goods have origins, using them has effects, 
and disposing of them has consequences. To ignore this ensures a sad deficit in any kind 
of social analysis.
183 Appleby 1993, p. 171
184 O ’Neill 1998, p.64
185 Craig Smith discusses consumer sovereignty as ‘the rationale for capitalism’ and argues that ‘The 
legitimacy of such a system rests on whether and what decisions are made in markets. Hence the 
argument for ethical purchase behaviour becomes an argument for capitalism’ (1990, p.3). And my 
thesis, that a range of inequitable conditions can improve via ‘purchase votes’ lies dangerously close to 
the neoliberal application of the concept of ‘consumer sovereignty’, which is used to absolve the 
‘amoralism’ of the market.
135
5Marx
It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids ...
(Marx 1985, p.83)
In the previous chapter I broached Marx's critique of capitalism’s touted promise of 
freedom - this chapter develops that account while considering in more detail Marx’s 
view of need, consumption, and how this might relate to ethical consumption 
specifically. Marx’s work in relation to consumption and need is of course important in 
its own respect, but in the introduction I also mentioned the tendency of many strains of 
social theory to regard consumption with disdain. Such conceptions have been taken as 
a given; further inquiry is deemed unnecessary. I shall examine some of these accounts 
in subsequent chapters, however this chapter is an important precursor to my later 
discussion, insofar as Marx’s views have informed many of these later accounts. For 
following in Marx’s theoretical wake a standard view of consumption is that it is 
primarily responsible for sustaining capitalism. Any expression of identity through 
consumption in this conception is artificial, imposed by the distortions of the capitalist 
system. Here Marx maintained the earlier longstanding hostility on the part of 
conservatives toward consumption, while turning it on its head: consumption was not 
symptomatic of any threat to the social order, simply an expression of its enduring 
actuality.
In her The llieory of Need in Marx (1974), Agnes Heller writes that while Marx’s work has 
been taken up in relation to many different concerns (although principally with reference 
to class conflict and inequality), there has been comparatively little research on how 
Marx viewed human need. Yet as Kate Soper observes in On Human Needs: Open and 
Closed Theories in a Marxist Perspective (1981), need is central to Marx’s theory as a whole —
Marx
while there are many different ways of interpreting Marx, a common thread that 
underlies every interpretation is some explicit or implicit view of need, insofar as 
capitalism is perceived as failing to fully meet human need, and so must eventually be 
surpassed by a system which can do so more successfully. For as Soper notes, the 
‘scientific’ or economic determinist aspects of Marx’s work, as well as that which evinces 
a more philosophical /  anthropological perspective concerned with values, both still rely 
on the existence of abjectly dissatisfied needs. In relation to the economistic versions of 
Marxism for instance, Soper writes that ‘whatever the sketchy nature of its outlines, this 
humanist ‘anthropology’ lies ‘as a background to the economic analysis, always 
perceptible but seldom remarked upon’1.
Soper and Heller both position need as a central issue for Marx, yet as Heller points out, 
while the term permeates his conceptual vocabulary, the detail of his argument is spread 
quite diffusely throughout his work. Meanwhile, Heller writes, Marx ‘never actually 
defines the concept of need itself2. A significant proportion of my analysis in this 
chapter is centred around Heller’s discussion of Marx’s theory of needs, Soper’s On 
Human Needs (1981), and Patricia Springborg’s The Problem ofiHuman Needs and the Critique of 
Civilization (1981). Soper and Springborg both view Marx quite differently to Heller, and 
Soper is actually quite scathing of the position Heller takes. But one reason Heller’s 
account has proven useful for my purposes is that in actually discussing Marx’s 
understanding of need at length she enables me to draw out various inconsistencies and 
tensions in relation to Marx’s account of need, which are too often glossed over, with the 
questions they raise remaining unexplored. Heller attempts to reconcile these 
inconsistencies, I believe unconvincingly (as with Soper). But what Heller’s explication 
of Marx does facilitate is a challenge to all interpretations which take Marx at ‘face 
value’, as simply condemning the ‘need’ that occurs or is expressed through 
consumption, and who then employ him as an epistemological touchstone on which to 
support their own similar claims. In this chapter then, I briefly outline a standard 
interpretation of Marx’s critique of consumption and capitalism, then move on to a 
discussion of Heller’s more specific analysis of Marx’s account of need, before 
considering how his work might actually relate to ethical consumption per se.
1 Soper 1981, p.33
2 Heller 1974, p.23
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Marx on capitalism and political economy
Marx refuted the economic liberalism of political economy by arguing that, in contrast 
to the liberal belief that capitalism offers the greatest degree of material wealth and 
freedom in which to produce and consume, that such ‘freedoms’ are illusory. Labour is 
coerced into selling itself for less than the value of what it produces, and Marx believed 
that workers, although ‘formally free’, really have no choice but to sell their labour as a 
commodity in a manner that sustains life, but impoverishes the rich potential of our 
human capacity to fruitfully engage with and beneficially transform both the world and 
ourselves:
Political economy, this science of wealth, is therefore simultaneously the 
science of renunciation, of want, of saving - and it actually reaches the point 
where it spares man the need of either fresh air or physical exercise. This science of 
marvellous industry is simultaneously the science of asceticism and its true ideal is 
the ascetic but extortionate miser and the ascetic but productive slave.3
Yet despite his critique of the human costs of capitalism, Marx was also effusive in his
praise for the material developments it delivered4, which as he details in the Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, is a result of the truly authentic engaged human activity of
shaping our environment in accordance with our needs. Phis interaction with the
environment was what Marx regarded as the essential quality of being human, as
through labour, and through need, people altered objects and their environment and so
shaped not only the world, but in the process also transformed themselves5. As Patricia
Springborg recounts in The Problem of Human Needs and the Cntique of Civilization (1981), for
Marx,
It is in desire that man comes to know himself, at first negatively, as a 
being to which what it needs is lacking; and then positively as he becomes aware 
of the being that he is and what it means to complete the lack and satisfy his 
needs. In this way, these physical needs which he shares with the animals 
become the opportunity for him to distinguish himself from other animate 
existence by his capacity for self-consciousness and rational thought.6
3 Marx 1968, p. 150
4 Capitalism has, as Marx put it, ‘accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman 
aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former 
Exoduses of nations and crusades’ (Marx and Engels 1985, p.83).
5 Marx 1968, pp.l 11-14. As Abercrombie, Hill & Turner put it, ‘Human beings are defined by their 
active appropriation and transformation of nature through their labour. At the ontological level, 
therefore, Marx saw human individuals as agents who, in transforming their environment, necessarily 
transform themselves’ (1986, p.7). See also Miller 1994.
6 Springborg 1981, p.3
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To this extent then, Marx acknowledged the ‘all-round civilizing influence’ of capitalism, 
insofar as even within the capitalist market system, people attempt, through production 
and consumption, to satisfy and develop their needs7. As Springborg notes, Marx in fact 
‘explicitly condemned utopian primitivism’ labelling such perspectives as promoting
the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization, the 
regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and crude man who has few needs 
and who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even 
reached it.8
On this point, as Kate Soper stresses, Marx did not have any quarrel with the political 
economist’s positive view of the material gains generated through production:
Marx’s attack on Smith and Ricardo could be said to be directed not so 
much against their faith in production, which indeed he regarded as a definitely 
enlightened aspect of their thought (as opposed to the nostalgic-regressive 
character of romantic critiques of capitalism), as to their failure to appreciate that 
the capitalist mode of production was itself but an historical and limited form of 
that productivity, whose barriers would be progressively overcome with the 
emergence of socialism and passage to communism.9
So, while acknowledging the positive aspects of capitalism, Marx also viewed it as a
transitional societal form. Although capitalism as an economic system promotes forms of
human creativity, he believed that under capitalism human ingenuity and
resourcefulness would increasingly become foreshortened and misshapen, because this
creativity takes place within the market system, and is forced to be amenable to and
trammelled within its constraints:
His labour is therefore not voluntary but coerced; it is forced labour. It is 
therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs 
external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no 
physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague. External 
labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, of 
mortification. Lastly, the external character of labour for the worker appears in 
the fact that it is not his own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong to him, 
that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another. 10
For Marx, due to the profit imperative, the free, creative activity of labour would 
increasingly become constrained, and non-market, non-profit forms of creativity 
discouraged and suppressed, as under capitalism, goods come to be deemed valuable 
only according to how they are measured in monetary terms. As Heller relates,
7 Springborg 1981, p.2
8 Marx 1968, pp. 133-4. Springborg 1981, p.2.
9 Soper 1981, p.23
>° Marx 1968, pp. 110-11
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Use values that do not represent exchange value cease to be objects of 
production. Capitalism “quantifies” all its objective expressions and produces 
them (as it also produces the needs directed towards them) only if it is 
“profitable” to do so ... [it] quantifies the complexly qualitative world of human 
needs, turns it into quasi-exchange value and renders it “purchasable”; all 
qualitative needs that can be neither quantified nor purchased are inhibited. 11
So despite the historically situated and transformative view of needs apparent in Marx’s
thought as a whole, even the increasing number of goods produced under capitalism
cannot be seen to represent genuinely satisfying needs or desires. As Heller elucidates,
citing Marx to support her point,
Capitalism is the pimp that by constantly producing new objects creates 
an unending stream of new needs which make people prostitute themselves. The 
numerical growth of needs will never be able to become true wealth, because it is 
merely a means serving an alienated force, alien to individual human beings, i.e. 
the expansion of capitalist production: “The extension of products and needs 
becomes the ingenious and calculating slave of inhuman, artificial and imaginary 
cravings” . 12
For Marx the failings of this system meant that it eventually must be surpassed by a 
system responsive to a more diverse range of human needs. For the difference under 
socialism, as Springborg observes, is that
Man under socialism will be for Marx a man rich in needs, but these will 
spring from the unfolding of his latent powers and potentialities and not from the 
dictates of an economic system. 13
In Marx’s thought then, the desire for commodities is envisaged as existing in and 
contributing to an egoistic world whereby people only become increasingly alienated 
from each other, and only interested in their own individual concerns:
The world of commodity exchange is the world of the universality of 
egoism: that of personal interest. The subjects of exchange are indifferent to 
each other; they stand in relation to each other only for the realisation of their 
personal interests: as regards the “need for other people” (which as we know, 
Marx considered to be the highest and “most human” need), the reduction is 
total. 14
The consumer sovereignty that also serves as the liberal justification for capitalism, is not 
just inadequate, then, but, as with the supposed freedom of labour, wholly illusory. As 
Marx puts it, ‘in the depths, entirely different processes go on, in which this apparent
11 Heller 1974, p.55
12 Heller 1974, p.50
13 Springborg 1981, p.2
14 Heller 1974, p.64
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individual equality and liberty disappear’15. The lack of freedom evident in the capitalist 
system of production is certainly not compensated for or ameliorated by any freedom to 
consume, at least not in any ‘real’ way:
Economic theory has, in spite of its lipservice to economic freedom, 
eliminated real freedom from its image of man by maintaining that perfect 
consciousness and knowledge permits only one, unequivocally determined kind 
of action, that is, action which leads to the maximization of material gains 
measured in terms of money. 16
So it seems clear this interpretation lends itself to a rigorous castigation of material gains 
and ‘wants’, as opposed to some more ‘authentic’ need. Writing in this tradition, 
Macpherson, for instance, has noted that the capitalist system of production is such,
that for most people, their productive labour cannot itself be regarded as 
fulfillment or development of their capacities. Fulfillment and development of 
individual capacities become, therefore, increasingly a matter of the development 
and satisfaction of wants for all kinds of material and, in the broadest sense 
aesthetic or psychic goods. 17
Yet given that Marx also celebrated the developing richness of human needs, even under 
capitalism, when thinking about consumption within capitalist society, how is it possible 
to clearly reconcile what needs met by consumption might be regarded as acceptable, 
civilising, human, and real? As opposed to ‘cravings’ which are misshapen?
Natural, necessary and socially p roduced  needs
Clarifying Marx’s understanding of need in any definitive manner is difficult, because as 
I noted previously, Heller writes that even though ‘Marx uses the concept of need in 
order to make definitions ... he never actually defines the concept of need itself18. Heller 
does, nevertheless, attempt to pin down a number of different formulations Marx uses 
when discussing needs, and the first of the terms she identifies is ‘natural’, as opposed to 
‘socially produced needs’. This distinction, she argues, is crucial to Marx’s whole 
approach, but is also deeply problematic since, as Heller stresses, Marx believed there 
are no endogenous, or purely natural human needs. In contrast to the stereotypical 
neoliberal rhetoric featuring autonomous, sovereign consumers, for Marx, needs come 
about in the context of and through interaction with others and with the environment. 
And although Marx acknowledged the existence of physical /  biological needs, as Heller
15 Marx 1974, p.247
16 Marx cited in Holbrook 1977, p. 183
17 Macpherson 1975, pp.30-1
18 Heller 1974, p.23
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details, this too is a social phenomenon, and the reduction of human need to its purely 
physical /  biological aspect was anathema to Marx19. One of Marx’s main criticisms of 
the prescriptions of political economy, in fact, was that this is what their ideas would 
increasingly reduce human needs to20. As Michael Schudson writes in his contribution 
to Ethics of Consumption: the Good Life, Justice and Global Stewardship (1998),
For Marx, the frightening invention of capitalism is not the creation of 
artificial or new needs but the emergence of a concept that there is such a thing 
as a purely physical or biological need. Other social systems had treated human 
beings as social entities, not biological machines ... Only capitalism conceived of 
people as raw material and only capitalists dared calculate the minimum amount 
it would take to keep workers alive and healthy enough to work in factories and 
reproduce in families the next generation of labourers.21
So when Heller points out that in Capital, Marx also contrasts ‘natural needs’ with 
‘necessary needs’, natural needs being needs for physical survival such as “food, clothing, 
fuel and housing”, and necessary needs being related to the ‘degree of civilization’, 
‘habits’, and the ‘historical and moral element’22, she is careful to stress that Marx 
viewed ‘necessary needs’ as social, whereas ‘natural needs’ serve just to maintain life, but 
are still more than animal needs. Heller notes the social aspect of need is the crucial 
factor in all of these classifications23, and she concludes that the distinctions Marx was 
making were heuristic24. Yet while Heller declares that this was a ‘descriptive concept’, 
but also a necessary one25, Kate Soper implies that to qualify Marx’s formulation of need 
in this way is pointless:
19 For Marx, ‘needs aimed merely at survival cannot form a general, historical-philosophical group of 
needs which is independent’ (Heller 1974, p.29).
20 Marx 1968, pp.106-19, p.147-50: ‘Self-renunciation’, he writes, ‘the renunciation of life and all 
human needs, is its principal thesis’.
21 Schudson 1998, p.252
22 Heller 1974, p.30
23 ‘If we state that the structure of need as a whole can only be interpreted in its correlation with the 
totality of social relations (and a quotation from Marx's Poverty of Philosophy will prove this point), then 
it follows that only socially produced needs exist, and “natural needs” (whose mode of satisfaction 
changes the need itself) also have this “socially produced” character’ (Heller 1974, p.31).
24 Heller also observes that in the Grundrisse Marx distinguishes between two sorts of need under 
capitalism, insofar as “a historically created need has taken the place of the natural one” (Marx cited 
in Heller 1974, p.30). However the overall thrust of his work seems to be towards the social aspect of 
need, because while there was a change in the concept o f ‘necessary needs’ between Grundrisse and the 
third volume of Capital (Heller 1974, p.31), and whereas in the Grundrisse Marx seemed to distinguish 
between needs ‘created by society’ and ‘natural’ needs, in Marx’s thought overall Heller argues that 
‘“Necessary” needs develop, historically, they are not dictated by mere survival; the cultural element in 
such needs, the moral element and custom, are decisive, and their satisfaction is an organic part of the 
“normal” life of people belonging to a particular class in a given society’ (Heller 1974, p.33). See also 
Soper 1981, p.88.
23 Heller 1974, p.33
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Hunger is still hunger, as Marx admits; biological drive is biological 
drive, but only in an abstract sense that has no concrete reference, and tells us 
nothing about the specifically human experience of it, since that experience is 
integral with the mode of its gratification.26
Commodity fetishism
In this interpretation nevertheless, distinguishing between ‘natural’ and socially 
produced’ needs seems to be merely a matter of degree. Yet Heller also doesn’t dwell on 
commodity fetishism, the process whereby needs, in Marx’s view, become warped. As I 
mentioned earlier, for Marx, a key aspect of capitalism was that the inequitable nature of 
the system was concealed because, as Slater puts it, ‘The true source of value - human 
labour - is not visible’27. As the processes involved in the making of commodities are 
clouded or mystified, commodities come to be regarded as something other than human 
products. Rather than being merely a result of human labour and having value only 
because of that labour, reified, almost god-like qualities, values and meanings begin to 
appear as inherent in the commodity itself28. In a futile attempt to recover, within 
themselves, those powers taken away by the production process, people feel impelled to 
purchase more and more goods, whatever the disjunction between the use, exchange 
and labour value of the commodity might be29. Commodities become so seductive and 
irresistible that they become responsible for sustaining a system that only spirals down to 
ever worsening modes of exploitation:
26 Soper 1981, p.88
27 Slater 1997, p. 111
28 ‘The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an 
external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it 
becomes a power on its own confronting him (Marx 1968, p. 108).
29 As I shall discuss in subsequent chapters, later thinkers have extended the power of this process as a 
way of explaining the longevity of capitalism by arguing that as capitalism has developed, the process 
of commodity fetishism has escalated to a point where human powers and need for value have been 
displaced onto things in a way that has become increasingly inescapable. For instance, Dupre argues 
that under late capitalism fetishisation impacts on every aspect of life: ‘This alienating tendency turned 
into a real fetishism of commodities only when the production of exchange value pervading all of 
modern culture converted every aspect of it into a commodity. For such a total reification of life to 
take place, the commodity economy first had to gain control over the entire production process and to 
transform mental attitudes as well as methods of production and distribution. In earlier stages of 
capitalism this “economic mystification” existed only with respect to money and interest bearing . . . 
Modern capitalism has abandoned this fetishization of a particular substance in favor of the abstract 
category of exchange value. In elevating exchangeability into the sole standard of economic profit, it 
has universalized the fetishist attitude that was once limited to a single aspect of the production 
system’ (Dupre 1983, p.48). Yet as I shall detail in the following chapter, this interpretation elides the 
importance Marx placed on the eventual, inevitable, supercession of capitalism, and so goes against 
the overall tenor of his work. See also Clarke 1983, p.68.
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Under private property their significance is reversed: every person 
speculates on creating a new need in another, so as to drive him to fresh sacrifice, 
to place him in a new dependence and to seduce him into a new mode of 
enjoyment and therefore economic ruin. Each tries to establish over the other an 
alien power, so as thereby to find satisfaction of his own selfish need. The 
increase in the quantity of objects is therefore accompanied by an extension of 
the realm of alien powers to which man is subjected, and every new product 
represents a new potentiality of mutual swindling and mutual plundering ... 30
In discussing Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism, Patricia Springborg argues that
the concept ineluctably leads to the conclusion that Marx was tacitly, but also quite
definitively proposing the existence of non-genuine, illusory needs. She states
throughout the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts as well as Capital itself 
we find ourselves constantly reminded that capitalism perpetuates itself precisely 
by treating articles of use as bearers of wealth, thus persuading people to 
produce, exchange and accumulate them in a volume and at a rate quite 
unrelated to their genuine needs. Although this argument is nowhere to my 
knowledge explicated in these terms, Marx's critique of capitalism would be 
meaningless if we did not assume it. In other words, the whole thrust of his 
distinction between use value and exchange value serves to remind us that 
whatever the mechanisms may be that allow us to inculcate a demand for the 
ever-increasing flow of commodities that capitalism produces, they stand in stark 
contrast to the needs of man under socialism.31
Marx’s argument as a whole depends on the idea that capitalism fails to adequately meet 
human needs and therefore must be surpassed by a system that can do so more 
successfully. The continued existence of the system is explained with reference to people 
not fully registering its dynamics and not realising that it simply does not satisfy some 
deeper, more real need. But what, specifically, are these real needs capitalism does not 
fulfill? For Heller argues quite definitively that according to the terms of Marx’s own 
theoretical framework there can be no non-genuine needs:
“imaginary” needs do not exist. Whether needs are “normal” or 
whether they are “artificial” (using the words negatively) depends completely 
upon the value judgments with which we define “normality”. However, even if 
we sought a so-called “objective” criterion we would only be able to conclude 
that, at any time, “normal” needs are those which individuals deem to be such; 
“sophisticated” or “unnatural” needs, on the other hand, are those which the 
majority regards as such. The concept of “artificial” needs is ambiguous even in 
Marx.32
30 Marx 1968, p. 147. Also Springborg 1981, p.95.
31 Springborg 1981, pp.1-2
32 Heller 1974, p.50. Paraphrasing Marx himself, Heller writes that, ‘it is irrelevant whether the needs 
are in the stomach or in the imagination. Satisfaction of a need is the sine qua non of any commodity. 
There is no value (exchange value) without use value (satisfaction of needs), but use values (goods) may 
well exist without value (exchange value), as long as they satisfy needs (which is precisely the definition
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Heller does draw out the ambiguities in Marx’s work, but the argument that needs are 
social creates certain problems. The problem with arguing that Marx viewed all needs 
as social is, as Nicholas Xenos comments in Scarcity and Modernity (1989), that
Marx’s attempt to base a critical theory of capitalism - one which entails 
its supercession - on the ground of a theory of need collapses once the claim that 
all needs are social in composition is taken seriously.33
Indeed, for Xenos,
Marx can foresee a communist society of abundance only because he 
retains the substantively empty notion of “authentic” needs in the domain of 
material wants that acts as a limitation his general theory of need denies.34
Radical needs
Heller tries to maintain the basic thrust of Marx’s program as a whole and so she tries to 
reconcile these issues with a discussion of what she refers to as ‘radical needs’, a notion 
she extracts from Marx’s work as a whole, although she does not attribute the term 
directly to him. With this discussion however, Heller only seems to emphasise how 
Marx’s study of needs is so qualified as to be amorphous. She writes that radical needs 
are the driving force behind the eventual transition to communism insofar as the ‘radical 
need’ that occurs on an individual level but is necessarily an essential human feature 
common to all, has the greatest influence on the unfolding development of the societal 
structure:
The functioning of the economy in the guise of natural law belongs in 
fact to commodity production and only to it, as an expression of commodity 
fetishism. The positive overcoming of private property cannot therefore in any 
way proceed in the form of a “natural necessity”; the essence of this process is the 
overcoming of fetishism and the revolutionary liquidation of the appearance 
which social existence has of being a quasi-law of nature. Although it has 
economic aspects, the transition cannot be a purely economic process, but must be 
a social revolution and is only conceivable as such.35
The tension between the structural economic interpretation of Marx as opposed to
Heller’s focus on Marx’s earlier work is apparent here, especially when, even more
directly on this point she stress that
of use values). It needs to be made clear from the outset that Marx uses the concept of need in order 
to make definitions, but that he never actually defines the concept of need itself (Heller 1974, p.23).
33 Xenos 1989, p.54
34 Xenos 1989, p.53
35 Heller 1974, p.81
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The necessity of the “transition” is not in fact “guaranteed” by any 
natural law but by radical needs.36
These ‘radical needs’ cannot, moreover, be reduced to the ‘general interest’ (a notion 
which Heller also spends some time criticising). She writes, for instance, that ‘Marx 
recognises no needs other than those of individual people’37, supporting this point by 
citing Marx himself:
The general interest is precisely the generality of self-seeking interests.38
Yet nowhere in The Theory of Need in Marx (1974) does Heller concretely define ‘radical 
needs’, although they are diffusely conceptualised in terms of the need to use and 
consume material objects, in a manner that generates and sustains the mechanisms of 
capitalism, but somehow, simultaneously, also manage to enable its supercession:
According to Marx, radical needs are inherent aspects of the capitalist 
structure of need: without them, as we have said, capitalism cannot function, so 
it creates them afresh every day. “Radical needs” cannot be “eliminated” from 
capitalism because they are necessary to its functioning. They are not 
“embryos” of a future formation, but “members” of the capitalist formation: it is 
not the Being of radical needs that transcends capitalism but their satisfaction. 
Those individuals for whom the “radical needs” already arise in capitalism are 
the bearers of the “collective Ought”.39
Once again though, what are these needs? Heller invokes the dialectic when arguing 
that it is only due to lack that we can reconcile the development of those legitimate 
radically human needs with an alienating system. As needs that ‘shape the human 
personality’40 only diminish under capitalism, thus repressed, they raise even further the 
need for fresh rapprochement with our ‘species being’41. Heller seems to be aiming for a 
clear cut definition of ‘radical needs’ when she refers to Marx’s view that ‘The capacity 
for objective activity is thus one of the greatest needs of man’42. This suggests that Heller 
equates Marx’s ‘radical need’ with what she regards as the essential human need to 
freely produce, but of course under the terms of her own interpretation of Marx this 
occurs in conjunction with the need to use those objects.
36 Heller 1974, p.84
37 Heller 1974, p.69
38 Marx cited in Heller 1974, p.64
39 Heller 1974, pp.76-7
40 Heller 1974, p.51
41 Note also Heller’s argument, that ‘In Marx's interpretation, alienation is not some sort of long­
standing “distortion” of the species or of human nature; the essence of man develops within alienation 
itself, and this creates the possibility for the realisation of man “rich in needs’” (1974, pp.46-7).
43 Heller 1974, p.42
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In her discussion of radical needs Heller often connects production to consumption in 
relation to need in an undifferentiated way, when in fact a distinction between the use 
aspects of consumption and need, and production and need, might add considerably to 
the clarity of her account43. And although Heller so hopefully accepts and offers this 
nebulous ‘radical need’ as an eventual solution to the inequities and oppressions of 
capitalism, she did not convince Soper for one, who in her review of Heller’s book, 
entitled ‘The Needs of M arxism ’ (1977), commented that Heller’s ‘vision’ of methods of 
producing and expressing ‘Being’ seemed rather ‘vacuous’44.
Yet given that Heller has phrased her interpretation in this way, at what point in the 
‘progression’ of the capitalist system can we, once again, clearly and decisively 
differentiate the ‘radical needs’ inherent within the capitalist system, from the ‘inhuman, 
artificial and imaginary cravings’45 that also sustain it? Certainly economic lack as 
opposed to luxury is not sufficient criteria to determine the existence of an ‘authentic’ 
need, because as both Heller and Springborg note, M arx himself abandoned this tack in 
his later work, although some inconsistency in his position on this is still evident. As 
Springborg directly states:
M arx in the 1844 Manuscripts had criticised political economy for its 
inhumane perspective on the individual as nothing but a “totality of needs” in 
which the pressing needs of the poor were not differentiated from the ephemeral 
needs of the rich. He was anxious, then, that his approach should not be 
equated with that of political economy and its indiscriminate treatm ent of needs 
as wants equally deserving of satisfaction. In his later scientific writings, 
however, this is a distinction that M arx no longer tries to press. So by the time 
we come to Capital he is ready to argue that use value simply depends on 
something being wanted and that “the nature of such wants, whether, for 
instance, they spring from the stomach or from fancy, makes no difference” 
(Vol.l, p.43). M arx is undoubtedly sufficiently aware that his concept of 
“hum an” needs was a metaphysical and not a scientific concept. This does not 
mean he abandons it altogether, however. In Capital M arx makes the general 
argum ent that, under the capitalist law of accumulation, production is geared to 
the self-expansion of capital rather than the satisfaction of needs, obviously
43 On this point, although not in relation to Heller’s argument specifically, Soper writes: ‘In the 
absence of anything more specific by way of explanation of what is meant by labour becoming life’s 
prime want, one is bound to suspect either that “labour” is doing duty for the concept of needs in 
general (in which case we are not greatly informed by being told that it becomes the prime need), or 
else that Marx’s vision of communism is imbued with a work ethic that is insufficiently distinguished 
from that of bourgeois society’ (Soper 1981, p. 197).
44 Soper 1977, p.42
45 Marx cited in Heller 1974, p.50
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referring to needs that are in some sense genuine in a way that run-of-the-mill 
wants are not.46
Macpherson has maintained that ‘Marx's whole point about the future good society was 
that it would be a realm offreedom - freedom for people to develop their own needs and 
wants in whatever ways they liked. It would have been perfectly inconsistent for him to 
say in advance what they would be’47. Yet this statement suggests Macpherson is either 
being disingenuous, or mistaken in believing that he has grasped the implications of 
Marx’s thought as a whole. If Marx was really unwilling to make determinate 
statements about need, he could have been more cautious about applying appellations as 
categorical as unnatural ‘cravings’.
Soper, in discussing the dichotomous nature of Marx’s work, the disjunction between his 
early more philosophical /  anthropological position, as opposed to his later focus on 
scientific /  economics, grants that Heller’s book draws attention to ‘the extent to which 
historical materialism as a ‘science’ of history calls in question traditional notions of 
scientificity based on the disjuncture between ‘fact’ and ‘value’, and the assignation of all 
‘facts’ to the realm of science and all ‘values’ to the realm of morality’48. Soper criticises 
however, what she calls Heller’s ‘exegesis and synthesis’ of Marx, arguing that Heller 
‘states’ rather than ‘critically assesses’ the internal contradictions of Marx’s theory as a 
whole49:
It is a pity that Heller, having exposed this tension, and shown us some of 
the ways it is reflected in Marx’s work, then stops short, being content to tell us 
simply that Marx “never separates value judgements from economic analysis; if 
he had done so he would be an anti-capitalist romantic”. She seems 
unconcerned with the epistemological questions this raises.50
In her subsequent book, On Human Needs: Open and Closed Theories in a Marxist Perspective
(1981), Soper argues, as in her earlier review, that Marx, ‘being as concerned as he was
with establishing the scientificity of scientific socialism, and too ready to accept that this
must have positivistic credentials, never managed to pose the problem that is raised by
46 Springborg 1981, p.106. The inconsistency in Marx’s position on this is evident in comments such 
as ‘There are not too many necessities of life produced in proportion to the existing population. Quite 
the reverse. Too little is produced to decently and humanely satisfy the wants of the great mass’ 
(Soper 1981, p.96, from Capital Vol.3).
47 Macpherson 1977, p.34
48 Soper 1977, p.39
49 Soper 1977, p.38
50 Soper 1977, pp.39-40
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the co-presence in his thought of a ‘factual’ and an ‘evaluative’ discourse’51. This meant 
that M arx ‘never expressly poses this problem of ‘true’ need as a problem or aporia 
created at the heart of his own thought, nor does he ever attem pt to confront it’52. For 
Soper, comm enting on the all too nebulous nature of M arx’s theory of need in her 
review of Heller’s The Theory o f Need in Marx (1974),
the M arxist theory of needs is not there to be extracted from a reading 
and exegesis of M arx’s texts but something that is yet to be constituted.53
Springborg likewise argues that
Needs represent basic hum an motivations and they represent the form in 
which m an’s relation to the world is actualised, but more than that they are 
tangible manifestations of an underlying hum an nature. So much is this so, that 
one is justified in asking whether, indeed, we are to understand M arx’s concept 
of needs in the literal sense at all. In other words, M arx so characteristically 
refers to the whole range of hum an powers in the abstract as “needs” that we are 
prom pted to ask whether these have to be concretely expressed as needs to count 
as such or not.54
Ethical consumption and need
The very obviousness of the appalling problems of capitalism enables the standard quite 
negative interpretation of consumption, synthesized from a general approximation of 
M arx’s approach as a whole, to survive in a taken-for-granted state. But with the 
internal contradictions, and amorphous and qualified formulations of M arx’s approach 
to need, how might he rate a phenom enon such as ethical consumption, given that it is 
consumption which, while still enmeshed within the dynamics of the capitalist price and 
profit system, is not orientated completely towards the profit dynamic of that system, but 
towards other forms of need? In more orthodox interpretations of M arx’s work, ethical 
consumption would, no doubt, simply be regarded as m aintaining the capitalist status 
quo, rather than facilitating any radical change. And certainly this is the case. Yet 
neither does ethical consumption accord with the notion that under capitalism, 
commodity exchange only facilitates alienation. Ethical consumption forms a strategic 
attem pt to ameliorate the more adverse aspects of the exploitation of capitalism by at
31 Soper 1981, p.26
32 Soper 1981, p .21. As George McCarthy notes in his Marx’s Critique of Science and Positivism (1988), a 
‘generally accepted’ interpretation of Marx, based on his later work, has ensured an emphasis has 
been placed on the ‘scientificity’ of Marx’s ‘historical materialism’ which, as a ‘scientific’ economic 
critique, stresses the inevitable natural transition from capitalism to communism’. However McCarthy 
disputes the break between these two periods, arguing that the earlier work provides a strong 
theoretical foundation for the later.
33 Soper 1977, p.39
34 Springborg 1981, p. 100
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least attempting to address the needs of others, according to judgments about the relative 
desirability of the origins and /  or consequences of specific goods. Ethical consumption 
then, although antithetical to Marxist orthodoxies, specifically acts against the typology 
of liberal, neoclassical and neoliberal economic thought. And while Marx never 
unambiguously delineated his understanding of needs, he certainly believed the 
ostensible, although also inconsistent liberal approach towards consumption as a private 
affair, warranting no intrusive judgments, had absolutely no foundation. This is 
particularly the case when considered in relation to labour as a ‘commodity’35, as Marx’s 
analysis was dedicated to revealing how under capitalism workers increasingly have no 
choice but to submit to market imperatives56. One of his main criticisms of the early 
political economists was that while they focused on commerce as a means of improving 
the relations between people, they disregarded any consideration of what was involved in 
the production of goods, except in terms of monetary cost. This is not the case in 
relation to ethical consumption, which is often directed against aspects of the labour 
production process. In ‘Mobilizing Consumers to Take Responsibility for Global Social 
Justice’, Michele Micheletti and Dietlind Stolle, for instance, detail the fascinating recent 
history of ethical consumption activists targeting companies who use sweatshop labour57. 
In Boycotts and the Labor Struggle (1913) Laidler offers an older history' of boycotts 
undertaken by labor activists in North America. And while under the terms of more 
orthodox Marxism it can be argued that such action merely takes place according to the 
whims of a complacent and self-satisfied bourgeoisie, it is nevertheless important to take 
into account that ethical consumption is not generally aimed at sustaining exploitative 
excess.
Distribution and Exchange
In the Grundrisse (1974) Marx wrote of the immediate connection between production 
and consumption58, but he also made quite sardonic statements about the vital 
importance of noting the division between production and consumption insofar as it is the 
dynamics of distribution and exchange under modern industrial capitalism that prevent
55 Nicolaus 1974, p.20
56 As Ingram puts it, ‘the quasi-natural, objective laws of the market, the mechanism of exchange 
determines the (low and value of all commodities, human and non-human alike’ (1990, p.22).
57 Micheletti and Stolle 2007. See also Wiedenhoft 2006.
58 ‘Production, then, is also immediately consumption, consumption is also immediately production’ 
(Marx 1974, p.91).
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individuals from producing according to their needs (without, of course, again specifying 
exactly which needs which capitalism does not requite):
in production the members of society appropriate (create, shape) the 
products of nature in accord with human needs; distribution determines the 
proportion in which the individual shares in the product; exchange delivers the 
particular products into which the individual desires to convert the portion 
which distribution has assigned to him; and finally, in consumption, the products 
become objects of gratification, of individual appropriation. Production creates 
the objects which correspond to the given needs; distribution divides them up 
according to social laws; exchange further parcels out the already divided shares 
in accord with individual needs; and finally, in consumption, the product steps 
outside this social movement and becomes a direct object and servant of 
individual need, and satisfies it in being consumed.59
In his ‘Introduction’ to the Grundrisse (1974), Nicolaus details how Marx actually
explicitly attacks the notion that “production is immediately identical 
with consumption”, and shows that this notion, in the greatest of hands -  for 
instance Ricardo’s -  may lead to profound insights, but not to a grasp of the 
totality in process, and ultimately results, in lesser hands, in childishness and 
absurdity.60
Marx writes,
The producer’s relation to the product, once the latter is finished, is an 
external one, and its return to the subject depends on his relations to other 
individuals.61
Nothing was easier for a Hegelian, Marx scornfully noted, to connect production and 
consumption in an indivisible way62. A more equitable system actually depends on the 
development of more equitable mechanisms of distribution and exchange, and in the 
wholesale castigation of the role consumption plays in sustaining capitalism this, I argue, 
is something that is all too often elided. Nevertheless, to the extent the question of a 
more equitable system of distribution and exchange is still based on questions about the 
determination of value and the determination of need, in abdicating a deeper analysis of 
these issues Marx’s analysis remains incomplete. Soper, for one, argues ‘Marx only 
“solves” the question of political justice by refusing to allow it to exist as a political 
question’63, and in discussing Marx’s famous dictum about the mechanism of 
distribution in a communist state, ‘From each according to his ability, to each according 
to his needs’, she furthermore notes that
59 Marx 1974, pp.88-9
60 Nicolaus 1974, p.39
61 Marx 1974, p.94
62 Marx 1974, p.93
63 Soper 1981, p. 194
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by treating “needs” and “capacities” as natural, as an original, 
predetermined property of individuals, and by allowing them to decide for society 
what that society shall be like, Marx naturalises politics itself: the whole burden 
of political decision is handed back to Nature, where our “nature” will decide 
what we need, and what we do will be determined by what “nature” can do.64
To the extent that Soper’s views have force then, Marx commits exactly the same error
of which, as I outlined in the previous chapter, he accused the political economists.
It seems clear that the modern ‘flexible’ deregulated labour market, as with the factory /  
industrial system to which Marx was specifically addressing his critique, can be 
unfulfilling, oppressive and alienating. It is clear that capitalism is horrendously 
exploitative and that material and monetary wealth are distributed in an extremely 
unequally manner. The significant majority of people are not recompensed for their 
labour in any just way, especially when compared to others whose income levels seem 
obscene. Meanwhile, the United Nations 2007 World Food Programme Annual Report 
estimates that every year 4 million people die as a result of poverty and hunger, while 
854 million people remain undernourished65. In light of this, Marx’s criticisms of the 
lack of satisfaction of needs still seem all too accurate, and his prediction of the system’s 
inevitable decline appealing. Despite this I believe that placing the responsibility for the 
longevity of this system upon commodities and consumption is not feasible. Even aside 
from the serious theoretical inconsistencies in Marx’s work in relation to need, it is 
placing too much weight on ‘consumption’ to blame it for the parlous state of capitalism. 
Consumption is not simply evidence of alienation, a distorted manifestation created by 
the perversions of the system resulting in the imposition of artificial needs. Ethical 
consumption in particular highlights the shortcomings of such an approach. Marx’s 
critique viscerally illuminates the nature of exploitation in the capitalist system. But 
within that exploitation human care and concern can still occur, and this is still possible 
even within the prism of commodity exchange.
64 Soper 1981, p.194. Xenos also writes of Sahlin’s argument that ‘Marx advances the idea that 
primitive societies are a part of nature, not history, a distinction that is based on the view that 
primitive societies reproduce rather than augment their limited needs’ (Xenos 1989, fn.38. p.62).
63 United Nations World Food Programme Annual Report 2007, p. 13
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... women have escaped the sphere of capitalistic production only to fall 
the more completely into the clutches of the sphere of consumption.
They are fascinated and restricted by the immediacy of the surface world 
of commodities no less than men are fascinated and restricted by the
immediacy of profit.
(Adorno 1941, p.396-7)
... almost all studies of housewifery ... have demonstrated, this is one of the least 
valorised, most lowly and most commonly denigrated practices of the modern world. 
The self-effacing, normative, moral and aesthetic concerns of housewifery reveal starkly 
the absurdities of economic theory and the barrenness of colloquial accounts of 
consumption. The very concept o f ‘choice’ is revealed to be very far from some 
autonomous, independently generated act. Rather it is a limited condition that bears the 
burden of histories of social category formation in terms of class, gender and other 
parameters, the normative adjudication of families and peers, and the pressure of 
business attempts to ensure their particular profitability ... while shopping and 
consumption may be a source of considerable pleasure, it may equally be regarded as the
source of considerable anxiety.
(Miller 1995, p.36)
Luxury is the source of this female insurrection.
(Cato, according to Livy, cited in Sekora, 1977, p .2 1)
In 1907 the American government legislated against consumer boycotts on the part of 
labour activists, representing it as a threat to the free operation of capitalism 1 Such 
boycotts had achieved improvements in working conditions, but the restrictive legislation 
did not impinge on the consciousness of the first generation Critical Theorists’ of the 
Frankfurt Institut of Social Research. And why would it? W hen the School first formed 
in 1923, this legislation was an insignificant American as opposed to European historical 
juridical event that would have in no way drawn their notice. Especially given their
1 Laidler 1913, p. 144. Smith 1990. Weidenhoft 2006.
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greater philosophical concerns, their hopes for and interests in transcending the capitalist 
system as a whole, the Frankfurt School did not consider ethical consumption as a 
possible method of effecting social change, but articulated Marx’s bitingly expressed but 
also consistently qualified polemics against consumption even more strongly, in the 
process subtracting his careful qualifications.
I mentioned in the previous chapter Marx’s tremendous influence on sociological 
accounts of consumption. This influence was largely filtered through the Critical 
Theorists of the Frankfurt Institut of Social Research which was founded with the aim of 
taking up the train of Marx’s work from a politically motivated and dedicated social 
justice perspective. In this the School saw themselves as taking up the mantle of Marx’s 
concerns in a wide ranging, sophisticated and philosophically rigorous way, with an 
approach that combined theory with studies of actual social conditions, ‘an 
interdisciplinary vision of a practical theory’2. And while the range of their work is far 
too elaborate to cover here, a significant proportion of their focus was on popular, or 
mass market consumption, best known through Adorno and Horkheimer’s ‘Culture 
Industry’ essays, and Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man (1972). It is this focus on mass 
market consumption which draws my concern, because in expounding their critique, the 
School presents consumption in a wholeheartedly negative light. As Lowenthal, for 
instance, scathingly maintained,
What on first sight seems to be the rather harmless atmosphere of 
entertainment and consumption is, on closer examination, revealed as a reign of 
psychic terror, where the masses have to realize the pettiness and insignificance 
of their everyday life.3
The citation from Adorno I began this chapter with intimates the strongly gendered 
character of the School’s analysis, but the similarity to Marx’s more bluntly expressed, 
less gender specific account is also evident. So too is the contrast to the arguments of the 
political and neoclassical economists; following Marx, their position was also a target for 
the School’s critique4.
2 Ingram 1990, p.59
3 Lowenthal [‘The Triumph of Mass Idols’ 1944] cited in Kellner 1989, p. 155
4 Slater and Tonkiss mention how Adorno’s aim, for instance, was to illuminate the falsity of 
representations that consumption /  capitalism enables freedom: ‘the figure of the sovereign consumer 
ideologically embodies a notion of freedom and supports the (false) claim that this freedom has already 
been achieved in the marketplace’ (Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p. 163).
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My aim in this chapter is to outline the arguments of the Frankfurt School in order to 
develop a slightly more detailed consideration of the shortcomings of their (in)famous 
true /  false needs perspective, intrinsic to their view of consumption, as well as how the 
School diverged from Marx’s views in advocating and developing this perspective. I 
mentioned in my introduction there are still theorists who ascribe to some either implicit 
or explicit version of the Frankfurt School’s true /  false needs approach. Clive Hamilton 
is the most obvious example. However for many other contemporary theorists of 
consumption it has become almost de rigueur to dismiss the Frankfurt School style 
accounts as reductionist (Woodward 2007, Slater 1997, Miller 1995, Featherstone 1991).
1 outline some of these positions in my final chapters, and ratify some of their conclusions 
in this. The influence the debate between these accounts has exercised over the 
direction of subsequent consumption research is an important aspect of my concern with 
the specifics of the Frankfurt School’s arguments here. Below then, I outline the genesis 
of the Institut’s negative approach towards consumption, and the various theorists, in 
addition to Marx, whose work supported and contributed to their account in this regard, 
principally Freud and Weber. My discussion in this section draws heavily on four main 
sources; Patricia Springborg’s The Problem of Human Needs and the Critique of Civilisation 
(1981), David Ingram’s Critical Theory and Philosophy (1990), Douglas Kellner’s Critical 
Theory, Marxism and Modernity (1989), and Martin Jay’s The Dialectical Imagination (1996).
Inception vis-a-vis Marx
From their inception in the early 1920s the principal question the Frankfurt School 
theorists were concerned with was why the transition to communism had not occurred5. 
Even from the beginning the School never regarded Marx’s work as received doctrine6. 
They were, nevertheless, at first optimistic about the decline of capitalism; as time went 
by, however, their hopes began to fade. By the early 1930s, especially with the rise of 
Fascism instead of communism as a dominant societal impulse, members of the School 
‘no longer believed that emancipation was imminent’7. They lost, as Jay notes in The 
Dialectical Imagination (1996), ‘that basic confidence, which Marxists had traditionally felt, 
in the revolutionary potential of the proletariat’8. During this period, especially with the
5 Ingram 1990, Springborg 1981, p.7-8
6 Jay 1996, p.254, and also Kellner 1989, pp.l 1-12.
7 Ingram 1990, p.48
8 Jay 1996, p.44
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rediscovery of the philosophical, Hegelian ancestry of Marx’s work9, they also 
increasingly came to regard the ‘vulgar determinism’ and ‘received truths’10 of orthodox 
and revisionist Marxists* 11, in perpetuating an inevitable theory of emancipation, as not 
only theoretically inadequate, but also as complicit in sustaining the continuing 
conditions of oppression. These factors resulted in a shift in their theoretical emphasis, 
formalised under Horkheimer’s directorship in 1930, away from a faith in the perceptive 
capacities of the working class, to a renewed appreciation of, and belief in, the 
emancipatory capacities of the educated, elite and critical social theorist. Subsequently, 
as Ingram notes in Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity (1990):
one detects in the Frankfurt School’s theoretical writings of the late 
thirties a return to a more Hegelian emphasis on the superior, “detached” 
understanding of the philosopher vis-ä-vis potential revolutionary practice.12
Idle influence of Freud
Martin Jay writes of how the School scattered in 1933, fleeing Nazi Germany, relocating 
first to Geneva and America shortly thereafter. He notes that with the growing stress 
they placed on theory and their increasing pessimism about the revolutionary potential 
of the working class, the School subsequently came to view the reason for the failure of 
the transition to communism as a result of a growing ‘falsity’ of beliefs about felt need 
across the spectrum of the population created by successful ideological impositions from 
what they eventually came to refer to as the ‘culture industries’13:
If it can be said that in the early years of its history the Institut concerned 
itself primarily with an analysis of bourgeois society’s socio-economic
9 Jay 1996, p.42. Ingram mentions that this was supported by a similar position Lukäcs’s adopted in 
History and Class Consciousness (1923) (see Ingram 1990, p.60), and also, as Kellner outlines, by others 
such as Karl Korsch in “Marxism and Philosophy” (1923) (see Kellner 1989, pp. 10-11).
10 Jay 1996, p.48
11 Ingram 1990, p.31 & 38. Kellner also refers to such approaches as ‘dogmatic, reductionist and 
objectivistic metaphysical materialism’ (1989, p.22). Jay notes also the influence of thinkers such as 
Groce and Dilthey, and writes that: ‘Hegel’s stress on consciousness as constitutive of the world 
challenged the passive materialism of the Second International’s theorists’ (1996, p.42, p.l 1).
12 Ingram 1990, p.36
13 Jay identifies the inner circle around Horkheimer, of Pollock, Adorno, Lowenthal, Marcuse, and 
Fromm, as those whose work ‘formed the core of the Institut’s achievement’ Jay 1996, p.31). Adorno 
only a full time member after 1938 Jay 1996, p.21), but contributed articles to the first publication of 
the Institut’s journal Zeitschrift prior to this and was involved even prior to this during the 1920s Jay 
1996, p.27, p.87). During the interwar years the tradition of the School was maintained principally by 
Adorno and Horkheimer, who placed their emphasis more on theory alone (Kellner 1989, pp.84-5). 
Jay notes the more ‘pessimistic’ tone that occurred after the shift to America Jay 1996, p.44). David 
Ingram likewise notes this increasingly pessimism in conjunction with a growing stress on theory.
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substructure, in the years after 1930 its prime interest lay in its cultural 
superstructure14
Where Marx had understood ideology as a false doctrine which, masquerading as a 
universal truth, in fact maintained the authority of the status quo, during the 1930s the 
Critical Theorists began to take the view, as Ingram outlines, that Marx had seriously 
underestimated what enabled its pernicious impact:
Although Marx had understood the significance of ideology in 
reproducing the system, he had no inkling of the subtle psychological dynamics 
informing its tenacious hold on the masses.15
In this sense the Frankfurt School shared an implicit similarity with an aspect of 
liberalism that I discussed earlier, that is, they viewed people as not yet autonomous -  
although if they began to ascribe to the Critical theorists’ ideas it was possible they might 
become so at some point. Yet regardless of this uneasy concurrence with liberal thought, 
the increasing focus on the role of ideology and the ‘falsity’ of need cohered particularly 
well with the School’s rejection of the scientistic and purely economic versions of 
Marxism, for As Ingram relates, they dismissed
“scientistic” versions of Marxism as insufficiently critical, arguing that a 
philosophically enlightened social theory could adduce universal moral standards from historical 
practice ...16
I shall return to the issue of ‘universal moral standards’ shortly. Here I note Soper’s 
point that the traditional scientistic /  economistic strand of Marxism attempted to 
expunge all metaphysical elements or value claims about what need should be, generally 
refusing to even consider the question of values at all, regarding this as just part of ‘an 
ideological project’17. However Ingram writes of the growing influence of Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory following its introduction to the Institut in the late 1920s, and its 
importance in terms of the Frankfurt School’s views about the economistic aspects of
14 Jay 1996, p.21
15 Ingram 1990, p.39
16 Ingram 1990, p.31. My italics.
17 ‘... the very posing of the question: ‘what is it, that human being beings need?’, let alone the attempt 
to answer it, is regarded as fundamentally mistaken and can only form part of an ideological project - 
at its worst consisting in the reproduction of a Feuerbachian speculative anthropology that cannot be 
reconciled with the ‘scientific’ problematic of historical materialism, at its best a doomed attempt to 
transcend the ‘non-scientific’ status of speculative anthropological categories while still having 
recourse to them and while still trying to accommodate the ethical or ideological aspect of Marxist 
social criticism within its scientific aspect’ (Soper 1981, pp.31-2).
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Marx’s arguments18. Jay also discusses the School’s ‘audacity’ in drawing on Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory, but too notes that Horkheimer came to consider it one of the 
School’s ‘Bildungs mächte’ or theoretical foundation stones19. And while the School 
used Freud in a range of ways, his principal contribution was in relation to the 
development and extension of ideology as a concept vis-ä-vis false consciousness and 
false needs:
Like Hegel, they were inclined to regard cultural artifacts - especially 
those of art and philosophy - as best revealing the true interests and norms 
underlying the just and happy society [however] ... What was needed was a 
psychological science explaining the natural and social dynamics of 
consciousness as such. Their discovery of Freudian psychoanalysis filled this gap 
by enabling them to appreciate the instinctual dynamics underlying ideological 
false consciousness.20
Normative criteria, immanent and transcendent critique
As I discussed in the previous chapter, a key aspect of Marx’s thought was that he 
celebrated the developing richness of needs, even under capitalism, even as he 
simultaneously attacked the existence o f‘unnatural’ needs, while never specifying exactly 
what an ‘authentic’ human need should be. As I mentioned above, the Critical 
Theorists made statements just as antithetical to consumption as Marx, but 
demonstrated far less compunction about qualifying their claims. They justified their 
position, Kellner details, by arguing they held an ‘emancipatory interest’21, 
distinguishing their understanding of ‘philosophical ideas’ from ‘ideology’ by arguing 
philosophical ideas should play a role in criticising society. Horkheimer, Jay relates, in 
fact believed the researcher had a duty to criticise society. To do otherwise would just be 
to maintain the status quo:
In fact it was his duty to reveal those negative forces and tendencies in 
society that pointed to a different reality. In short, to maintain the formalistic 
dualism of facts and values, which traditional theories of the Weberian kind so 
strongly emphasized, was to act in the service of the status quo. The researcher’s 
values necessarily influences his work; indeed they should consciously do so. 
Knowledge and interest were ultimately inseparable. 22
l8Jay 1996, pp.25-8 and Ingram 1990, p.31. Jay further comments that ‘In the 1970’s it is difficult to 
appreciate the audacity of the first theorists who proposed the unnatural marriage of Freud and Marx’ 
(Jay 1996, p.86).
19 Horkheimer cited in Jay 1996, p. 102
20 Ingram 1990, p.31
21 Kellner 1989, p.204 
22Jay 1996, pp.81-2
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Ingram relates that the School justified their views as an ‘im m anent’ critique, objectively 
‘truthful’ and critically ‘accurate’ insofar as the values offered by their criticisms were 
measured against the undelivered promises of capitalism, measured in turn against ‘goals 
of universal justice and happiness’23. He claims they revisited M arx’s earlier engagement 
with Hegel in order to formulate this position, believing
with Hegel that the “tru th” of these ideas consisted precisely in their 
transcendence of a “false” or imperfect social reality. Obviously, the criteria of 
truth to which they appealed was not correspondence with factual historical 
reality, but correspondence with essential humanity and its goals of universal justice and 
happiness.24
The Critical Theorists were attempting an uneasy balancing act here, and Kellner notes 
Horkheim er also stated such ‘goals’ have ‘to be developed and modified constantly in the 
course of experience’25. Jay  observes how Horkheim er rejected ‘all claims to absolute 
tru th’26, while maintaining that ‘Each period of time has its own truth ... although there 
is none above time’27. He also describes how Horkheim er stressed the social, cultural 
and historical position of the researcher, yet still tried to grant them a position from 
where they could effectively ‘deconstruct’ that which they observed:
it would be a mistake to see intellectuals as freischwebende (free-floating), to 
use the term M annheim  had taken from Alfred W eber and popularized. The 
ideal of a “free-floating” intellectual above the fray was a formalistic illusion, 
which should be discarded. At the same time, it would be equally erroneous to 
see the intellectual as entirely verwurzelt, rooted in his culture or class, as had 
Völkisch and vulgar Marxist thinkers. Both extremes misconstrued subjectivity 
as either totally autonomous or totally contingent. Although definitely a part his 
society, the researcher was not incapable of rising above it at times. 28
The problem, Jay writes, was that while they rejected M annheim ’s position, it was one
their own increasingly came to resemble29.
In The Theory of Need in Marx (1974), Agnes Heller writes that whether ‘im m anent’ or 
‘transcendent’, there are m ajor problems involved in attem pting to formulate ‘a general 
system of needs which, so to speak, is “suspended above” individual people and is at a
23 Ingram 1990, pp.38-9.
24 Ingram 1990, pp.38-9. Kellner similarly writes that 'Critical theory does not offer any absolute 
foundation for morality and politics, yet it attempts to overcome relativism through its intense focus 
on human needs, sufferings and struggles in the present age' (Kellner 1989, p.35).
2o The text Kellner references is ‘Materialism and Metaphysics’ (Kellner 1989, p.28).
26 Jay 1996, p.63
27 Jay 1996, p.63
28Jay 1996, pp.81-2
29 ‘Despite their scorn for Mannheim’s ideas about free floating intellectuals, the Frankfurt School’s 
members came increasingly to resemble his model’ Jay 1996, p.292).
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higher level than the personal needs of the individuals who constitute society’30. The
positing of a Truth underlying ideology, which only certain theorists have privileged
access to, has been a commonplace aspect of Enlightenment discourse, and this positions
these theorist as outside, immune to, and somehow beyond the influences of the society
they are judging. In her subsequent book, The Power of Shame (1985), Heller notes
All division of needs into true and false ones based on the theory of 
fetishism assumes that the position of the judging persons transcends the society 
in question.31
Despite this, she writes,
none of the advocates of the theory of ‘true’ and ‘false’ needs seriously 
faces the question of how one know if one’s consciousness is not a fetishized one. 
Or if they do face it, they do not proceed in a consistent manner.32
Such a stance does not offer a situated argument, but the delineation of a Truth and the
imposition of that Truth upon others, despite Horkheimer’s best initial qualifications. It
also inescapably falls back on an essentialised ontology of origins33.
The influence o f W eb er
It is easy now to dismiss the School’s account as incomplete. But it is not as though they 
were not sophisticated thinkers, despite my truncated, partial account. Horkheimer did 
attempt to qualify his position, and at the time there appeared to be good reasons for the 
views the School adopted. I mentioned above that during the 1920s and 30s, Marx’s 
influence on the School was still very strong, and they were still committed to his project 
as a whole. While the School had tried to marry Freud and Marx, there were key 
differences between their ideas. Ingram for instance, notes how Freud’s Hobbesian 
conception of reason (‘reason itself operates through the mechanisms of repression and 
domination’34) did not sit comfortably with Marx’s ultimately optimistic stance. For the 
Critical Theorists, although less sanguine about the demise of capitalism, still took a 
largely hopeful perspective in the 1920s and 30s, choosing to argue for the beneficent 
potential of reason:
30 Heller 1974, p.67. A further issue is that attempts to determine which needs are ‘essential’ and 
which are not can tend to relegate everything ‘that exceeds the bare minimal of survival to imaginary’ 
(Heller 1985, p.286). Assuming mass consumption involves new, unprecedented types o f ‘irrationalist 
and fantastic desires’ is also predicated on, as Miller notes, the assumption of some previous purely 
utilitarian functional relations to goods, representing ‘basic needs and true interests’ (1995, p.26).
31 Heller 1985, p.286
32 Heller 1985, p.286 check this.
33 Miller 1995
34 Ingram 1990, p.48
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Despite their realistic appraisal of the ideological forces preventing 
revolutionary enlightenment, the members of the Frankfurt School nonetheless 
believed in the power of reason to enlighten and emancipate. Decisive, in this 
regard, was their attempt to develop an interdisciplinary research program 
combining philosophy and social science. Although they harbored no illusions 
about the capacity of theory to promote the popular dissemination of 
enlightenment among the working classes, they still believed that its conjunction 
of theory and practice could help aid progressive forces in combating ideology 
and pinpointing areas of resistance.35
Following their shift to America in the late 1930s, the Critical theorists reacted with 
aversion to the positivism and instrumental rationality they found dominating the 
American Academy36. Freud’s work cohered with their rejection of both, despite his 
negative view of reason, which they still did not completely adhere to37. Kellner argues 
the Critical Theorists nevertheless felt strongly about their inability to ‘formulate an 
appropriate political response’ that could effectively address the societal problems which 
they so keenly observed and dissected, especially in relation to the growth of Fascism 
during the 1930s38. By the 1940s, he writes, their previous optimism about the 
emancipatory power of reason and the nature of ‘progress’ was being seriously 
undermined39. With the growth in fascism (the School even debating as to whether it 
was the logical corollary’ of capitalism40), the exposure of Stalin’s atrocities, and the new 
horror revealed by the German genocidal program, the School underwent a radical 
theoretical revision, and found new support for Freud’s negative view of reason in 
Weber’s gloomy prognostications about capitalist society.
Weber’s attraction to the School is most immediately evident in their mutually 
unfavorable views of consumption. Simmel and Veblen were also influential in this 
regard41, but another strong link between the Frankfurt School and Weber was Lukäcs, 
whose arguments about reification and consumption had also had a considerable impact 
on the Critical Theorists. For Lukäcs, Kellner writes,
35 Ingram 1990, p.48
36 This was, of course, an extension of their ongoing critique, evident even from Horkheimer’s 
inaugural address to the Institut in 1931 (see Kellner 1989, p. 17).
37 Jay 1996, p. 105
38 Kellner 1989, p.65, p.100, p. 107
39 Kellner 1989, pp.83-5
40 Kellner 1989, p.97. ‘ “The fascist order,” Horkheimer wrote during the war, “is the reason in which 
reason reveals itself as irrational’” Jay 1996, p. 121).
41 As I shall discuss in the following chapter, Adorno published an article on Veblen in 1941, and at 
this point remained an optimistic enough Marxist to argue Veblen’s analysis was lacking only because 
he did not understand the full dynamic of the capitalist production process.
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capitalism was characterized by an expanding “commodification” of the 
entirety of social life wherein everything from the worker to culture and sex 
becomes a commodity in the capitalist market ... “Reification” ... described the 
process whereby individuals become like things, or more thing-like, and 
accordingly perceive themselves, other individuals, social processes and history as 
static, objectified entities detached from social and historical processes and the 
possibility of social and self-transformation .42
Lukäcs had engaged with W eber in formulating this position43, and W eber regarded
consumption as both tangible evidence and a result of the decline in values and the
growing instrumentality of belief and action which stemming from the Protestant Ethic.
In the second chapter I briefly mentioned W eber’s analysis of the Protestant Ethic in
relation to the Protestant religion supplying another discourse which enabled a lessening
of hostility towards consumption. For W eber this growing secularisation m eant a
distorted instrumental rationality would just take the place of religious narratives,
supplanting the dominance of all prior ‘metaphysical absolutes’44 with a new all-
encompassing imperative for people to become cogs in the wheel of the capitalist system.
W here Lukäcs retained hope that a better society might develop45, this was not the case
with Weber. The penultimate end for his ‘specialist without spirit’ and ‘sensualist
without heart’, would be to treat everything as useful only insofar as it ensures a
particular end46, that end being the empty, ‘meaningless’ act of consumption:
the “iron cage” of modern society consists in the only “rational” calling 
remaining in a spiritless society - the sacrifice of moral autonomy to the twin 
Gods of capitalism: the blind necessities of work and consumption .47
The Frankfurt School, Kellner writes, had always viewed consumption as responsible for 
the longevity of capitalism:
42 Kellner 1989, pp.52-3. ‘The central tenet of reification’, Miller writes, ‘is that human beings create 
objects in order to understand themselves, but under capitalism then become separated from them, 
perceiving the object as having an external reality and an origin separate from themselves. Such 
products thereby develop an autonomy, deflecting society’s attention from critical self-awareness to 
this mysterious other’ (Miller 1994, p.44).
43 Kellner notes how Lukäcs’s analysis of reification and focus on the commodity as ‘the key unit of 
capitalist society’ was instrumental in contributing to the Critical Theorist’s views, and how while 
Lukäcs drew on Weber to formulate his ideas, his analysis also connected closely with Marx’s position 
about how, under capitalism, ‘everything becomes a commodity’ (Kellner 1989, pp.52-3).
44 Ingram 1990, p.54
45 Kellner 1989, p. 131
46 So that ‘everything can be treated as a calculable object rather than as a meaningful, intrinsically 
valued subject’ (Slater 1997, p.l 17).
47 Ingram 1990, p.59. And: ‘With the decline of religion, individuals cease to think of themselves as 
moral agents who orient their conduct toward absolute values. What remains, Weber tells us, is a life 
orientated toward survival, a life of work and consumption ruthlessly organized around the purposive- 
rational imperatives of efficiency and success’ (Ingram 1990, p.58). Also Jay 1996, p.259.
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Following Marx and Lukäcs, Critical Theory from the beginning 
characterized capitalist society as a commodity-producing society, and took the 
commodity as the basic social unit and key to the functioning of capitalism.48
The School made few references to consumption during the depression, but Kellner
charts how this changed in the 40s and 50s as mass consumer society developed. From
this time Adorno and Horkheimer in particular began to strongly represent ‘the culture
industry as involving administered culture, imposed from above, as an instrument of
indoctrination and social control’49. With this both found an increasing correspondence
between their ideas and Weber’s: consumption was an unhealthy and oppressive
phenomenon colonising all aspects of life, with an ability to ‘lull its victims into passive
acceptance’50:
In the new configurations of capitalism, everything -  goods and services, 
art, politics and human life -  became a commodity, while commodity exchange 
became the basic form of relationship in the consumer society.51
In this the Critical Theorists’ use of Weber supported an analysis of capitalism that Marx
also enabled, namely, the view that consumption was a key determinant of what was
propping up the enforced, unnatural exploitation of capitalism.
Weber’s analysis of capitalism was radically different to Marx’s, and Weber disagreed 
with Marx’s later stress on the economistic dynamics of capitalism, rejecting the view 
that ideas were ‘mere ideological reflections of economic interest’52. Ingram portrays the 
Critical Theorists as finding a further affinity between Weber’s approach and their own 
through their mutual rejection of ‘scientistic’ and ‘economistic’ versions of Marx, and 
notes that the School began to use Weber’s methodology, even though it also purported 
to offer a ‘scientific explanation of social phenomena’53. It was this ‘scientific’ 
methodology Ingram believes further buoyed the conclusions about false consciousness 
that the Critical Theorists had drawn from Freud, their growing ascription to the idea 
that action could be a result of subconscious beliefs54. He writes how in developing their
48 Kellner 1989, p. 147
49 Kellner 1989, pp. 130-1
50Jay 1996, p.216. Jay notes that Horkheimer had ‘always been an interested reader of Weber’ Jay 
1996, p.44, p.259), but doesn’t mention any particular influence Weber had on the School. Kellner in 
contrast writes that the Critical theorists had been influenced by Weber from the first (1996, pp.3-4), 
and notes the similarities between their respective critiques (Kellner 1989, p.100).
51 Kellner 1989, p. 147 
32 Ingram 1990, p.50 
53 Ingram 1990, pp.49-50 
34 Ingram 1990, p.51
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‘materialist social psychology’55, W eber enabled the Critical Theorists to conceptualise a 
firm ‘scientific’ connection between the material /  economic aspects of society which 
drew M arx’s concern, and cultural ideas:
W eber was sufficiently moved by M arx's critique of idealism to deny that 
the content of ideas was alone capable of affecting historical change. Ideas prove 
ineffective unless there exists an elective affinity, or correspondence, between them 
and prior socioeconomic interests. Furtherm ore, it is not the explicit m eaning of 
ideas that often motivates, but the unintended - and largely unconscious - 
psychological effects that arise from their affinity with economic interests. In the 
final analysis, ideas and material interests are mutually interrelated. The pursuit 
of material interests is selectively governed and legitimated by ideas, but ideas 
achieve their effect in and through material interests.56
In short, in attempting to overcome various tensions between the differing
interpretations of M arx, Ingram argues that ‘W eber's combined idealist /  materialist
approach played an im portant role in the Frankfurt School's attempt to formulate a
scientific method of ideology critique’51:
First, W eber developed a theory of social action that attempted to show 
the peculiar psychological nexus linking transcendent cultural ideals, subjective 
ideas, and concrete material interests. His analysis of the “elective affinity”, 
linking Protestantism and capitalism, exemplified this connection in a way that 
proved decisive for the school's own attem pt to come to grips with the positive 
and negative elements underlying bourgeois moral idealism. Second, the theory 
of social action provided W eber with a methodology for both understanding and 
causally explaining social phenom ena. This method helped the school 
understand how philosophical interpretation of and reflection on cultural 
meanings could be wedded to scientific explanation of social phenom ena. Above 
all, it enabled them to conceive ideological false consciousness along a model of a fixed and 
unfree form of reflex-patterned behavior,58
55 As Kellner terms it (1989, p.36).
36 Ingram 1990, p.50.
57 Ingram 1990, p.51
38 Ingram 1990, pp.49-50. My italics. Even in his inaugural address to the Institut, Horkheimer had 
rejected any division between the material and the ideal, arguing both must be overcome by a 
dialectical fusion (Kellner 1989, p. 19). The attractions of Weber’s work in this regard becomes 
evident, especially when considered in relation to Horkheimer’s ‘programmadc statement’ in the first 
issue of Zeitschrift which Kellner summarises as follows: ‘social research from various academic fields in 
the journal would be part of an attempt to develop a “theory of contemporary society as a whole” 
aiming at “the entirety of the social process. It presupposes that beneath the chaotic surface of events 
one can grasp and conceptualize a structure of the effective powers.” This theory would be based on 
the results of historical studies and the individual sciences, and would therefore strive for the status of 
“science”’ (Kellner 1989, p.27). Yet in Marx, Marginalism and Modem Sociolog)) (1983), Clarke casts 
strong doubts on Weber’s value-neutral claims: ‘While he endorsed ... research that was ‘value­
relevant’, that would inform contemporary ethical and political debate, he insisted that the research 
itself had to be conducted with scrupulous regard for objectivity and that the results of the research 
could not impose particular ethical or political conclusions. Research could provide only the facts that 
could inform debate. To reach ethical conclusions it was necessary to judge those facts in accordance 
with chosen ethical criteria. The argument was extremely disingenuous, however well-intentioned, for
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Reason, agency, structure and the challenge to Marx
One other significant aspect of the increased emphasis the School placed on ‘ideology’, 
‘false consciousness’ and ‘false need’, was the concomitant stress it came to place on the 
role of ‘structure’. This was in striking opposition to Marx’s early and still unpublished 
work which retained a significant place for the importance of individual agency; it also 
exhibited a strong parallel to those economic determinist versions of Marx which the 
School rejected. I have discussed above how, influenced by Weber and Freud in their 
attempts to account for the longevity of capitalism, in conjunction with their increasingly 
gloomy prognosis about the possibility for positive change, the School overturned Marx’s 
later economic analysis of how capitalism must eventually implode under the cannibalising 
weight of its internal contradictions and replaced it with a psychological explanation which 
focused on how ‘true’ and ‘false’ needs were able to perniciously sustain the capitalist 
system. As Springborg details in The Problem of Human Needs and the Critique of Civilisation'.
the doctrine of true and false needs asserts that capitalism has developed 
the unique capacity to perpetuate itself by introjecting into the psyche of its 
subjects those needs that it requires them to have in order for it to survive. It is 
only by being able to create a demand for new products that keeps pace with the 
volume at which these commodities are produced that capitalism has been able 
to stave off the effects of the law of the declining rate of profit, overproduction, 
and so on which would otherwise have brought about its collapse59.
And in taking this new tack, the true and false needs theorists came, perhaps
unsurprisingly in retrospect, to proffer what effectively was an ‘iron cage’:
the doctrine of true and false needs involves a hidden contradiction, a 
practical antinomy. It makes a judgment on capitalism as a system which does 
not permit man to realise his latent powers and his full development as an 
individual, on the tacit assumption that under other conditions or another system 
these powers can flourish. But to find his way out of the condition of alienation 
presupposes that man still has the critical judgment and moral capability to 
transcend the constraints of his condition. And yet it is precisely this critical 
judgment and moral capability that the doctrine denies by arguing that false 
needs have been introjected into the psyche of the individual, so that behaviour 
is predetermined.60
Or as Axel Honneth puts it:
while the facts might never be able to impose a particular judgement, they could certainly be 
formulated in such a way as to leave little room for serious choice’ (Clarke 1983, p.196).
59 Springborg 1981, p.6
60 Springborg 1981, p. 11
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Adorno had made Marx's critique of fetishism so decisively the point of 
departure for his critique of society that he could no longer find any trace of an 
intramundane transcendence in the social culture of everyday life’61.
Springborg points out that this shift actually transmuted the thrust of Marx’s original 
program altogether, especially insofar as it was a radical revision of and departure from 
his labour theory of value:
Now there is no way to explain how the consumer comes to be able to 
purchase these commodities that is congruent with the labour theory of value 
and its principle that the disposable income of the worker is being constantly 
reduced to nil by the necessity of the capitalist to make a profit. The doctrine of 
true and false needs, to the extent that it offers a theory of exploitation, means by 
that something entirely different ... By framing a theory' of alienation in terms not 
of deprivation, but of surfeit, the doctrine of true and false needs meets peculiar 
difficulties. What it really asserts is that men under capitalism are alienated not 
because their fundamental human needs have not been met, but because the 
needs they exhibit are not genuine ones. Exploitation then consists not in the 
failure to meet basic needs so much as in the creation of false needs.62
She believes that Marcuse was the strongest adherent of this approach. In One
Dimensional Man (1972), for instance, Marcuse explicitly refers to false needs
‘superimposed upon the individual’63:
products indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote a false 
consciousness which is immune against its falsehood.64
But Adorno and Horkheimer’s mass society essays offer a position just as constricting,
and with this, Jay believes,
the Institut presented a revision of Marxism so substantial that it forfeited 
the right to be included among its many offshoots. By challenging the actual or 
even potential existence of a historical subject capable of implementing a rational 
society, the Institut finally jettisoned that central premise of Marx’s work, the 
unity of theory and praxis.65
Patricia Springborg observes that the vision of human existence offered by the Frankfurt 
school is one in which ‘the corruption of capitalist man, his willing compliance as an 
insatiable consumer, produces a more gross form of alienation than that produced by the 
outright exploitation of capitalism in its earlier phases’66. For instance, in terms of 
degrees of corruption, Adorno himself stated that people were not dupes, but rather saw
61 Honneth 1994, pp.256-7
62 Springborg 1981, pp.7-8
63 Marcuse 1972, p. 19
64 Marcuse 1972, p.24
65 Jay 1996, p.296
66 Springborg 1981, p.6
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no alternative, taking a sado-masochistic consolation for their misery and oppression but 
despising themselves for it:
they desire a deception which is nonetheless transparent to them. They 
force their eyes shut and voice approval, in a kind of self-loathing, for what is 
meted out to them, knowing fully the purpose for which it is manufactured. 
W ithout admitting it they sense that their lives would be completely intolerable 
as soon as they no longer clung to satisfactions which are none at all.67
Yet despite people knowing, and choosing its ‘satisfactions’, Adorno writes that the
culture industry still utterly ‘impedes the development of autonomous, independent
individuals who judge and decide for themselves’68.
Perhaps the most curious aspect of the Frankfurt School’s use of this quasi-W eberian 
‘scientific’ method was the strange juxtaposition it formed to the School’s attacks on 
positivism and instrumental rationality. Curious, because while criticising positivism, the 
Critical Theorists, in effect, also represented themselves as drawing on rigorously 
‘scientific’ techniques to formulate their critique, albeit under the auspices of contrasting 
their ‘critical reason to positivism’s instrumental and formal reason’69. Yet the extent to 
which ‘critical reason’ can gain any special exemption which delivers it from positivism’s 
flaws is highly questionable. For the School’s theories o f ‘true’ and ‘false’ needs, Patricia 
Springborg avers, really only proffer another brand of crypto-scientism which acts to 
disguise the value judgm ents it obtains:
... the doctrine of true and false needs turns out to be an ethical theory 
which (1) does not recognise its status as such, and (2) does not admit of ethical 
solutions. Dialectical materialism specifically rejects the fact /  value distinction, 
on the grounds that moral imperatives merely reflect the presuppositions and 
requirements of an economic system. The doctrine of true and false needs is 
advanced not as an ethical or normative but as a scientific theory (my emphasis), 
whose laws hold with the same necessity as the laws of the physical world. In 
other words, in so far as it supplants the labour theory of value as an explanation 
of the underlying mechanisms by which the capitalist system maintains itself, the 
doctrine of true and false needs is understood as having the same force: as an 
empirical and not as an ethical theory.70
67 Adorno 1991b, p.89
68 Adorno 1991b, p.92 check quote mark
69 Kellner 1989, p.86
70 Springborg 1981, pp.9-10. Note how Springborg’s conclusions re the fact /  value distinction differ 
from Soper’s, while in this section Springborg places more emphasis on the scientific /  economic 
aspects of Marx’s work. The position of the Critical Theorists here however, takes on a particular 
irony when weighed against Adorno and Horkheimer’s eventual divergence from Marx. Jay describes 
how this was so complete that in the Dialectic of Enlightenment (1946) they began to comprehensively 
criticise, rather than just depart from his ideas, and in undertaking a critique of reason itself, they 
actually displaced class conflict as the problem: ‘The focus was now on the larger conllict between man
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The doctrine of true and false needs and its associated critique of consumption has clear 
flaws. Critical theory gestures towards there being no one truth, with the theorist being 
inextricably embedded in the society they are judging, unable to escape socially given 
determinants of value. It then subsumes this acknowledgment under a totalising theory 
with claims to a determinate truth, a whole knowledge of what “is”, thus bearing an 
uncanny resemblance to some of the religious, moral and romantic criticisms of 
consumption outlined in chapters two and three. Springborg certainly notes this 
similarity to romanticism:
In its weak form, then, the doctrine of true and false needs is no more 
than a theory about man's susceptibility to corruption .71
And while the historical weight of these hostile attacks on consumption go some way
toward explaining modern antipathy, this still does not entirely account for the
continuing popularity of the true and false needs doctrine in the face of its obvious flaws.
Even Kellner, who places himself in the Critical Theory tradition, acknowledges its
shortcomings, while writing that much of this work has been politically ineffectual in
terms of achieving reform:
while Critical Theory's analysis of the consumer society provide 
illuminating historical and critical perspectives on the development of the 
consumer culture and the ways in which it has produced social integration, 
global denunciations of consumption have little political resonance, and provide 
a very weak basis for political radicalization and struggle today .72
He continues,
we need, I believe, new critical perspectives on the commodities, needs 
and consumption which contemporary Critical Theory should try to provide if it 
wishes to be relevant to progressive social transformation in the future, where, 
among other things, the rigid dichotomy between production and consumption 
may well be overcome .73
and nature both without and within, a conflict whose origins went back to before capitalism and 
whose continuation, indeed intensification, appeared likely after capitalism would end’ (JaY 1996, 
p.256). And in this, ‘not only did the Frankfurt School leave the vestiges of an orthodox Marxist 
theory of ideology behind, it also implicitly put Marx in the Enlightenment tradition’ (Jay 1996, 
p.259). See also Ingram (1990, p.45), and Craib (1992, p.214).
71 Springborg 1981, p. 12
72 Kellner 1989, p. 162
73 Kellner 1989, p. 162. Kellner still also unconvincingly attempts to distinguish between consumption 
and ‘consumerism’ (1989, p. 161). In this he himself maintains a true false needs paradigm -  in terms 
of a kind of truth-in-advertising perspective coupled with consumer satisfaction: ‘If a commodity, after 
critical scrutiny and use, reveals itself to be life-enhancing, truly useful, well constructed and fairly 
priced, then a need for it can be said to be a “true need”. If the commodity fails to offer the 
satisfactions promised and is not beneficial, life-enhancing and useful, then a perceived need for it can 
be said to be a “false need”. Note the distinction between true and false needs proposed here rests on 
empirical grounds’ (Kellner 1989, p.160). In relation to this, however, note Soper’s comment and her
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Yet while views such as Kellner’s may have leavened the tone of the debate, the 
influence of the Frankfurt School’s critique remains potent. Their attacks on the ‘culture 
industry’ read as almost histrionic today, yet their theory of ‘true’ and ‘false’ needs has 
remained one of the most discredited but also resilient and surreptitiously ubiquitous 
doctrines of modern social analysis. The Frankfurt School’s was a predominately 
‘horizontal’ consideration of consumption, that is, a focus only upon the ‘illusory’ or 
‘arbitrary’ nature of the meaning of goods, rather than a concern about the ‘vertical’ 
effects of goods, that is, their origins or consequences. In the following chapters I 
examine the particular nature and considerable range of this influence upon Marx and 
the Frankfurt School’s theoretical progeny, together with the refutation of this position 
by other theorists, most of whom while rejecting the thesis of the consumer as ‘wholly 
determined by the monopoly’74, nevertheless enable arguments focused around identity 
to fully set the course and parameters of the consumption debates.
subsequent analysis that effectively responds “So what” ... this approach still disqualifies any 
investigation into the concept of need itself: ‘though sociology shares with economics a positivistic 
tendency to think of needs in terms of actual consumption, it has also tended to recuperate the 
concept of need from economic theory precisely in order to designate a demand that is not effective 
and thus to mark areas of consumption for which there is a ‘need’ but for which there is no provision 
— therefore no ‘need’ in the strict economic sense’ (Soper 1981, p.29).
74 Adorno 1991a, p.73
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part one: changing the subject
Changing the subject is always hard, because the audience must accept that the new 
subject is significant. And that is a matter of intellectual culture.
(McClosky 1994, p.38‘2)
In the previous chapter I noted three issues associated with the Frankfurt School’s true /  
false needs perspective. First, proposing that ‘real’ needs underlie those imposed by 
ideology is predicated, as Danial Miller (1995) observes, on an ontology of origins. Yet 
how can any aspect of our identity be considered timeless or authentic given the extent 
to which we are shaped by our society, culture and history? Second, given we are 
‘constituted’ in this manner, how can any theorist see through, and so avoid the social 
determinants informing their views of that which they purport to judge? What makes 
their judgements about how any one form of identity is more ‘authentic’ or genuine than 
another more valid than anyone else’s? How are they alone exempt from ideology? 
And finally, if, as Adorno and Horkheimer maintain, the ability of capitalism to sustain 
this false process has become so powerful, how then can we theorise the character of 
human agency, and change?
I summarise these points again here because for a considerable period of time they were 
not seen as vexed, or even as particularly significant on the part of those advocating any 
of the multiple twentieth century variations on the Frankfurt School critique. Simmel 
and Thorstein Veblen were important precursors to the Frankfurt School, and I consider 
their arguments below. Many later theorists including Raymond Williams, Vance 
Packard, Roland Barthes, Guy Debord, Stuart Ewen, Lasch, Haug, and many others not 
writing on consumption directly, made comments that confirmed the existence of a 
hostile consensus. I outline some of these arguments over the first part of this chapter.
The identity debates (part one): changing the subject
In the previous chapters I provided an overview of some of the more general European 
debates about consumption, identifying a longstanding hostility which enjoyed wide 
currency in theory, if not in practice. To what extent did this supply an ethos that 
informed and helped shape twentieth century accounts of consumption? It is beyond my 
purview to track direct lines of influence in as much detail as I would like here, but as I 
outline below, there certainly appear parallels between the earlier antipathetic views of 
lower class consumption expressed by elites, and twentieth century literary theory, for 
instance. In the previous chapter I also noted Springborg’s point about the similarity 
between the views of the Frankfurt School and Romanticisms. What is very clear 
however, is that coupled with the earlier hostility, the sheer bulk of antipathetic twentieth 
century arguments gave them doctrinal weight, no matter how different the respective 
motivations, or how reductive, class biased, or gendered the analysis. Yet my fourth 
chapter on economic theory also gives an indication of what increasingly appeared to be 
at stake in many of the later critical perspectives: as liberal and neoliberal economic 
discourse fostered the idea of the autonomous individual, this began to enjoy a tenacious 
hold over Western social thought. And this generic conception of the sovereign 
individual of capitalism, the supposedly atomistic agent able to choose /  consume freely 
and rationally drew a strong countervailing response. The character and role of 
consumption was a key point of contention in these debates.
Many of the theorists writing against consumption whom I mentioned above lay stress 
on the shaping and constraining role of social forces. And as shall be evident below, for 
a considerable period the standing of these accounts certainly constituted a particular 
orthodox configuration of its own. A configuration which other theorists eventually 
complained offered scant space for human agency, and as such, an incomplete account 
of change. The second half of the chapter considers the slow development of these later 
perspectives, but also how in relation to consumption the issue was conceived of 
primarily via questions of identity which then cannibalised most other concerns. As I 
shall discuss, it was anthropology which first signalled a change, with Mauss’s classic 
essay The Gift (1990 [1924]) suggesting consumption involved more a complex and 
nuanced interplay of interpersonal social dynamics than had previously been allowed 
for. Mauss’ arguments were later taken up and developed in Douglas and Isherwood’s 
The World of Goods: Towards an Anthropology of Consumption (1979), which I shall discuss in 
the following chapter. 'The latter part of this chapter surveys how in the 1970s the
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Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies also came to view consumption 
as indicative of systems of meaning requiring more considered analytic frameworks than 
those extant, navigating their way through the many accounts antithetical to 
consumption by initially formulating a position validating certain modes of subcultural 
consumption as ‘resistant’ to various oppressive aspects of capitalism. This enabled the 
Centre to celebrate popular culture, and to represent those who practiced ‘resistant’ 
consumption as demonstrating a degree of ‘agency’ which had not previously been 
allowed for. Changing the subject is not easy however, as I shall detail below. Especially 
when trying to reconcile a number of seemingly incompatible accounts.
“Thorstein Vehlen has much to answer for'
In his famous analysis of American elite in The Theory of the Leisure Class (1970 [1899]) 
Veblen presented the ‘conspicuous consumption’ and unproductive leisure activities of 
the elite as principally serving to ‘signal’ their wealth and status. There are curious 
similarities as well as differences between his account and the subsequent arguments of 
the Frankfurt School. Veblen positions the underlying motivation for this American elite 
as ‘emulation’ connected with competition for placement in the social hierarchy. 
Drawing parallels between the behavior of this elite to ‘predatory’ and ‘barbaric’ 
cultures, Veblen represents their behaviour as being so superficial as to crush any claim 
on their part of cultural refinement or civility. The utilitarian intent and effect of this 
elite consumption is to simply reinforce the class system, as the need to emulate trickles 
down the social strata1. Veblen cites a plethora of examples to support his thesis, from 
religious accoutrements and practices2, to naturalistic gardens and topiary3. And off­
hand it is very easy to think of many other present day instances that appear to 
substantiate his critique. Yet in 1941 Adorno dissected Veblen’s The Theory of the Leisure 
Class in an article entitled ‘Veblen’s Attack on Culture’, lyrically referring to Veblen’s 
‘vitriol’ and ‘spleen’, which featured both ‘the asceticism of a Lutheran peasant’4 coupled 
with a ‘Rousseauist ideal of the primitive’5. Adorno’s principal criticism of Veblen, 
however, was that his analysis simply fell short, failing to recognise the underlying nature 
of that which he sought to critically assess, insofar as he mistakenly attacked the 
symptoms while overlooking the fundamental complaint, that being the ‘economic
1 Campbell 1998, p. 141
2 Veblen 1970, pp.90-???
3 Veblen 1970, pp. 100-102
4 Adorno 1941, pp.398-9
5 Adorno 1941, p.405
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structure of society’6. In this, Adorno characterises Veblen as a pragmatic ‘backwoods 
sectarian’7, his stasis a mistaken ressentiment, which invokes the kind of ‘spite’ that 
‘hypostatizes this situation as an eternal one’8, and so is unable to take into account the 
‘objective potentiality’ of societal emancipation9.
When he published his article Adorno still remained an optimistic enough Marxist to 
argue Veblen’s analysis was lacking only because he did not understand the significance 
of the dynamics of the production process. Moreover, in valorising work while criticising 
idle leisure, Adorno perceived that Veblen simply failed, Kellner explains, ‘to provide 
adequate critical perspectives on capitalism itself10. Jay also records that Adorno in any 
case did not approve of aestheticism, believing, as with Marx, that even if the desire for 
status recognition is ‘distorted’ it still signals a desire for a ‘happiness’ that must be 
social* 11 (and this could not be solely a matter of economic well-being). Yet aside from 
the droll incongruity of Adorno accusing Veblen of so much subsequently directed 
against himself, Adorno’s critique was not a fatal issue for those who otherwise read his 
position as a support to Veblen’s, and vice versa. But apart from whatever theoretical 
consonance exists between them, Veblen’s celebrated account stands on its own merits. 
Campbell has noted a long sociological tradition of calling on Veblen to denigrate 
consumption, with such a strong adherence to his model that ‘its inadequacies are rarely 
noted’12. Campbell’s is merely one account of the many that have drawn attention to 
and questioned the reductive, one-sided way Veblen portrays human motivations (see 
also Weatherill 1993, Vickery 1993, Gabriel and Lang 2006, and Slater 1997). Yet these 
positions are relatively recent. For a considerable period of time, Douglas and 
Isherwood note, Veblen’s undersocialised conception of human motivations was simply 
taken as given:
Thorstein Veblen has much to answer for when we consider how widely 
his analysis of the leisure class is received and how influential has been his 
unqualified scorn of conspicuous consumption.13
6 Adorno 1941, p.406. It is possible Veblen drew Adorno’s ire with a 1906 article, when he wrote of 
Marx’s theory as having ‘a great logical consistency’, more than any other theory, but that it was also 
‘not only not tenable, but it is not even intelligible’, Marx’s ‘disciples’ were only ‘bent on exegesis and 
on confirming their fellow-disciples in the faith’.
7 Adorno 1941, p.406
8 Adorno 1941, p.412
9 Adorno 1941, p.413
10 Kellner 1989, p. 150
11 Jay 1996, p. 180
12 Campbell 1998, p. 139
13 Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p. p.vii
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Simmel: "an artificial demand that is senseless from t fie perspective of the 
subject’s culture”
Veblen’s German contemporary Simmel’s work has been connected to Veblen’s, even 
regarded as extending Veblen’s14, insofar as Simmel is interpreted as arguing 
consumption involves not only emulation and imitation, but differentiation and 
individuation also. This too is based broadly around class distinctions, with people 
continually attempting to distinguish themselves from those who seek to emulate them. 
As Simmel wrote in his famous essay ‘Fashion’:
the fashions of the upper stratum of society are never identical with those 
of the lower; in fact, they are abandoned by the former as soon as the latter 
prepares to appropriate them.15
Simmel’s principal interest, overall, was in identity, individuality and social connections 
and forms of interactions in the context of the impact of industrialisation, modernisation, 
rationalisation, and monetarisation, with the concurrent rise of individualism and 
breakdown of traditional societal rules and norms. Yet while his focus on modernisation 
incorporated class analysis, Simmel’s purview extended beyond a critique of capitalism. 
He was, actually, quite ambivalent about the effects of the societal changes he analysed16. 
He did view with concern the intensification of alienation and exploitation, facilitated by 
the
progressive obscuring of the qualitative values by a merely quantitative 
one, by an interest in a pure more-or-less, since after all it is only the qualitative 
values which ultimately satisfy or needs.17
Yet Simmel also identified positive aspects to the development of monetary relations, in 
so far as ‘the subject is freed from restrictive commitments’18, enabling ‘a new possibility 
of development’19. And despite Simmel’s interest in modernisation, as opposed to 
capitalism specifically, in Material Culture and Mass Consumption (1994) Danial Miller notes 
Simmel’s ‘considerable influence’ on Lukäcs, and through him, ‘a certain tradition of 
Western Marxism’20. However, Miller continues,
Within this tradition, the argument has been that Simmel’s The Philosophy 
of Money provides an important critique of alienation, which, unfortunately, the 
author perceived as a condition of modernity itself instead of a specific attribute
14 Gabriel and Lang 2006, p.49
15 Simmel 1971 [1904], p.298
16 See Abercrombie et al 1986, p.22, and Slater 1997, p.l 18
17 Simmel 1991a, p.24
18 Simmel 1991a, p. 18
19 Simmel 1991a, p. 19
20 Miller 1994, p.68
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of capitalism; but, once his philosophy is directed back to its proper object, there 
is much to be learnt from his examples.21
This critique appears to be another version of Adorno’s main complaint against Veblen. 
Haberm as has also written of A dorno’s more sympathetic reception of Simmel however, 
while raising various issues with Simmel’s work, remarking that ‘Horkheim er and 
Adorno, too, offered with their theory of mass culture only a variation on a Simmelian 
them e’22. And although Simmel’s account of modernity represents a far more 
ambiguous stance than Adorno and H orkheim er’s critique of consumer culture, 
H aberm as’ ability to draw such parallels is easier to understand, given statements 
Simmel made such as this:
vast supplies of products come into existence which call forth an artificial 
dem and that is senseless from the perspective of the subject’s culture.23
Culture as a synonym for civilisation
As with the Frankfurt School, Simmel and Veblen’s arguments connected oddly with the 
criticisms from a range of social comm entators about to the relative merits of high /  low 
culture, despite differences in their respective motivations. Early twentieth century 
literary theorists such as the Leavis’s positioned high culture as a positive aesthetic ideal 
to be emulated, and popular culture as lesser and coarser. Everyday popular culture was 
not considered a worthy object for the academic gaze: as Graem e 'burner puts it in 
British Cultural Studies (2003), such practices were deemed ‘meretricious’24. In their 
Introduction to Rethinking Popular Culture: Contemporary Perspectives in Cultural Studies (1991) 
C handra Mukerji and Michael Schudson identify how in ‘the eighteenth century, 
“culture” was a synonym for “civilization”, the general process of becoming civilized or 
cultivated’25, and popular or mass culture was seen as ‘anti-culture’. This particular
21 Miller 1994, p.68
22 Habermas 1996
23 Simmel cited in Miller 1994, p.77. Yet on ‘The Berlin Trade Exhibition’ Simmel writes: ‘Every fine 
and sensitive feeling, however, is violated and seems deranged by the mass effect of the merchandise 
offered, while on the other hand it cannot be denied that the richness and variety of fleeting 
impressions is well suited to the need for excitement for overstimulated and tired nerves ... The 
differentiation of the active side of life [on production] is apparently complemented through the 
extensive diversity of its passive and receiving side. The press of contradictions, the many stimuli and 
the diversity of consumption and enjoyment are the ways in which the human soul -  that otherwise is 
an impatient flux of forces and denied a complete development by the differentiations in modern work 
-  seeks to come alive. No part of modern life reveals this need as sharply as a large exhibition. 
Nowhere else is such a richness of different impressions brought together so that overall there seems to 
be an outward unity, whereas underneath a vigorous interaction produces mutual contrasts, 
intensification and lack of relatedness’ (1991c, p. 120).
24 Turner 2003, p.2
25 Mukerji and Schudson 1991, p.2
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approach can be connected again to the more conservative strains of romanticism, 
mentioned in chapter two (where such distinctions can be traced back to the eighteenth 
century romantic notion of the authentic individual - inconsistently envisaged as 
unpolluted by the detritus of society, but whose authenticity still entails the visible 
exhibition various cultural significrs of refinement, sensibility and taste26). According to 
Slater however, Leavisite views also found mutually supportive and sustaining themes in 
writers as disparate as Nietzsche, Ortega, and Pound. Their ‘contem pt for the 
“masses’” , Slater comments, was ‘not incompatible with a desire to purify them as a 
Volk"11.
Turner writes of how within the British literary critical tradition the valorisation of high 
culture was coupled with the view of ‘popular culture as a threat to the moral and 
cultural standards of modern civilisation’28. In Subculture the Meaning of Style (1998), Dick 
Hebdige similarly situates theorists such as Arnold, Elliot and Leavis in this tradition. 
With an almost Evangelical fervour these critics focused on the capacity of literary texts 
to uplift social and moral standards. Elite bourgeois standards of value were idealised, 
but neither was ‘aping’ ones betters deemed appropriate behaviour for the working class. 
Each class was viewed as having its own validity - in its own ‘place’ (despite, or perhaps 
because of how increasing industrialisation and urbanisation led to traditional 
stereotypical roles fragmenting). T urner outlines how Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy (1869) 
‘warned of the likely consequences of the spread of this urban, “philistine culture”, which 
was accelerating with the extension of literacy and democracy’29. According to Turner, 
Arnold was concerned about the decline o f ‘organic’ communities, but he also associated 
‘philistine culture’ with the failure of democracy, insofar as he predicted subordinate 
classes would not having the capacity for judicious judgem ent.
In the interwar period Leavis and Eliot took up Arnold’s concerns, balancing an 
idealised ‘traditional’ English cultural past against the shortcomings of the industrialised 
present. In this critique, popular culture was represented as having no aesthetic value, as
26 See Campbell 1993
27 Slater 1997, p.72. Hilton also discusses this literature, and cites Carey’s The Intellectuals and the Masses 
(1992) as offering a fuller account, albeit one which ‘ignores the discrepancies, contradictions and 
ambiguities in the opinions of many leading literary and artistic figures’ (2004, p.109). See also 
Thompson (2007) for a good overview of a range of socialist concerns about consumption around the 
turn of the century.
28 Turner 2003, p.2
29 Turner 2003, p.34
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well as being morally deficient30. Hebdige later cites Orwell and Hoggart as advocating 
subsequent variations on this position, with modern mass consumer culture envisaged as 
corroding and cheapening the staunch wholesome ‘honesty’ of authentic British working 
class culture31. In Hiding in the Light (1988) he writes that these views were predicated on 
distinctions of “good” and “bad” taste and ascriptions of ‘culture’, with the normative 
criteria supporting such judgements founded in elite determinations of value, strongly 
influenced by the late Romanticism of William Morris’ Arts and Crafts Movement. 
Which was itself based on designs and techniques taken from India, whose textiles 
industry was later casually destroyed by the British East India company32.
Positioning these debates in the context of the changing material culture of the time is a 
curious exercise. Hebdige discusses the new ‘streamlined’ forms in architecture, 
industrial design and the burgeoning, ‘austere, patrician’ Modernist aesthetic that was 
challenging the Romantic aesthetic of the Arts and Crafts Movement. This new 
Modernist aesthetic, he writes, was ‘still ‘perfectly compatible with the definitions of 
“good taste” which were then becoming prevalent in broadcasting circles’33, and was 
also associated with ‘futurist manifestos and the popular imagery of progress’34. Yet 
when this same Modernist aesthetic when translated to mass culture it was depicted in 
elite representations as simply vulgar:
aesthetic and the meanings constructed round it were transformed as 
they passed across from high to low, from the lofty assertions of an artistic avant 
garde to the context of consumption and use - the domain of the popular.35
Hoggart’s commentary on the new milk-bars, for instance, refers to ‘the nastiness of their
modernistic knickknacks, their glaring showiness’36. And while Turner views Hoggart’s
willingness to at least undertake an analysis of range of popular cultural ‘texts’ as a
positive departure, opening ‘up culture as a field of forms and practices’37, he still
underscores Hoggart’s ‘nostalgia’, and his reproduction of ‘Leavisite aesthetic
standards’38.
30 Turner 2003, p.35. See also Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p. 153, and Inglis 1993, pp.41-6.
31 Hebdige 1988, pp.51-8
32 See for instance Burnard 1994
33 Hebdige 1988, p.61
34 Hebdige 1988, p.61 
3j Hebdige 1988, p.64
36 Hoggart cited in Turner 2003, p.40
37 Turner 2003, p.41
38 Turner 2003, p.39
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Raymond Williams, British Marxism, Humanism
In British Post-structuralism since 1968 (1991), Antony Easthope writes of Raymond 
Williams’ response, in Culture and Society 1780-1950 (1958), to T.S. Eliot’s Notes towards the 
definition oficulture (1948). Eliot had moved away from earlier elite notions o f ‘culture’, to 
the extent he began to reconfigure the term around an acceptance of different ways of 
life39, and culture as being ‘the development “of a whole society”40. Williams subsequently 
accepted that Eliot was writing against ‘atomised’ and ‘individualist’ notions of society 
associated with ‘unregulated’ industrialism, but he still viewed Eliot as conservative 
insofar as Eliot’s conception of culture remained fossilised around the ‘Informal, 
consumerist, pastoral’41. Easthope relates that in this Williams saw Eliot as sustaining a 
conservative elitism, his notion of culture being predicated on upholding ‘precisely that 
economic system of “free economy” which goes along with the “atomised”, individualist 
view of society Eliot wishes to attack’42. For Williams, Easthope relates, Eliot was
inevitably complicit with traditional liberal notions of the organic unity 
of society, state and nation in a ‘common culture’ imagined as transcending class 
divisions.
Such a domain of transcendence can only be founded in a notion of the 
individual as somehow constituting an essence and origin finally beyond all 
structural determinations, economic, social and linguistic.43
Yet Easthope points out that while Williams criticised Eliot’s essentialism, he too faced a
similar conceptual impasse which ensured that, in Culture and Society at least, Williams
remained ‘committed to a fundamental humanism’44. In writing from a ‘left-culturalist’
position, Williams was seeking more of an acceptance of the legitimacy of working class
culture. In this, Easthope describes, ‘Williams's text criticises explicitly the “Romantic”
tradition and works hard to negotiate an opposing stance45. However Williams was also
trying to balance his arguments against the then dominant strand of doctrinal British
Marxism, and successfully navigating a route between these positions proved difficult.
In ‘Itinerary of a thought: Stuart Hall, Cultural Studies, and the unresolved problem of 
the relation of culture to “not culture’”, Peck relates how this brand of Marxist
39 Williams [1958] 1963, p.229, see also Hebdige 1998.
40 Eliot cited in Easthope 1991, p.3
41 Easthope 1991, p.3
42 Easthope 1991, p.3
43 Easthope 1991, pp.3-4
44 Easthope 1991, p.4
45 Easthope 1991, p.4
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determinism conceived of the economic base as a ‘first cause’ which was the seen as 
shaping everything else in a society, so that everything else was only a ‘reflection’ of the 
base. This perspective, she writes,
identified the “base” with the state of development of the productive 
forces. All other aspects of existence, including culture, were relegated to the 
“superstructure” and treated as a reflection of the demands of the base, which 
was considered autonomous, unconditioned, and self-determining.46
1 have already outlined in the previous chapter how the Frankfurt School responded to
this strain of orthodox Marxism. Easthope charts how Williams’ approach was to stress
the power of individual agency, which in the context of the creative artistic process, he
conceptualised as part of an ‘essence’ flowing somehow, from within. This is exemplified
in a 1960 essay, ‘Advertising: the Magic System’, when Williams implicitly posits a
counterfactual notion of authenticity and a pure human essence, an originary truth
underlying that imposed by the system:
Advertising, in its modern forms, then operates to preserve the 
consumption ideal from the criticism inexorably made of it by experience. If the 
consumption of individual goods leaves that whole area of human need 
unsatisfied, the attempt is made, by magic, to associate this consumption with 
human desires to which it has no real reference ... The magic obscures the real 
sources of general satisfaction because their discovery would involve radical 
change in the whole common way of life.47
In this his position was not so different to that of the Frankfurt School. Easthope, 
burner, Hebdige and Slater all identify how Williams was open to broader, less elitist 
conceptions of culture, yet still simultaneously depicted the new mass consumption with 
negative overtones, as cheap, in the pejorative sense, and in connection with the polluted 
influence of advertising, as an addiction, manipulation and deformation of ‘traditional’ 
ways of life and ‘essential’ values48. Schudson describes Williams in similar term, 
labelling him as a ‘puritan’ critic, representing goods as, on some intrinsic level, having 
purely functional uses, with those uses subverted by the almost irresistible, polluting force 
of advertising49.
46 Culture is thus ‘a reflection of a more primordial mental or material process’ (Peck 2001, p.202).
47 Republished in Williams 1982b, p.189).
48 Flebdige 1998, p.6-7; Slater 1997, p.7 1; Turner 2003, p.48. Turner observes how William’s The 
Long Revolution (1961) ‘closely aligns him with Hoggart’s pessimistic accounts of popular culture and, in 
particular, the media’ (Turner 2003, p.44).
49 Schudson 1998, p.254
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Slater argues many of the values ‘in which modern consumer goods come wrapped’ are 
based upon a belief in ‘authenticity’ gleaned from the romantic period50, with 
romanticism being a key influence in the formulation of these utopian visions of an ideal 
culture51. Schudson concurs:
Most criticism of consumer culture share a few basic assumptions, which 
should be questioned at the outset. The critiques of consumer culture all object, 
as Emerson did, that things are in the saddle and ride us. They all seem to hold 
that if we could live the simple life, where things satisfy natural, biological needs 
and little more, we could properly devote attentions to justice or comradeship or 
aesthetic pleasures. We could then bask in the spiritual satisfactions the natural 
world can provide.52
Resonating with the views of the Frankfurt School, theorists in the above traditions, 
then, all maintain variations on the view of consumer culture as a lack of culture, the 
debasement o f‘real’ culture, and a symptom of a confused and alienated society, holding 
out a promise doomed to fail. And in this, a range of quite disparate streams of thought 
come together, proffering a seemingly conclusive intellectual summation of the 
unwholesome dynamics of consumer culture under capitalism.
Packard: “Large-scale efforts are being made, often with impressive 
success, to channel our unthinking habits ...”
It was the dangers and persuasive distortions of advertising that was the key concern of
many of these accounts, including that of the Frankfurt School. With the mass affluence
and production of uniform, inexpensive mass consumption items of the Fordist, post
WW2 Western, but more specifically American, 1950s consumer boom, these concerns
about advertising were directly addressed by Vance Packard’s persuasive, widely
consumed and anxiety provoking Hidden Persuaders (1957). Like Raymond Williams,
Packard represented advertising techniques as having an impact almost impossible to
resist. As Packard dramatically put it;
Large-scale efforts are being made, often with impressive success, to 
channel our unthinking habits, our purchasing decisions, and our thought 
processes by the use of insights gleaned from psychiatry and the social sciences.53
Advertising, in Packard’s schema, was imposed on individuals by powerful interests,
‘genuine, deeply rooted human needs were being appealed to in unscrupulous ways’54,
with a resultant overwhelming diminution of individual autonomy and agency. Yet
50 Slater 1997, p. 16
51 Slater 1997, p.66
02 Schudson 1998, p.251
53 Packard 1963, p. 11
54 Leiss, Kline andjhally 1986, p.25
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Hebdige depicts Packard’s analysis as incorporating a gendered bias remarkably similar
to those I referred to earlier. Hebdige views Packard’s ‘misogynist values’ as a
dominating motif, his work featuring various
analogies between the decline of the “real” solid /  masculine /  functional 
aspects of American industrial design which symbolise the pioneer spirit, and the 
complementary rise of the “fantastic” /  feminine /  decorative elements which 
symbolise consumer decadence. The fact that terms taken from women’s fashion 
are beginning to infiltrate the language of automobile design is cited as evidence 
of a more general decline in standards ... 55
Barthes’s Mythologies
Roland Barthes’ (1915-80) Mythologies, also published in 1957, represented consumer 
items and practices as being redolent with meanings that could be interpreted. Like 
Packard, Barthes presented this meaning as fraudulent, the obvious meanings denoted 
by the ‘function’ of goods obscuring the connotations or other layers of meaning, and 
thus essentially mystificatory of the ‘real’ processes and dynamics underlying the 
consumption act. For Barthes goods contain /  transmit ideological myths that serve only 
to sustain the class system. Because ideology thrives ‘'beneath consciousness’, and is, in fact, 
most effective in its operations there56, these ideological myths present the capitalist 
status quo as the way things ‘should be’, class inequality as unremarkable. To this extent 
then, myths do not hide, but distort. Represented as naturalised, given, wholly 
acceptable process, the class system thus becomes taken-for-granted, and in this sense 
‘disappears’, with the structure of society thus falling outside the ambit of any need for its 
basic premise to be questioned:
The fact of the bourgeoisie becomes absorbed into an amorphous 
universe, whose sole inhabitant is Eternal Man, who is neither proletarian or 
bourgeois.57
Although Barthes later changed his perspective to take post-structuralist arguments into 
account, at this point he was writing from a purely structuralist Marxist stance, analysing 
how the meanings attached to goods could act as ideological tools. Slater argues that at 
this time, Barthes effectively concurred with ‘Veblen’s general idea that the only real 
function of goods is to signify status’58. In Mythologies (1993), capitalism is sustained 
through a cycle of negatively ascribed motivations of emulation. For Barthes it is
55 Hebdige 1988, p.87. See also Slater 1997, p.73.
56 Hebdige 1998, p.l 1
57,‘the further the bourgeois class propagates its representations, the more naturalized they become’ 
Barthes (1993, p. 140).
58 Slater 1997, p .l58
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by penetrating the intermediate classes that the bourgeois ideology can 
most surely lose its name. Petit-bourgeois norms are the residue of bourgeois 
culture, they are bourgeois truths which have become degraded, impoverished, 
commercialized, slightly archaic, or shall we say, out of date?59
Debord: “our old enemy the commodity” 60
Barthes and Packard’s accounts, although questioning the ability of individuals to 
combat the structural forces of power sustaining the status quo, and decrying the 
diminution of individual agency, were both intended as heuristic, assisting their readers 
to combat the pernicious effects of advertising and dominant societal norms. Guy 
Debord’s fashionably resistant and colourful Society of the Spectacle, first published in 1967, 
was intended to perform, quite literally, a similar function, as a theoretical complement 
to the street performances of the Situationists, which through their discordant spectacle 
aimed to jolt people’s awareness and awaken them to the more illogical everyday 
spectacle of capitalism, which they did not see. As with Barthes, consumption for 
Debord served only to mask and sustain the various oppressions of capitalism. His views 
thus did not deviate significantly from the orthodox consensus:
The spectacle corresponds to the historical moment at which the 
commodity completes its colonization of social life. It is not just that the 
relationship to commodities is now plain to see - commodities are now all that 
there is to see; the world we see is the world of the commodity ... social space is 
continually being blanketed by stratum after stratum of commodities. With the 
advent of the so-called second industrial revolution, alienated consumption is 
added to alienated production as an inescapable duty of the masses.61
Ewen: “the chasm between surface and reality widens; we experience a 
growing sense of disorientation”
Cognisant of the work of the Frankfurt School, Packard and Barthes, Stuart Ewen’s 
Captains of Consciousness (1976) attempts the same heuristic function; on the back cover of 
Ewen’s book Newsweek incongruously claims that Ewen ‘sharpens our minds and steels 
our instincts against seductive subliminal appeals’ [of advertising]. As with the critics 
above, for Ewen, the consumption that occurs under industrial capitalism, although 
offering ‘gratification and excitement’62, once again just acts as consolation for the 
monotony of modern systems of production, while ensuring people become socially and
59 Barthes 1993, p. 140
60 Debord 1997, S.35, p.26
61 Debord 1997, S.42, p.29
62 Ewen 1976, p .189
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politically passive63. Personal identity is not determined by work but by possession of 
goods, whose meaning is manufactured and created by ‘commercial propaganda’ 
according to market imperatives64. For Ewen, this ‘diverts attention’ away from 
attempts to achieve better work conditions. Ewen’s subsequent book, All Consuming 
Images (1988), ostensibly an analysis of style, does not deviate substantively from his 
earlier thesis. Ewen focuses more on how in conjunction with their social networks 
individuals shape and give expression to their identity through their consumption 
practices, and in this he does attem pt to allow, to some extent, for later more considered 
accounts of consumption. But identity here is still delimited by the mass media insofar as 
people’s understanding ‘of style was linked to consumption, and to the power of the mass 
media to convey, magnify, refract, and influence popular notion of style’65.
Ewen’s argum ent as a whole envisages commodification as an abomination, as stripping 
the meaning from other, more intrinsically hum an relationships. For Ewen, 
consumption ultimately can only be seen as waste, and in fact he does discuss the 
consequences of consumption in terms of the impact of physical waste on the 
environm ent, but this is only a by-product of his main attack on consumption. 
Theoretically Ewen offers no advance on the culture industry thesis, and does not 
attem pt to address the criticisms raised against it. Effectively paraphrasing, he writes
The ability to stylize anything -  toothpaste, clothing, roach spray, dog 
food, violence, other cultures around the world, ideas, and so on -  encourages a 
comprehension of the world that focuses on its easily manipulable surfaces, while 
other meanings vanish to all but the critical eye.66
Consum ption can thus only ever be a facade, the meanings invested in goods masking an
underlying, more honest reality. The consequences of this process are grim, and
increasingly difficult to escape because as
the chasm between surface and reality widens; we experience a growing 
sense of disorientation.67
63 As Schudson notes, people come to expect ‘political life to be prefabricated and expect to 
participate in it simply by makine a choice between predetermined alternatives’ (1998, p.258).
64 Ewen 1976, p.109 
63 Ewen 1988, p. 10
66 Ewen 1988, p.262
67 Ewen 1988, p.271
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Giddens, Lasch, and Haug: “artificially framed styles of life ... 
a substitute for the genuine development of self”
Giddens and Lasch are noted for offering similar views: consumption is again a
‘compensatory bribe’ which merely relieves the exploitation of capitalism, that has so
alienated people from their labour68 it has resulted in the complete distortion and the
decline o f‘authentic’ society69. For as Giddens states:
The project of the self becomes translated into one of the possession of 
desired goods and the pursuit of artificially framed styles of life ... The 
consumption of ever-novel goods becomes in some part a substitute for the 
genuine development of self. 70
Gabriel and Lang point out how Lasch similarly represents consumers as ‘dupes’, and 
Schudson too notes his argument that consumption ‘merely reinforces the discontents for 
which it promises consolations’71. Lasch, Schudson writes, views consumption as an 
‘opiate’ for consumers who are ‘perpetually unsatisfied, restless, anxious, and bored’72. 
Consumption becomes ‘a compulsion, an addiction, a sickness linked intrinsically to 
consumer capitalism’73. Advertising distorts desires in a manner that results in 
‘unappeasable appetites’74, and consumer culture only offers an endless, perpetual cycle 
of dissatisfaction that fails to fulfil, while warping other, more intrinsically ‘real’ human 
needs. Meanwhile, as with the many other critical accounts, for Lasch consumer culture 
only results in a developing political passivity, with consumption becoming a facile 
‘alternative to protest or rebellion’75, serving to sustain capitalist excess and inequality. 
For Lasch more ‘authentic’ human needs can never be fulfilled by goods - these merely 
take on false, quasi-reified meanings. As Schudson outlines, the only meaning goods can
68 Slater (1997, pp.92-4, p. 107) and Fowles (1996, pp.62-3) both note the similarities between Giddens 
and Lasch. See also Schudson (1998), Fowles (1996), Gabriel and Lang (2006), Corrigan 1997, p.l.
69 Slater 1997, p.71
70 Giddens cited in Slater 1997, p.87. In a recent interview Giddens reiterated this view of consumers 
as manipulated; ‘Anyone who starts from an idea of hegemony, or from Foucault’s governance, still 
has that kind of idea. There is the claim to know that, behind what people are thinking, is a symbolic 
system which is robbing them of some aspects of their subjectivity and will. Perhaps in media and 
cultural studies there’s more stress on the interactive, but theoretically I would have thought that 
anyone influenced by Foucault or Gramsci is still fairly deeply into that kind of thing. There’s a kind 
of traditional Leftism associated with it in which you somehow want to hold a view that people are 
manipulated so that you can rescue them from the manipulations of the wider culture or of the 
economy and capitalism’ (Giddens 2003, pp.391-2, pp.397-8).
71 Gabriel and Lang 2006, p.91, p. 109
72 Lasch cited in Schudson 1998, p.254
73 Schudson 1998, p.254. Slater similarly states that Lasch views of consumption as a ‘pathology’, 
where capitalism only ‘reduces individuals to interchangable objects that relate to each other as pure 
objects (things that can potentially gratify the needs of the self (Slater 1997, p.94).
74 Lasch cited in Fowles, 1996, p.62 
7j Schudson 1998, p.261
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safely and legitimately contain in Lasch’s vision are those stripped of ascribed human 
meaning and given value for the functional, utilitarian, ‘puritan’ purposes they obtain76: 
‘The concept of needs’, Schudson states, ‘here seems to be very limited’77. This 
imposition of what can be viewed as acceptable types of consumption ‘is suspicious of the 
aesthetic dimension of human experience and has no place for someone who takes 
pleasure in the feel or look of a consumer good’78. Yet Lasch validates his position, 
privileging hand crafted products over the mass produced, indifferent or unaware of 
Veblen’s sharp critique re this79, instead arguing that hand crafted products deliver 
improved individual psychological development, helping, as Schudson puts it, to ‘bridge 
the gap between the individual’s inner self and the social world’80. Refuting Lasch’s 
position on hand crafted products, Schudson refers to the change in housewives’ labour 
do labour saving devices, he asks, represent ‘progress and liberation? Or must we 
conclude this represents the underspiritualization of food and clothing? ’81
Other theorists offering variations on the Frankfurt School attacks on consumption 
include Haug82 and Baudrillard83. But the monochromatic schematics of these accounts 
dull with continual repetition. Schudson’s response to Lasch is nevertheless just one of 
many more recent approaches stressing the acute limitations of this generic brand of
76 Schudson writes that Lasch only has a ‘utilitarian valuation of goods. Goods should serve practical 
human needs (or human social relationships, in Lasch’s view). They should be valued for their 
capacity to fulfil human needs but they should not be ends of desire in themselves. The concept of 
needs here seems to be very limited’ (Schudson 1998, p.254).
77 Schudson 1998, p.254
78 Schudson 1998, p.254 
79Veblen 1970, pp.94-5
80 Schudson 1998, p.254
81 Schudson 1998, p.255
82 Haug believes products are now consciously manufactured and marketed to take maximum value of 
the ‘reified’ aesthetic. He writes: ‘The people, as in monopoly capitalist society, are faced with a 
commodity world of attractive and seductive illusion and here, despite the outrageous deception, 
something very strange occurs, the dynamics of which arc greatly underestimated. An innumerable 
series of images are forced upon the individual, like mirrors, seemingly empathetic and totally 
credible, which bring their secrets to the surface and display them there. In these images, people are 
continually shown the unfulfilled aspects of their existence. The illusion ingratiates itself, promising 
satisfaction: it reads desires in one’s eyes, and brings them to the surface of the commodity. While the 
illusion with which commodities present themselves to the gaze gives the people a sense of 
meaningfulness, it provides them with a language to interpret their existence and the world. Any 
other world, different from that provided by the commodities, is almost no longer accessible to them’ 
(Haug 1994, p.69).
83 Slater argues that Barthes and Baudrillard both view consumption as motivated primarily according 
to how status is signified by goods. They ‘generalize this to all classes and translate it into semiotic 
terms. Baudrillard takes this furthest, to the point of arguing that we no longer consume things but 
only signs. As in Veblen and Barthes, the putative function or utility of a consumer good is unmasked 
as merely a rationalization, an “alibi”: the good is really valuable because it marks a social position. 
Even its economic value or price is important only as a signifier’ (1997, p.158).
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criticism proffering an extraordinary vision of the power of the ‘system’, coupled with a 
tacit, or not so tacit humanism, an implicit, or not so implicit conception of some kind of 
counterfactual authenticity, a Truth underlying that imposed by ideology. For as 
Kellner writes, there is clearly
a latent Manichaeism and puritanism in this perspective. Commodities 
and consumption are negatively presented, simply as means of class domination, 
and the model also assumes a magical, diabolical power on the part of capital to 
create unreal false needs which it is then able to manipulate in its own interest.84
Mauss: “consumption as a system of reciprocity in which the honour of 
giver and recipient are engaged”
The growing acknowledgement of these problems arose in the context of a theoretical 
revisioning of consumption via a number of disparate intellectual skeins which came 
together towards the middle of last century which, over time, began to take into account 
the rich degree of human complexity and creativity involved in consumption practices. 
One of the first of these accounts was not directed at reappraising the worth of 
consumption within modern capitalist societies per se. Mauss’s The Gift, first published 
in 1925 (in English in 1954), was concerned with Northwest Coast American Alaskan, 
Melanesian, Polynesian, and Australian Aboriginal communities and their social 
patterns and reciprocal connections involving elaborate consumption rituals and 
exchanges of ‘gifts’, the selection of which was determined according to the subtle 
gradations and degrees of value those gifts were deemed to represent. As the 
anthropologist Mary Douglas describes in her 1990 introduction to Mauss’s book, Mauss 
portrayed these forms of gift giving as ‘part of a system of reciprocity in which the 
honour of giver and recipient are engaged. It is a total system in that every item of status 
or of spiritual or material possession is implicated for everyone in the whole 
community’85. For Mauss, these gift giving regimes involved sophisticated and complex 
understandings of honour, etiquette and obligation, incorporating rules operating with 
varying degrees of ‘informal’ social cognisance86. There were valid systems of meaning 
associated with consumption which called into question assumptions of the primitive 
character of these ‘so-called primitive societies’87. Although these systems involved,
84 Kellner 1989, pp. 158-9
85 Douglas 1990, p.viii
86 In Alaska for instance, ‘the juridical and economic concepts possess less clarity and less conscious 
precision. However, in practice, the principals are positive and sufficiently clear-cut’ (Mauss 1990, 
p.35).
87 Mauss 1990, p.3
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albeit not exclusively, ‘Competition, rivalry, ostentatiousness, the seeking after the 
grandiose, and the simulation of interest’88, they also featured social rules and norms 
disproving notions of the isolated individual, who, using a rationality which inheres 
solely within themselves, coldly calculates and maximises their utility. So while 
resonating with aspects of Veblen’s arguments, in Mauss’s conceptual schema 
consumption was theoretically transformed. It became a possible expression of human 
sociability, a means of bonding and joining, a legitimate way of maintaining social 
relations, and, most importantly, a valid and civil way of expressing care and concern. 
As Slater writes, for Mauss,
goods are consumed and exchanged as part of the construction of social 
bonds and moral obligations. The flow of goods maps out along the ley lines of 
social relationships and simultaneously reproduces and represents those 
relationships.89
The Gift (1990) became a classic anthropological text, although in subsequent years the 
nuances of Mauss’s representation of consumption as a legitimate expression of human 
sociability was marginalised by the emphatic negativity toward consumption that was 
compounded by the theoretical repute (and echolalia) of each successive critic. I 
mentioned above that this was ameliorated somewhat with Barthes. Earlier I discussed 
Barthes’s Mythologies (1957) as an illustration of one of these hostile accounts resonant 
with overtones of the influence of Veblen, Marx and the Frankfurt School. Barthes’s 
thinking subsequently went through various transmutations, yet even prior to this point, 
the lyricism of his prose and engaging semiotic analysis of the social meaning he saw 
accruing to goods had enabled and provoked further intellectual consideration, as 
opposed to a dismissal, of consumption across a range of disciplinary arenas. Moreover, 
while the overall thrust of Barthes’s early account was antipathetic, Barthes’s semiotics, 
as Hebdige put it in his Subculture: the Meaning of Style (1998),
promised nothing less than the reconciliation of the two conflicting 
definitions of culture upon which cultural studies was so ambiguously posited - a 
marriage of moral conviction (in this case, Barthes’ Marxist beliefs) and popular 
themes: the study of a societies total way of life.90
88 Mauss 1990, p.28
89 Slater 1997, p. 149
90 Hebdige 1998, p.10
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The Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies and 
structuralist Marxism
Hebdige suggests Barthes’ early, decisive influence within cultural studies91. But the 
trends which Hebdige refers to were also nested within other debates in the British social 
sciences. I have already discussed how early/mid-twentieth century orthodox British 
Marxism’s promotion of economic determinism and denegation of agency influenced 
Raymond Williams’s implicit humanism. In giving pre-eminence to the directing role of 
the economic base, traditional British Marxism also dismissed the importance of theory 
in effecting change. This brand of Marxism had developed through the Second 
International, and was rejected also by a range of European theorists including Lukäcs 
and the Frankfurt School. Yet as Hall notes in his formative essay ‘Cultural Studies: two 
paradigms’, much of that work was not available in Britain when Williams first started 
writing92. But following the English translation of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts in 1959, William’s own work ‘drew theoretical sustenance’ from Marx’s early, 
more humanist ideas93.
The Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies developed steeped in 
Williams’s ‘left-culturalism’. Yet despite these early humanist inclinations, Peck notes 
that from the late 1960s structuralism came to be perceived as capable of providing 
solutions to the problems connected to the reflection theory of culture94. Easthope relates 
how in engaging with structuralist thought the Birmingham School’s principal focus still 
centred around ‘the way economic forces were mediated on the terrain of culture’95, and 
in this, the concordance with the Marxist themes running through Barthes’ work, to 
which Hebdige refers, is clear. But Peck also writes of how under Stuart Hall’s 
directorship (from 196996) structuralist accounts were diffused through Saussure, Levi- 
Strauss and Althusser, to the extent that structuralism achieved a ‘paradigmatic status’97.
91 See also Peck 2001, p.206, and Olsen 1990, pp. 163-205
92 Hall 1980, p.23
93 Peck 2001, p.207
94 Hall 1980. Peck 2001, p.206-11
95 Easthope 1991, p.71. Although Peck has written of how the Marxist historian E.P. Thompson, in a 
review of William’s book, The Long Revolution (1961), accuses Williams of collapsing culture into society 
while excising the impact of economic and political forces from the cultural terrain (Peck 2001, p.201)
96 Although Hall was closely involved with the centre from its inception.
97 Peck 2001, p.208. Peck notes how Hall, in his 1980 article “Cultural studies: two paradigms”, ‘sides 
with structuralism’s view of “experience” as an effect of structure, favors its notion of “the necessary 
complexity of the unity of a structure” over culturalism’s “complex simplicity of an expressive 
causality” and grants it methodological superiority owing to its “concepts with which to cut into the 
complexity of the real’” (2001, p .212). She continues: ‘For Hall, structuralism’s value for building a
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Hall has referred to the influence of many ‘structuralisms’ upon the Centre98, however 
both Peck and Easthope stress that it was the primarily the work of Althusser which the 
‘New Left’ in Britain, from 1958, utilised to resuscitate the role of theory within the 
M arxist tradition:
Although Levi-Strauss had aspired to “a theory of the superstructures” 
and Barthes had turned the lens of semiotics on ideology, it was Althusser who 
would tie the knot of Marxism and structuralism within cultural studies.99
Althusser’s structuralist Marxism still conceived of the economic base as determining ‘in
the last instance’, yet the arguments of the New Left also centred on a vigorous defence
of the cultural superstructure as having a degree of ‘relative autonom y’ from the
economic base100. Yet even here, due to the temporal differentiation and distanciation
of these structures “the lonely hour of the ‘last instance’ never comes” 101. It was this
account which seemed to bypass the base /  superstructure problem of reflection and the
economic determinism of orthodox British Marxism; while still rejecting humanism,
Althusser’s structuralist Marxism also offered, as Easthope outlines, the conclusion that
theory m attered after all102.
The introduction of Althusserian ideas in Britain was not straightforward. The ensuing 
debates were intense, but also enormously generative. From 1964 through the New Left 
Review (established in I960103), then the multidisciplinary influence of the film journal 
Screen (from 1971104), Althusser was utilised to argue everyday cultural products could 
regarded as ‘texts’ that could be scientifically ‘read’ as a study of how various ‘audiences’ 
were constructed. In formulating this position Althusser had drawn on Lacanian
“non-reductionist” cultural theory was its method for “studying the systems of signs and ... 
representations”; its “emphasis on the specificity, the irreducibility, of the cultural” and its break with 
“theoretical humanism”’ (2001, pp.212-13).
98 See, for instance, ‘Cultural studies: two paradigms’ (Hall 1980), and ‘The rediscovery of “ideology”: 
return of the repressed in media studies’ (Hall 1982).
99 Peck 2001, p.213
100 Easthope 1991, p.10, pp. 16-22, and pp.38-42. Peck also disccusses how the ‘social totality’ for 
Althusser consists of the “‘economic infrastructure, the politico-juridical superstructure, and the 
ideological superstructure” . . . each level possessed a degree of autonomy and efficacy, it was also 
determined by the totality of practices of all three instances . . .  A social formation was not, however, 
simply “an equality of interaction between all instances” (Dew, 113), but “a structure articulated in 
dominance” (Althusser, For Marx, 202)’ (Peck 2001, p.214).
101 Althusser cited in Easthope 1991, p. 17
102 Easthope 1991, p.10. See also During’s interesting article ‘Socialist ends: the British New Left, 
cultural studies and the emergence of academic ‘theory’” on the call for a need for theory within the 
British academic sphere.
103 With Stuart Hall as editor, then Perry Anderson from 1962.
104 Easthope 1991, p.34
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psychoanalysis to conceptualise ideology as constituting or ‘interpellating’ the subject105, 
texts operating to shape their reader’s identities in a particular way, while simultaneously 
giving them a false sense of autonomy, so in this
they misrecognise themselves as free individuals, [the texts] returning to 
them an apparently coherent and full identity.106
Judith Williamson’s Decoding Advertisements
Peck notes that ‘Hall has insisted that Althusserianism in its “fully orthodox form ... 
never really existed for the Centre’”, but she also records Hall’s acknowledgement of its 
‘formative intervention’107. Judith Williamson, who was associated with the Centre, is 
one of those who made exemplary use of Althusser. In the conceptual panorama offered 
by her Decoding Advertisements (1978), Easthope explains,
T he advertisement acts to anneal the gap it has opened up -  between the 
perfect self and you -  by inviting the viewer to merge with the image in the 
represented mirror ... 108
Despite the Althusserian inspired use of Lacanian psychoanalysis (and the reference to 
Lacan’s so-called ‘mirror phase’), the similarity to the accounts discussed earlier is 
evident. Unsurprisingly, because as Easthope notes, for Lacan, desire
is socially and historically discovered ... under the system of commodity 
production ... “needs are reduced to exchange values” ... and objects of desire 
provided for the subject in the form of capitalist consumption.109
Williamson by extension argues advertisements speak to a ‘real need ... falsely fulfilled’, 
this being predicated on a system o f ‘perpetual unfulfillment'110. Advertisements act 
primarily yet again to
obscure and avoid the real issues of society, those relating to work: to 
jobs and wages and who works for whom. They create systems of social 
differentiation which are a veneer on the basic class structure of our society.* 111
105As Easthope describes ‘Social construction is internalised through a process of interpellation or 
hailing, exemplified when someone calls out “Hey, you there!” and the individual addressed turns 
round recognising that it really is him or her who is meant by the hailing. Through this process 
subjects are pulled into a position, a social identity they thus support’ (Easthope 1991, p.40).
106 Easthope 1991, p.41
107 Peck 2001, p.220
108 Easthope 1991, p.73
109 Easthope 1991, p.21. Citation is from Lacan’s Edits: a selection (1977, p.252)
110 Williamson 1978, p.9
111 Williamson 1978, p.47. Subsequently, in Consuming Passions ([1980] 1987), arguing for the 
continuing vital importance of the influence of the economic sphere, she writes, ‘Of course, the great 
irony is that it is precisely the illusion of autonomy which makes consumerism such an effective 
diversion from the lack of other kinds of power in people’s lives. At a time when such power in the
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Althusser’s account did enable the value of theory to be reconstituted in Britain, but as
this usage suggests, questions of agency and change remained problematic, because
within the Althusserian conceptual schema, Peck points out
meaning (more accurately, signification) was seen as arising not from 
subjective experience, but from within the operation of objective signifying 
systems that preceded and determined individual experience112.
Ideology was again conceived of, Easthope notes, as generating and
producing submissive subjects, subjects who submit precisely in 
misrecognising their subordination as freedom.113
Although Williamson remained optimistic, believing that advertising could be ‘decoded’
and its pernicious influence ‘reversed’114 (with the aid of judicious theoretical analysis),
others began to raise points of concern regarding the extent to which questions of agency
were occluded within the Althusserian problematic. Both Peck and Easthope relate how
it was argued readers of a text were not simply blank slates (upon whom the text was
inscribed115): neither could any implicit positing of a truth underlying ideology (which
the theorist somehow standing ‘apart from the structure’ could determine116) be sensibly
sustained.
Althusser’s ideas were vitally important in generating positions and questions that 
facilitated the development of post-structuralism in Britain, although Peck and Easthope 
both also note how this was complicated by the British intellectual milieu. Yet even 
though ideology was still viewed as a central concept, it was at this time that many 
cultural studies theorists attached to the Birmingham Centre began to argue that the 
disparagement of popular culture and attacks on mass consumption was elitist. It was 
seen, Micheal Schudson relates, that ‘the attack on mass-produced goods is often a thinly 
veiled attack on the masses themselves’117. In 1979, at the Oxford History Workshop, 
Stuart Hall felt moved enough to offer similar sentiments. In ‘Notes on deconstructing
political and economic spheres seems very distant, the realm of the “superstructure” is, for consumers 
and Marxists alike, a much more fun place to be’ (1987, p.233).
112 Peck 2001, p.203
113 Easthope 1991, p.42
114 Williamson 1978, p.9
115 Easthope 1991, pp.68-70. Easthope also notes Hirst’s argument in Law and Ideology (1979) that in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis the subject somehow still has the capacity to recognise themselves in the first 
place: “the dual-mirror relation only works if the subject ... who recognises already has the attributes 
of a knowing subject” for recognition “presupposes a point of cognition prior to the recognition” 
(Hirst cited in Easthope 1991, p.40).
116 Peck 2001, p.218
117 Schudson 1998, p.261
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“the popular’”, his contribution to the resultant Workshop publication, Hall declared 
that although mass consumption /  culture is
quite rightly associated with the manipulation and debasement of the 
people ... if the forms and relationships, on which participation in this sort of 
commercially provided ‘culture’ depend, are purely manipulative and debased, 
then the people who consume and enjoy them must either be themselves 
debased by these activities or else living in a permanent state of ‘false 
consciousness’. They must be ‘cultural dopes’ who can’t tell that what they are 
being fed is an up-dated form of the opium of the people. That judgement may 
make us feel right, decent and self-satisfied about our denunciations of the agents 
of mass manipulation and deception - the capitalist cultural industries: but I 
don’t know that it is a view which can survive for long as an adequate account of 
cultural relationships; and even less as a socialist perspective on the culture and 
nature of the working class. Ultimately, the notion of the people as a purely 
passive, outline force is a deeply unsocialist perspective.118
Hall's Gramsci qua Althusser
Hall was in a curious position in advocating this new perspective: he was effectively 
attempting to theorise agency while at the same ratifying structuralism over 
culturalism119. Although seemingly incompatible, Hall and others affiliated with the 
Birmingham Centre had come to believe they could reconcile these disparate accounts 
by using Gramsci’s ideas to represent relations between the bourgeoisie and the ruling 
class as negotiated (via ideological struggle). This shift was indicated in Hall’s ‘Notes on 
deconstructing “the popular’” 120 article, and laid out in various other programmatic 
statements, such as ‘The rediscovery of “ideology”: return of the repressed in media 
studies’121, ‘Encoding /  decoding’122, and as Janice Peck records, most definitively in 
Hall’s seminal 1980 article, ‘Cultural studies: two paradigms’123.
How meaning was negotiated was the key element in this new conflation. Facilitated 
also by Barthes’s foray into post-structuralism signalled by his 1967 ‘The Death of the 
Author’ essay and S/2j (19 7 4)124, Hall’s ‘Encoding /  Decoding’ forms a departure here: 
readers of cultural ‘texts’ are no longer simply inscribed (or ‘interpellated’). For Hall,
118 Hall 1981, pp.231-2
119 Easthope notes how at this same conference Hall criticised Thompson’s Poverty of Theory for its 
attack on Althusser (Easthope 1991, p. 104).
120 Hall 1981
121 Hall 1982
122 Hall [1980J 2000
123 Peck 2001, p.221
l24)‘... writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin’ (Barthes [1967] 1984, p. 142). 
Barthes [1970] 1974).
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although ‘the discursive form of the message has a privileged position’125 and 
‘inscription’ is still possible, so too are negotiated and oppositional readings. In texts such as 
‘The rediscovery of “ideology”: return of the repressed in media studies’ and ‘Cultural 
studies: two paradigms’, Hall then connects this new acceptance of different 
interpretations to a political struggle over meaning via Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, with 
hegemony used to account for working class consent to unequal power relations. Here 
consent is seen as obtained not through force, but through accommodation and co­
option of commonsensical working class values, with the working class thus persuaded it 
is in their interest not to challenge or alter the status-quo126. And with this, Peck writes, 
ideology came to be perceived as a struggle over meaning: ‘an activity of social subjects 
engaged in ideological struggle’127.
Hebdige: subcu ltu re , autonom y, resistance
Concerned with theorising popular cultural resistance and change, in 1979 Dick 
Hebdige’s engaging Subculture: the Meaning of Style neatly punctuates this changing 
approach. But Hebdige’s account is also important in so far as it became one of the 
better known more positive revisionings of consumption practices since Mauss. Utilising 
Barthes’s Mythologies (1993), Hebdige argued that modes of consumption could be 
regarded symbolically, and in this, like Barthes, he also drew on anthropological 
perspectives, in particular Claude Levi-Strauss’s concept of bricolage. The ‘bricoleur’, 
Levi-Strauss wrote in T e  Savage Mind (1966),
‘speaks’ not only with things ... but also through the medium of things: 
giving an account of his personality and life by the choices he makes between the 
limited possibilities. The ‘bricoleur’ may not ever complete his purpose but he 
always puts something of himself into it128
Translating the concept of bricolage to the subcultural groups he analysed, Hebdige 
argued that through heterodox consumption practices these groups transformed the
125 Hall 2000, p.124
126 In his introduction to Popular Culture and Social Relations (1986) Tony Bennett also outlines this 
development, and depicts Gramsci as enabling an escape from the structuralist /  culturalist ‘impasse’: 
‘... Gramsci argues that the bourgoisie can become a hegemonic, leading class only to the degree that 
bourgeois ideology is able to accommodate, to find some space for opposing class cultures and values. 
A bourgeois hegemony is secured not via the obliteration of working class culture, but via its articulation 
to bourgeois culture and ideology so that, in being associated with and expressed in the forms of the 
latter, its political affiliations are altered in the process’ (Bennett 1986a, pp.xiv-xv. Cited also in 
Easthope 1991, p.75). As Peck details, ‘Just as “theoretical practice” was the Althusserian key to 
unmasking ideologies, Gramsci seemed to imply that radical intellectuals could denaturalize 
“common sense” through the application of “systematic thought”’ (Peck 2001, p.220).
127 Peck 2001, p.222
128 Levi-Strauss 1966, p.21
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dominant definitions of meanings attached to goods, subverting and replacing those 
meanings with their own, in a manner resonating of “semiotic guerilla warfare”129. 'This 
signalled a ‘self-imposed exile’ from and resistance to dominant societal norms130. And 
in portraying the subordinate subcultural groups he studied as effectively ‘refusing’ 
dominant societal definitions of value (which included what Barthes had referred to as 
‘intentional’ values transmitted by advertising), Hebdige located agency as evident in a 
political opposition to the dominant structures of capitalism. In contrast to previously 
dominant functionalist accounts which viewed society as a well ordered consensus 
(marred only by relatively small groups of disturbed and aberrant deviants), Hebdige 
vindicated subcultural modes of consumption, positioning them as acceptable, even 
commendable. Yet although he was careful to depict subcultural groups as embedded, 
and their identities constituted, Hebdige’s argument could also be read as containing an 
uneasy tension; the view of subcultural expressions of identity as legitimate also intimates 
an authenticity that arising ‘organically’ within those groups131.
Apprehending agency
Both Hebdige and Hall were attempting to locate resistance to dominant ideological 
norms while theorising a stronger account of agency: Hall and Jefferson’s edited 
Resistance through Rituals (1975) (which Hebdige contributed to), and Hebdige’s Subcultures 
(1998 11979]) were both exemplary in contributing to the development of a new focus on 
the resistant, often ‘ungovernable’ and transgressive character of usually working class 
subcultural groups132. Yet while agency exists in Hebdige’s Subculture (1998), it exists only 
insofar as it reveals itself as resistance. In his introduction to the second edition of Folk Devils 
and Moral Panics (1980) Stanley Cohen raises this focus on resistance as a serious 
shortcoming in relation to the accounts of both Hebdige and Hall specifically, as well as 
the outlook of British cultural studies more broadly. I will return to this point shortly.
I note here that Hall has positioned his attempt to navigate between culturalism and 
structuralism via Gramsci as successful insofar as ‘some of the best concrete work has
129 Eco cited in Hebdige 1998, p.105
130 Hebdige 1998, p.2
131 In ‘Cultural studies and its theoretical legacies’ Hall discusses how one of the aims of cultural 
studies was to produce ‘organic’ intellectuals, and while what this comprised was unclear Hall also 
admits that ‘we were prepared to imagine or model or stimulate such a relationship in its absence’ 
(Hall 1996c, p.267).
132 Hall discusses how Resistance through Rituals (1975) became ‘quite influential’ in ‘For Allon White: 
metaphors of transformation’ (1996d, p.294)
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flowed from the efforts to set one or other of these paradigms to work on particular 
problems and materials’133. While he acknowledges the inadequacy of both culturalism 
and structuralism alone, as well as the problems associated with drawing on both 
simultaneously134, Hall has labelled it crudely reductionist, an unproductive ‘prison- 
house of thought’ to ‘over-polarise’ these positions, or to challenge the possibility of a 
segue between them:
the arguments and debates have most frequently been over-polarized 
into their extremes. At these extremities, they frequently appear only as mirror- 
reflections or inversions of one another. Here the broad typologies we have been 
working with - for the sake of convenient exposition - become the prison-house 
of thought.135
Hall’s oeuvre has been extraordinarily productive, but no matter how many careful 
nuances and ‘convenient expositions’ he appeals to, structuralism and culturalism are 
incompatible.
What is particularly questionable in Hall’s structuralist /  culturalist, and later 
poststructuralist confection is his attempt to theorise agency. And in his contribution to 
Questions of Cultural Identity (1996) Hall does, if implicitly, suggest the partial character of 
his own account. In the course of a discussion about the different stages in Foucault’s 
engagement with subjects and subjectivity, Hall discusses how late in his career Foucault 
came to realise that he could not maintain an account of how subjects are governed 
without a corresponding account of how subjects choose and shape their subjectivity, 
that is, how and why they occupy one subject position rather than another:
through a series of conceptual shifts at different stages in his work, 
[Foucault realised] that since the decentring of the subject is not the destruction 
of the subject, and since the ‘centring’ of discursive practice cannot work without 
the constitution of subjects, the theoretical work cannot be fully accomplished 
without complementing the account of the discursive and disciplinary regulation 
with an account of the practices of subjective self-constitution.136
Hall argues Foucault never resolved this issue, and while he suggests Butler’s Gender
Trouble (1990) and Bodies that Matter (1993) with her synthesis of Foucault and
psychoanalysis offers a possible solution137, overall he positions the issue as remaining
133 Hall 1980, p.30
134 ‘Without suggesting there can be any easy synthesis between them, it might usefully be said at this 
point that neither ‘culturalism’ nor ‘structuralism’ is, in its present manifestation, adequate to the task 
of constructing the study of culture as a conceptually clarified and theoretically informed domain of 
study’ (Hall 1980, p.30).
135 Hall 1980, p.30
136 Hall 1996b, p. 13
137 Hall 1996b, p.14-6
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‘tangled and unconcluded’138. In itself, this statement is revealing - Hall is effectively 
owning his own inability, even via Gramsci, to theorise a choosing, constitutive subject: 
the issue remains ‘tangled and unconcluded’139.
W hat implications does this have for Hall’s arguments overall? W hat happens when a 
theorist promotes a model of both structure and agency without any means of cogently 
theorising the latter? Inevitably they make arbitrary decisions, value judgements about where and how 
agency is instantiated, ‘reading’ and ‘decoding’ the motivations and views of their target subcultural 
groups. Cohen positions this need to interpret an underlying resistance to capitalism, and 
/o r  protest about the decline of community /  tradition as a feature of British cultural 
studies more generally:
Above all else, the new theories about British post war youth cultures are 
massive exercises of decoding, reading, deciphering and interrogating.140
Cohen also notes how often Hebdige presents subcultural resistance taking place ‘at a
level beneath the consciousness of the individual m em bers’141.
Easthope observes similar themes in relation to how cultural studies was taught in the 
widely attended Open University cultural studies course on “Popular Culture”, run 
collaboratively by Hall, Bennett, Williams and Eagleton between 1982-87142. He traces 
how the course claimed to enable participants to appreciate and critically interpret 
popular culture, with its central theoretical paradigms formulated through the usual 
synthesis of Althusser’s notion of interpellation and Cram sci’s concept of hegemony. In 
this the course was represented as ‘post-structuralist’, with popular culture theorised
both as active and passive, both an expression of the creative impulses of 
people and a consumption over which the broad mass of people have little 
control ... 143
138 Hall 1996b, p. 16
139 Hall 1996b, p. 16. In ‘Cultural Studies and its theoretical legacies’ Hall writes of how Gramsci 
addressed certain question but did not resolve them (Hall 1996c, pp.266-67).
140 Cohen 1980, p.ix
141 Cohen 1980, p.xiv
142 According to Easthope this course had student numbers of over 5000 ‘More than graduated in that 
period from all the other media and cultural studies courses in the country . . .  [it also provided] a re­
education for several hundred teachers besides an uncounted number of the general public who 
eavesdropped on its television transmissions (Easthope 1991, p.73).
143 Here ‘the ruling bloc rules by winning consent rather than using force, admitting dissent so long as 
it is expressed on the grounds of consensus defined according to the interests of the ruling bloc’ 
(Easthope 1991, p.74).
196
The identity debates (part one): changing the subject
While gesturing to post-structuralism via Hall’s new emphasis on the decentred subject144, 
and the recognition of ‘subjects of desire’, the course’s version of post-structuralism was 
also distinguished from structuralism due to its ‘dynam ic’ character:
Although it would object to the notion of the hum an subject as 
transcendent (that is, existing outside the structure and operating it), post­
structuralism marks itself off from its classical forerunner by its dynamic rather 
than static character. M ore precisely, it does not just see the subject as existing 
within the structure and dependent on it, but rather sees the subject as produced 
by the structure, the play of signifiers.145
In the course anthologies Hall’s belief in the didactic function of cultural studies also 
becomes apparent: ‘organic’ cultural studies intellectuals can deliver positive political 
interventions by contributing to the struggle over m eaning146.
Yet in this contribution to the ‘struggle over m eaning’, Easthope also argues that the 
various course anthologies privileged, even attem pted to fix determinate readings of 
various cultural ‘texts’, while on a theoretical level at the same time drew the notion of 
fixed readings into question:
Texts come to be dematerialised, treated as merely transparent vehicles 
between a historical intention and an historical reading. Contem porary readings 
are privileged as original - and originary (though the capacity of the texts to be 
re-read without final end is demonstrated by the analytic texts themselves, the 
course units and notes, as they advance this reading of those texts, a reading 
from the early 1980s hardly possible for the ‘original’ audience).147
In short, the course promotes a certain vision of ‘the real’148 underlying any
interpretation, one which cultural studies theorists can determine. Once again, the
144 In ‘The Meaning of New Times’ for instance, Hall writes that ‘our models of ‘the subject’ have 
altered. We can no longer conceive of ‘the individual’ in terms of a whole, centred, stable and 
completed Ego or autonomous, rational ‘self. The ‘self is conceptualised as more fragmented and 
incomplete, composed of multiple ‘selves’ or identities in relation to the different social worlds we 
inhabit, something with a history, ‘produced’, in process’ (Hall, S. 1996a, p.226). See also Hall 
1996b.
145 Easthope 1991, p.76
146 See, for instance, Hall’s ‘Cultural Studies and its theoretical legacies’ (1996b, p.268), ‘Cultural 
studies: two paradigms’ (Hall 1980), and ‘The rediscovery of “ideology”: return of the repressed in 
media studies’ (Hall 1982).
147 Easthope 1991, pp.77-8
148 As Hall puts it in ‘Cultural studies: two paradigms’: ‘... to think about or to analyse the complexity 
of the real, the act of practice of thinking is required; and this necessitates the use of the power of 
abstraction and analysis, the formation of concepts with which to cut into the complexity of the real, in order 
precisely to reveal and bring to light relationships and structures which cannot be visible to the naive naked eye ...’ (Hall 
1980, p.31). My italics. Peck too argues ‘Hall requires a “truth” that precedes any particular 
articulation. That truth resides in what he has variously construed as “the real conditions of 
existence,” the “social formation,” “social relations,” “the prevailing system,” “structures,” and “the 
economic,” which he holds to exist independently of symbolic representation or subjective experience’ 
(Peck 2001, p.229).
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notion that agents can step outside the structure and determine Truth. And in this 
Easthope views the course as in fact ‘ultimately’ prescriptive, relegating
popular culture ... to the category of a false consciousness which betrays 
the revolution ...149
I mentioned at the beginning of this thesis my concern lay ultimately with the theoretical 
hegemony of identity and how discussions about consumption have been dominated to 
date by questions of structure and agency. In responding to this thematic I have spent 
the whole chapter trying to demonstrate, ad nauseam, the internal contradictions and 
aporias associated with accounts which do just this. The following chapter also focuses 
on the issue, but from the perspective of theorists other than those associated with the 
Birmingham Centre, who from the 1970s began to promote far more positive ideas 
about consumption while at the same time appearing to suggest some overt or implicit 
notion of agency. And I note that in such accounts, ideas about consumption still 
remain wholly centred around the issue of identity.
149 Easthope 1991, p.80. For support on this Easthope refers to John Thompson’s categorisation of 
the course as being part of a ‘traditional, moralising and puritanical left dismissal of popular culture 
as the opium of the masses, a capitalist con, ignoring the fact that many of the products of popular 
culture are deeply pleasurable’ (Easthope 1991, p.78).
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Neither falsehood nor truth is an attainable epistemic ideal.
(Harre 1986, p. 19, cited in McClosky 1994, p.95).
As a range of theorists attempted to promote stronger accounts of agency in the 1970s, 
ideas about consumption became entangled in structuralist /  poststructuralist, modernist 
and postmodernist debates. Discussions about the character of contemporary change 
and the extent to which it could be considered as representative of a distinctive new 
epoch instantiated through ‘post-fordism’, new technology, the deregulation of markets, 
globalisation, and so on, only added to the complexity and controversy of such debates. 
Questions around identity also played a crucial role, with subjectivity increasingly being 
positioned as dislocated and decentred, identity as fragmented, and identifications 
multiple and shifting. Academic interest in the proliferation of new social movements 
based around a ‘politics of difference’ sharpened.
New accounts of consumption positioned it as a complex and integral aspect of human 
sociability, and an intrinsic part of human identity. This led to subsequent theorists 
analysing particular consumption practices as indicative of some aspect of identity and 
identifications, which shortly after fed into a new focus on the body, pleasure, desire, 
curiosity, novelty, creativity and play1. Authoritative and influential accounts which 
facilitated this new approach included Pierre Bourdieu’s Distinction (1979), anthropologist 
Mary Douglas, and economist, Baron Isherwood’s The World of Goods: Towards an 
Anthropology of Consumption (1979), Michel de Certeau’s The Practice of Eveiyday Life (1988), 
and John Fiske’s Understanding Popular Culture (1989) and Reading the Popular (1989). I
1 Crocker and Linden (1998), Gabriel and Lang (2006), Anderson (1995), Featherstone (1991)
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consider the arguments of these five theorists in this chapter, for with Hebdige and 
others associated with the Birmingham Centre, they played a pre-eminent role in 
ensuring questions around consumption remained centred on identity and agency.
The W orld o f  Goods: Goods are “arranged in vistas and hierarchies that can 
give play to the full range of discrimination of which the human 
mind is capable”
Published in 1979, the same year as Hebdige’s Subculture, Mary Douglas and Baron 
Isherwood’s The World of Goods: Towards an Anthropology of Consumption (1996) formed an 
intriguing support to the key aspects of the British cultural studies arguments, despite 
several also crucial differences. Hebdige and Hall focused on reassessing and validating 
the value of subcultural consumption, Douglas and Isherwood sought to validate 
consumption per se. The World of Goods (1996) was an extraordinary departure in this 
respect; it did not attack consumption or represent it as something false or lacking- 
authenticity, as with many accounts derived from or associated with Marxism. In 
contrast, Douglas and Isherwood argued that tastes derived ‘from the social structure’2 
and, as such, goods could be regarded as constituting a legitimate and valid language 
with symbolic significance:
It is standard ethnographic practice to assume that all material 
possessions carry social meanings and to concentrate a main part of cultural 
analysis upon their use as communicators’3.
In this formulation goods, both individually and in combination, carry multiple 
meanings which ‘constitute an intelligible universe’4:
Rituals are conventions that set up visible public definitions ... 
consumption is a ritual process whose primary function is to make sense of the 
inchoate flux of events ... The most general objective of the consumer can only 
be to construct an intelligible universe with the goods he chooses.5
Consumption here is thus presented as an intrinsic part of social solidarity:
What we call consumption rituals are the normal marks of friendship. 
The patterned flow of consumption goods would show a map of social 
integration. The community that involves its members in most social 
commitments would have the most consumption rituals, and at times of crisis 
information and support would flow there more freely. Members of another
2 Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p.xxvii
3 Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p.38. See also Slater 1997, p.150.
4 Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p.ix
5 Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p.43
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kind of community, less engaged in ritual exchanges, would be more vulnerable 
to shocks, economic or other.6
The arguments of Douglas and Isherwood differ to Hebdige’s in part because of their 
different disciplinary orientations. Baron Isherwood was an economist, and Mary 
Douglas was writing from an anthropological Durkheimian structural-functionalist 
tradition. In this Douglas was informed by M auss’s more positive reappraissal of 
consumption in The Gift (1990) and, like Mauss, and Dürkheim before him, Douglas and 
Isherwood also wrote against utility theory and its conception of atomised sovereign, 
rational consumers7. Yet while drawing on ‘traditional’ anthropological research 
concerned with non-W estern cultures, unlike Mauss, Douglas and Isherwood clearly 
directed their analysis toward modern consumer culture, and in depicting modern 
consumption as part and parcel of normal social integration, Veblen’s censorious 
ascription of consumer motivations became another target, with Douglas and Isherwood 
arguing that the ‘intelligible universe’ of meaning expressed via consumer goods 
deserved far more considered analysis than that offered by Veblen (and those influenced 
by him8). Motivations associated with the act of consumption could not be reduced to 
status competition. While not precluding status competition, contra Veblen, they viewed 
consumption as subject to a far wider range of meanings and conceptions of value. 
Goods are
arranged in vistas and hierarchies that can give play to the full range of 
discrimination of which the hum an mind is capable. The vistas are not fixed: nor 
are they randomly arranged in a kaleidoscope. Ultimately, their structures are anchored 
to hum an social purposes.9
Accordingly, where Hebdige and the Birmingham Centre validated popular culture and 
consumption insofar as it could be interpreted as resistant, Douglas and Isherwood 
recognised consumption as an expression of hum an sociality more generally. In this, any 
lingering essentialism and notions of authenticity became obsolete. By extension, neither 
is there any tacit perception of a somehow more wholesome, quasi-functionalist
6 Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p.xxii
7 In the preface to their 1996 edition they wrote that utility theory ‘supposes that wants come out of 
individuals' own private perceptions of their needs, so it is not auspicious for an idea about 
consumption that puts social interaction first’ (Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p.xxv).
8 In the preface to the 1996 edition, Douglas and Isherwood clearly state that ‘Sociologists were all too 
ready to believe that emulation, envy, and striving to do better than the Jones are the intentions which 
fuel consumption’ (Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p.xxi).
9 Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p.44
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conception of a human relationship with goods untainted by consumer capitalism. 
Consumption in itself is not responsible for utility theory, or capitalism per se. As with 
both the Birmingham Centre and Veblen consumption contains meaning that can still 
be ‘read’ and ‘interpreted’, but that meaning is now more directly connected to 
conscious, sometimes semi-conscious intent on the part of the person(s) using the good(s), 
what that good means to them, and their understanding of what that good 
communicates to others:
Goods assembled together in ownership make physical, visible statements 
about the hierarchy of values to which their chooser subscribes.10
These ideas are an extraordinary amalgam, however the language used elides, but also
suggests questions of agency very carefully. The consumer chooses, but from within the
social structure* 11. Yet ‘vistas are not fixed’12. Choice takes places within a social system,
reflects values, and reproduces the social order from specific subject positions, but choice
is somehow not quite ‘fixed’.
The structure /  agency problematic is neither fully addressed nor resolved here. Yet the 
interpretation of human motivations is also more direct, less obscure and speculative 
than that carried out by Hebdige and the Birmingham Centre: there seems greater scope 
for ethnographic research focusing more directly on how consumers perceive, 
understand and use goods in their daily lives. In this, The World of Goods (1996) provides 
an authoritative and influential account of consumption; in a recent obituary for Mary 
Douglas, Daniel Miller noted the ‘impact’ it had on his own interest in meanings 
attached to material culture13. However one notable absence in the text is any 
discussion of class relations. As Michael Schudson notes, here ‘there is no room for 
politics and no standards forjudging the place of goods in society’14. Other questions 
raised but not answered are how, if goods have /  are given meaning(s) and value(s), how 
do those meanings and values come to change? Douglas just follows the Durkheimiam 
tradition in perceiving social judgement as supplying a positive, stabilising, and 
supporting social fabric, and it is this, with its lack of consideration of class relations that 
led Slater in Consumer Culture and Modernity (1997) to argue that Douglas and Isherwood
10 Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p.ix
11 As Slater states, ‘the classification systems that govern the meanings of things reflect the social order 
itself and are central to its reproduction as a moral order’ (Slater 1997, pp.150-1)
12 Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p.44
13 Miller 2007
14 Schudson 1993, p. 161
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simply did not fully take into account the dynamics of how power relations impact on the 
meanings associated with consumer goods, leading them to gloss over the significance of 
power differentials:
as an information flow, public consumption meanings are not the 
prerogative of social networks but are increasingly managed by vested 
commercial interests with public technologies of design, marketing and 
advertising. The desire for ‘cognitive order’ like any other need is increasingly 
merely a means to the end of profit. Integration in this context is a matter of 
socio-economic power as well as of intelligibility ...15
While this disjunction in power throughout society is still a social phenomenon, Slater’s
point is astute.
Bourdieu and “the infinitely varied art of marking distances”15 
Douglas and Isherwood elide any discussion of class, but this was definitely addressed by 
another text published in 1979, French theorist Pierre Bourdieu’s Distinction (2000)17. In 
David Swartz’s lucid introduction to Bourdieu’s work, Culture and Power (1997), Swartz 
refers to Bourdieu as a prolific writer with ‘a substantial corpus of work spanning many 
intellectual disciplines’18. It is through Distinction (2000) that Bourdieu’s thinking has 
particular resonance for this thesis however: the book is relevant not just for its 
celebrated analysis of consumption practices, but also for its subsequent authority. For 
Distinction (2000) Bourdieu carried out extensive surveys and interviews across a number 
of classes about a wide range of consumption practices, interpreting the data to argue 
there is a ‘significant statistical relationship’ between individuals’ dispositions and social 
locations19, with specific class positions, ‘upbringing and education’20, generating 
particular ways of viewing the world, and shaping the skills individuals bring to bear in 
all their interactions and activities. Bourdieu termed these capacities, and concomitant 
outlook habitus. In Consumer Culture and Postmodernism (1991) Mike Featherstone refers to 
habitus as manifest in all of an individual’s practices, interactions with, and use of material 
culture:
By habitus Bourdieu is referring to the unconscious dispositions, the 
classificatory schemes, taken-for granted preferences which are evident in the 
individual's sense of the appropriateness and validity of his taste for cultural
15 Slater 1997, p. 152
16 Proust cited in Bourdieu 2000a, p.66
17 translated into English in 1984
18 See also Robbins (2000, p.viii) on the number and range of Bourdieu’s publications.
19 Bourdieu 2000b, pl50
20 Bourdieu 2000a, p.l
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goods and practices - art, food, holidays, hobbies, etc. It is important to stress 
that habitus not only operates on the level of everyday knowledgeability, but is 
inscribed onto the body, being revealed in body size, volume, shape, posture, 
way of walking, sitting, ways of eating, drinking, amount of social space and time 
an individual feels entitled to claim, degree of esteem for the body, pitch, tone of 
voice, accent, complexity of speech patterns, body gestures, facial expression, 
sense of ease with one's body - these all betray the habitus of one's origins. In 
short the body is the materialization of class taste: class taste is embodied. Each 
group, class and class fraction has a different habitus, hence the set of differences, 
the source of the distinctions and vulgarities of taste, can be mapped onto a 
social field which should in effect form a third grid to be superimposed onto the 
space of lifestyles and class /  occupational capital ... 21
For Bourdieu then, habitus is a key to understanding how goods and practices can be 
positioned in a social hierarchy, as
Social subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves 
by the distinctions they make ...22
It is in the context of their socio-cultural circumstances that individuals internalise and 
reproduce socially structured determinants of value and classification. Patterns of 
behaviour, capacities, awareness of cultural codes and ways of conceptualizing the world 
are transmitted across generations. Specific socio-economic class locations thus play a 
crucial role in informing and shaping habitus, which in turn shapes consumption 
practices.
While Distinction (2000) obviously reflects Bourdieu’s concern with the intergenerational 
impact of socio-economic inequality, in the preface to the English translation, he writes 
that the motivation for his research was actually to critique the Kantian hierarchy of 
taste, and he refers to his
perhaps immoderate ambition of giving a scientific answer to the old 
questions of Kant’s critique of judgment, by seeking in the structure of social 
classes the basis of the systems of classification which structure perception in the 
social world and designate the objects of aesthetic enjoyment.23
I briefly mentioned Bourdieu’s attack on the Kantian aesthetic in chapter two: elite
judgments of value and beauty represent elite taste as universally applicable, while
concealing the class based normative criteria which shapes that elite aesthetic. Yet that
same judgement also gave good taste moral connotations; it is ‘pleasure’, Bourdieu writes
21 Featherstone 1991, p.90
22 Bourdieu 2000a, p.6
23 Bourdieu 2000a, pp.xiii-iv
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purified of pleasure, which is predisposed to become a symbol of moral 
excellence and a measure of the capacity for sublimation which defines the truly 
human man.24
The ‘capacity for sublimation’ is the key here, for with Kant, as Jukka Gronow observes 
in The Sociology of Taste (1997),
the ‘near’ senses, taste and smell, were treated with suspicion because 
they were thought to be capable of serving only lower sensual pleasures, whereas 
hearing and sight, in particular, were held up as the senses capable of mediating 
pure, and therefore more noble, aesthetic pleasures.25
Following Kant elite taste was thus represented as superior and refined; working class
taste coarse, common, declasse, and lacking proper sensibility. As Slater outlines:
Bourgeois cultural consumption is defined in terms of a Kantian 
aesthetic in which the audience calmly and knowledgeably contemplates the art­
work; popular consumption is characterized by emotional and bodily immersion 
in an event.26
In Distinction (2000) Bourdieu dismissed the Kantian aesthetic, labelling it merely a 
pretext which acts as ‘an affirmation of the superiority of those who can be satisfied with 
the sublimated, refined, disinterested’27. Taste, he argued, masks, legitimates, maintains 
and justifies existing socio-economic hierarchies. It does not serve as ‘proof for an 
inherently class-based natural superiority of judgement, or discernment:
The ideology of natural taste owes its plausibility and its efficacy to the 
fact that, like all ideological strategies generated in the everyday class struggle, it 
naturalizes real differences, converting differences in the mode of acquisition of 
culture into differences of nature; it only recognizes as legitimate the relation to 
culture (or language) which at least bears the visible marks of its genesis, which 
has nothing “academic”, “scholastic”, “bookish”, “affected”, or “studied” about 
it, but manifests by its ease and naturalness that true culture is nature - a new 
mystery of immaculate conception.28
Elite taste may present itself as a universally applicable ‘pure aesthetic’, but this ‘pure 
aesthetic’ taste is only possible for those less subject to ‘the necessities of the natural and 
social world’29. In other words, people were only able to indulge in elite cultural 
practices if they had the luxury of income and time in which to do so. So while the elite 
aesthetic forms its own key discourse through which a hierarchy of valuation is sustained, 
elite practices are not in fact ‘consecrated’ activities undertaken by those with special
24 Bourdieu 2000a, p.6
25 Gronow 1997, p.ix
26 Slater 1997, p.57
27 Bourdieu 2000a, p.7
28 Bourdieu 2000a, p.68
29 Bourdieu 2000a, p.5. See also p.54.
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access to a superior aesthetic sensibility. These activities are simply class-based markers 
of social distinction intended to validate and sustain the same socio-economic hierarchy 
that generated and enabled them in the first place:
This affirmation of power over a dominated necessity always implies a 
claim to a legitimate superiority over those who, because they cannot assert the 
same contempt for contingencies in gratuitous luxury and conspicuous 
consumption, remain dominated by ordinary interests and urgencies. The tastes 
of freedom can only assert themselves as such in relation to the tastes of 
necessity, which are thereby brought to the level of the aesthetic and so defined 
as vulgar.30
Bourdieu’s study has the tone of a ‘measured’ and ‘scientific’ analysis, appeared to 
depart from the censorious attacks on consumption discussed in the previous chapter, 
and represented a radical intervention in cultural politics in the context of the period it 
was written. His ruthless delineation of the pretensions of aesthetic elites, placed against 
a seemingly less hostile analysis of subordinate consumption per se was also perceived as 
having a clear affiliation with the new tack taken by the Birmingham Centre, and 
Distinction (2000) was ratified by Raymond Williams and Nick Garnham in a 1980 
article, ‘Pierre Bourdieu and the sociology of culture: an introduction’, where they 
applaud the perspicuity of Bourdieu’s analysis of how elite forms of consumption are 
only available to those with the means to partake in it31.
With its nuanced layers of analysis Distinction (2000) represents a far more considered and 
sophisticated account than any examined thus far. But it has also drawn criticisms. 
Some of these see Bourdieu’s class boundaries as too rigid32, his analysis of consumer 
taste in terms of class alone as an essentialist reductionism33, others argue he reduces 
human motivations solely to ‘interest’34, and yet others argue he imposes his own
30 Bourdieu 2000a, p.56. Moreover, ‘It is no accident that, when one sets about reconstructing its 
logic’, the popular “aesthetic” appears as the negative opposite of the Kantian aesthetic, and that the 
popular ethos implicitly answers each proposition of the “Analytic of the Beautiful” with a thesis 
contradicting it. In order to apprehend what makes the specificity of aesthetic judgment, Kant 
ingeniously distinguished “that which pleases” from “that which gratifies”, and, more generally, strove 
to separate “disinterestedness”, the sole guarantee of the specifically aesthetic quality of 
contemplation, from “the interest of the senses”, which defines “the Good”.’ (2000a, p.41)
31 ‘the post-Kantian aesthetics of “pure” form and “disinterestedness”’, they write ‘are an expression 
of and objectively actually depend upon the relative distance from economic necessity provided by the 
bourgeois possession of economic capital’ (Garnham and Williams 1980, p.217).
32 Bennett, Emmison and Frow 1999, Douglas 1981.
33 Frow 1995, Gronow 1997.
34 In The Sociology of Taste (1997) Gronow argues that Bourdieu reduces human motivations to ‘interest’ 
and the struggles that entails. In Cultural Studies and Cultural Value (1995) John Frow similarly views 
Bourdieu as conflating all motivations to a singular one - that concerned with social hierarchy (1995,
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understanding of consumer motivations35. These issues merit debate, however the two 
substantive criticisms raised here relate principally to concerns raised in previous 
chapters. The first regards Bourdieu’s stance of measured objectivity; the second, the 
degree to which Bourdieu’s use of habitus to attribute agency actually does take agency 
into account.
Wh ere of j u d gem ent ?
In The Sociology of Taste (1997) Jukka Gronow connects Bourdieu to Simmel, Veblen and 
the ‘general theoretical problems associated with this type of approach’36, arguing it is 
Bourdieu’s apprehension over a ‘new’ kind of petite bourgeoisie consumer that directs 
and motivates key features of his account. Gronow cites Bourdieu as stating that the 
new petite bourgeoisie represent ‘perfect consumers whom the economic theory has 
always dreamed o f 37, as this new petite bourgeoisie is anxious to partake in any signifier 
of value, not necessarily due to any desire to emulate, but because of ‘a morality of 
pleasure as duty ... pleasure is not only permitted but demanded, on ethical as much as 
on scientific grounds’38. Gronow interprets Bourdieu as believing that ‘T his new ethic of
pp.45-6). Yet Bourdieu claims various qualifications in this respect. While an important component 
of his argument in Outline of a Theory of Practice (2002 [1972]) is the view that all human relations 
involve power strategies and relations of struggle, beyond ‘the dichotomy of the economic and non­
economic’, in the same text Bourdieu states that practices need to be studied in economic terms:
a general science of the economy of practices, capable of treating all practices, including those 
purporting to be disinterested or gratuitous, and hence non-economic, as economic practices 
directed towards the maximizing of material or symbolic profit ... (2002, p.183)
Despite such ambiguity, reduction to calculations of interest is a charge Bourdieu has consistently 
denied (See for instance Bourdieu and Wacquant 2002, pp. 115-7). For Bourdieu, agents do utilise the 
resources they have access to, and using cultural competencies enabled by their habitus, develop 
strategies to maximise their goals in ‘competitions’ of interest between and within various arenas, or 
‘fields’, ‘within which human agents are engaged in specific struggles to maximize their control over 
the social resources specific to that field’ (Garnham and Williams 1980, p.215). But noting the danger 
o f ‘partial’, ‘fragmentary’ interpretations of Bourdieu’s oeuvre (Swartz 1997, p.3-4), Swartz takes care to 
observe that
By strategy, Bourdieu (1987b: 76, 78, 127) does not mean conscious choice or rational 
calculation ... choices do not derive directly from the objective situations in which they occur or 
from transcending rules, norms, patterns, and constraints that govern social life; rather, they stem 
from practical dispositions that incorporate ambiguities and uncertainties that emerge from acting 
through time and space.' (Swartz 1997, p.100. The text referred to is Choses Dites.)
Bourdieu too writes that ‘habitus, field, and capital can be defined, but only within the theoretical 
system they constitute, not in isolation’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2002, p.96). So in this sense, 
habitus, with all the homologous non-interest based influences and motivations that entails, can be 
interpreted as guiding interest.
35 Campbell 1993
36 Gronow 1997, p.20
37 Bourdieu cited in Gronow 1997, p.22. As Featherstone also writes, this ‘new petite bourgeoisie may 
well be in the process of creating the perfect consumer' (1991, p.91).
38 Bourdieu cited in Gronow 1997, p.22-3
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hedonism is also functional to the economic system’39, because these are ‘consumers 
whose demands are not constrained any more by any traditional moral order’40. This 
new class is ‘outside all formal hierarchies’41, ‘opposed to the old middle class morality of 
duty’42, as well as the ‘repressive morality of the declining petite bourgeoisie’43. So 
despite Bourdieu’s claim to an objective, measured and ‘scientific’ stance, for Gronow it 
is Bourdieu’s bias in relation to this new class that guides his analysis.
To what extent do Gronow charges hold up? O n one hand, while maintaining a focus 
on socio-economic inequality (unlike Douglas and Isherwood), Bourdieu seems to shed 
the negative ascriptions of false value ascribed to consumption associated with earlier 
critiques, and appears to depart from representing the value of particular goods as false. 
Goods for Bourdieu, have no essential value or merits as such44. By extension, 
functionalist conceptualisations of goods - whether expressly stated or counterfactually 
implied - are also misguided. So like Douglas and Isherwood, and like the Birmingham 
Gentre, Bourdieu gestures strongly toward goods as having a rich social meaning:
the consumer helps produce the product he consumes, by a labour of 
identification and decoding ... 45
Yet with this affirmation of the social character of goods, Bourdieu also establishes that 
character as constructed. Now of course this is the case, as Douglas and Isherwood 
recognise also, but Bourdieu’s argum ent has a somewhat different tone and slant. W hat 
Bourdieu does in effect is position his subjects as misrecognising46 the effect that power 
relations have on all their interests and activities; the values they themselves place on the 
practices they undertake do not tell the whole story. In this Bourdieu positions the 
subject’s class position vis-a-vis their comprehension and capacity to grasp and m anage 
various social distinctions as the key issue in analysing consumption practices, even
39 Gronow 1997, p.22
40 Gronow 1997, p.23
41 Gronow 1997, p.24
42 Gronow 1997, p.23
43 Bourdieu cited in Gronow 1997, p.22
44 See Bourdieu 2000a, p.l 1. Garnham and Williams also stress how Bourdieu identifies the fallacy 
behind Kantian ascriptions of value, so fatally undermining ‘all essential theories of cultural 
appropriation (taste) and cultural production (creativity), upon all notions of absolute, universal 
cultural value (1980, p.210)
45 Bourdieu 2000a, p .l00
46 In Culture and Power {1997), Swartz details Bourdieu’s belief that ‘the task of sociology is to unveil this 
hidden dimension of power relations’ (1997, pp.9-10), here the societal ‘misrecognition’ of power 
relations (as opposed to ‘false consciousness’) becomes a problem intellectuals can hope to correct.
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though those distinctions are positioned as effectively arbitrary47 and thus ultimately 
without any real value unless the subject recognises just how such mechanisms of 
distinction serve to maintain, validate and naturalise unequal socio-economic relations 
under capitalism48. Bourdieu himself rectifies a lack in this regard, supplying a text 
which stands above and beyond the class position of all its subjects, a guide to and 
arbiter of class distinctions and valuations, but most importantly, as the panoptic 
deliverer of the Truth about how socio-economic class differentials under capitalism 
shape and construct consumption practices. Consumption, in other words, is ultimately 
reduced to the question of how it instantiates capitalism.
In Bourdieu’s formulation blame is apportioned and directed most strongly against those 
who fail to appreciate the key role strategies of distinction via consumption play in 
maintaining the capitalist status quo. For in addition to undermining the pretensions of 
elite aesthetics Bourdieu’s characterisation of that new class of ‘perfect consumers’, the 
petite bourgeoisie, can be read as utterly derisory:
Guided by their anti-institutional temperament and the concern to 
escape everything redolent of competitions, hierarchies of knowledge, theoretical 
abstractions or technical competences, these new intellectuals are inventing an art of 
living which provides them with the gratifications and prestige of the intellectual at the least cost: 
in the name of the fight against “taboos” and the liquidation of “complexes” they 
adopt the most external and most easily borrowed aspects of the intellectual lifestyle, 
liberated manners, cosmetic or sartorial outrages, emancipated poses and 
postures . . . 49
Yet although this class is superficial and lazy, ultimately this is only due to ‘changes in 
the mode of domination ... substituting seduction for repression’50. It is the ‘seduction’ of 
‘imposed needs’ which has created the petite bourgeoisie modus operandi:
the emergence of the new petite bourgeoisie, which employs new means 
of manipulation to perform its role as an intermediary between the classes and 
which by its very existence brings about a transformation of the position and
47 Swartz 1997, p.86. See also Slater who specifies that in this, meaning is culturally, not socially 
arbitrary (1997, p. 160).
48 Frow cites Rabinow as stating that ‘Fundamentally there are only two types of subjects for 
Bourdieu: those who act in the social world and those who don’t. Those who do, do so on condition 
that fundamentally they are blind to what they are doing, they live in a state of illusio.... The other 
possible subject position is the sociologist who studies those who act, those beings who take their lives 
seriously, those who have “interests”. The scientist, through the application of a rigorous method 
preceded and made possible through the techniques of asceticism applied to the self, frees himself 
from the embodied practices and organized spaces that produce the illusio and sees without illusion 
what everyone else is doing (they are maximizing their symbolic capital, while mistakenly believing 
they are leading meaningful lives’ (cited in Frow 2003, pp.25-6).
49 Bourdieu 2000a, p.370-71. Cited also in Gronow 1997, p.23-4, Featherstone 1991, p.91. My italics.
50 Bourdieu 2000a, pp. 153-4
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dispositions of the old petite bourgeoisie, can itself be understood only in terms of 
changes in the mode of domination, which, substituting seduction for repression, 
public relations for policing, advertising for authority, the velvet glove for the 
iron fist, pursues the symbolic integration of the dominated classes by imposing 
needs rather than inculcating norms.51
While Bourdieu has consistently maintained his stance of objectivity is an ‘artificial’ 
heuristic device that is modified by a considered ‘reflexivity’52, with all Distinction’s tables 
and graphs, when does a pinch of ‘reflexivity’ become only a gesture sublimated to 
Truth?53 In The Practice of Everyday Life (Vol One) (1984) Michel de Certeau notes a similar 
inconsistency in Bourdieu’s The Logic of Practice in relation to how he represents practices 
and ‘strategies’ among “petit-bourgeois” and ‘housewives’ as impoverished, and 
contrasts this to Bourdieu’s more general ratification of strategies in ‘traditional’ 
societies’54, de Certeau also charges Bourdieu with presenting ‘culture as coherent and 
unconscious’55, and argues that Bourdieu implicitly represents himself as having a 
‘superior’ knowledge to that which ‘the society had of itself56. Against criticisms, 
Bourdieu has repeatedly qualified his qualifications, and consistently dismissed questions 
about his approach as misconstruals and misinterpretations57. Yet that criticisms and 
doubts about the efficacy of this, as well as other aspects of his account exist, suggests, at 
the least, that his arguments are not as compelling as they might be.
51 Bourdieu 2000a, pp. 153-4. My italics. He also writes: ‘The allodoxia which the new system 
encourages in innumerable ways is the reason why relegated agents collaborate in their own 
relegation by overestimating the studies on which they embark, overvaluing their qualifications, and 
banking on possible futures which do not really exist for them; but it is also the reason why they do 
not truly accept the objective reality of their position and qualifications’ (Bourdieu 2000a, p. 155).
52 Swartz also stresses Bourdieu believes ‘sociology’ cannot achieve objectivity, noting Bourdieu’s 
argument that ‘it is only through a reflexive practice of social inquiry that one can hope to achieve a 
desirable degree of objectivity on the social world’ (Swartz 1997, p. 11). As Derek Robbins likewise 
states in the introduction to his mammoth four volume edited collection, Pierre Bourdieu (2000): ‘The 
social phenomena which are observed are themselves the products of the intellectual construction of 
agents involved in everyday social exchange and communication. The processes of reciprocal or 
mutual observation and understanding are inherent within the phenomenal situational that the social 
scientist seeks to observe. The social scientist only has something to say as a result of constructing an 
artificial locus of detachment within social space ... ‘ (Robbins 2000, p.xxviii)
33 In Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (1992) Bourdieu writes of how ‘Like any social universe, the academic 
world is the site of struggle over the truth of the academic world and of the social world in general’ 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p.70).
54 de Certeau 1988, pp.54-5
53 de Certeau 1988, p.56
36 de Certeau 1988, p.56
37 See also Robbins 2000, pp.9-10.
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Bourdieu’s agency
The second particular concern I have regarding Bourdieu’s portrayal of consumption 
relates to how he theorises agency. My conclusions are obviously suggested by the 
section above, but Bourdieu’s oeuvre, along with his claims and arguments about agency 
are somewhat labyrinthine, and he has consistently argued habitus allows for a more 
‘fluid’ conception of agency insofar as while habitus is set and determined by experience, 
this shaping of habitus also enables each individual’s capacity for action:
The habitus, the durably installed generative principal of regulated 
improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities 
immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative 
principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in 
the situation, as defined by cognitive and motivating structures making up the 
habitus.58
In this, as Swartz explains, Bourdieu views societal structures as constituted by agents as 
well as constitutive of them:
practices are constitutive of structures as well as determined by them ... 
structures are themselves socially constructed through everyday practices of 
agents.59
Although structures are constituted by agents there seems a danger here that 
conceptualising structures simply in terms of the practices of other agents collapses the 
power of larger societal forces altogether. However the primary aim of this formulation 
is to draw out how habitus as a concept transcends the subjective /  objective dichotomy, 
which Bourdieu acknowledges, but dismisses in Pascalian Meditations (2000) as part of 
Kant’s ‘transcendental anthropology’60. What he is referring to here is Kant’s dictum in 
the Critique of Pure Reason that
though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that 
it all arises out of experience.61
For Kant, sensory impressions supply the ‘raw material’, but this material is made 
intelligible only as it is processed through concepts and categories our own minds supply:
58 Bourdieu 2002, p.78. As Swartz explains; ‘Habitus results from early socialization experiences in 
which external structures are internalised. As a result, internalised dispositions of broad parameters 
and boundaries of what is possible or unlikely for a particular group in a stratified social world develop 
through socialization. Thus, on the one hand, habitus sets structural limits for action. On the other 
hand, habitus generates perceptions, aspirations, and practices that correspond to the structuring 
properties of earlier socialization’ (Swartz 1997, p. 103).
59 Swartz 1997, p.58 b
60 Bourdieu 2000b, p. 147
61 Kant 1970, p.41
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understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only 
through their union can knowledge arise.62
With this, the notion of a physical barrier between things in the world became 
conceptually entrenched; we can never know the ‘thing in itself as bit actually is, we can 
never be it. We can only ‘know’ it in so far as we perceive it: this is the division between 
the appearance of the ‘thing in itself (phenomenon), and the ‘thing as it actually is’ 
(noumenon) - a material /  transcendental division which set in place a rigid theoretical 
divide between things in the world.
Bourdieu views Kant’s phenomenal /  noumenal divide with its incognizable ‘thing-in- 
itself as setting in place and preserving a transcendental subjective individualism, 
‘ahistorical and antigenetic’63. A consciousness above and beyond, or, as Bernstein puts 
it in Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (1983), ‘completely 
independent of the ways in which we condition and constitute experience’64. For 
Bourdieu the subject is inextricably embedded in and given by their experience, as he 
states in an Outline of a Theory of Practice (2002 [1972]):
The construction of the world of objects is clearly not the sovereign 
operation of consciousness which the neo-Kantian tradition conceives of; the 
mental structures which construct the world of objects are constructed in the 
practice of a world of objects constructed according to the same structures. The 
mind born of the world of objects does not rise as a subjectivity confronting an 
objectivity: the objective universe is made up of objects which are the product of 
objectifying operations structured according to the very structures which the 
mind applies to it. The mind is a metaphor of the world of objects which is itself 
but an endless circle of mutually reflecting metaphors.65
In Pascalian Meditations (2000) Bourdieu further refers to how he believes habitus escapes
the subject /  object dichotomy, yet also stresses how the ‘agency’ of habitus is ‘generative’:
the notion of habitus, which restores to the agent a generating, unifying, 
constructing, classifying power, while recalling that this capacity to construct 
social reality, itself socially constructed, is not that of a transcendental subject but 
of a socialized body, investing in its practice socially constructed organizing 
principles that are acquired in the course of a situated and dated social 
experience.66
The question this raises however is where precisely, does Bourdieu’s subject, the 
choosing T , which selects one option, rather than another, come from? While the mind
62 Kant 1970, p.41
63 Bourdieu 2000b, p.147
64 Bernstein 1983, p. 10
65 Bourdieu 2002, p.91
6,i Bourdieu 2000b, pp. 136-7
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may be ‘a metaphor of the world of objects which is itself but an endless circle of 
mutually reflecting metaphors’67 it is still not clear exactly how Bourdieu theorized the 
agency he wanted to acknowledge.
In Pascalian Meditations (2000), arguing for an understanding of the world through a bodily 
knowledge, Bourdieu writes:
The world encompasses me, comprehends me as a thing among things, 
but I, as a thing for which there are things, comprehend this world ... The ‘I’ that 
practically comprehends physical space and social space (through the subject of 
the verb comprehend, it is not necessarily a ‘subject’ in the sense of the philosophies 
of mind, but rather a habitus, a system of dispositions) is comprehended in a 
different sense, encompassed, inscribed, implicated in that space.68
This bodily,
corporeal knowledge ... provides a practical comprehension of the world 
quite different from the intentional act of conscious decoding that is normally 
designated by the idea of comprehension. In other words, if the agent has an 
immediate understanding of the familiar world, this is because the cognitive 
structures that he implements are the product of incorporation of the structures 
of the world in which he acts; the instruments of construction that he uses to 
know the world are constructed by the world. The practical principles of 
organization of the given are constructed from the experience of frequently 
encountered situations and can be revised and rejected in the event of frequent 
failure.69
Despite the introjection of this rather diffuse conception of ‘bodily knowledge’ (the body 
just chooses, habitually, instinctively) the extent to which Bourdieu’s formulations fully 
account for agency is still moot. His argument contains a welter of logical 
inconsistencies which the typical appeal to ‘subtleties’ and ‘nuances’ does not offset. 
Jenkins for one, argues Bourdieu’s account is really a case of determinism in the ‘last 
instance’:
although Bourdieu starts out by rejecting the necessity of making ‘false’ 
choices between objectivism and subjectivism, the relationship he eventually 
posits between ‘objective structures’, the habitus and social practice becomes one 
of determination. The analytical emphasis falls upon causes rather than reasons. 
Structures produce the habitus, which generates practice, which reproduces the 
structures, and so on.70
67 Bourdieu 2002, p.91
68 Bourdieu 2000b, p . 130. See also Outline of a Theory of Practice 2002 [1972], p.91
69 Bourdieu 2000b, p. 135-6
70Jenkins 2000, p. 152. While Garnham and Williams offer Bourdieu as a theorist who ‘confronts and 
dialectically supersedes’ the debates between Althussian Marxism and the views of an ‘older Marxist 
tradition’ they also state they ‘feel’ Bourdieu still maintains ‘a functionalist /  determinist residue in ... 
[his] conception of reproduction’ (Garnham and Williams 1980, p.222).
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As with Jenkins, de Certeau also regards habitus as static, only able to respond to changing 
circumstances, when through practices habitus is revealed as ‘achievements’. For de 
Certeau, the agency in Bourdieu’s habitus is ‘a false departure, a textual “strategy”’71. 
Habitus is an ‘interiorization’ of structures, and in ‘the last instance’, wholly determined 
by structures:
structures can change and thus become a principle of social mobility (and 
even the only one). Achievements cannot. They have no movement of their 
own. They are the place in which structures are inscribed, the marble on which 
their history is engraved. Nothing happens in them that is not the result of their 
exteriority.72
In Invitation to Reßexive Sociology (2002) Bourdieu attempts to address such interpretations, 
writing that ‘arguments and expressions’ in his work enable ‘systematic misreadings’73. 
He dismisses these as ‘superficial criticisms’, restating he believes there exist ‘dispositions 
to resist’74. Yet here, as with Hebdige, agency once again appears evident only in acts of 
resistance, and Bourdieu still does not clearly delineate how he theorises the processes 
from whence agency develops.
Distinction (2000) has been enormously influential. Even responses arguing Bourdieu’s 
analysis is flawed or incomplete in various ways ensure the text maintains its status. It 
remains a ‘primary definer’75 that requires a response. This ensures that any discussion 
of consumption formulated in terms of the text remains ossified around the dynamics of 
taste and the formation of taste, rather than a consideration of the origin or 
consequences of goods. In other words, identity remains a point of focus to the exclusion 
of other concerns. And although Bourdieu purports to represent the meaning attached 
to goods and practices as culturally arbitrary, thus avoiding essentialism, he still presents 
this cultural meaning as essentially mystificatory, as mistaken, and responsible for 
concealing the underlying forces behind the operation of capitalism. The final issue is 
that despite Bourdieu’s rejection of Althussian Marxism76, in Distinction (2000) he too 
ultimately positions the economy as determining in the final instance: change is only
71 de Certeau 1988, p.60
72 de Certeau 1988, p.57
73 Bourdieu and Wacquant 2002, p.79
74 Bourdieu and Wacquant 2002, p .81, p.82
75 As Hall, Chritcher, Jefferson, Clarke, and Roberts put it in their contribution to The Manufacture of 
News, here a primary interpretation is positioned as predominant; ‘This interpretation then 
“commands the field” in all subsequent treatment and sets the terms of reference within which all 
further coverage or debate takes place’ (1981, p.342).
76 Swartz notes how Bourdieu rejects Althusserian Marxism as ‘rooted’ in a materialist /  idealist 
division‘that must be transcended’ (Swartz 1997, p.39)
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possible when conditions degenerate to the extent that agents finally realise the objective 
impossibility of achieving their ‘subjective aspirations’77. It is only this that delivers 
‘agency’, enabling a positive change to, or ‘genuine inversion’ of objective conditions and 
potentialities.
Goods vis-a-vis identity
Despite its inconsistencies the breadth of Bourdieu’s study was perceived as so 
theoretically sophisticated it strongly augmented the credibility of accounts focusing on 
consumption as a phenom enon meriting further analysis. In Consumer Culture and 
Postmodernism (1991), Featherstone refers to Bourdieu, among others, when pointing to a 
range of new studies identifying how goods ‘are used to demarcate social relationships’78. 
He himself attempted to validate the substantive reasons underlying the consumption 
act, arguing that we should attach more importance to ‘interpreting the everyday’:
we can take a wider definition of culture which will focus not only on 
formal religious institutions and movements but also those social processes and 
practices which generate and regenerate sacred symbols, be it the ceremonies of 
the state, rock concerts or the little sacred rituals which convey solidarity in small 
groups, or between friends and lovers. Hence we need to move away from 
approaches which read off consumption as a derivative of production and seek to 
dismiss it as “mass” consumption. Instead we have to acknowledge that while 
consumerism results in an inflation in the quantity of goods in circulation, this 
does not result in a general eclipse of the sacred, something which is evident if we 
focus on the symbolism which goods have in practice.79
In this Featherstone is primarily refuting Daniel Bell’s arguments in relation to societal
problems which he viewed as connected to a loss of belief and a loss of the sacred (both
epitomised through the brash disconnectedness of consumer culture), but the arguments
of Lukäcs, M arx and the Frankfurt School are other obvious targets. Featherstone in
fact claims the Frankfurt School ‘are no longer accorded great significance’80, and cites a
num ber of studies by Swingewood, Bennett (et al from The Study of Culture 1977), Gellner,
Strauth and T urner81, interpreting the Frankfurt School as ‘elitist’, and unable ‘to
examine actual processes of consumption which reveal complex differentiated audience
responses and uses of goods’82.
" Bourdieu 2000a, p. 168. Citing Caille, even Swartz agrees Bourdieu ‘nonetheless makes claims that 
are suggestive of some degree of reduction in this direction . . .’ (Swartz 1997, p.80)
78 Featherstone 1991, p.16-17
79 Featherstone 1991, p. 122
80 Featherstone 1991, p.vii
81 Featherstone 1991, p. 15
82 Featherstone 1991, p. 15
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The very existence of such arguments is indicative of how from the 1980s many theorists 
began to reassess both the worth of studying consumption and the notions of agency 
associated with it. As Kim Hum phrey notes in Shelf Life: supermarkets and the changing 
cultures of consumption (1998):
By the early to mid-1980s the consumption of goods and services in 
contem porary Western societies had been embraced by many writers within 
cultural studies and other disciplinary areas as a potential arena of personal 
empowerment, cultural subversion, and even political resistance. W ithin this 
analytical framework the ‘consumer’ was positioned as active, rather than 
passive, as the ‘producer’ of usages and meanings that the marketplace may not 
have assigned to a particular commodity or consumer space, and which 
potentially underm ined or evaded consumerist ideologies.83
In their introduction to the Ethics of Consumption: the Good Life, Justice, and Global Stewardship 
(1998) Crocker and Linden outline how in radical contrast to the culture industry thesis 
‘new scholars’84 began to focus on the importance of creativity and play85 and the role of 
consumption in this process. In The Truth About the Truth (1995) Anderson likewise relates 
how many began to regard the expression of identity through consumption as a genuine 
expression of identity accurately reflecting the messy disorder and diversity of the socio­
cultural world86. Different ‘identities’ (that could be expressed via consumption) were 
celebrated as legitimate expressions of people’s difference.
M ichel de C erteau, and the hungry  search for resistance
Michel de C erteau’s The Practice of Everyday Life (Vol One) (1988)87, anticipated, and 
perhaps even initiated many of the more ‘postm odern’ accounts, de Certeau positioned 
his argum ent as largely a response to Bourdieu’s Outline o f a Theory of Practice (1972) and 
Foucault’s account in Discipline and Punish (1975) of the ‘microphysics of power’. Although 
granting studies which focus on structures and apparatuses of power a ‘fundam ental’ 
importance88, de Certeau argued Foucault, in privileging only the ‘coherence’ of a 
dom inant colonising discourse89, overlooked practices which escape, or seep through
83 Humphreys 1998, pp.7-8
84 Crocker & Linden 1998, p.7
85 Crocker & Linden 1998, p. 12
86 Anderson 1995
8/ First published as L'invention du quotidien. Vol. 1, Arts de faire (1974)
88 de Certeau 1988, p.41
89 He writes, ‘Beneath what one might call the “monotheistic” privilege that panoptic apparatuses 
have won for themselves, a ‘polytheism ” of scattered practices survives, dominated but not erased by the 
triumphal success of one of their number’ (de Certeau 1988, p.48).
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structures and apparatuses of power, moving through and beyond ‘technocratic’ and
‘functionalist rationality’ via ‘unreadable paths’90:
They circulate, come and go, overflow and drift over an imposed terrain, 
like the snowy waves of the sea slipping in and among rocks and defiles of an 
establishes order.91
In The Practice of Everyday Life (1988) consumption is one of de Certeau’s principle 
concerns, and he has a lyrical, but also quite nebulous ‘take’ on the resistant nature of 
‘everyday’ consumption practices:
a rationalized, expansionist, centralized, spectacular and clamorous 
production is confronted by an entirely different kind of production, called 
“consumption” and characterized by its own ruses, its fragmentation (the result 
of the circumstances), its poaching, its clandestine nature, its tireless but quiet 
activity, in short by its quasi-invisibility, since it shows itself not in its own 
products (where would it place them) but in an art of using those imposed on it.92
In this de Certeau is clearly proposing that speakers (re)appropriate language93, in a
similar manner to Hebdige’s use of bricolage, Stuart Hall’s ‘Encoding /  Decoding’, and
also Barthes’s later work, which de Certeau cites when he discusses the readerly
appropriation of texts, and how users don’t necessarily ‘receive’, or make use of meaning
in the manner intended94. For de Certeau, the ‘clandestine’ improvisation, and
makeshift ‘tactics’ of everyday practices have ‘legitimacy’, and a ‘creativity that
flourishes’95, so that
users make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of 
and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own 
interests and their own rules.96
Consumers, he writes, by using ‘tactics’ of their own, become ‘poets of their own affairs, 
trailblazers in the jungles of functionalist rationality’97. Yet his use of the term ‘tactics’ is 
extraordinarily diffuse; ‘tactics’ are described only as ‘the ingenious ways in which the 
weak make use of the strong’ through a ‘surreptitious and guileful “movement,” that is, 
the very activity of “making do’”98. So what exactly constitute the ‘tactics’ that draw de 
Certeau’s interest?
90 de Certeau 1988, p.xviii.
91 de Certeau 1988, p.34
92 de Certeau 1988, p.31. See also pp.xii-iii.
93 de Certeau 1988, p.xiii, p.xviii, p.33
94 de Certeau 1988, pp.xxi-ii, p.33, p.44
95 de Certeau 1988, p.xvii
96 de Certeau 1988, pp.xiii-iv
97 de Certeau 1988, p.34. See also p.xviii.
98 de Certeau 1988, , p.xvii, p.34-5. For a discussion o f‘tactics’ such as “la perruque” see pp.24-8.
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In order to clarify his understanding of ‘tactics’, de Certeau differentiates ‘tactics’ from 
‘strategies’. Reminiscent of Foucault’s popular military metaphors, ‘strategies’ are ‘the 
calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a 
subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be 
isolated’99. Tactics, in contrast, belong, he writes, somewhat glibly, to ‘the space of the 
other’100. But how do we determine what constitutes a ‘resistant’ ‘tactic’? Precisely what 
makes one practice fall into the category ‘tactic’, as opposed to ‘strategy’? Do people 
who practice ‘strategies’ (structural impositions involving a control of time /  place, 
wherein ‘a certain power is the precondition of this knowledge’101), ever practice ‘tactics’ (‘the 
absence of a proper locus’102)? Conversely, do people who practice ‘tactics’ practice 
‘strategies’? And if not, are these categories then just distinguished by a quantifiable 
differentiation of power? de Certeau expresses a concern with the disjunction in power 
relations when he states that tactics are only ever utilised by the weak103. But weak in 
relation to what specifically?
If tactics are determined by ‘the absence of power’ alone104 de Certeau is still operating in 
the old framework of power as a ‘top down’, ‘quantifiable’, structural operation of force. 
He has, consequently, not only failed to have fully grasped the radical nature of 
Foucault’s capillary conception of power, but has grounded his own stylistically lyrical 
schema on evocative, but concomitantly weak distinguishing criteria. Simultaneously, 
with the reification of everything which comprises an undifferentiated ‘resistant’ 
‘everyday’ as moving through and beyond technocratic and ‘functionalist reality’ via 
‘unreadable paths’, in a sense he appropriates Foucault’s conception of capillary power, 
while imparting this ‘everyday’ with the glamorously iconic status of an ineffable sublime 
simply by virtue of its being:
The practices of consumption are the ghosts of the society that carries 
their name. Like the “spirits” of former times, they constitute the multiform and 
occult postulate of productive activity. 105
Although camouflaged by his expressive poeticism, this internal incoherence ultimately 
emerges as an awkward, carping circularity in his work:
99 de Certeau 1988, pp.35-6. See also p.xix.
100 T he  space of the tactic is the space of the other’ (de Certeau 1988, p.37. Also p.xix.)
101 de Certeau 1988, p.36
102 de Certeau 1988, p.37
103 de Certeau 1988, pp.36-8
104 de Certeau 1988, p.38
105 de Certeau 1988, p.35
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Tactics are more and more frequently going off their tracks. Cut loose 
from the traditional communities that circumscribed their functioning, they have 
begun to w ander everywhere in a space which is becoming at once more 
homogeneous and extensive. Consumers are transformed into immigrants. The 
system in which they move about is too vast to be able to fix them in one place, 
but too constraining for them to ever to be able to escape from it and go into 
exile elsewhere. There is no longer an elsewhere. Because of this, the “strategic” 
model is also transformed, as if defeated by its own success: it was by definition 
based on the definition of a “proper” distinct from everything else; but now that 
“proper” has become the whole.106
How does de Certeau actually conceive the subject in all this? I noted earlier how he 
criticised Bourdieu’s determinism. One im portant issue Frow notes, is that with de 
Certeau, the person is always fully constituted prior to the text, ‘in a space of social 
allegiances that is therefore deemed to be pre-textual’107. Yet de Certeau at the same 
time rejects any taint of essentialism - he is not theorising isolated individuality:
each individual is a locus in which an incoherent (and often 
contradictory) plurality of... relational determinations interact.108
de Certeau nevertheless glosses over his elisions in relation to ‘the subject’ by claiming
that structures are constructed theoretical representations109, with tactics /  practices
being his concern. But while de C erteau’s agents are not passive, they ‘transgress’, and
move through structural impositions, as with Bourdieu he never specifies exactly how this
can be the case, and where the choices his agents make are derived from. But even in
this, his ‘tactics’ bear an uncanny resemblance to Bourdieu’s ‘logic of practice’, and
although he often refers to Bourdieu’s ‘practical sense’110, de Certeau only distinguishes
his approach by labelling it an ‘art of practice’* 111. In light of this, de Certeau’s criticisms
of both Foucault and Bourdieu seem often derivative, with the concomitant elisions and
absences of his own account particularly limited.
The evocative language of de C erteau’s account was well received and contributed 
markedly to a more open, positive and interesting approach to consumption. However 
his text raised as many criticisms as it generated acclaim. For instance in the 
introduction to Acknowledging Consumption; a review of new studies (1995), Danial Miller notes
106 de Certeau 1988, p.40
107 Frow 1995, p.64
108 de Certeau 1988, p.xi
109 de Certeau 1988, p.57
110 de Certeau 1988, p. 19, p.
111 de Certeau 1988, p.24
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that de Certeau presents cultural resistance as more effective than it in fact, really is; yet
at the same time still notes his intellectual affiliation to it:
Absurdly, consumption becomes ‘the transgressive tactics of the weak’ 
(de Certeau 1984: xviii -xx). My own work is properly subject to critique in as 
much as it may have favoured this tendency.112
As Miller states, often this type of work
ignores any negative impact of consumption itself.113
The connection of consumption, agency and resistance is just as powerful with de
Certeau as it is with Hebdige, Hall and Bourdieu. This has resulted in a plethora of
accounts focusing on how the disenfranchised resist the system. But while such
approaches generate a range of investigations into the ‘identities’ of interesting and
usually stylistically fashionable subcultural groups there has been much less attention
paid to how powerful informal networks facilitate and ‘deregulate’ exchange, with far fewer
direct investigative accounts of how elites use power to bypass the system and
successfully accomplish their aims. This now has the unfashionable, uncomfortable
whiff of conspiracy theory.
Fiske
In Market Society (2001) Don Slater and Fran Tonkiss expressed concern about
uncanny convergences between neo-liberals and postmodernists, both of 
whom regard people's engagement with commercially produced culture not as a 
sell-out or impurity, but rather as a basis for real pleasures, real autonomy and 
real assaults on cultural and social elites ... 114
Slater and Tonkiss claim British cultural studies facilitated the development of
postmodern approaches, citing Paul Willis’s Common Culture (1990) as a text fitting the
category of a postmodern account ‘consonant’ with a ‘modified and qualified market
populism’115. In this Slater argues, in his earlier Consumer Culture and Modernity (1997),
perspectives such as Willis’s tend to represent ‘consumption as a rather unconstrained
sphere of interpretive freedom’, with consumption always assumed to represent
a site of political struggle, [and] that consumer acts of interpretation and 
appropriation automatically have political significance or consequences.116
112 Miller 1995, p.29
113 Miller 1995, p.29
114 Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p. 167
115 Slater and Tonkiss 2001, pp. 168-9
116 Slater 1997, p. 168
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Yet as he and Fran Tonkiss point out in Market Society (2001), this kind of theorising tends 
to excise ‘economic analysis entirely’117.
Slater locates John  Fiske’s Reading the Popular (1989) as another text advocating a market 
populism which assumes political resistance occurs simply through the act of 
consum ing118, and Slater believes Fiske draws on de Certeau in a far less cautious 
m anner than de C erteau’s work actually permits. Fiske has been rather influential in the 
development of Australian cultural studies, and pursuant to the influence of the 
Birmingham Centre, cultural studies in Australia has taken up the theme of resistance 
vis-a-vis consumption largely through Fiske’s arguments and his reading of de Certeau, 
which was ‘as widely contested’, John  Frow records, ‘as it was influential’119. In an 
overview of communications research in Australia Terry Flew refers to Fiske as one of a 
‘significant transnational milieu of cultural studies practitioners based in Australia in the 
1980s’120. In Contemporary Cultural Theory (1991) Andrew M ilner similarly notes how 
Fiske’s influence spread through the. Australian Journal of Cultural Studies, ‘internationalised 
as the new journal Cultural Studies in 1987’121, which Fiske also edited. Fiske’s principal 
argum ents were further disseminated through Myths of O f  (1987) (with Bob Hodge and 
Graem e Turner), Understanding Popular Culture (1989), and Reading the Popular (1989). All 
reiterate similar themes. For instance in Reading the Popular (1989). Fiske argues 
subordinate cultural groups, motivated by pleasure, use popular culture to ‘resist’ and 
‘evade’ the impositions o f ‘the social system that disempowers them ’122. The book as a 
whole examines a range of popular cultural ‘texts’ - shopping, beach culture, video 
arcades, rock videos, the singer M adonna, television quiz shows, dating programs, and 
television news, in the process representing popular culture as ‘the culture of the 
subordinate who resent their subordination ...’ 123
Fiske uses a curious amalgam of theorists, including de Certeau, but also Barthes, 
Gramsci, Hall, Althusser, Bourdieu and Foucault. As will become evident below, his
117 Slater and Tonkiss 2001, p. 170
118 Slater 1997, p. 168
119 Frow 2005
120 Flew 2004, p.37
121 Milner 1991, p.78
122 Fiske 1989, p.2
123 Fiske 1989, p.7
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interpretation of all of them is rather questionable. He describes, for instance, notions of 
‘improvement’ as bourgeois idealisations. Popular culture by way of contrast is proudly
tasteless and vulgar, for taste is social control and class interest 
masquerading as a naturally finer sensibility.124
Recognising the subjective character of previous high cultural ascriptions of value, Fiske
opines that few now advocate such views125. Yet despite feeling able to invoke Bourdieu,
while simultaneously questioning the effectivity (as opposed to validity) of ascriptions of
value, Fiske concludes the desire for popular culture is not imposed from above, ‘as mass
cultural theorists propose’126. In his schema it comes from ‘within’ subordinate groups,
in the context of the power disparities of the socio-economic system they exist in. In
Understanding Popular Culture (1989) he writes
Popular culture is made by the people, not produced by the culture 
industry. All the culture industries do is produce a repertoire of texts or cultural 
resources for the various formations of the people to use or reject in the ongoing 
process of producing their popular culture.127
In this he definitively rejects the Frankfurt School thesis as implausible, and in Reading the
Popular (1989) concludes
the people are unlikely to choose any commodity that serves only the 
economic and ideological interests of the dominant.128
Arguments representing popular culture as a controlled ‘safety valve’ sustaining 
capitalism, or an ineffective ‘fantasy’, simply do not take into account the connection 
between socio-political resistance and the ‘politics of everyday life’129. Currently, against 
a patronising, ‘pessimistic elitism’130,
The desire to investigate the practices of making do, wherein can be 
found the cunning, the creativity, and the power of the subordinate, has been 
part of a shift in academia that has transformed much of academic theory and 
research over the past few years.131
In this, as with Hebdige and de Certeau, Fiske tends to valorise popular culture simply 
by virtue of the subordinate, disenfranchised class based socio-economic status of those
124 Fiske 1989, p.6
125 Fiske 1989, p.7
126 Fiske 1989, p.7
127 Fiske 1989a, p.24
128 Fiske 1989, p.5
129 Fiske 1989, p.9, also p.32. Popular culture he writes, ‘often centers on the body and its sensations 
rather than on the mind and its sense, for the bodily pleasures offer carnivalesque, evasive, liberating 
practices - they constitute the popular terrain where hegemony is weakest, a terrain that may possibly 
lie beyond its reach’ (Fiske 1989, p.6)
130 Fiske 1989, p.33
131 Fiske 1989, p.32
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whom partake in and shape it, especially insofar as this is connected to what he regards 
as that class’s potential to bring about emancipatory change:
Shopping malls and cultural practices, the variety of shoppings that take 
place within them, are key arenas of struggle, at both economic and ideological 
levels, between those with the power of ideological practice (Althusser), 
hegemony (Gramsci), or strategy (de Certeau) and those whose construction as 
subjects in ideology is never complete, whose resistances means that hegemony 
can never finally relax in victory, and whose tactics inflict a running series of 
wounds upon the strategic power. Shopping is the crisis of consumerism: it is 
where the art and tricks of the weak can inflict most damage on, and exert most 
power over, the strategic interests of the powerful. 132
This emancipatory change however, is not radical change, which Fiske positions in
Understanding Popular Culture (1989) as a ‘utopian’ ideal. Hoping for ‘progressive’ change
alone is more realistic133. Yet in a curious Althusserian moment in Reading the Popular
(1989) he also overturns the thrust of his own arguments entirely and appears to situate
‘the economy’ as determining in the last instance:
It is material historical conditions that produce radical reform; evasive 
and semiotic resistances can maintain a popular consciousness that can fertilize 
the growth of those conditions and be ready to exploit them when they arise, but 
they cannot in themselves produce such conditions. But the resistances of 
popular culture are not just evasive or semiotic: they do have a social dimension 
at the micro level. And at this micro level they may well act as a constant erosive 
force upon the macro, weakening the system from within so that it is more 
amenable to change at the structural level.134
To the extent Fiske attempts to counteract the negative, one-sided depictions of 
consumption discussed in the previous chapter his arguments are appealing. Yet as with 
de Certeau, his account features strange inconsistencies and contradictions, as well as 
notable elisions in relation to ‘the subject’. His arguments do not focus on individual 
agency, but with his attention to resistance, he skirts very close to ascribing an 
authenticity /  essentialism to various cultural groups. Neither does he provide a clear 
statement regarding how he reconciles the tension between the general social character of 
consumer culture, and from whence the resistant capacity of subordinate groups arises; 
or how meaning comes to be associated with various consumer objects and activities.
132 Fiske 1989, p. 14. Yet he also later contradicts himself, writing that shopping ‘is more a bourgeois 
act; it appears to support, rather than threaten, bourgeois values . . . Shopping can never be a radical 
subversive act; it can never change the system of a capitalist-consumerist economy. Equally, however, 
it cannot be adequately explained as a mere capitulation to the system’ (Fiske 1989, p.27).
133 Fiske 1989a, p. 188
134 Fiske 1989, p. 11
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This becomes particularly vexed given the ramifications of Fiske’s most contentious 
chapterin Reading the Popular (1989), ‘News, History, and Undisciplined Events’. In this 
chapter his principal aim is to argue ‘news is watched for pleasure’, and he utilises first 
Gramsci (as per Stuart Hall), and then his own version of Foucault135, to sketch out two 
very different ways of interpreting popular reception of television news. The Gramscian 
‘method’ is ultimately seen as inferior to the Foucauldian. For Fiske, Gramsci facilitates 
an understanding of ‘the hegemonic recruitment of this narrative into the service of the 
dominant classes’136. Fiske wants to ‘emphazise news’ discursive energy’137, and how 
although there is a ‘heteroglossia’, or a ‘weave of voices’ in news programming, this is 
not intended to ‘deconstruct this textuality and call it into question, but ... authenticate it 
by reference to an apparent “truth” that is located in reality itself138. For Fiske, a 
Gramscian model would explain this aspect of news programming by viewing it as 
subordinate knowledge that is subsumed, although never quite repressed139. Attempts to 
impose order and narrative are, moreover, continually challenged by the messy disunity 
of events themselves. It is with reference to this messy disunity Fiske writes that the 
Gramscian model cannot fully account for ‘contradictions and the discontinuities of 
events’ which are still evident in the news and ‘resist its attempts to write a coherent 
history out of them’140. In contrast to the Gramscian model, focused on class concerns, a 
Foucauldian approach would interpret news programming as a more generalised 
‘discourse of power’141:
the coherence of the news is discursive power at work, rather than more 
narrowly defined socio-political power. This does not mean the two are 
unconnected, clearly they are not, but rather that power is not to be explained 
by a model of a “grand narrative,” whether it be Marxist, neo-Marxist, capitalist, 
or liberal-pluralist in inflection. Rather, power must be understood discursively 
in terms of its ability to impose a particular knowledge over resisting, competing 
knowledges.142
It is relatively straightforward to interpret Foucault in this way. What Fiske does next 
however, is translate Foucault’s conception of ‘a will to knowledge’ to read any position
135 ‘I not only draw on Foucault, I take liberties with him - but what the hell, that’s what ideas are for, 
aren’t they?’ (Fiske 1989, p. 180)
136 Fiske 1989, p. 152
137 Fiske 1989, p.152
138 Fiske 1989, p. 153
139 Fiske 1989, p. 161
140 Fiske 1989, p. 152
141 Fiske 1989, p. 159
142 Fiske 1989, p. 162
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as representing ‘a will to knowledge’. He then invokes Foucault in relation to news 
‘discourse’ to argue that
Because of our “will to knowledge,” the production of a truth is 
inherently pleasurable, whether that truth be a dominating or resisting one143
Ergo, even if we dispute the dominant propositions put forward by news programmes,
we still get pleasure from disagreeing with them144. And for Fiske, agency is extant here,
because despite the expedient, and inconsistent character of his token acknowledgment
of a struggle over meaning ‘more tilted in favour of the top’145, he still represents
consumers of news programmes as able to comprehensively make meaning of these
programmes in relation to of the events of their own lives, facilitated by the ‘resistance’
of events146:
The traces of undisciplined events that history represses but genealogy 
recovers not only allow us to produce resisting knowledges, but gives us access to 
the process of producing knowledge. The pleasure in this is a double-voiced 
pleasure, for it lies not only in the production of a knowledge-truth, but also in 
the recognition that this knowledge-truth is a subjugated truth playing a resisting, 
scandalizing role in the “hazardous play of domination” by which men 
govern. 147
In addition to his (mis)use of ‘resistant pleasure’, Fiske then writes that Foucault’s radical 
reconceptualisation of power foregrounds the impossibility of the realisation of any one 
overriding Truth:
News’s struggle to subjugate unruly events to its own rules can never be 
won, and can never produce a hegemonically smooth surface. 148
So despite Foucault’s extensive body of work on governmental rationalities and just how
comprehensively subjectivity is shaped149, in a remarkable reversal Fiske suggests we
need not give wholehearted consideration to systems of domination associated with
popular news media, simply because of the inevitability of power disparities:
143 Fiske 1989, p. 161
144 ‘They talk, they think, they joke, and all the time they are making their sense of their particular 
form of subordination, they are exploiting their power to use discourse differently, resistingly. And the 
indisciplinarity of events gives them points of purchase, weak spots in the discourse of domination, at 
which they can exercise this power’ (Fiske 1989, p. 179).
145 Fiske 1989, p. 149
146 The implication of a ‘natural’ resistance of events is later qualified: ‘The undisciplinarity of events, 
their unruliness, stems not from their nature or essence, but from their potential to be mobilized in 
other discursive formations: they can be made to mean differently by being taken up by different 
discourses’ (Fiske 1989, p. 178).
147 Fiske 1989, p. 173
148 Fiske 1989, p.174
149 Foucault 1977, Rose 1990, and Hindess 1997.
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there is no necessity in history, no grand narrative of the oppressed and 
powerless overthrowing the systems that oppress and disempower them . 150
Seemingly unconscious of his incongruous teleological acrobatics, Fiske then indulges a
whimsical expectation that the ‘truth’ of events will out, assuming (eventual?) access to a
more comprehensive knowledge on the part of television viewers:
There would be no need for a governing knowledge that capitalist 
democracies are good if there were not a multitude of contradictory events that 
challenge and resist it. 151
All of this is vexed. Aside from his extremely selective use of various aspects of
Foucault’s work, Fiske simply doesn’t explore the stratiform inconsistencies of his own
arguments. While supplying his television viewers a ‘pleasurable’ agency, from whence,
exactly, do subcultures acquire their ‘resistant’ meanings? Fiske writes:
people use the discursive resources of a society quite differently from the 
way that the dominant forces do. They talk, they think, they joke, and all the 
time they are making their sense of their particular form of subordination, they 
are exploiting their power to use discourse differently, resistingly. 152
Facilitated by the intransigence of events, Fiske suggests this is the wellspring of social
change153. But what if these meanings /  understandings happen to be socially /
politically conservative? Thinking of the ascendency of neo-liberal politics, we might ask
about subcultures who don’t ‘resent their subordination’. . . 154 And, if still arguing resistant
‘agency’ exists to the extent people are not wholly determined, how is it logically possible
to account for exactly how each agent /  subculture makes choices, drawing a clear
distinction pertaining to this ‘agency’, and the extent to which each agent /  subculture is
written on by their social /  cultural /  historical milieu? By logical extension, if ‘popular
forces’ have the capacity to transform the cultural commodity155, how then is it
conceptually possible to account for this ‘agency’ without imputing some kind of
authenticity /  essentialism /  humanism to these groups?
As an epistemological issue these questions have no ready, clear-cut solution. But Fiske 
does not acknowledge this. His arguments are interesting insofar as they attempt to
150 Fiske 1989, p. 173
151 Fiske 1989, p. 173
152 Fiske 1989, p.179
153 Fiske 1989, p. 179. Earlier he promotes a curious combination of economist, structuralist Marxism.
154 Fiske 1989, p.7
155 ‘... the meanings of commodities do not lie in themselves as objects, and are not determined by 
their conditions of production or distribution, but are produced finally by the way they are consumed’ 
(Fiske 1989, p.28).
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reverse the previous assumptions about consumption being merely an imposition of ‘top 
down’ power which creates ‘false needs’, but in this Fiske just dismisses how ‘top down’ 
power relations can have a significant impact on the production and expression of what is 
popular156, and thus what is consumed. With Fiske, popular culture remains simply 
‘what the people want’. Once again expounding, if implicitly, the notion of an 
autonomous human actor, with endogenous needs only waiting to be uncovered.
Aside from this, arguing that everyone, even disenfranchised groups, can express identity 
through consumption implicitly furnishes a ‘level-playing field’ between those who have 
access to different ‘identities’ that can be expressed via consumption, implicitly promotes 
the notion o f ‘purchase votes’ and elides the disparities in wealth between those who can 
and cannot afford to ‘express’ identity in whichever way they choose. Further, theories 
about acts of ‘resistance’ such as 7a perruque’ and ‘bricolage\ where workers take small 
liberties with employers time or property, or where different subcultural groups 
challenge the prevailing cultural norms, seem to offer small consolation or challenge in 
the face of the abusive and exploitative relations of power in society. Accounts such as 
Fiske’s then, that focus diffusely on concepts such as meaning, identity, pleasure and 
choice, and represent consumption as a liberating manifestation of the ‘bottom-up’ 
power of an ‘authentic’ consumer, do, as Slater points out, form a strange parallel with 
the neo-liberalism paradigm of the primacy of autonomous individual choice, ‘sovereign’ 
consumers, ‘uninfected’ by social ‘prejudices’.
Agency and Epistemology
My aim in this chapter has been to locate key arguments about consumption, agency 
and identity in the latter part of the twentieth century as exemplified through the work of 
Douglas and Isherwood, Pierre Bourdieu, De Certeau and Fiske. Each of these theorists 
have in a range of different ways, attempted to offer a more fluid account of agency and 
a more complex, richer and appreciative conceptualisation of consumption than 
previously promoted by others offering variations on the arguments of the Frankfurt 
School. As I have discussed however, these accounts also contain gaps and /  or 
inconsistencies. Douglas and Isherwood position consumption as central to social 
integration and legitimate it as a significant means of expressing human social identity.
156 Bennett (1986, p.xi) and Hall (1981, p.232) have noted how power relations are often ignored by 
culturalism, and this criticism is also valid in relation to certain ‘postmodern’ accounts.
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Yet in this, they avoid theorising the interplay of the structure and agency, determinism 
and freedom, tacitly positing, while also glossing over the crucial importance of class 
differentials (even as they argue ‘no serious consumption theory can avoid the 
responsibility of social criticism’157). As with Douglas and Isherwood, Bourdieu too 
positions consumption as a key reflection and expression of human sociality, yet while he 
makes class an intrinsic factor of his analysis, he ultimately subsumes the value of any 
study of consumption as dependent on its ability to analyse the part consumption plays 
in maintaining socio-economic stratification. In this, the way he posits agency in terms 
of habitus forms a creative attempt to surmount problems associated with the Frankfurt 
School tradition, but his account still appears more, as de Certeau and Jenkins both 
aver, as a case of determinism ‘in the last instance’. In contrast to Bourdieu, de Certeau 
celebrates everyday consumption practices (reassessing the worth of what Mark Poster 
refers to as traditionally ‘nonhistoric spaces, of empty time and waste’158), attempting in 
the process to advance a stronger conception of agency by stressing the efficacy of 
resistant consumption practices. In this agency is yet again theorised as extant only 
through the prism of resistance; neither does de Certeau flesh out, or delineate precisely 
from whence the agency he perceives derives. And with Fiske the problems associated 
with these issues are magnified considerably.
Despite these limitations, my intent in this chapter is not to wholly disparage the 
contributions of these theorists, each of whom has re-defined what is involved in 
studying consumption and stressed the complexities of consumption as a phenomenon. I 
do wish to highlight however, how, in conjunction with the Birmingham Centre, their 
arguments have had the tendency to structure the pattern and questions of 
contemporary debate. Questions about identity vis-ä-vis consumption have been a 
predominant concern, and these are important, not least in terms of their connections 
with identity politics. What I have aimed to demonstrate here, however, is that 
arguments about identity and agency, (even those as elaborate and convincing as 
Bourdieu’s, with his appeal to subtleties and nuances and so on), actually rest on 
epistemological issues which I believe currently have no resolution. Meanwhile, the 
dominance of debates about identity (especially in terms of how it is either produced by
157 Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p.62-3
158 Poster 1992, p. 101
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societal forces or is resistant of those forces) has had the strong tendency to displace or 
minimise the importance of arguments about the origin and consequences of goods.
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Arguments against a primary interpretation are forced to insert themselves into its 
definition o f‘what is at issue’ - they must begin from this framework of 
interpretation as their starting point, this initial interpretative framework ... is 
extremely difficult to alter, fundamentally, once established.
(Hall, Chritcher, Jefferson, Clarke, and Roberts 1981, p.34‘2)
... the consumer as activist seems to be the great absentee from many 
celebrations of contemporary consumer culture. This absence has left 
discussions on the subject seriously impoverished.
(Lang and Gabriel 2005, p.52)
At the beginning of this thesis I argued that the lack of a more detailed and nuanced 
consideration of consumption in general and ethical consumption in particular is due to 
longstanding academic habits and tastes. Throughout the thesis I have attempted to 
delineate and map the trajectory of these habits and tastes while exploring the rigor of 
their normative foundations. My aim here has been to highlight internal inconsistencies 
that call into question the received status of each of these thematic accounts; for within 
the Western academic social sciences certain arguments have been taken as given and 
have been drawn on time and time again to support positions which are eerily similar. 
Ethical consumption as an emancipatory possibility (whether that ‘emancipatory 
possibility’ might be for something as seemingly insignificant as the eradication of battery 
farming due to an increased demand for free range eggs, the development of cars that do 
not run on fossil fuels, or for better conditions for workers involved in the production of 
clothing) simply had no space in this theoretical terrain.
In the initial chapters I traced an intense hostility expressed by European writers toward 
consumption, lower class consumption in particular, from the Middle Ages up to the 
early nineteenth century. In subsequent chapters I outlined how this critical opprobrium
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was still evident in the early twentieth century: a particularly clear example is Leavisite 
literary criticism which regarded consumption with distaste. While Smith and Hume in 
the eighteenth century took a more positive approach toward consumption, the 
neoclassical economists of the nineteenth century transmuted this stance, resting 
economics’ scientific status on its disciplinary concern with ‘m eans’ as opposed to 
‘values’. Although the consumer is still envisaged as ‘sovereign’, in neoclassical /  
neoliberal doctrine any consideration of the values represented by consumption, 
conscious or otherwise, became heterodox to economics as a discipline. Values are 
dismissed as the province of other disciplines, tacitly positioned as irrational, perhaps 
even deluded, and, often feminised, are usually set against the pure rationality of an 
imaginary idealised ‘economic m an’, the clean motivar of modern capitalism.
Economic theory perceives consumption with mixed regard; Leavisite literary criticism 
viewed mass consumption with disdain. So too did the Frankfurt School and others 
following in that tradition. Drawing on M arx while eliminating his more careful 
qualifications, the Frankfurt School did not valorise high culture in the same way or with 
the same motivations as the Leavisites, but mass consumption was also represented as 
reprehensible insofar as it played a key role in sustaining capitalism. In this, the 
Frankfurt School, as with the large num ber of theorists reiterating similar themes, 
treated consumption as false and mistaken, and simultaneously, as essentially lacking in 
values. This m eant that although the motivations of those bruiting this brand of 
argum ent appear diametrically opposed to the stance taken by neoclassical /  neoliberal 
economic doctrine, ethical consumption has no point, real purpose, or space in either schema.
In the 1970s and 80s a num ber of accounts began to question the depiction of 
consumers as wholly determined. But attempts to amend this portrayal demonstrated, in 
turn, a striking similarity to the neoliberal celebration of consumer sovereignty. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter Fiske was one of the more notable culprits here. His 
account of agency is un-theorised. Yet none of the positions I have examined in this 
thesis has synthesised structure and agency in a wholly convincing manner. Evident, 
instead, is a range of creatively intricate formulations featuring either an 
unacknowledged essentialism or a fuller bodied determinism. In relation to consumption 
the more direct ripostes between these positions has tended to repetitive, circuitous 
argum ent. For, as Slater has stressed, this has been
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the least productive side of debates on consumer culture: the opposition 
between characterising needs as determined by social powers and regarding 
them as arising from autonomous individual self-determination, needs as slavery 
or as freedom.1
In my initial chapter I mentioned how in recent years there has been a tremendous 
increase on the amount of research on consumption, particularly in the UK. A new 
consensus appears to be emerging in consumption studies as to how to manage the 
structure /  agency issue via a theory o f ‘practices’2. I discuss this below. These accounts 
in general are far more complex and considerably less reductionist than what has gone 
before. Yet in the Australian social sciences discussions focusing on consumption 
directly have a propensity to outline and respond to older perspectives (as with my study 
here), and to a certain degree this has tended to sustain the more traditional hostility, 
and the focus on identity. Yet it is because so much of the new research on ethical 
consumption was not published when I began the thesis I felt re-examining issues with 
the older accounts to be necessary. So many approaches along the lines of older 
perspectives remain current in Australia, especially insofar as they remain implicit within 
more general ‘critical’ social theory. These seemed so resilient, and have been drawn on 
to reiterate similar arguments, time after time again setting the terms of any debate.
Throughout the thesis I referred to a number of relatively recent and more productive 
accounts of consumption which developed through the 1990s. These included Brewer 
and Porter’s richly layered and elaborate edited collection Consumption and the World of 
Goods (1993); Daniel Miller’s various contributions; and not least, Don Slater, to whom I 
am particularly indebted. His Consumer Culture and Modernity (1997) provided me with an 
important template for a number of ideas I have attempted to cover, though my own 
approach differs from Slater’s in several key respects. (Principally in regard to Hobbes 
and Locke’s ‘ratification’ of consumption, my fuller discussion of Marx and the Frankfurt 
School, as well as my arguments around the issue of structure and agency in relation to 
the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, de Certeau, and Bourdieu.) 
An important gap in my argument however, is the lack of in-depth analysis of the 
trajectory of consumption studies over the last ten years, where there has been an 
explosion in the literature. New journals include the Journal of Consumer Culture (2001-),
1 Slater 1998
2 Warde 2005, Miller and Slater 2007.
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Journal of Material Culture (1996-), the International Journal of Consumer Studies (2001-), 
Consumption, Markets and Culture (1998-), the Journal of Research for Consumers (2001-), and the 
Journal of Cultural Economy (2008-). The num ber of books focusing specifically on 
consumption has also grown to an extraordinary degree.
In discussing aspects of this new trajectory let me again note again that it has been 
driven by new research in the UK. I have not surveyed the North American literature 
on consumption in any detail, but Wilk (2001) argues that over-consumption in America 
is so evident that ‘O n this side of the Atlantic it is easier to take concepts like 
“overconsumption” and “afiluenza” seriously’3. Yet even as he takes a stance against 
moralist critics of consumption, he writes ‘that consumption is in essence a moral 
m atter’4. Nevertheless, in relation to ethical consumption specifically, Micheletti notes 
that American social scientists commonly ‘condemn the phenom enon of political 
consumerism as a right-wing, left-wing, or inconsequential political activity’5. She 
believes this is ‘surprising’ given the extent of political consumption in America, ‘and the 
richness of the phenom enon as an area of study for the social sciences’6. To what extent 
then, not just in America, but in the social sciences more generally, has the wariness with 
moralism on the part of consumption theorists prevented a richer consideration of the 
effects and consequences of various consumption activities?
W hat I have called for in this thesis is a reconsideration of the impact of consumption in 
the world, a new awareness of, discussion about and shifts in habits in response to that 
awareness of what consumption means in terms of its effects and consequences. Yet in 
Australia, as I m entioned above, consumption as an overall category still remains on the 
margins, and within the larger domain of ‘critical’ social theory consumption as a stand-
3 Wilk 2001, p.245. Wilk is responding here to Miller’s positioning of certain American theorists as 
having an ‘extraordinarily conservative’ view of consumption (Miller 2001, p.227). Expanding on his 
position Miller writes that ‘it seems to me that research on consumption, especially that within the 
USA, derives from something completely different than the desire to study actual consumption or 
consumers, something far removed from this commitment to ethnographic or equivalent experience 
based on an empathetic encounter with consumers. Rather, I see an astonishing continuity between 
the most recent discussions of consumption and the foundational work of Veblen and those that 
preceded him’ (Miller 2001, p.232).
4 Wilk 2001, p.246
5 Micheletti 2003, p.158. See for instance, Carducci (2006) who from a ‘left’ perspective positions 
culture jamming as only serving to ‘help rehabilitate the market system’.
6 Micheletti 2003, p. 158. Just one instance of this interest is suggested in Binkley’s discussion of the 
import of countercultural publications featured in Whole Earth Catalog (2003). Another is offered in 
Thompson and Coskuner-Balli’s account of Community Supported Agriculture (2007).
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alone phenomenon worthy of analysis does not rate7. Unusually, in 2007 consumption 
was promised as a Australian Sociological Association’s (TASA) annual conference 
keynote address, but Barry Smart’s paper was not delivered. His previous work in any 
case suggests the theme. Smart is based in the UK, but his view of consumption is 
‘critical’8, and his recent Economy, Culture and Society: A Sociological Critique of Neo-Liberalism 
(2003) appears to mirror the current sociological state of play in relation to consumption 
in Australia generally9. It would take at least another chapter, more likely another thesis 
to analyse the background which has shaped the intellectual factions, specific research 
influences and programs of individuals and sociology schools within the Australian 
academy vis-ä-vis consumption. A chapter in Humphrey’s Shelf Life (1998) provides an 
overview of relatively recent themes, over the last forty or so years. More recently, there 
has been some discussion of consumption in the Journal of Sociology acknowledging the 
richness of meaning people attach to goods from a ‘cultural sociology’ perspective, 
drawing on Bourdieu’s Distinction (2000) to consider how effectively his account ‘speaks’ 
to class-based analyses of identity, while thinking through the dynamics of social and 
political change. Otherwise, however, while within the literature on consumption 
delineation and denunciation of Frankfurt School style arguments is commonplace now, 
the sociological high ground still appears to remain with arguments such as Bauman’s, 
and more crudely, the Clive Hamiltons and Ritzers. It seems community interest in
7 See for instance Thesis Eleven. More ‘classical’ accounts are the focus here, those which usually view 
consumption with antipathy. Connell notes Australian sociology’s tendency to adhere to ‘classic 
texts’, while dealing with ‘them in an essentially religious way, as timeless objects of exegesis and 
commentary’ (2005, p.4). Pertinent also is Buttel, Dickens, Dunlap and Gijswijt’s observation of a 
range of recent literature identifying how ‘nineteenth century social thought has had the effect of 
steering the discipline of sociology in the direction of ignoring resources, nature and the environment’ 
(2002, p.5). What elements there were in nineteenth century theory open to environmental concerns 
were not taken up by mid-twentieth century proponents of the discipline (2002, p. 12). One example of 
this is how in a recent interview Giddens positioned consumption as belonging ‘within the individual 
sphere of autonomy’. Consumer culture, he argued, has little relevance to ecological politics (Giddens 
2003, p.395).
8 The proposed paper was titled ‘Confronting the Consequences of Consumption - A Critical View of 
Consumer Society’.
9 Citing other ‘critical’ accounts (such as Bauman’s) with approbation, Smart writes that ‘The 
consumer is not “sovereign”, but more like a “postmodern” serf (2003, p.77) ... ‘the possibility of 
finding fulfilment and meaning in consumption is far from guaranteed, and is likely to be at best 
partial and transitory’ (2003, p.60). Meanwhile, ‘a common hybribized consumer identity ... overrides 
distinctive local cultural identities’ (2003, p.76). See also Smart (2007, p. 171): ‘What the rhetoric 
equating consumer choice with freedom neglects to do is to give any critical consideration to the 
complex processes in play that attempt to stimulate a compulsion or craving to consume, a 
compulsion that is increasingly represented, if not lived, as an exercise of free-will, and simultaneously 
work to shape, influence and direct the expression of consumer choice’.
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ethical and sustainable consumption continues to grow, still largely unrem arked by the 
discipline.
In my opening chapter I noted H um phrey’s observation of how in Australian cultural 
studies consumption has been theorised via a consideration of popular culture, as with 
British cultural studies10. He also mentions that questions and qualms about arguments 
along the lines of Fiske’s have been extant for some tim e* 11. He writes that
Disdain for everyday participation in consumer cultures now seems 
entirely unacceptable and outright celebration positively naive. The one mode 
left is a critical ambivalence in the face of the complexities and political 
ambiguities of everyday life.12
Ambivalence has its issues, as I suggested in my opening chapter in relation to Probyn’s 
critical distancing of the ethical concerns associated with various aspects of consumption 
practices. It nevertheless still remains part and parcel of cultural studies’ wide ranging 
disciplinary orientation to focus on the complexity and ambiguity of the ‘everyday’, the 
‘aesthetic’, the ‘social’, the personal and subjective, subcultures, identity, power and 
resistance. However perspectives connected more closely and directly to sustainable 
consumption have also recently begun to emerge, largely driven by concerns of 
environmental crisis13. This is perhaps best indicated by two 2007 conferences. The 
first, the Cultural Studies Association’s annual conference titled ‘Sustaining Culture’, 
dem onstrated a new clear attention to sustainability. As usual, the conference theme was 
open to interpretation, but as per practice, many papers of course just incorporated the 
word ‘sustaining’ (as a present progressive verb i.e. as to ‘hold up’, ‘m aintain’ or 
‘support’) in relation to each au thor’s current research interests. With these, sustaining 
discussions of ‘culture’ and more specifically, discussions of ‘identities’ in relation to 
culture appeared of more concern. However a num ber of papers subsequently 
published on-line upheld the promise of the conference them e14. The second 
conference, ‘In the Pipeline: New Directions in Cultural Research on W ater’ held in 
July, 2007, exercised a far more concerted interest in the impact of water consumption.
10 Humphrey 1998, p. 171
11 Humphrey 1998, p. 173
12 Humphrey 1998, p . 176. Humphrey writes that an issue with ‘an attention to specificity, complexity, 
contradiction and ambiguity’ is that it ‘can undercut any attempt to move beyond a partial or 
fragmentary view’ (1998, p. 1 76).
13 See for instance, Giblett and Lester 2008, Rose and Robin 2004
14 On-line papers from the Sustaining Cultures Conference are available at: 
http://www.unisa.edu.au/com/minisites/csaa/onlineproceedings.htm
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Importantly, the keynote address was given by Elizabeth Shove from Lancaster 
University in the UK , whose work on consumption, convention and habit I will discuss 
below.
A small num ber of research groups concerned with issues relating to consumption has 
developed over the last few years. Continuum, the Australian media and cultural studies 
journal, has also featured a special issue which addressed consumption, largely from an 
ecological /  sustainability perspective15. But in the UK, by way of contrast, stand-alone 
research programs on consumption are far more established. This is seen in an 
escalating num ber of publications, as well as increased research funding. Most notable is 
the £ 5  million Cultures of Consumption program , which ran between 2002 - 2007. This 
project was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council, and involved 26 separate research groups. The 26 projects 
are diverse, ranging from a historical analysis of water politics /  use in Britain, to the role 
of the British Council of Industrial Design in twentieth century consumer politics, to 
various qualitative analyses of national and international socio-demographic patterns of 
consumption in terms of age, gender and status. Despite this last, the focus on identity 
appears much diminished, replaced by a concern with general practices.
In addition to de-prioritising this previously predom inant theoretical concern, many of 
the 26 research teams challenged a num ber of more traditional criticisms of 
consumption. In program  director Frank T rentm ann’s brief summary of the most 
significant issues highlighted by the projects overall, for instance, he stresses four key 
points which became apparent:
1. multinational global patterns of consumption do not equate with a lack of 
diversity. (Here he refers to several projects which draw into question key 
aspects of arguments along the lines of Ritzer’s ‘M cDonaldization’ thesis.)
2. consumption should not be automatically opposed to political citizenship. 
Neither should consumers be conceived of as ‘self-centred individualists’, focused 
wholly on their own interests. (Here again, T rentm ann references a num ber of 
projects discounting arguments such as Baum an’s, as well as the traditionally 
conceived rational, sovereign individual of economic theory.)
15 Continuum 2008 Vol.22, Issue 2. The Australian Humanities Review also incorporated an ‘Eco 
Humanities Corner’ from 2004.
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3. a lot of consumption is carried out with the care of others in mind, especially in 
relation to food and home. More consumers are also becoming concerned about 
how and what they consume. Ethical consumption can act ‘as a pathway to a 
broader political engagement’, but ‘as individuals, people feel easily 
overwhelmed by appeals to save the planet’. And here Trentmann also 
emphasises the inadequacy of accounts such as that of the Frankfurt School, as 
well as their political ineffectiveness:
Conventional attacks on consumerism backfire if they assume 
consumers are manipulated and have “false needs” or if they imagine a 
return to some mythical “natural” way of life ... Homogeneous models of 
‘consumer society’ or ‘mass consumption’ have passed their sell-by 
date.16
4. consumption is socially embedded, and much consumption is habitual and 
routine. Focusing on individual choice ‘is of limited value’.
Once again, while consumption is represented as ‘socially embedded’, questions of 
structure and agency have clearly been given lesser priority here. Also notable is how 
one of the 26 projects actually focuses specifically on ethical consumption: ‘Governing 
the Subjects and Spaces of Ethical Consumption’, led by Clive Barnett, from the Open 
University. I cited this report in my introductory chapter. Again, one of the main 
project findings is that while ethical consumption has the potential to achieve positive 
change, ‘informational strategies’ are not particularly effective in further supporting and 
encouraging individuals to adopt ethical and sustainable consumption behaviour. How 
does any discussion of manipulated consumers and false needs fit in here? It doesn’t. 
The question is displaced altogether. Barnett simply argues it is essential to transform 
‘policies and infrastructures of collective provision’17 in order ‘to practically re-articulate the 
ordinary moral dispositions of everyday consumption’18 and supply more effective 
operative frameworks through which people can act on their concerns. Ideally such 
frameworks could deal with how people commonly ‘find themselves “locked into” 
certain patterns of consumption’19.
16 Trentmann 2007, p.3
17 Barnett 2007b, p.3
18 Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, and Malpass 2005, p.47. My italics.
19 Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, and Malpass 2005, p.47
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Barnett’s project was the one most directly concerned with ethics and sustainability, but 
both issues featured prominently in several other projects20. One of these, M oya 
Kneafsey’s ‘Reconnecting consumers, food and producers: exploring ‘alternative’ 
networks’ was intriguing, with research investigating how a quite diverse and growing 
range of smaller, usually independent ‘alternative’ food networks in the U K  form a way 
for consumers to develop ‘a sense of connection with ... people, places and processes’21. 
H er project findings concluded that ‘often consumers identify increasingly with the 
ethical aims of the scheme in which they participate’. Such concerns can, moreover, 
extend into awareness of and feelings of responsibility for the ramifications of those 
individuals’ more general consumption activity, leading to yet further changes in 
behaviour.
Kneafsey writes that individual motivations for participating in the ‘alternative’ food 
networks are diverse, but often relate to ethical concerns and also general ideas about 
what constitutes the ‘good life’. In this, her research is complemented by Kate Soper’s 
ESRG project ‘Alternative hedonism: a theory and politics of consumption’ which 
expanded on Kneafney’s area of interest, alternative food networks, to investigate a 
broader, ‘emerging dissatisfaction with ‘consumerist’ consumption ... seen to function 
not just in alternative or marginal spaces but in a wide range of contexts’. Soper’s study 
included a media analysis and this identified an increasing focus on this issue in both 
‘lifestyle television and magazines’, as well as news media:
News media, particularly radio and television, now contain significant 
coverage of concerns about the environment, work-life balance, health and 
quality of food, and global and national social inequalities.22
These issues, along with the desire for ‘connection’ Kneafsey identifies, appear 
analogous to concerns in Australia that Clive Hamilton attempts to tap into with his 
arguments against ‘commodification’ and ideas about developing social connections and 
downsizing. Yet Soper’s arguments diverge drastically from H am ilton’s. First, in a 
recent essay Soper points to a difference between ‘merely downsizing’ consumers and
20 These include Redclift (2007), and Jackson (2007).
21 Kneafsey 2007, p. 1
22 Soper 2007, p. 1. In a more detailed ‘working paper’ Soper and Lyn Thomas discuss a television 
program with an ‘explicit ecological agenda’ and write that ‘The fact that this type of programme is 
being made and broadcast on terrestrial television at all suggests a growing awareness that the pursuit 
of individual gratification through ecologically damaging practices is, to say the least, short-sighted, 
and self-defeating’ (Soper and Thomas 2006, p. 18).
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those who practice a more ‘globally’ conscious consumption, what she refers to as 
‘alternative hedonism ’:
The ‘alternative hedonist’ consumer differs from the ‘eccentrically’ or 
‘occasionally’ alternative or the merely downsizing or relocating consumer in 
being sensitive to the ‘tragedy of the com m ons’ factor in consumerism and keen 
to adjust individual consumption in the light of it .23
Second, contra H am ilton’s pathologising of consumption, with his tacit, counterfactual
essentialism, Soper rebuffs essentialist conceptions of need, including those which
advocate ‘voluntary simplicity’ and ‘downsizing’. She rejects
the presumption that the ‘excesses’ of m odern consumption can be 
corrected through a return to a simpler and supposedly more ‘natural’ way of 
life. So far from calling for a more cyclical or reduced existence, it [the report] 
fully recognises that diversity, change and self-development are indispensable 
features of hum an fulfilment.24
Soper also sees theories of consumer manipulation as reductionist. As for the broader 
political impact they might have, she strongly positions such ideas as both ineffective and 
undemocratic:
Critiques o f ‘consumerism’ cannot be effective or democratically sensitive 
if based on the idea of consumer manipulation and grounded in an essentialist 
distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ or more or less ‘natural’ needs... 25
Soper is, however, still ambivalent about the effects of m odern consumption. It can be,
she argues,
hedonistically repressive. It creates environments that blunt sensibility to 
sensual delight itself. It generates forms of alienating tolerance that ought to be 
more readily recognized as sources of deprivation .26
To address this, she writes,
we need a new political imaginary that dwells explicitly on the 
satisfactions to be had from consuming differently .27
Soper is nevertheless positive about the broader concern expressed in the media about
the general quality of life and the environment; she notes how such concerns are
23 Soper 2007b, p.215. “Alternative hedonism’ points ... to the way in which affluent consumption 
may itself prompt revisions in thinking about the ‘good life’ as a result of its less enjoyable byproducts 
(noise, pollution, danger, stress, health risks, excessive waste and aesthetic impact on the 
environment). One is talking here of a response that may in part derive from altruistic concern for the 
global ecological and social consequences of the consumerist lifestyle, but is also reflecting an altered -  
or now changing -  conception of self-interest. In this conception, the individual acts with an eye to the 
collective impact of aggregated individual acts of affluent consumption for consumers themselves, and 
takes measures to avoid contributing to it’ (Soper 2007b, p.211).
24 Soper 2007, p.2 
23 Soper 2007, p. 1.).
26 Soper 2007, p.221
239
Formulating a more ‘productive’ approach
‘acquiring a broad cultural resonance, beyond marginal and alternative sites’. This new 
mood, she believes, provides a key opportunity for policy advocates to facilitate the 
development of more proactive sustainable consumption policies:
This ‘mainstreaming’ of concern about the quality of the ‘good life’ 
provides a democratic grounding for those seeking to implement more 
sustainable policies on consumption.28
Another ESRC project taking a markedly different approach to standard academic 
accounts was led by Elizabeth Shove from Lancaster University; ‘Designing and 
Consuming: Objects, Practices and Processes’. This developed from an initial focus on 
consumption and design29 to investigate issues around how material culture, habitual 
practices, design technology conjoin at the interstices of everyday life. Crucially, it 
focuses on how the connection between design and the social practice of using goods 
might be rethought so as to enable design practitioners to further encourage the 
emergence of sustainable consumption practices. On the level of public policy 
sustainability also became central to one of her project’s key recommendations, namely, 
that
public sector organizations should pay less attention to the ebb and flow 
of individual belief and commitment and concentrate instead on basic questions 
about how more and less sustainable complexes of practice emerge and 
disappear.30
Here the emphasis and thrust of Shove’s report is obviously directed toward how 
government organisations might facilitate /  generate ‘pathways’ to sustainable 
consumption within the habitual practices of everyday life.
I have argued that whether implicit or explicit the focus on structure and agency has 
hindered any more concerted consideration of ethical and sustainable consumption 
within the academy. Clearly this has not been the case for many of the ESRC reports; 
the issue appears to have been set aside by the UK researchers who participated in the 
program31. Yet while the structure /  agency aporia has not cannibalised the ESRC 
research, sociology as a discipline is based on developing an understanding of the role
27 Soper 2007, p.222
28 Soper 2007, p.3
29 Shove 2004, Original Project Proposal
30 Shove 2007, p.3, Shove, Watson and Ingram 2007, p.9
31 Slater argued this point in his contribution to the earlier European Science Foundation ‘Tackling 
Resource Management Programme’ (1997-2001) which focused on consumption, and also featured 
Shove as one of its principal researchers (Slater 1998).
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played by societal forces, thus drawing into question ‘commonsensicaf notions of 
individuality. This is clear in Shove’s comm ent above about ‘complexes of practice’. 
Yet when considering how meaning develops and how change occurs, the issue of 
agency always lingers in the background, and in this way the structure /  agency dilemma 
becomes central to sociology’s normative disciplinary matrix. Nevertheless, while the 
U K  researchers have stressed that consumption is socially embedded, they have not let 
the structure /  agency dichotomy consume them.
In one of the most cited articles from the Journal of Consumer Culture Alan W arde recently 
proposed a new ‘theory of practices’32. In this he drew on Bourdieu and also Reckwitz 
to offer one possible means of attempting to displace the structure /  agency aporia:
practices contain the seeds of constant change. They are dynamic by 
virtue of their own internal logic of operation, as people in myriad situations 
adapt, improvise and experim ent.33
Understanding is situated, but as I discussed in my previous chapter in relation to 
Bourdieu, this is not wholly sufficient to account for action. The exact dynamics of the 
constitution of subjectivity remains an open question here, as does the exact why and 
how of its expression. W arde’s precise answer to such questions, is, as with Bourdieu, 
just displaced by reference to ‘bodily-mental routines’. And in this respect W arde also 
draws on Reckwitz for support:
As carriers of practices, they (agents) are neither autonomous nor the 
judgem ental dopes who conform to norms: They understand the world and 
themselves, and use know-how and motivational knowledge, according to the 
particular practice. There is a very precise place for the ‘individual’ - as 
distinguished from the agent ... As there are diverse social practices and as every 
agent carries out a multitude of different social practices, the individual is the 
unique crossing point of practices, of bodily-mental routines .34
O n a pragmatic level this general process must be taken as given. As an overarching
theoretical formulation however, I believe it remains incomplete35. Yet I also believe the
issue has to be set aside.
32 Warde (2005). ‘Consumption and Theories of Practice’.
33 Warde 2005, p. 141
34 Reckwitz cited in Warde 2005, p. 143. As Warde writes, ‘Contrasting understandings, levels of 
practical competence, and degrees of involvement generate behavioural variation’ (2005, p. 147).
3o In Governance, Consumers and Citizens: Agency and Resistance in Contemporary Politics (2007), Frank 
Trentmann and Mark Bevir similarly propose a ‘situated agency’: ‘the possibility of local reasoning 
and situated agency entail a creativity that means rules, norms, and institutional and social trajectories 
are contingent and contested’ (Bevir and Trentmann 2007b) (See also Bevir 2007, and Bevir and 
Trentmann 2007a). As a guide to a practical analytic approach which attempts to transcend the 
structure /  agency divide this idea is useful. Their arguments still do not, however, address precisely
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For while older accounts taking a position on one side or another of the structure /  
agency aporia have done so in order to take a particular stance of either wholeheartedly 
celebrating or castigating various consumption practices, another difference between the 
ESRC researchers and other more traditional accounts is the program ’s far richer, more 
considered and less reductionist ‘take’ on consumption36. Com pare for instance Bauman 
and Shove: Bauman emphasises how consumption occurs with complete disregard to its 
effects, where no concern whatsoever for the ‘o ther’ is exhibited:
Thick walls are an indispensable part of consumer society; so is their 
inobtrusiveness for insiders ... Consumers rarely catch a glimpse of the other 
side. The squalor of inner cities they pass in the comely and plushy interior of 
their cars. If they ever visit the ‘Third W orld’, it is for its safaris and massage 
parlours, not for its sweatshops.37
I have quite a degree of sympathy with Baum an’s point. His observation is im portant, 
the issue acute, and it cannot be dismissed. But Bauman is not telling the whole story 
when he positions consumption in this way38. Quite a few of the ESRC program  reports 
stress how much consumption is carried out and undertaken with care for others in 
mind. Kneafsey and Soper for instance, identify how certain types of consumption occur 
informed by a growing mood of concern about quality of life, social equity and the 
environment. As I have already argued, moreover, I believe one of the reasons many 
consumers do not think more about the ramifications of their actions is because 
academics and moralists have attacked consumption itself over the years in a m anner 
that has had, in Kellner’s terms, ‘little political resonance’39 yet at the same time has 
contributed to a general, generic perception of consumption as valueless. Bauman 
himself is perpetuating this narrative.
how and why individuals have the capacity and come to make specific choices within the context of the 
particular socio-economic circumstances through and within which they are constituted.
36 Miller notes, for instance, that ‘What we learn from the academic study of consumption is not that 
material culture is good or bad for people. Rather we learn that people have to engage in a constant 
struggle to create relationships with things and with people, and there is much to be gained from an 
empathetic documentation of those struggles’. (Miller 2001, p.241).
37 Bauman 1988, p.92. Also cited in Gabriel and Lang 2006.
38 Neither does Bauman appear interested in telling the whole story: Consuming Life (2007) signals his 
awareness of other perspectives, but solipsistically just ‘silently silences’ dissenting views (2007, p.48), 
instantiating no evidence of wishing to engage with or address how they impact on his own account.
39 Kellner 1989, p. 162. Barnett, Cafaro and Newholm similarly note that ‘to cast everyday 
consumption as unequivocally unethical threatens to alienate ordinary people rather than recruit 
them’ (2005, p.21). In relation to environmentalist discourse Hawkins also writes that ‘They can 
perpetuate the very relation to nature they seek to challenge: alienated distance and disinterest. When 
the exploitative force of economic power and human destruction is so overcoded why bother 
contesting it? You may as well just keep shopping.’ (Hawkins 2006, p.9).
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Com pare then, Baum an’s position to Shove’s, who in Comfort, Cleanliness and Convenience: 
the Social Organization of Normality (2003), stresses the impact of daily, usually household 
practices, ‘inconspicuous’ consumption concerned with everyday ‘comfort, cleanliness and 
convenience’. Focusing on the supposedly m undane, ‘barely detectable gridlines of 
everyday life’40, Shove argues sociology has disregarded the vital importance of these, 
‘perhaps to its cost’41. (She writes of how, for instance, ‘Around half the energy used in 
the world is used in buildings and much of that is devoted to keeping people 
com fortable’42.) Consumption, she argues, is ‘a collective enterprise held together by 
social expectations, cultural conventions, and material constraints’43. Most consumption 
is habitual, and consumers ‘do not consume resources ... they consume the services those 
resources make possible’44. Here consumption is not depicted as intrinsically antithetical 
to social solidarity and social connection. Consumption is just another facet of daily, 
habitual routines. These routines are subject to the ‘creep of convention’45; and what is 
most im portant to investigate is how consumption is grounded and naturalised in social 
norms, and ‘how societal expectations of normality are established’46. So where Bauman 
apportions blame, Shove emphasises ways to facilitate positive change47.
Baum an’s concerns about equity and exploitation are more than legitimate. Neither 
ethical nor sustainable consumption is a panacea, especially not for the inequality 
associated with capitalism. But both ethical and sustainable consumption can achieve 
crucial degrees of positive change throughout a range of different areas. The extent to 
which this has the potential to result in a movement toward a more sustained, significant 
societal transformation remains an open question. For this even to begin to occur 
certainly requires the development of a far greater degree of ethical and sustainable
40 Shove 2003, p.2
41 Shove 2003, p.2. The ‘realm of inconspicuous consumption’, she writes elsewhere, is ‘a realm 
ignored by studies of consumer culture that are enthralled by the significance of immediate visual 
clues to social meaning’ (Shove and Warde 2002, p.247).
42 Shove 2003, p.3
43 Shove 2003, p.7
44 Shove 2003, p.8
45 Shove 2003, p.2
46 Shove 2003, p.9
4/ Shove and Warde also note that ‘there is a profound disjuncture in our means of understanding, on 
the one hand, the escalating consumption of glamorous items of an aestheticized consumer culture 
and, on the other, the inconspicuous mundane products associated with daily reproduction’ (Shove 
and Warde 2002, p.249).
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consumption than currently exists. And achieving such change may not be particularly 
easy, for, as more recent research shows,
consumers are often effectively ‘locked-in’ to certain patterns of 
consumption by the material infrastructures of m odern, urban living; and that 
the commitments that people have to certain consumption behaviours might be 
deeply held emotional, affective ones that cannot be sloughed-offjust like th a t .48
Given this, for the instance of ethical and sustainable consumption to continue to grow
requires a major shift in how ‘we’ regard consumption. Yet the potential is there, despite
the habitual facility of many current consumption practices. Here government can
support and encourage the changing mood, in the process of responding to it, but in
terms of public debate over policy (in the ‘struggle over m eaning’, as Stuart Hall phrases
it) it is perhaps almost as im portant that a reassessment of consumption occur also within
the academy.
I have pointed out that the structure /  agency debate is an intrinsic aspect of disciplines 
such as sociology which focus on ‘the social’, and change. Here, for the ‘social’ sciences, 
agency is a shadowy doppelgänger, always just barely there, that won’t, can’t, just go 
away. In relation to consumption however, especially in the Australian disciplinary 
arena it is vital to overcome the extent to which the structure /  agency issue tacitly 
frames and structures discussion in a m anner which creates a particular moral blindness, 
in spite of the circumscribed epistemology of the debate. Arguments echoing some 
affiliation (however distant) to the true /  false needs perspective have contributed nothing 
toward positive change. Those who emphasise how dreadful consumption is and that 
wants /  needs are imposed only reiterate a hostility that has been expressed thousands of 
times before. The perpetuation of this narrative has done nothing substantive to alter 
consumption practices on a general societal level. History has demonstrated that. It is 
nonetheless arguable that the negative accounts of consumption from within the 
academy and from those who claim a province to interpret and comment on society do 
have an influence on people’s general outlook. This influence has not changed people’s 
practices en-masse, for how many consumers are persuaded they have false and /  or 
excessive needs? People, including critics themselves, more commonly perceive it is only 
the needs of others which are excessive, false and m anipulated49. In this schema their own
48 Malpass, Barnett, Clarke and Cloke 2007, p.243
49 Malpass, Barnett, Clarke and Cloke cite research that identifies how ‘vocabularies of blame’ are 
used to shift ‘responsibility onto other actors’ (2007, p.243). See also Miller who notes how the ‘bogey
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consumption remains generic, the act itself representative of no particular value, 
meaning or import, divorced from any perhaps distant concerns individuals might feel 
about larger societal practices of consumption on any more general level.
Clearly those who practice ethical consumption are moving beyond the narrow confines 
of such a view. Still, how is it possible to encourage an even greater awareness and 
debate about the ethical ramifications of consumption in terms of the origin and 
consequences of goods in the face of a longstanding discourse attacking all consumption 
tout court as inimical to hum an society /  sociality? Such a position is not only wrong­
headed, but also counter-productive. It does nothing to recognise the hum an creativity 
connected to consumption. It does not acknowledge the richness of meaning humans 
can attach to goods. Such critics may have the best of intentions insofar as they perceive 
consumption as an expression of the inequality associated with the current system of 
distribution and exchange, but as argued in chapter five, consumption in itself is not 
responsible for this system. Ethical and sustainable consumption does not have the 
capacity to address the flaws of this system, it cannot alter the appalling economic 
inequality endemic to capitalism, yet ethical /  sustainable consumption currently does more 
to effect positive change than any anti-con sumption narrative. If those critics really do want to 
achieve any more positive impact they might consider a more politically astute 
approach: not ceasing to criticising consumption, but beginning to criticise certain aspects 
of it more effectively. Ideally they might do so while supplying constructive, practical 
(and possibly even realistic) recommendations about how to facilitate positive change.
The previous two chapters discussed how over the last thirty or so years new accounts of 
consumption - identifying its intimate interrelationship with hum an sociality and how 
consumption ‘speaks’ of /  to identity - have been an innovative, im portant alternative 
and /  or challenge to those more traditional hostile accounts. Consumption clearly is a 
central category when it comes to understanding identity50. And this reassessment has 
permitted, enabled and contributed to the increasingly positive theoretical reassessment 
of consumption that has occurred in recent years. Yet so much discussion of
of a deluded, superficial person who has become the mere mannequin to commodity culture is always 
someone other than ourselves’ (2001, p.229).
50 Campbell 2004. But neither is consumption the only signifier of identity, ‘national, ethic, 
occupational ... social relations of kinship, friendship and association’, for instance, are all also 
significant... (Shove and Warde 2002,p.235).
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consumption is still focused on ‘identity’, with ‘subcultural’ identities being given pre­
eminence in many such accounts. Neither has an exploration of the identity / 
subjectivity and consumption of corporate and government ‘subcultures’ been a 
particularly evident feature of such research. And while Stuart Hall once referred to 
cultural studies as a whole as being motivated by political concerns (as per those 
accounts of ‘subcultural’ consumption that traditionally formed an attempt to account 
for agency as instantiated via some kind of ‘resistance’ to the exploitation of capitalism), 
the stress on ‘resistance’ within cultural studies is increasingly being recognised as 
flawed51. But even with this, the lingering search for agency is still an epistemological 
dead-end. How do such accounts avoid becoming entangled, enmeshed and ensnared in 
a tacit essentialism? And where then does this now leave the more recent explicitly 
poststructuralist deliberations regarding what various consumption practices mean for / 
about human subjectivity?
In The Ethics of Waste (2006) Gay Hawkins writes of the value of Delueze’s conception of 
‘a self without any essential interiority’52. She also notes that such accounts, while 
helpful in understanding what ‘constitutes us as governable subjects’, are unfortunately 
‘less able to see ... those forces of ethical life and being - those encounters, visceral 
movements, and differences - that initiate other possibilities for subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity’53. As I mentioned earlier in relation to Warde, the exact dynamics of the 
constitution of subjectivity remains an open question here, as does the exact why and 
how of its expression. Yet Hawkins’s own discussion does attempt to weave a way 
through the issue, acknowledging ‘other possibilities’ of understanding the consequences 
of consumption in terms of waste, even as she shies away from full bodied moral 
judgements. So although her discussion is still framed around the issue of subjectivity, 
given her inclusion of environmental concerns, it suggests a positive new direction: one 
with less of a tendency to the anthropocentrism apparent in accounts which treat
51 Cohen 1980, Gelder 1997, Frith 1997, Stratton 1997, Thornton 1997. Hilton also notes the 
existence of ‘a more widespread trend in consumer studies that constantly speaks of individuals’ 
abilities to appropriate and negotiate, but less frequently examines the political systems that place 
limits on such actions or the moralities of consumption that tie consumers to wider practices of belief 
(Hilton 2004, p.l 19).
52 Hawkins 2006, p.36
53 Hawkins 2006, p.37
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consumption as only worthy of consideration to the extent it reveals identity /  
subjectivity via the dynamics and formation o f ‘taste’54.
The focus on the social is the province of the social sciences. In calling for a greater 
consideration of the material impact of consumption practices I do not wish to denigrate 
this. As will be clear by now however, my overall concern is how attention paid to 
identity /  taste vis-ä-vis consumption can leave much that impacts on ‘the social’ out. 
M arx’s famous dictum of philosophers only interpreting the world where the point is to 
change it55, is more than relevant here. Academic ideas can inform social debate insofar 
as strong tropes /  doctrines do filter through to society at large56. In this the academy 
can contribute to the formation of government policy, in addition to those more obvious 
regular, formal avenues or channels through which policy recommendations normally 
take place. W hat I am arguing here is that in relation to the development of ethical and 
sustainable consumption the intangible way the academy treats consumption and thus 
shapes public feelings, beliefs and opinion is vitally important. Public ‘ethos’ impacts on 
public policy. And public policy plays a key role in turn. 1 have noted how theorists 
such as Naomi Klein, Noreena Hertz, Clive Barnett, as well as Bentley, Fien and Neil, 
all posit the potential of ethical /  sustainable consumption to achieve positive change. 
All also acknowledge the role government can and should play in enabling this to 
develop further. In chapter four I discussed the difficulties and limitations on 
governmental power in the global capitalist marketplace. Yet no m atter what changes 
will be wrought by the fallout from the subprime mortgage crisis, in Australia 
government still both contributes and responds to public moods, and it is the only 
institution with the formal capacity to implement ‘whole-of-society’ frameworks that 
might facilitate, promote and support ethical and sustainable consumption practices. 
Hertz suggests it is vitally im portant such formal frameworks include legislation to 
strengthen trade regulations in order to impose ‘standards of transparency and 
accountability in business’57. Similarly, in a recent submission to the Productivity 
Commission Inquiry into Australian Consumer Policy the Australian Network of 
Environmental Defender's Offices (ANEDO) drew on the United Nations Guidelines for
54 Potter 2008 
35 Marx 1974a, p. 123
56 Wilk for instance, acknowledges how academic ‘analysis both builds upon and feeds ideological 
warfare over consumption’ (2001, p.246).
37 Hertz 2003, p. 174
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Consumer Protection (2003)58, to recommend that a far more comprehensive labelling 
system be instituted on all products sold in Australia, and that other measures to support 
ethical and sustainable consumption be implemented:
Appropriate measures would include m andatory information on the 
environmental impacts, including climate change impacts, of products, the 
impartial environmental testing of products, the encouragement of alternatives to 
environmentally harmful uses of substances, the strengthening of regulatory 
mechanisms to ensure sustainable consumption, and the introduction of 
sustainable operations into government practices.59
At one point it seemed possible that the likelihood of this occurring in Australia might be 
set to increase with the newly elected Labor federal government signalling a shift in 
attitude toward sustainability /  climate change by immediately ratifying the Kyoto 
Protocol, and offering policies focused on developing renewable and sustainable energy 
with a promise ‘to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 60 per cent by 2050’60. This was in 
marked contrast to the Federal Liberal-National Coalition government, which refused to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol and had no concerted national whole-of-government strategy 
aimed at fostering sustainability. In September 2007 that government did table the 
results of an inquiry that recommended developing an aspirational ‘Sustainability 
C harter’6'. T he report was titled ‘Sustainability for survival: creating a climate for 
change’, yet in a marvellous example of political doublespeak it excluded climate change 
from its terms of reference. Unhappily, the new Labor governm ent’s carbon emissions 
trading scheme has been deemed as not living up to its rhetoric, with at least sixty 
environmental and community groups issuing a media release saying the governm ent’s 
emission targets represent a ‘total failure of climate change policy’, and that in this ‘the 
Rudd government has caved in to pressure from big polluters’62. Com m enting on the 
proposed unconditional $9 billion63 ‘com pensation’ payments to big polluters for
58 The United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection (2003), recommend governments ‘develop or 
encourage the development of general consumer education and information programmes, including 
information on the environmental impacts of consumer choices and behaviour and the possible 
implications, including benefits and costs, of changes in consumption’.
59 Australian Network of Environmental Defender's Offices Submission to Productivity Commission 
Inquiry into Australia's Consumer Policy Framework, 11 May 2007. Berry and McEachern (2005, 
p.72) write of an earlier Australian labelling system being ‘scrapped’. They also note various issues 
involved in setting up such schemes, as well as strategies governments have used to bypass them.
60 Australian Labor Party Media Release, 2007
61 Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Heritage 2007, 
p.xiii, pp.23-4
62 Friends of the Earth 2008
63 Cubby 2009
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supposed future ‘loss of asset value’, even Ross G arnaut, the author of the governm ent’s 
own climate change review report felt impelled to state outright that
Never in the history of Australian public finance has so much been given 
without public policy purpose, by so many, to so few.64
W hen I began this thesis both ethical and sustainable consumption were subject to 
approximately equal levels of public concern. As the above policy debates indicate, this 
has obviously changed in the last few years, with sustainability vis-ä-vis climate change 
becoming increasingly the subject of global debate (even as it has become subordinate to 
the fall out from the subprime mortgage crisis). As a recent editorial in the cultural 
studies journal Continuum also pointed out, environmental sustainability ‘has been 
highlighted as one of four national research priorities’65. In this context I must point out 
that sustainable consumption is only a subset of ethical consumption as a whole. Yet it 
may be possible that an increasing awareness of the importance of sustainability will 
have a flow-on effect perhaps encouraging the general public to become more concerned 
about thinking through the impact of their own, as well as broad based societal 
consumption practices. Nevertheless, while Bentley, Fien and Neil’s report, Sustainable 
Consumption: young Australians as agents of change (2004), suggests that many consumers 
currently simply do not seem to register the impact of their own consumption behaviour, 
let alone understand how they might go about altering it66, they also argue government 
can play a central role in beginning to change this situation, by
shaping individual consumer behaviours through institutional, social, 
cultural and ethical factors ... 67
Improved consumer information and more stringent regulatory constraints as well as 
incentives /  subsidies for business are im portant and should facilitate some positive 
change. Having said this, however, it is vital to recall again Barnett’s ‘Governing the 
Subjects and Spaces of Ethical Consum ption’, which suggests ‘informational strategies’ 
targeting individuals are not enough. As with Shove’s study, Barnett’s report suggests 
frameworks for enabling action need to be put in place to target ‘complexes of practice’.
64 Garnaut 2008. Australian Conservation Foundation executive director Don Henry has stated that 
these payouts will mean that ‘every Australian household will be paying an average of $389 a year in 
2010 and $558 by 2015 to fund the activities of the companies that are fuelling climate change’ 
(Australian Conservation Foundation media release, 2009).
65 Allmark 2008
66 Bentley, Fien and Neil 2004, p.33
67 Bentley, Fien and Neil 2004, p.3
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Formulating a more ‘productive’ approach
Ideally people should be ‘provided with practical ways of actually making changes to 
consumption activity which can then become routinised’68. The need to determine what 
these frameworks /  practical ways might consist of is becoming increasingly imperative. 
Consideration of how to contend with regressive corporate interests is also vital here. 
The overall point however, is that governmental policies to further enable positive 
industry /  corporate and societal change can and should be developed and instituted. 
The academic social sciences can contribute to facilitating and investigating the 
possibility of such change or they can impede, hinder and delay it.
68 Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, and Malpass 2005, p.47
Appendix A - Jonah Peretti's email exchange with Nike
The below exchange began following Jonah Peretti’s take up of Nike’s offer to 
personalise his Nike shoes. The word Peretti chose was ‘sweatshop’.
From: "Personalize, NIKE iD" <nikeid_personalize@nike.com>
To: "Jonah H. Peretti'" <peretti@media.mit.edu>
Subject: RE: Your NIKE iD order o 16468000
Your NIKE iD order was cancelled for one or more of the following reasons.
1) Your Personal iD contains another party's trademark or other intellectual property.
2) Your Personal iD contains the name of an athlete or team we do not have the legal right 
to use.
3) Your Personal iD was left blank. Did you not want any personalization?
4) Your Personal iD contains profanity or inappropriate slang, and besides, your mother 
would slap us.
If you wish to reorder your NIKE iD product with a new personalization please visit us 
again at www.nike.com 
Thank you,
NIKE iD
From: "Jonah H. Peretti" <peretti@media.mit.edu>
To: "Personalize, NIKE iD" <nikeid_personalize@nike.com>
Subject: RE: Your NIKE iD order o 16468000
Greetings,
My order was canceled but my personal NIKE iD does not violate any of the criteria 
outlined in your message. The Personal iD on my custom ZOOM XC USA running shoes 
was the word "sweatshop." Sweatshop is not: 1) another's party's trademark, 2) the name of 
an athlete, 3) blank, or 4) profanity. I choose the iD because I wanted to remember the toil 
and labor of the children that made my shoes. Could you please ship them to me 
immediately.
Thanks and Happy New Year,
Jonah Peretti
From: "Personalize, NIKE iD" <nikeid_personalize@nike.com>
To: "Jonah H. Peretti'" <peretti@media.mit.edu>
Subject: RE: Your NIKE iD order o 16468000
Dear NIKE iD Customer,
Your NIKE iD order was cancelled because the iD you have chosen contains, as stated in 
the previous e-mail correspondence, "inappropriate slang".
If you wish to reorder your NIKE iD product with a new personalization please visit us 
again at www.nike.com
Thank you,
NIKE iD
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From: "Jonah H. Peretti" <peretti@media.mit.edu>
To: "Personalize, NIKE iD" <nikeid_personalize@nike.com>
Subject: RE: Your NIKE iD order o 16468000
Dear NIKE iD,
Thank you for your quick response to my inquiry about my custom ZOOM XC USA 
running shoes. Although I commend you for your prompt customer service, I disagree with 
the claim that my personal iD was inappropriate slang. After consulting Webster's 
Dictionary, I discovered that "sweatshop" is in fact part of standard English, and not slang. 
Ehe word means: "a shop or factory in which workers are employed for long hours at low 
wages and under unhealthy conditions" and its origin dates from 1892. So my personal iD 
does meet the criteria detailed in your first email.
Your web site advertises that the NIKE iD program is "about freedom to choose and 
freedom to express who you are." I share Nike's love of freedom and personal expression. 
The site also says that "If you want it done right...build it yourself." I was thrilled to be able 
to build my own shoes, and my personal iD was offered as a small token of appreciation for 
the sweatshop workers poised to help me realize my vision. I hope that you will value my 
freedom of expression and reconsider your decision to reject my order.
Thank you,
Jonah Peretti
From: "Personalize, NIKE iD" <nikeid_personalize@nike.com>
To: "Jonah H. Peretti'" <peretti@media.mit.edu>
Subject: RE: Your NIKE iD order o 16468000
Dear NIKE iD Customer,
Regarding the rules for personalization it also states on the NIKE iD web site that "Nike 
reserves the right to cancel any Personal iD up to 24 hours after it has been submitted".
In addition it further explains:
"While we honor most personal iDs, we cannot honor every one. Some may be (or contain) 
others' trademarks, or the names of certain professional sports teams, athletes or celebrities 
that Nike does not have the right to use. Others may contain material that we consider 
inappropriate or simply do not want to place on our products.
Unfortunately, at times this obliges us to decline personal iDs that may otherwise seem 
unobjectionable. In any event, we will let you know if we decline your personal iD, and we 
will offer you the chance to submit another."
With these rules in mind we cannot accept your order as submitted.
If you wish to reorder your NIKE iD product with a new personalization please visit us 
again at www.nike.com
Thank you, NIKE iD
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From: 'Jonah H. Peretti" <peretti@media.mit.edu>
To: "Personalize, NIKE iD" <nikeid_personalize@nike.com>
Subject: RE: Your NIKE iD order o 16468000
Dear NIKE iD,
Thank you for the time and energy you have spent on my request. I have decided to order 
the shoes with a different iD, but I would like to make one small request. Could you please 
send me a color snapshot of the ten-year-old Vietnamese girl who makes my shoes?
Thanks,
Jonah Peretti
{no response}
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